Sec. 53a-35b. "Life imprisonment" defined. A sentence of imprisonment for life
shall mean a definite sentence of sixty years, unless the sentence is life imprisonment
without the possibility of release, imposed pursuant to subsection (g) of section 53a-46a, in which case the sentence shall be imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's natural life.
(P.A. 80-442, S. 11, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 3; P.A. 95-19, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 80-442 effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added provision re life imprisonment without the possibility
of release; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change.
See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
Cited. 198 C. 92, 94. Cited. 201 C. 276, 277. Cited. 207 C. 374, 386. Cited. 215 C. 231, 232. Cited. 216 C. 282, 285.
Cited. 219 C. 752, 759. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 234 C. 139, 144, 166.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 24 CA 612, 618, 622.
Sec. 53a-35c. Availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release
shall not be available as a sentence for an offense committed prior to October 1, 1985.
(P.A. 85-366, S. 4.)
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.
Sec. 53a-36. Imprisonment for misdemeanor: Maximum and minimum sentences. A sentence of imprisonment for a misdemeanor shall be a definite sentence and
the term shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, a term
not to exceed one year except that when a person is found guilty under section 53a-61(a)(3) or 53a-61a, the term shall be one year and such sentence shall not be suspended
or reduced; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, a term not to exceed six months; (3) for a
class C misdemeanor, a term not to exceed three months; (4) for an unclassified misdemeanor, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general
statutes that defines the crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 36; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 14; P.A. 77-422, S. 6; P.A. 92-260, S. 16.)
History: 1971 act added exception re guilt under Sec. 53a-61(a)(3) in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 77-422 expanded exception to
include guilt under Sec. 53a-61a; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (1) to consolidate statutory references and delete redundant
language.
See Sec. 53a-42 re fines for misdemeanors.
Cited. 169 C. 223. Cited. 178 C. 145, 153. Court in sentencing of defendant found guilty under Sec. 53a-61a must
impose a mandatory nonsuspendable term of imprisonment and does not have option of imposing a fine or a sentence of
unconditional discharge. 180 C. 557, 559-561, 564. Cited. 194 C. 198, 209. Cited. 217 C. 73, 90. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275.
Cited. 223 C. 635, 666.
Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720, 731. Cited. 19 CA 631, 635. Cited. 32 CA 656, 660;
judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 189 C. 114, 117.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 727.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 184 C. 434, 438.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 722.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 194 C. 198, 199.
Cited. 12 CA 481, 494.
Sec. 53a-37. Multiple sentences: Concurrent or consecutive, minimum term.
When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time,
or when a person who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at
a previous time by a court of this state is sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment,
the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall run either concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other and to the undischarged term or terms in such manner
as the court directs at the time of sentence. The court shall state whether the respective
maxima and minima shall run concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other,
and shall state in conclusion the effective sentence imposed. When a person is sentenced
for two or more counts each constituting a separate offense, the court may order that
the term of imprisonment for the second and subsequent counts be for a fixed number
of years each. The court in such cases shall not set any minimum term of imprisonment
except under the first count, and the fixed number of years imposed for the second and
subsequent counts shall be added to the maximum term imposed by the court on the
first count.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 37; P.A. 73-639, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 73-639 added provisions clarifying court's sentencing powers in cases where person is to be sentenced
for two or more counts each of which constitutes a separate offense.
Cited. 178 C. 427, 432, 436. Statute provides for three sentencing options where multiple sentences are imposed at
same time. Id., 634-639. Section authorizes multiple sentences with consecutive minimum and maximum terms. 179 C.
381-384. Cited. Id., 384-387. Cited. 184 C. 366, 367; Id., 434, 439. Cited. 185 C. 473, 478. Cited. 190 C. 327, 335. Cited.
192 C. 471, 477. Cited. 197 C. 413, 427, 428. Cited. Id., 485, 503. Cited. 206 C. 40, 55. Cited. Id., 685, 701-703. Cited.
207 C. 270, 276. Cited. Id., 276. Cited. 208 C. 420, 422. Cited. 217 C. 568, 577. Does not impose limits on trial court's
common law inherent sentencing power to stay execution of a criminal sentence. 225 C. 46, 52-54. Cited. 228 C. 384,
389. Court was not prohibited from imposing a term of incarceration consecutive to a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of release. 249 C. 645.
Cited. 7 CA 131, 135. Cited. Id., 367, 377. Cited. 9 CA 365-367. Cited. Id., 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 17 CA
307, 311. Cited. 20 CA 572, 575, 576. Cited. 26 CA 10, 12. Cited. 34 CA 503, 507. Application of section is limited to
"offenses" and since criminal contempt is not a criminal offense it is not a matter within the section's scope; however,
legislature did not intend to change existing common law in enacting this section and therefore trial court had inherent
authority to impose criminal sentence that ran concurrently with previous sentence for criminal contempt. 59 CA 145.
Cited. 30 CS 71. Cited. 36 CS 168, 169.
Sec. 53a-38. Calculation of terms of imprisonment. (a) An indeterminate sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody or institution to which he was sentenced.
(b) A definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received
in the custody to which he was sentenced. Where a person is under more than one
definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run
concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has
the longest term to run; (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to
arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.
(c) When a sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on a person is vacated
and a new sentence is imposed on such person for the same offense or for an offense
based on the same act, the new sentence shall be calculated as if it had commenced at
the time the vacated sentence commenced, and all time served under or credited against
the vacated sentence shall be credited against the new sentence.
(d) When a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment escapes, the escape
shall interrupt the sentence and such interruption shall continue until the return of such
person to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 38; P.A. 92-260, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (c).
Calculations of terms of imprisonment discussed. 185 C. 124-129. Cited. 230 C. 17, 18.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 45 CA 566.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 185 C. 124, 131; Id., 124, 126-129, 131.
Cited. 33 CA 205, 213.
Cited. 40 CS 354, 356.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 209 C. 23-26, 28, 32-34. Subdiv. (2) cited. 217 C. 568, 577. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 384, 388, 390. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 384, 390.
Cited. 34 CA 503, 508. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 503, 508, 509. Cited. 45 CA 566.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 202 C. 343, 347-349. Cited. 215 C. 695, 697, 699. Cited. 216 C. 220, 224. Fundamental purpose is to afford
inmate credit toward current sentence for time that he was confined as direct result of his initial trial on same charges and
therefore petitioner entitled to credit toward his prison sentence for time that he was confined in mental health facility.
258 C. 394.
Cited. 30 CA 190, 195, 196. Cited. 39 CA 455, 461, 463, 464.
Sec. 53a-39. Reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant by sentencing
court or judge. Statement by victim. (a) At any time during the period of a definite
sentence of three years or less, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for
good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the
defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed
that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced.
(b) At any time during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years,
upon agreement of the defendant and the state's attorney to seek review of the sentence,
the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the
sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation
or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could
have been originally sentenced.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any portion of a sentence imposed
that is a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense which may not be suspended or
reduced by the court.
(d) At a hearing held by the sentencing court or judge under this section, such court
or judge shall permit any victim of the crime to appear before the court or judge for the
purpose of making a statement for the record concerning whether or not the sentence
of the defendant should be reduced, the defendant discharged or the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this
section. In lieu of such appearance, the victim may submit a written statement to the
court or judge and the court or judge shall make such statement a part of the record at
the hearing. For the purposes of this subsection, "victim" means the victim, the legal
representative of the victim or a member of the deceased victim's immediate family.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 39; P.A. 82-428, S. 1, 4; P.A. 84-505, S. 3, 6; P.A. 85-354, S. 1, 3; P.A. 87-538, S. 1, 3, 5; P.A. 90-261, S. 7, 19; P.A. 94-119; P.A. 95-175, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 82-428 specified applicability to definite sentences "of three years or less"; P.A. 84-505 authorized the
sentencing court or judge to order certain defendants discharged on intensive probation, effective June 13, 1984, to July
1, 1987; P.A. 85-354 added provisions to require applications for the intensive probation program to be referred to the
office of adult probation for assessment and recommendations, to specify that the period of intensive probation shall not
exceed the unexpired portion of the sentence, to authorize the court or judge to place on regular probation a defendant who
successfully completes intensive probation, to specify the period of such regular probation, and to require a defendant
discharged on intensive probation to comply with the probation conditions ordered by the court or required by the office
of adult probation; P.A. 87-538 prohibited the discharge on intensive probation of a defendant sentenced for a class A
felony, authorized the placement in the intensive probation program of a defendant with a definite sentence which includes
suspension of incarceration after a period of at least two years but not more than five years, followed by a period of
probation, if he has served at least one-half of the unsuspended portion of his sentence prior to release, and reenacted and
continued in effect on and after July 1, 1987, the provisions of this section previously effective from June 13, 1984, until
July 1, 1987; P.A. 90-261 deleted all provisions re the discharge of a defendant on intensive probation; P.A. 94-119
designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a), added Subsec. (b) authorizing the sentencing court or judge at any time
during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years to reduce the sentence or order the defendant discharged
and added Subsec. (c) making the section inapplicable to any sentence imposed for an offense carrying a mandatory
minimum sentence; P.A. 95-175 added Subsec. (d) re statement by victim re reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant.
See Sec. 51-195 re sentence review by review division.
Cited. 184 C. 366, 368. Cited. 187 C. 109, 124. Cited. 200 C. 664, 674. Cited. 208 C. 420, 429, 430. Cited. 210 C. 519,
526, 527. Cited. 214 C. 717, 718, 722-725. Does not confer continuing jurisdiction on trial court to entertain a motion for
judgment of acquittal. 230 C. 427, 432-434. Cited. 240 C. 708.
Cited. 3 CA 497-502. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 32, 45. Term "sentence" refers to the aggregate
or total effective sentence. 19 CA 631-639. Cited. 20 CA 467-469. Cited. 21 CA 557, 565. Cited. 22 CA 601, 605. Cited.
23 CA 201, 203, 205, 206. Nothing in this section or any other statute confers on trial court jurisdiction to entertain a
motion for acquittal after service of a sentence has commenced. 32 CA 1, 3-5. Section does not violate separation of
powers doctrine. 39 CA 632-635. A definite sentence includes both its executed and suspended portions. 54 CA 387.
When the original sentence was defective, commitment for violation of probation is illegal. 31 CS 350. Cited. 40 CS
238, 241, 242. Cited. 41 CS 229, 251.
Sec. 53a-39a. Alternate incarceration program. (a) In all cases where a defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony, other than a capital felony, a
class A felony or a violation of section 21a-278, 21a-278a, 53a-55, 53a-56, 53a-56b,
53a-57, 53a-58 or 53a-70b or any other offense for which there is a mandatory minimum
sentence which may not be suspended or reduced by the court, after trial or by a plea
of guilty without trial, and a term of imprisonment is part of a stated plea agreement or
the statutory penalty provides for a term of imprisonment, the court may, in its discretion,
order an assessment for placement in an alternate incarceration program under contract
with the Judicial Department. If the Court Support Services Division recommends placement in an alternate incarceration program, it shall also submit to the court a proposed
alternate incarceration plan. Upon completion of the assessment, the court shall determine whether such defendant shall be ordered to participate in such program as an
alternative to incarceration. If the court determines that the defendant shall participate
in such program, the court shall suspend any sentence of imprisonment and shall make
participation in the alternate incarceration program a condition of probation as provided
in section 53a-30.
(b) An alternate incarceration program includes, but shall not be limited to, an intensive probation program, any community service program approved by the Chief Court
Administrator and any residential or nonresidential program approved by the Chief
Court Administrator which provides care, supervision and supportive services such as
employment, psychiatric and psychological evaluation and counseling, and drug and
alcohol dependency treatment. Any defendant placed in an alternate incarceration program shall comply with any other conditions of probation ordered by the court or required
by the Court Support Services Division, as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of section
53a-30.
(P.A. 89-383, S. 3, 16; P.A. 94-128, S. 1, 3; P.A. 02-132, S. 33.)
History: P.A. 89-383, S. 3 effective July 5, 1989, to July 1, 1994; P.A. 94-128 negated effect of P.A. 89-383, reenacting
and continuing existence of section, effective July 1, 1994; P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing "program to be
conducted by the Office of Adult Probation" with "program under contract with the Judicial Department" and replacing
"Office of Adult Probation" with "Court Support Services Division" and amended Subsec. (b) by replacing "Office of
Adult Probation" with "Court Support Services Division".
Sec. 53a-39b. Special alternative incarceration program for young male defendants. Section 53a-39b is repealed, effective October 1, 2003.
(P.A. 89-390, S. 18, 37; P.A. 90-230, S. 75, 101; 90-261, S. 10, 19; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-9, S. 5, 10; P.A. 03-48, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-39c. Community service labor program. (a) There is established,
within available appropriations, a community service labor program for persons charged
with a violation of section 21a-267 or 21a-279 who have not previously been convicted
of a violation of section 21a-267, 21a-277, 21a-278 or 21a-279. Upon application by
any such person for participation in such program the court may grant such application
and (1) if such person has not previously been placed in the community service labor
program, the court may either suspend prosecution and place such person in such program or, upon a plea of guilty without trial where a term of imprisonment is part of a
stated plea agreement, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation
in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with
section 53a-30; or (2) if such person has previously been placed in such program, the
court may, upon a plea of guilty without trial where a term of imprisonment is part of
a stated plea agreement, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation
in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with
said section 53a-30. No person may be placed in such program who has twice previously
been placed in such program.
(b) Any person who enters such program shall pay to the court a participation fee
of two hundred five dollars, except that no person may be excluded from such program
for inability to pay such fee, provided (1) such person files with the court an affidavit
of indigency or inability to pay, (2) such indigency is confirmed by the Court Support
Services Division, and (3) the court enters a finding thereof. All program fees collected
shall be deposited into the alternative incarceration program account.
(c) Any person for whom prosecution is suspended and who is placed in the community service labor program pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall agree to the
tolling of the statute of limitations with respect to such crime and to a waiver of such
person's right to a speedy trial. A pretrial community service labor program established
under this section for persons for whom prosecution is suspended shall include a drug
education component. If such person satisfactorily completes the program of community
service labor to which such person was assigned, such person may apply for dismissal
of the charges against such person and the court, on reviewing the record of such person's
participation in such program and on finding such satisfactory completion, shall dismiss
the charges. If the program provider certifies to the court that such person did not successfully complete the program of community service labor to which such person was assigned or is no longer amenable to participation in such program, the court shall enter
a plea of not guilty for such person and immediately place the case on the trial list.
(d) The period of participation in a community service labor program shall be a
minimum of fourteen days for a first violation and thirty days for a second violation
involving a plea of guilty and conviction.
(P.A. 90-213, S. 3, 56; P.A. 97-248, S. 11, 12; P.A. 99-148, S. 2, 4; P.A. 03-2, S. 50.)
History: P.A. 97-248 amended Subsec. (a) to make ineligible for the program persons who have previously participated
in the drug education program established under Sec. 54-56i, and amended Subsec. (b) to require a pretrial community
service labor program established for persons for whom prosecution is suspended to include a drug education component,
effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 99-148 amended Subsec. (a) to make eligible for the program persons charged with a violation
of Sec. 21a-267, to make ineligible for the program persons who have previously been convicted of a violation of Sec.
21a-267 and to delete the provision that made persons who previously participated in the drug education program established
under Sec. 54-56i ineligible for the program, amended Subsec. (c) to replace provisions that specified differing periods of
participation in the program depending upon whether the violation was of subsection (a), (b) or (c) of Sec. 21a-279 with
provisions requiring a period of participation consisting of a minimum of fourteen days for a first violation and thirty days
for a second violation involving a plea of guilty and conviction, and made technical changes for purposes of gender
neutrality, effective July 1, 1999; P.A. 03-2 added new Subsec. (b) to establish a participation fee of two hundred five
dollars, prohibit the exclusion of a person from the program for inability to pay such fee and require that all program fees
collected be deposited into the alternative incarceration program account and redesignated existing Subsecs. (b) and (c)
as new Subsecs. (c) and (d), respectively, effective February 28, 2003.
Program intended to avoid unnecessary trials and expenditures of resources, so defendant's application for program
when trial nearly complete is justification for denying application. 51 CA 126.
Sec. 53a-39d. Pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program. (a) Not later than
October 1, 1998, the Chief Court Administrator shall establish a pilot zero-tolerance
drug supervision program. Eligibility for participation in the program shall be limited
to (1) individuals who are eligible to be sentenced by the court to a period of probation,
pursuant to section 53a-29, and have been ordered by the court, as a condition of such
probation, to participate in the program, (2) individuals who are eligible to be released
on bail under section 54-63d or 54-64a and have been required by the bail commissioner
or the court, as a condition of release, to participate in the program, (3) individuals who
have been sentenced to a period of probation and, in the judgment of their probation
officers, have violated the conditions of such probation and been referred to the program
by their probation officers pursuant to subsection (a) of section 53a-32, and (4) individuals who have been ordered by the court, as a condition of probation, to participate in
the program pursuant to subsection (d) of section 54-56e or subsection (b) of section
54-76j and shall be based upon criteria, including a limit on the maximum number of
eligible participants, established by the Chief Court Administrator.
(b) Any person entering such program shall, as a condition of participating in such
program, agree to: (1) Submit to periodic urinalysis drug tests, (2) detention in a halfway
house facility for a period of two days each time such test produces a positive result,
(3) comply with all rules established by the halfway house if detained in such facility,
and (4) waive the right to a hearing.
(c) Participants in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program shall submit to periodic urinalysis drug tests. If the test produces a positive result, the participant shall be
detained in a halfway house facility for a period of two days.
(d) Any person who has submitted to a urinalysis drug test pursuant to subsection
(c) of this section that produced a positive result may request that a second urinalysis
drug test be administered, at such person's expense, to confirm the results of the first
test, except that if the participant is determined to be indigent, based upon financial
affidavits, the Judicial Department shall pay the cost of the test. The second drug test
shall be a urinalysis drug test, separate and independent of the initial test. The participant
shall be detained in a halfway house pending the results of the second test. If such second
test does not produce a positive result, the participant, if detained in a halfway house,
shall be released and the fee, if paid by the participant, shall be refunded to the participant.
(e) A participant enrolled in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program as a condition of probation may be charged with a violation of probation, if the participant's
probation officer determines that the participant has violated the conditions of probation
or the conditions of the program. A participant enrolled in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program as a condition of release may be charged with a violation of the conditions
of such person's release, if a bail commissioner determines that the participant has
violated the conditions of such person's release or the conditions of the program.
(P.A. 98-145, S. 3, 4; P.A. 99-187, S. 3; P.A. 02-89, S. 83.)
History: P.A. 99-187 amended Subsec. (a) to expand eligibility for the program by adding Subdiv. (2) to include
individuals eligible to be released on bail who have been required as a condition of release to participate in the program,
adding Subdiv. (3) to include individuals sentenced to a period of probation who have violated the conditions of probation
and been referred to the program by their probation officers, and adding Subdiv. (4) to include individuals ordered by the
court to participate in the program as a condition of probation under the accelerated rehabilitation or youthful offender
programs, and amended Subsec. (e) to make existing provisions applicable to a participant enrolled in the program "as a
condition of probation" and add provision that a participant enrolled in the program as a condition of release may be
charged with violation of the conditions of such person's release if a bail commissioner determines there has been a violation
of the conditions of release or conditions of the program; P.A. 02-89 deleted as obsolete Subsec. (f) requiring the chairman
of the Board of Parole, the Commissioner of Correction and the Chief Court Administrator to submit a report on the program
to the committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to criminal justice not later than January
1, 2000.
See Secs. 18-100e and 54-125f re pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program established by Commissioner of
Correction and chairman of Board of Pardons and Paroles, respectively.
Sec. 53a-40. Persistent offenders: Definitions; defense; authorized sentences.
(a) A persistent dangerous felony offender is a person who:
(1) (A) Stands convicted of manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first
or second degree, or assault in the first degree, and (B) has been, prior to the commission
of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal
correctional institution, for any of the following crimes: (i) The crimes enumerated in
subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii)
murder, sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first
degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, or an attempt to commit any
of said crimes; or (iii) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section
53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or
prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117,
or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9, 53-10, 53-11, 53-12 to 53-16, inclusive,
53-19, 53-21, 53-69, 53-78 to 53-80, inclusive, 53-82, 53-83, 53-86, 53-238 and 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes
in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iv) in any other state, any
crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes
enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph; or
(2) (A) Stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated
sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and
(B) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned
under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this
state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for any of the following
crimes: (i) Murder, manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first or second degree or assault in the first degree, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii)
prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117,
or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9, 53-10, 53-11, 53-12 to 53-16, inclusive,
53-19, 53-21, 53-69, 53-78 to 53-80, inclusive, 53-82, 53-83 and 53-86 of the general
statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or
an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iii) in any other state, any crimes the
essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated
in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph.
(b) A persistent dangerous sexual offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of
sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree
or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of
imprisonment of more than one year, in this state or in any other state or in a federal
correctional institution, for (A) any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this
subsection, or (B) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section
53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or
prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53-238
or 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor
statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes, or (C) in any other
state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of
the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection or this subdivision.
(c) A persistent serious felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a
felony, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present felony, convicted of
and imprisoned under an imposed term of more than one year or of death, in this state
or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for a crime. This subsection
shall not apply where the present conviction is for a crime enumerated in subdivision
(1) of subsection (a) of this section and the prior conviction was for a crime other than
those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section.
(d) A persistent serious sexual offender is a person, other than a person who qualifies
as a persistent dangerous sexual offender under subsection (b) of this section, who qualifies as a persistent serious felony offender under subsection (c) of this section and the
felony of which such person presently stands convicted is a violation of subdivision (2)
of subsection (a) of section 53-21, or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b and the prior conviction is for a violation of section 53-21 of the general
statutes, revised to January 1, 1995, involving sexual contact, committed prior to October
1, 1995, a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes, committed
on or after October 1, 1995, and prior to October 1, 2000, a violation of subdivision (2)
of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b,
53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.
(e) A persistent larceny offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of larceny in
the third degree in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October
1, 1982, or larceny in the fourth, fifth or sixth degree, and (2) has been, at separate times
prior to the commission of the present larceny, twice convicted of the crime of larceny.
(f) A persistent felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a felony
other than a class D felony, and (2) has been, at separate times prior to the commission
of the present felony, twice convicted of a felony other than a class D felony.
(g) It shall be an affirmative defense to the charge of being a persistent offender
under this section that (1) as to any prior conviction on which the state is relying the
defendant was pardoned on the ground of innocence, and (2) without such conviction,
the defendant was not two or more times convicted and imprisoned as required by this
section.
(h) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender,
and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature
and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of
imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of
which such person presently stands convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the
crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July
1, 1981, shall sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than forty
years and, if such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present
crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in
subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section, sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than life.
(i) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous sexual offender,
and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature
and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of
imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of
which such person presently stands convicted, shall sentence such person to a term of
imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of imprisonment for life, as defined in section
53a-35b.
(j) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious felony offender, and
the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and
circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration
will best serve the public interest, the court in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of which such person presently stands
convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the crime of which such person presently
stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981, may impose the sentence of
imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony.
(k) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious sexual offender, and
the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and
circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration
will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands
convicted, may impose a sentence of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute the maximum sentence
specified by section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of felony.
(l) When any person has been found to be a persistent larceny offender, and the
court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best
serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section
53a-36 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the
sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony authorized by section 53a-35, if the crime
of which such person presently stands convicted was committed prior to July 1, 1981,
or authorized by section 53a-35a, if the crime of which such person presently stands
convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981.
(m) When any person has been found to be a persistent felony offender, and the
court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best
serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section
53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the
sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree
of felony; provided the sentence imposed may not be less than three years, and provided
further three years of the sentence so imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the
court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 40; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 15; P.A. 73-616, S. 40; P.A. 76-336, S. 20; P.A. 80-442, S. 12, 28; P.A. 83-4, S. 1, 2; P.A. 85-603; P.A. 92-260, S. 18; P.A. 94-37, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 48; P.A. 01-84, S. 18, 26.)
History: 1971 act removed requirements that offenders under Subsecs. (a) and (b) have been previously convicted and
imprisoned "two or more times" and "at separate times" and redefined persistent larceny offender as one who stands
convicted of larceny in "the third or fourth degree" rather than in "the second or a lesser degree" in Subsec. (c); P.A. 73-616 corrected section reference re assault with intent to kill, substituting Sec. 54-117 for Sec. 53-117 in Subsec. (a); P.A.
76-336 substituted sexual assault in first or third degree or sexual assault in first or third degree with a firearm for "rape"
in Subsec. (a) and specified applicability of conviction for crimes enumerated in Secs. 53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 prior to
October 1, 1975; P.A. 80-442 specified applicability of Subsec. (b) to persistent "serious" felony offenders, inserted new
Subsec. (d) re persistent felony offenders, relettering as necessary, amended Subsecs. (f) to (h), formerly (e) to (g), re
crimes committed on or after July 1, 1981, and added Subsec. (i) re extended incarceration effective July 1, 1981; P.A.
83-4 amended Subsec. (c) to reflect the establishment of six degrees of larceny pursuant to P.A. 82-271 by including
persons convicted of larceny in the third degree "in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October
1, 1982" and larceny in the "fifth or sixth" degree; P.A. 85-603 made a technical change to Subsec. (h) and rewrote some
of the language of said Subsec. to reflect said change; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace an obsolete reference
to the offense of "sexual assault in the first degree with a firearm" with its revised name of "aggravated sexual assault in
the first degree", and made other minor technical changes in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (d); P.A. 94-37 amended Subsec. (f) to
revise the penalty for a person found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender by replacing the provision that permitted
the court to impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized for a class A felony with the provision requiring the court to
sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than forty years and by adding the provision requiring the
court to sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than life if such person has been twice convicted and
imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in Subsec. (a)(2); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (a) to delete
from category of a persistent dangerous felony offender a person who stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third
degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm and has been
previously convicted and imprisoned for more than one year for any of said crimes or any predecessor statutes, or an
attempt to commit any of said crimes, to revise and restructure Subsec. to reflect such deletion and to revise Subdiv. and
Subpara. indicators accordingly, added new Subsec. (b) re persistent dangerous sexual offender, new Subsec. (d) re persistent serious sexual offender, new Subsec. (i) re penalty for persistent dangerous sexual offender and new Subsec. (k)
re penalty for persistent serious sexual offender, relettering intervening and remaining Subsecs. accordingly, and made
provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (d) to replace in provision re the offense for which the
person presently stands convicted the reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of
subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21", to replace in provision re offenses for which the person was previously
convicted the reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of subdivision (2) of section
53-21 of the general statutes, committed on or after October 1, 1995, and prior to October 1, 2000," and to add reference
to a prior conviction for "a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21", effective July 1, 2001.
Annotations to former section 53-67:
Cited. 157 C. 466. Cited. 168 C. 395.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 176 C. 270, 272. Cited. 180 C. 660, 661. Cited. 184 C. 215, 216. Cited. 188 C. 27, 28. Cited. 191 C. 180, 182.
Cited. 192 C. 471, 475. Cited. 194 C. 573. Cited. Id., 692, 699. Cited. 195 C. 326-330. Cited. 197 C. 280, 281. Cited. 198
C. 158, 159, 166-168. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. 203 C. 506, 519, 521, 523, 524. Cited. 207 C. 619, 620. Cited. 218 C.
273, 275. Cited. 226 C. 601, 611. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 1, 30, 31. Cited. 31 CA 140, 148. Cited. 36 CA 401, 406. Cited. 45
CA 390. Admission of certified copy of judgment sufficient to prove persistent dangerous felony offender. 50 CA 521.
Subsec. (a):
Constitutionality of dangerous felony offender statutes has long been upheld. 173 C. 545, 548, 554, 557. Nothing in
statute precludes state from offering probative evidence to clarify an official judgment of conviction in order to prove
defendant a second offender. 194 C. 573, 574, 586-589. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 573, 586. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
692, 693, 695. No viable basis for challenge to statute on the grounds of vagueness. 195 C. 326, 329-333. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 326, 330. Cited. Id., 475, 476. Cited. 193 C. 273, 275, 282. Cited. 200 C. 350. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 453, 458.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdivs. (1) and (2)(B) cited. 202 C. 509, 511. Cited. 203 C. 81, 82. Cited. Id., 506, 509, 519-522.
Cited. 206 C. 621, 622. Cited. 207 C. 276, 278. Cited. 210 C. 573, 579. Cited. 213 C. 97, 99. Cited. 216 C. 220, 221. Cited.
224 C. 445, 447. Cited. 232 C. 455, 459. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.
Cited. 17 CA 490, 492. Cited. 19 CA 571, 572. Cited. 29 CA 274, 276. Cited. 37 CA 672, 674. Cited. Id., 733, 735.
Cited. 39 CA 82, 86. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 131. Jury improperly found defendant to be a persistent dangerous felony
offender because his conviction of attempted assault in the first degree is not one of the qualifying felonies enumerated in
subsection. 51 CA 171.
Cited. 43 CS 77, 82.
Subsec. (b):
Presentence report used to prove that defendant was not persistent felony offender under this subsection. 169 C. 263-
266. Cited. 182 C. 176, 177. Failure to allege imprisonment under provisions of the statute not considered reversible error
where proof of imprisonment was established during trial and defendant failed to request complete statement of facts. 184
C. 215, 216. Cited. Id., 369, 370. Cited. 187 C. 264, 265, 278. Cited. 195 C. 326, 331. Cited. 198 C. 158, 160, 161, 166,
167. Cited. 224 C. 397, 398, 400, 418, 419. Cited. 227 C. 711, 714. Cited. Id., 751, 753. Cited. 232 C. 455, 459. Cited.
234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.
Cited. 9 CA 133, 135. Cited. 10 CA 279, 280. Cited. 12 CA 1, 3, 29, 30. Cited. Id., 375, 376. Cited. 13 CA 438, 440.
Cited. 20 CA 586, 587. Cited. 31 CA 140, 141. Cited. Id., 178, 180. Cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Cited. 35 CA 405, 407. Cited. 37
CA 733, 735. Cited. 39 CA 82, 86. Cited. Id., 789, 791. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 202 C. 369, 371. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.
"By pleading nolo contendere to the charge of being a persistent larceny offender, defendant waived her right to appeal
this issue." 4 CA 676, 677, 682. Cited. 14 CA 88, 90, 97, 100. Cited. 21 CA 331, 332. Cited. 37 CA 228, 229, 232.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 195 C. 326, 329-333. Cited. 198 C. 158, 167. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Language of section and its legislative
purpose require sequence of offense, conviction and punishment for each prior felony before enhanced penalty as a persistent
offender attaches. 240 C. 317. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Cited. 41 CA 391, 393, 404-406.
Subsec. (e):
Cited. 176 C. 270, 271. Cited. 194 C. 573, 587. Cited. 195 C. 326, 328, 329, 331. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Subsec. (f):
Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. 187 C. 264, 278. Cited. 200 C. 453, 458. Cited. 207 C. 276, 285. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338,
339. Purpose is to allow sentencing court to impose a more severe sentence than would be allowed for the substantive
offense. Subsection requires sentencing court to consider defendant's history and character and the nature and circumstances
of his criminal conduct and whether extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest.
There is no requirement that sentences imposed be strictly proportional to the nature of substantive offense or offenses of
which defendant was convicted. Nature of substantive offense is only one factor to be considered by sentencing court. 254
C. 613.
Cited. 19 CA 571, 572, 574.
Subsec. (g):
Cited. 224 C. 397, 400. Cited. 227 C. 751, 754. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Cited. 12 CA 1, 29, 32. Cited. 37 CA 733, 735. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Subsec. (h):
Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Cited. 21 CA 331-335, 338. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231, 232.
Subsec. (i):
Cited. 184 C. 215, 217. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Sec. 53a-40a. Persistent offenders of crimes involving bigotry or bias. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of crimes involving bigotry or bias is a person
who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k
or 53a-181l, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted
of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l or section 53a-181b in effect prior to October 1, 2000.
(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving
bigotry or bias, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character
and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that an
increased penalty will best serve the public interest, the court shall: (1) In lieu of imposing
the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a if the crime is a felony,
impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious
degree of felony, or (2) in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under
section 53a-36 if the crime is a misdemeanor, impose the sentence of imprisonment
authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor, except that
if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall impose the sentence of imprisonment
for a class D felony as authorized by section 53a-35a.
(P.A. 90-137, S. 2; P.A. 00-72, S. 10.)
History: P.A. 00-72 amended Subsec. (a) to replace reference in Subdiv. (1) to "subsection (a) or (c) of section 53a-181b" with reference to Sec. "53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l" and to replace reference in Subdiv. (2) to "subsection (a)
or (c) of section 53a-181b" with reference to "section 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l or section 53a-181b in effect prior
to October 1, 2000" and amended Subsec. (b) to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality.
Sec. 53a-40b. Additional term of imprisonment authorized for offense committed while on release. A person convicted of an offense committed while released
pursuant to sections 54-63a to 54-63g, inclusive, or sections 54-64a to 54-64c, inclusive,
other than a violation of section 53a-222, may be sentenced, in addition to the sentence
prescribed for the offense to (1) a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years if
the offense is a felony, or (2) a term of imprisonment of not more than one year if the
offense is a misdemeanor.
(P.A. 90-213, S. 54; P.A. 98-90, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 98-90 excepted convictions under Sec. 53a-222 from provisions of section.
Jury hearing not constitutionally required for enhanced sentence based on prior conviction; enhanced penalty provisions
do apply to defendant who committed second crime while released on written promise to appear. 62 CA 34.
Sec. 53a-40c. Psychological counseling required for person convicted of sexual
assault of a minor. Any person convicted of a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a,
53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a where the victim of the sexual assault was a person
ten years of age or under shall, in addition to any fine or term of imprisonment imposed,
be sentenced to undergo psychological counseling.
(P.A. 93-340, S. 15.)
Sec. 53a-40d. Persistent offenders of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order or criminal
violation of a restraining order. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of
crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation
of a protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order is a person who (1) stands
convicted of assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening
under section 53a-62, harassment under section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223, criminal violation of a restraining order under section
53a-223b or criminal trespass under section 53a-107 or 53a-108, and (2) has, within the
five years preceding the commission of the present crime, been convicted of a capital
felony, a class A felony, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86 or
53a-122, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a-153, or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a-72b,
53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216, assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening under section 53a-62, harassment under
section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223, criminal
violation of a restraining order under section 53a-223b, or criminal trespass under section
53a-107 or 53a-108 or has been released from incarceration with respect to such conviction, whichever is later.
(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving
assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective
order or criminal violation of a restraining order, and the court is of the opinion that
such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's
criminal conduct indicate that an increased penalty will best serve the public interest,
the court shall, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section
53a-36 or section 53a-35a, as applicable, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section 53a-36 or section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of
misdemeanor or felony, except that if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall
impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony, as authorized by section
53a-35a.
(P.A. 95-193, S. 2; P.A. 02-127, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 02-127 applied the provisions to criminal violation of a restraining order under Sec. 53a-223b and in
Subsec. (b) added references to Sec. 53a-35a, specified "felony" in the provision concerning the imposition of the sentence
of imprisonment authorized for the next more serious crime and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality.
Sec. 53a-40e. Standing criminal restraining order. (a) If any person is convicted
of a violation of section 53a-59, 53a-59a, 53a-60, 53a-60a, 53a-60b, 53a-60c, 53a-70,
53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-181c, 53a-181d or 53a-181e, or of
attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a, against a family
or household member as defined in subdivision (2) of section 46b-38a, the court may,
in addition to imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a, if
the court is of the opinion that the history and character and the nature and circumstances
of the criminal conduct of such offender indicate that a standing criminal restraining
order will best serve the interest of the victim and the public, issue a standing criminal
restraining order which shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court for
good cause shown.
(b) Such standing criminal restraining order may include but is not limited to enjoining the offender from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the
victim; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking
the victim; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the victim.
(c) Every standing criminal restraining order of the court made in accordance with
this section shall contain the following language: "This order shall remain in effect until
modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown. In accordance with section 53a-223a, violation of a standing criminal restraining order issued by the court pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less
than one year nor more than five years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or
both."
(P.A. 96-228, S. 1; P.A. 98-15; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 41, 121; P.A. 99-186, S. 13.)
History: (Revisor's note: In Subsec. (c) the reference in public act 96-228 to "section 1 of this act" was deemed by the
Revisors to be a reference to section 2 of that act and therefore codified as "section 53a-110c"); P.A. 98-15 amended
Subsec. (a) to add references to Secs. 53a-181c, 53a-181d and 53a-181e; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change
in Subsec. (c), effective June 24, 1998; P.A. 99-186 amended Subsec.(a) to make provisions applicable to any person
convicted "of attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a".
See Sec. 51-5c re automated registry of protective orders.
Imposition of a standing criminal restraining order after defendant began serving his sentence did not constitute punishment or affect defendant's sentence and therefore, trial court had jurisdiction to impose it. 269 C. 107.
Order precluding defendant from having contact with his minor children is within scope of the statute. 81 CA 84.
Sec. 53a-40f. Persistent operating while under the influence felony offender.
Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent operating while under the influence felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d and (2) has, prior to the commission of the present crime and within the preceding
ten years, been convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection (a)
of section 14-227a or been convicted in any other state of an offense the essential elements of which are substantially the same as section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection
(a) of section 14-227a.
(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent operating while under the
influence felony offender, and the court is of the opinion that his history and character and
the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration
will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized
by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may
impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious
degree of felony.
(P.A. 97-291, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-41. Fines for felonies. A fine for the conviction of a felony shall be fixed
by the court as follows: (1) For a class A felony, an amount not to exceed twenty thousand
dollars; (2) for a class B felony, an amount not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars; (3)
for a class C felony, an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars; (4) for a class D
felony, an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars; (5) for an unclassified felony,
an amount in accordance with the fine specified in the section of the general statutes
that defines the crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 41; P.A. 92-256, S. 1; 92-260, S. 19; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70.)
History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A felony from ten to twenty thousand dollars, for a class
B felony from ten to fifteen thousand dollars, and for a class C felony from five to ten thousand dollars; P.A. 92-260
amended Subdiv. (3) to replace "law" with "section of the general statutes"; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective
date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section.
See Sec. 53a-35a re terms of imprisonment for felonies.
See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.
Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Failure of trial court to inform defendant of amount of fine not plain error. 65 CA 234.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 728.
Sec. 53a-42. Fines for misdemeanors. A fine for the conviction of a misdemeanor
shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, an amount not to
exceed two thousand dollars; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed
one thousand dollars; (3) for a class C misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed five
hundred dollars; (4) for an unclassified misdemeanor, an amount in accordance with
the fine specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 42; P.A. 92-256, S. 2; 92-260, S. 20; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70.)
History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A misdemeanor from one to two thousand dollars; P.A.
92-260 replaced "law" with "section of the general statutes"; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section.
See Sec. 53a-36 re terms of imprisonment for misdemeanors.
See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.
Cited. 178 C. 145, 153; 180 C. 557, 561. Cited. 217 C. 73, 90.
Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 32 CA 656, 660; judgment reversed in part, see 232
C. 345 et seq.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 722, 727.
Sec. 53a-43. Fines for violations. A fine for a violation shall be fixed by the court
in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars. In the case of a violation defined in
any other section of the general statutes, if the amount of the fine is expressly specified
in the section that defines the offense, the amount of the fine shall be fixed in accordance
with such section.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 43.)
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.
Sec. 53a-44. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain. If a person has gained
money or property through the commission of any felony, misdemeanor or violation,
upon conviction thereof the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense
under section 53a-41, 53a-42 or 53a-43, may sentence the defendant to pay an amount,
fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain from the
commission of the offense. In such case the court shall make a finding as to the amount
of the defendant's gain from the offense and, if the record does not contain sufficient
evidence to support such a finding, the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For
purposes of this section, the term "gain" means the amount of money or the value of
property derived.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 44; P.A. 92-260, S. 21.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in punctuation.
Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.
Sec. 53a-45. Murder: Penalty; waiver of jury trial; finding of lesser degree.
(a) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section
53a-35a unless it is a capital felony or murder under section 53a-54d.
(b) If a person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing
conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a waives his right to a jury
trial and elects to be tried by a court, the court shall be composed of three judges designated by the Chief Court Administrator or his designee, who shall name one such judge
to preside over the trial. Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide
all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly.
(c) The court or jury before which any person indicted for murder or held to answer
for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a is tried may find such person guilty of homicide in a lesser degree than that charged.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 45; P.A. 73-137, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 13, 28; P.A. 82-298, S. 4; P.A. 83-210, S. 2, 5; P.A. 92-260,
S. 22.)
History: P.A. 73-137 added reference to capital felonies in Subsec. (a) and substituted reference to Sec. 53a-46a for
reference to Sec. 53a-46, deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed person indicted for murder to plead guilty with
consent of court and state's attorney in which case court would sentence him as for a Class A felony, relettering former
Subsecs. (c) and (d) accordingly; P.A. 80-442 specified punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a and deleted reference
to death sentenced under Sec. 53a-46a in Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 82-298 amended Subsec. (b) to provide
that court shall be composed of three judges designated by chief court administrator, who shall also name one such judge
to preside, where previously one judge was the judge presiding at the session and the other two were designated by the
chief justice of the supreme court; P.A. 83-210 amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) by inserting "or held to answer for murder
after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a"; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add
exception for "murder under section 53a-54d", amended Subsec. (b) to replace provision that such judges or a majority of
them "shall determine the question of guilt or innocence and shall, as provided in said section 53a-46a, render judgment
and impose sentence" with "shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render
judgment accordingly", and amended Subsec. (c) to replace "him" with "such person".
See annotations to part IV.
Cited. 187 C. 6, 28.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 201 C. 435, 438.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 180 C. 382, 404. Cited. 190 C. 639, 640. Cited. 198 C. 77, 90. Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 381.
Subsec. (c):
Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find a defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree
where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382, 399, 400, 402,
403, 407. Cited. 181 C. 187, 200; id., 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66, 71, 72. Cited. 187 C. 6, 28. Cited. 188 C. 542, 546. Cited.
190 C. 639, 652. Cited. 193 C. 695, 732. Cited. 195 C. 232, 243. Manslaughter is not lesser included offense of felony
murder. 196 C. 421, 422, 427. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. Id., 368, 372. Cited. 206 C. 346, 359. Cited. 210 C. 78, 105.
Cited. 212 C. 593, 607. Cited. 214 C. 57, 63. Cited. 225 C. 55, 65. Cited. 226 C. 237, 250. Cited. 231 C. 115, 140. Cited.
240 C. 727.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 187. Cited. 17 CA 502, 521; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. 40 CA 151, 164.
Cited. 42 CS 426, 429.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 206 C. 346, 359.
Sec. 53a-46. Sentencing proceedings; appeal. Section 53a-46 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 46; 1972, P.A. 56, S. 1; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)
Sec. 53a-46a. Imposition of sentence for capital felony. Hearing. Special verdict. Mitigating and aggravating factors. Factors barring death sentence. (a) A
person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for a capital felony only if a hearing is
held in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b) For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is
convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony, the judge or judges who presided at the
trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate hearing to
determine the existence of any mitigating factor concerning the defendant's character,
background and history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, and any aggravating factor set forth in subsection (i). Such hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates
that none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists or
that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists. Such hearing shall be conducted (1)
before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled
for the purpose of such hearing if (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty;
(B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before three judges as provided in subsection
(b) of section 53a-45; or (C) if the jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been
discharged by the court for good cause, or (3) before the court, on motion of the defendant
and with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.
(c) In such hearing the court shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel all material
contained in any presentence report which may have been prepared. No presentence
information withheld from the defendant shall be considered in determining the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. Any information relevant to any mitigating
factor may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility
under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the
admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials.
The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the
hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of
the information to establish the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. The
burden of establishing any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be
on the state. The burden of establishing any mitigating factor shall be on the defendant.
(d) In determining whether a mitigating factor exists concerning the defendant's
character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, pursuant
to subsection (b) of this section, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall first
determine whether a particular factor concerning the defendant's character, background
or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, has been established by the
evidence, and shall determine further whether that factor is mitigating in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Mitigating factors are such as do not
constitute a defense or excuse for the capital felony of which the defendant has been
convicted, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as tending either to
extenuate or reduce the degree of his culpability or blame for the offense or to otherwise
constitute a basis for a sentence less than death.
(e) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting
forth its findings as to the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the existence
of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant
to subsection (d).
(f) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) none of the factors set
forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in
subsection (i) exist and (3) (A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating
factors exist but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i), the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
(g) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) any of the factors set
forth in subsection (h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection
(i) exists, or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist
and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set
forth in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors, the court shall
impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
(h) The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury or,
if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as provided in subsection (e), that
at the time of the offense (1) the defendant was under the age of eighteen years, or (2)
the defendant was a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, or (3)
the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant's ability to
conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired
but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (4) the
defendant was criminally liable under sections 53a-8, 53a-9 and 53a-10 for the offense,
which was committed by another, but the defendant's participation in such offense was
relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (5)
the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the defendant's conduct in the
course of commission of the offense of which the defendant was convicted would cause,
or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.
(i) The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following: (1)
The defendant committed the offense during the commission or attempted commission
of, or during the immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of, a
felony and the defendant had previously been convicted of the same felony; or (2) the
defendant committed the offense after having been convicted of two or more state offenses or two or more federal offenses or of one or more state offenses and one or more
federal offenses for each of which a penalty of more than one year imprisonment may
be imposed, which offenses were committed on different occasions and which involved
the infliction of serious bodily injury upon another person; or (3) the defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of death to
another person in addition to the victim of the offense; or (4) the defendant committed
the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; or (5) the defendant
procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything
of pecuniary value; or (6) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the
receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; or (7) the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a; or
(8) the defendant committed the offense set forth in subdivision (1) of section 53a-54b
to avoid arrest for a criminal act or prevent detection of a criminal act or to hamper or
prevent the victim from carrying out any act within the scope of the victim's official
duties or to retaliate against the victim for the performance of the victim's official duties.
(P.A. 73-137, S. 4; P.A. 80-332, S. 1; 80-442, S. 14, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 1; P.A. 93-306, S. 12; P.A. 95-19, S. 1; P.A.
01-151, S. 1, 2, 5.)
History: P.A. 80-332 restated provisions and referred to mitigating or aggravating factors throughout, replacing references to factors set forth in Subsecs. (f) and (g); P.A. 80-442 referred to imposition of sentence in accordance with Sec.
53a-35a(1) rather than to sentence for a Class A felony in Subsec. (e), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added a new
Subsec. (d) to specify the procedure for the determination by a jury or court of the existence of a mitigating factor and to
add a definition of mitigating factors, relettered the remaining Subsecs. and amended Subsec. (f) to replace "a sentence in
accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(1)" with "a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release"; P.A. 93-306
amended Subsec. (h) to add as an aggravating factor that the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon;
P.A. 95-19 revised section to permit the jury or court to make findings as to whether any aggravating factor or factors
outweigh any mitigating factor or factors and require the court to sentence the defendant accordingly, while retaining
provision that the existence of certain factors concerning the defendant will operate to automatically bar the imposition of
the death sentence, and, more specifically, amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the separate hearing shall not be held if
the state stipulates "that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists" rather than "that one or more mitigating factors exist"
and make technical changes, amended Subsec. (c) to make technical changes, amended Subsec. (e) to require the jury or
court to return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to "the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the
existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors
outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d)" rather than "the existence of any
aggravating or mitigating factor", amended Subsec. (f) to revise the circumstances that must be found for the court to
impose the death sentence by requiring the court to sentence the defendant to death if the jury or court finds "that (1) none
of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist
and (3)(A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist but are outweighed by one or more
aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i)" rather than "that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist
and that no mitigating factor exists", designated provisions of Subsec. (f) re the circumstances that must be found for the
court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release as new Subsec. (g) and amended said
Subsec. to require the court to impose said sentence if the jury or court finds "that (1) any of the factors set forth in subsection
(h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exists or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors
set forth in subsection (i) exist and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set forth
in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors" rather than "that none of the factors set forth in
subsection (h) exists or that one or more mitigating factors exist", redesignated former Subsec. (g) as new Subsec. (h) and
amended said Subsec. to replace the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if the jury or court finds
that "any mitigating factor exists" and that "the mitigating factors to be considered concerning the defendant shall include,
but are not limited to" the five enumerated factors with the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if
the jury or court finds any of the enumerated factors and deleted former Subdiv. (3) as a factor that would in and of itself
bar the imposition of the death sentence the circumstance that at the time of the offense the defendant "was under unusual
and substantial duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution", renumbering Subdivs. (4) and
(5) as Subdivs. (3) and (4), respectively, redesignated former Subsec. (h) re aggravating factors as new Subsec. (i) and
amended said Subsec. to replace the provision requiring the court to impose the death sentence if no mitigating factor is
present and the jury or court finds one of the enumerated factors with "The aggravating factors to be considered shall be
limited to the following:"; P.A. 01-151 amended Subsec. (h) to add new Subdiv. (2) barring the imposition of the death
sentence on a defendant who was a person with mental retardation, as defined in Sec. 1-1g, redesignate existing Subdivs.
(2), (3) and (4) as Subdivs. (3), (4) and (5), and make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality and amended
Subsec. (i) to add Subdiv. (8) establishing as an aggravating factor the commission of the offense set forth in Sec. 53a-54b(1) to avoid arrest for a criminal act, prevent detection of a criminal act, hamper or prevent the victim carrying out the
victim's official duties or retaliate against the victim for performance of the victim's official duties and make a technical
change for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.
See Sec. 53a-35b re definition of "life imprisonment".
See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.
Former Sec. 53-10 unconstitutional. 164 C. 162. Cited. 197 C. 436, 440. Cited. 207 C. 374, 375, 382, 383, 390, 392,
393, 399. Cited. 209 C. 225, 227. Cited. 212 C. 258, 260, 264. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 225 C. 559, 562. Does not
violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183, 185, 189, 193, 229,
235, 236, 245, 252-254, 257-259, 268, 286. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 234 C. 735,
748. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209, 211, 214, 236, 247, 252, 257, 260. Cited. 237 C. 332, 334, 335, 338. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital
sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 409. Court upheld previous
holding that statute does not require a capital sentencer to give mitigating force to any particular proven factor solely
because that factor establishes something good about the defendant. Instead, statute leaves the decision as to whether a
proven factor is mitigating in nature to sentencer's reasoned moral judgment. 264 C. 1. Once sentencer has found an
aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no requirement that it go further and make an additional
determination that the presence of that factor justifies imposition of the death penalty. Id.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720. Cited. 32 CA 296, 308. Cited. 36 CA 364, 366.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 240, 278. Cited. 237 C. 332, 337. Cited. 238 C. 389. Term "judges" in
the first sentence does not entitle defendant who elected to have a jury determine his sentence at the penalty phase hearing
to have all three members of the panel before whom the guilt phase was conducted preside at such hearing. 264 C. 1.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 383-385, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 238, 266-271, 273. Cited. 235 C. 206, 257, 259. Cited. 237
C. 332, 334. Cited. 241 C. 57. The state may present evidence to rebut mitigation at the penalty phase that would not be
admissible under normal rules of evidence. Under the statute, the state like the defendant only has to meet the relevancy
standard for evidence to be allowed. 251 C. 579.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 383, 386, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 240, 281-284. Cited. 235 C. 206, 207, 218, 229, 234, 251,
255. Cited. 238 C. 389. Mercy is a legitimate consideration only insofar as it is related to mitigating evidence. 264 C. 1.
Requirement for capital sentencer to consider "all the facts and circumstances of the case" is not unconstitutionally vague.
Id. Lack of remorse is not listed as a statutory aggravating factor, and so may not be relied upon as an aggravating factor,
but because mitigating factors call upon jury to elect whether to exercise mercy, defendant's lack of remorse will be relevant
generally to rebut defendant's claimed mitigating factors. 266 C. 171. Jury must make its determination of whether the
proposed mitigating evidence is mitigating in nature considering all facts and circumstances of the case, but statute does
not require that mitigating evidence have some nexus to the offense. Id.
Subsec. (e):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 166. Imposition of death penalty premised on two unanimous findings by trier of fact that (1) existence
of aggravating factor proved beyond a reasonable doubt by state; (2) existence of a mitigating factor not proved by defendant
by a preponderance of the evidence. 207 C. 374, 382, 383, 386-388, 390, 392-394. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 239, 240, 243,
244. Cited. 235 C. 206, 215, 236, 247.
Subsec. (f):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 391. Cited. 208 C. 125, 128. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 230 C. 183,
237-240, 258, 285. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 235 C. 206, 219, 238, 245-247. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Statute requires that jury determine that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors by any amount or degree. 266 C.
171. In light of the unique nature of death penalty, of the need for reliability and consistency and the nature of rendering
a verdict requiring death penalty, jury must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh
mitigating factors and therefore it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death sentence should be imposed. Id.
Subsec. (g):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 166. Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 384. Cited. 212 C. 258, 262. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 183, 272, 284. Cited. 235 C. 206, 207, 247, 251. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206, 229. Cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 828. Although trial court should generally use language of Subdiv. (2) in instructing jury on the
statutory mitigating factor, it is not possible that court's minor misstatement, involving such a tenuous semantic distinction,
could have misled jury. 269 C. 213. General thrust of statute as a whole persuades us that legislature intended to recognize
as mitigating, per se, only those factors that tend to reduce defendant's moral culpability for the offense and make it unlikely
that threat of execution would serve as effective deterrent. Id. "Mental capacity" as used in Subdiv. (2) is not open-ended
term referring to any and all types of mental function, but refers specifically to defendant's ability, at time of the offense,
to understand the wrongful nature and consequences of his conductLlegislature's intent in enactingsubsec. was to specify
factual circumstances under which defendant's moral culpability for committing the offense is reduced. Id. In order to
establish either prong of the mitigating factor of Subdiv. (2), defendant must show that his mental impairment had a causal
nexus with the offense, thereby reducing his moral culpability. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 364, 366.
Subsec. (h):
Subdiv. (4) cited. 209 C. 225, 229. Subdiv. (4): Meaning of "especially cruel" must include intentional infliction of
extreme pain or torture above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing. 212 C. 258, 259, 265,
266, 270, 271. Cited. Id., 258, 262. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 258, 265. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Subdiv. (6)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 230 C. 183, 185, 190, 193, 242, 252, 255, 256, 258-262, 265, 274, 276, 278. Cited. Id., 183,
237, 259, 261. Subdiv. (4) cited. 235 C. 206, 214, 219, 220. Cited. Id., 206, 221, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id. Cited. 242 C. 409. "Same felony" means a felony that is the same in all material respects as the felony that
is committed in this state during commission of the capital felony. That requirement is fully satisfied only if the two felonies
share the same essential elements. 264 C. 1.
Subsec. (i):
To qualify as an aggravating factor that defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner, victim must have suffered extreme pain and torture beyond that necessary to cause death. 253 C. 1. Subdiv. (6)
does not apply to a capital felony committed during the course of a robbery. 261 C. 111. In order to establish the aggravating
factor defined in Subdiv. (4), state must prove that defendant murdered both victims in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner. 262 C. 537.
Subdiv. (1): To ensure that prior felony conviction that is based on a constitutionally invalid guilty plea is not used as
aggravant in a death penalty case, it is in the interests of justice that court hear evidence on whether the plea was voluntarily
and knowingly made, and defendant bears burden of establishing the constitutional invalidity of prior plea. 48 CS 279.
Sec. 53a-46b. Review of death sentence. (a) Any sentence of death imposed in
accordance with the provisions of section 53a-46a shall be reviewed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its rules. In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate said sentence and remand
for imposition of a sentence in accordance with subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a.
(b) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that:
(1) The sentence was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; or
(2) the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating factor specified in subsection (i) of section 53a-46a.
(c) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal and, if an appeal is
taken, the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall
then render its decision on the legal errors claimed and the validity of the sentence.
(P.A. 80-332, S. 2; P.A. 81-472, S. 151, 159; P.A. 85-366, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 23; P.A. 95-16, S. 3, 5; 95-19, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 81-472 made technical changes; P.A. 85-366 made a technical change to reflect changes made to Sec.
53a-46a by same public act; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes; P.A. 95-16 amended Subsec. (b) by deleting Subdiv.
(3) that had required the Supreme Court to affirm the death sentence unless it determines the sentence to be excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, effective April 12, 1995; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change.
Cited. 212 C. 258, 271. Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on due process rights.
230 C. 183, 185, 188, 191, 193, 236, 239. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 234 C. 735, 737, 738, 746. Cited. 235 C.
206, 211, 212, 250. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 235 C. 206, 226, 227. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Subsec. (b):
Subdiv. (3): Class of similar cases to include all convictions of a capital felony after October 1, 1973, resulting from a
trial or from a plea whether or not convictions were followed by imposition of death penalty. 225 C. 559, 560, 563. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 230 C. 183, 258, 259, 265. Subdiv. (1) cited. 234 C. 735, 736, 740, 741, 759-763. Subdiv. (3): Prohibition against
disproportionality discussed. Id., 735-738, 740-742, 745, 747, 748, 750, 752, 760-762. Cited. Id., 735, 763. Cited. 235
C. 206, 216, 227. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206, 220, 226, 228. Subdiv. (3) cited. 237 C. 332, 338. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C.
389. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3): Court concluded that statutory proportionality review scheme is constitutional and
that it involves the precedent seeking method of comparative, rather than traditional, proportionality review. Id.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 237 C. 332, 336, 338. P.A. 95-16, Sec. 3(b) cited. Id.
Sec. 53a-46c. Applicability of death penalty provisions in effect on and after
October 1, 1980. The provisions of sections 53a-46a and 53a-46b in effect on and after
October 1, 1980, shall be applicable to any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty
to a capital felony under subdivisions (1) to (6), inclusive, of section 53a-54b on or after
June 13, 1983.
(P.A. 83-327, S. 1, 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 24.)
History: P.A. 92-260 replaced "on October 1, 1980" with "on and after October 1, 1980".
Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183, 185,
236. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.
Sec. 53a-46d. Victim impact statement read in court prior to imposition of
sentence for crime punishable by death. A victim impact statement prepared with the
assistance of a victim advocate to be placed in court files in accordance with subdivision
(2) of subsection (a) of section 54-220 may be read in court prior to imposition of
sentence upon a defendant found guilty of a crime punishable by death.
(P.A. 00-200, S. 6; P.A. 03-179, S. 2; 03-278, S. 104.)
History: P.A. 03-179 replaced "prepared by" with "prepared with the assistance of" and made a technical change; P.A.
03-278 made a technical change, effective July 9, 2003.
Sec. 53a-47. Disposition of person found not guilty by reason of mental disease
or defect. Confinement and examination. Release. Section 53a-47 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 47; P.A. 75-476, S. 5, 6; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 2, 115, 127; P.A. 81-301, S. 2; P.A. 83-486, S. 2; P.A.
85-506, S. 31, 32.)
PART III*
INCHOATE OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 54-197:
To constitute conspiracy there need be no formal agreement between the parties; conspiracy may be established by
proof of separate acts of individual conspirators with common purpose. 129 C. 540. Principles stated which prevent a
charge of conspiracy against certain participants in unlawful acts. 132 C. 335. Conspiracy is a distinct offense, entirely
independent of the unlawful act which is its purpose. 134 C. 183. Conspiracy may be inferred from activities of accused
persons. 138 C. 292. Where a prima facie case is made out, court is entitled to take into consideration the fact that defendant
failed to testify. 139 C. 229. Declaratory judgment that a violation would exist. 142 C. 53. Cited. 145 C. 124; 150 C. 230;
152 C. 167. No formal agreement need be proven; it is enough if there is a mutual purpose to do the forbidden act. 147 C.
296. Information charging a conspiracy may properly allege acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Information charged
that defendants conspired to commit larceny and in pursuance of the conspiracy stole copper wire worth $2000. Since
larceny statute made theft of property worth more than $50 a felony, effect of the information was to charge a conspiracy
to commit a felony. Not necessary for state to prove that the unlawful object of the conspiracy was ever successfully
accomplished or that any larceny was ever committed in any amount. Confessions made by two conspirators were not
admissible to prove guilt of third conspirator. Since court made that clear in instructions to jury, third conspirator could
not complain of admission of confessions in evidence. 149 C. 640. Fact that one or more persons jointly charged with the
commission of a crime pleaded guilty is not admissible, on trial of another person so charged, to establish that the crime
was committed. A plea of guilty is, in effect, a confession of guilt which, having been made by one of those charged with
the crime, can be no more than hearsay as to another who is so charged. The state must prove the whole case against any
accused. 150 C. 195. Where one of alleged coconspirators is acquitted, this does not necessarily make fatal convictions of
other coconspirators. 151 C. 592. Crime of conspiracy at common law is unlawful combination and accomplishment of
objectives of conspiracy is not material. 157 C. 330. Once defendant had been proved to be member of conspiracy, declarations of coconspirators in furtherance of conspiracy could be used against him. 158 C. 412. Warrant authorizing search
for "...paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197" was general warrant and therefore was illegal and did not
meet constitutional requirement that search warrant particularly describe things to be seized. 160 C. 28, 33-37. Admission of
evidence that defendant denied he knew coconspirators was reversible error when interrogation was made in absence of
defendant's counsel. 159 C. 608. Essence of crime of conspiracy is unlawful combination coupled with act done and not
accomplishment of act. 160 C. 140, 149. Common law conspiracy deemed a separate and distinct crime. 162 C. 215. Cited.
163 C. 231.
Cited. 8 CS 330; 22 CS 173; 27 CS 130, 131. Person convicted of violating act cannot be sent to Kentucky hospital by
petitioning review division of superior court. 25 CS 7. Cited. 27 CS 380; 28 CS 240. Conspiracy common law crime, when.
Id., 344. Cited. 29 CS 333. Cited. 30 CS 211.
Crime of conspiracy is a separate offense and does not merge in the act which is executed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 50, 51. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 548.
Annotations to former section 54-198:
Must be specific intent to commit crime and same overt act adopted to effectuate such intent. 141 C. 731. Cited. 143
C. 368; 156 C. 391.
Cited. 19 CS 267.
Sec. 53a-48. Conspiracy. Renunciation. (a) A person is guilty of conspiracy
when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one
or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one
of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy.
(b) It shall be a defense to a charge of conspiracy that the actor, after conspiring to
commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 48, 49; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 16.)
History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (b) to remove reference to "affirmative" defense.
See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.
Cited. 169 C. 377, 380. Cited. Id., 517, 518. Cited. Id., 642, 643, 645. Generally may prosecute and sentence defendant
for both conspiracy to commit offense and offense itself; Wharton's rule: An agreement by two persons to commit crime
which necessarily requires participation of two persons cannot be prosecuted as conspiracy; rule currently valid only as
presumption of legislative intent (dissent noted); exception to rule when more persons than required participate. 171 C.
105. Abuse of conspiracy charge to bring in otherwise improper evidence. Id. Cited. Id., 524, 528. Cited. 172 C. 74, 75.
Cited. 174 C. 135, 136. Cited. Id., 338, 339, 344. Cited. Id., 376. Cited. 176 C. 131, 132. Cited. 177 C. 370, 371. Cited.
178 C. 67, 68; id., 163, 164; id., 649, 650. A defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when
evidence under this section is before jury. Id., 704, 708. Cited. 180 C. 481, 482. Cited. 182 C. 262, 263; id., 595, 600.
Cited. 184 C. 369, 370, 377, 378. Cited. 186 C. 426, 427; id., 648, 649; id., 696, 707. Cited. 187 C. 109, 111; id., 264, 265;
id., 513, 514. Cited. 188 C. 515, 516, 529; id., 542, 543; id., 671, 675. Cited. 189 C. 201, 202; id., 337, 339. Cited. 190 C.
259, 260. Cited. 191 C. 360, 362. Cited. 194 C. 18, 20. Cited. Id., 361, 362. Cited. 195 C. 128, 129. Cited. Id., 183, 185.
Cited. Id., 598, 604. Cited. 196 C. 115, 116. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 197 C. 201, 203. Cited. Id., 326, 327. Cited. Id.,
413, 415. Cited. Id., 644, 656. "There is no such thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of
recklessly or negligently causing a result," therefore conspiracy to commit arson in the third degree in violation of this
statute and Sec. 53a-113 is not crime cognizable under state law. 199 C. 1-3, 5. Cited. Id., 14, 16. Cited. 200 C. 113, 114.
Cited. Id., 310, 311, 314. Cited. 201 C. 489, 490, 496, 497, 501. Cited. 202 C. 520, 526, 527, 529. Cited. 204 C. 240, 241,
250, 257, 258. Cited. Id., 630, 636, 637. Cited. 207 C. 323, 324. Cited. 209 C. 1, 6. Cited. 210 C. 435, 438, 439. Cited.
211 C. 289, 293. Cited. 212 C. 195, 196, 199-203. Cited. Id., 387, 389. Cited. Id., 593, 594. Cited. 213 C. 233-235.
Conspiracy charge against a defendant is barred after acquittal of sole alleged coconspirator. Conspiracy statute as "bilateral" in nature discussed. Id., 243, 250. Cited. Id., 422, 424. Cited. Id., 708, 711, 721. Cited. 215 C. 716, 718. Cited. Id.,
739, 743. Cited. 216 C. 801. Cited. 218 C. 349-351. Cited. Id., 432, 433, 435. Cited. 220 C. 602, 604, 606. Cited. Id., 765,
767, 771. Cited. 221 C. 447, 449. Cited. Id., 595, 598. Cited. 223 C. 243, 245, 248, 263. Cited. Id., 384, 386. Cited. 224
C. 322, 323. Cited. 225 C. 270, 271. Cited. Id., 347, 349. Cited. 227 C. 1, 3. Cited. Id., 32, 35. Cited. Id., 207, 210, 211.
Cited. 235 C. 397, 398. Cited. Id., 679, 682, 683. Cited. Id., 748, 750. Cited. 236 C. 176, 178. Cited. Id., 514, 517. Cited.
237 C. 518. Cited. 238 C. 380. Cited. 239 C. 56. Cited. Id., 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 708. Cited. 241 C. 322.
Cited. 242 C. 93.
Cited. 1 CA 524. Cited. 3 CA 503. Cited. 5 CA 347, 348. Cited. Id., 491, 492, 494. Cited. Id., 599, 600, 604. Cited. 8
CA 119, 120. Cited. Id., 478, 480, 481, 490. Cited. Id., 667, 671. Cited. 9 CA 548, 549. Cited. 10 CA 130, 131. Cited. Id.,
147, 148. Cited. Id., 447, 448, 451, 453, 455. Cited. 11 CA 397-399. Cited. Id., 621, 623. Cited. 14 CA 205, 207. Cited.
Id., 445-447. Cited. Id., 605, 607. Cited. Id., 807. Cited. 15 CA 122, 123, 125. Cited. 15 CA 328, 329. Cited. Id., 539, 540.
Cited. 16 CA 18, 20, 33. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 17 CA 247, 248. Cited. Id., 648, 650. Cited. 19 CA 554, 555, 562-
564. Cited. Id., 640, 641. Cited. 21 CA 299, 301, 309, 311, 313. Cited. Id., 386, 387, 392, 403. Cited. Id., 519, 520. Cited.
22 CA 449, 450. Cited. Id., 567, 569, 577. Cited. 23 CA 502, 506. Cited. Id., 615, 617. Cited. Id., 667, 670. Cited. 24 CA
316, 318. Cited. Id., 493, 494. Cited. 26 CA 94, 100. Cited. Id., 667, 668. Cited. Id., 779, 780. Cited. 27 CA 596, 597.
Cited. 28 CA 34, 35. Cited. Id., 126, 128, 134. Cited. Id., 416, 420. Cited. 29 CA 359, 361. Cited. Id., 843, 844. Cited. 30
CA 190-192. Cited. Id., 232, 241. Cited. Id., 550, 558. Cited. Id., 654, 655. Cited. Id., 712, 713. Cited. 32 CA 224, 226.
Cited. 33 CA 253, 254. Cited. Id., 409, 410. Cited. 34 CA 751, 753. Cited. 35 CA 714, 716, 717. Cited. Id., 839, 841-843,
846, 848, 849. Cited. 36 CA 59, 60. Cited. Id., 190, 200. Cited. Id., 454, 455. Cited. Id., 556-558, 570, 571. Cited. Id.,
631, 632. Cited. Id., 672, 673. Cited. Id., 753, 755, 764. Cited. Id., 774, 775. Cited. 37 CA 219. Cited. Id., 456, 458;
judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 481, 483. Cited. Id., 536, 538. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. Id., 777,
778, 800. Cited. Id., 868, 869. Cited. 39 CA 224, 226. Cited. Id., 333, 336, 342. Cited. Id., 526, 540. Cited. Id., 550, 553.
Cited. 40 CA 515, 520. Cited. Id., 789, 791. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited. Id., 147, 148. Cited. Id., 495, 498. Cited. 42 CA
472. Cited. Id., 500. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 687. Cited. 43 CA 142. Cited. Id., 252. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. 44 CA 338.
Cited. 45 CA 110. Cited. Id., 282. Cited. Id., 455. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 791. Elements of crime of conspiracy under
sec. discussed. 63 CA 82. Statute is bilateral in nature in that conspiracy requires a showing that two or more coconspirators
intended to engage in or cause conduct that constitutes a crime. 64 CA 384. Conviction and sentencing for multiple
conspiracy offenses based on a single agreement is double jeopardy violation. 65 CA 788. Elements of crime of conspiracy
discussed. 70 CA 393. There was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly entered
into a conspiracy to possess a narcotic substance with intent to sell. 75 CA 223.
Cited. 29 CS 344. Cited. 30 CS 211. Overt act is essential element of offense and must be alleged in information charging
conspiracy. 35 CS 96, 97. Cited. 36 CS 603, 604; 37 CS 527, 528, 531; id., 853. Cited. 38 CS 301, 302, 308; id., 374, 375;
id., 593, 594, 596.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 171 C. 524, 527, 529. Cited. 177 C. 243. Cited. 186 C. 696, 697. Cited. 187 C. 264, 271. Cited. 189 C. 752, 754.
Cited. 192 C. 383-385. Cited. 195 C. 598, 599. Cited. 197 C. 644, 645, 654. Cited. 199 C. 389, 391. Cited. 200 C. 586,
587. Cited. 201 C. 289, 290, 298, 300. Cited. 202 C. 520, 528. Cited. 203 C. 420, 421. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242. Cited. 207
C. 118, 120. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81. Cited. Id., 619, 621. Cited. 212 C. 50, 52. Cited. Id., 195, 197, 200. Cited. Id., 485, 488.
Cited. 213 C. 243, 244. Cited. 214 C. 122, 123. Cited. Id., 344, 347. Cited. 215 C. 570, 576. Cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Cited.
218 C. 151-153. Cited. 221 C. 595, 598. Cited. 223 C. 384, 386. Cited. Id., 635, 637, 638. Cited. 227 C. 32, 35, 41. Cited
erroneously as Subsec. (1). Id., 363, 365. Cited. 230 C. 351, 353. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433; judgment superseded by en banc
reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 537, 538. Cited. 235 C. 502, 504. Cited. 239 C. 235. Cited. Id., 467.
Cited. Id., 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 727. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 296.
Appellate court in State v. Torres, 41 CA 495 reversed trial court's judgment on grounds of insufficient evidence to convict,
judgment of appellate court reversed. Id., 485. Evidence was sufficient to support conspiracy conviction. 253 C. 354.
Where two defendants were tried separately and their respective juries were presented with separate, independent evidence
of their agreement to commit the crime in question, acquittal of the defendant's coconspirator did not nullify defendant's
conviction of the same charge. 257 C. 587.
Cited. 7 CA 701, 702. Cited. 9 CA 313, 314, 317. Cited. 10 CA 447, 452. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment reversed,
see 212 C. 50 et seq. Cited. Id., 605, 609. Cited. Id., 688, 689. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 416, 417. Cited. 16 CA 89, 90.
Cited. Id., 245, 248. Cited. Id., 402, 403. Cited. 18 CA 134, 137. Cited. 19 CA 179-181, 186. Cited. Id., 195, 196. Cited.
20 CA 665, 666. Cited. 21 CA 386, 400. Cited. 22 CA 340, 341. Cited. 23 CA 502-504. Cited. Id., 602, 604. Cited. Id.,
667, 669, 670. Cited. Id., 746, 747; judgment reversed, see 221 C. 595 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 493, 498. Cited. 25 CA 3, 4.
Id., 21, 22. Cited. Id., 318, 319. Cited. 26 CA 94, 95, 99. Cited. Id., 279, 280. Cited. 27 CA 558, 560. Cited. 28 CA 126,
134. Cited. Id., 161, 162, 168. Cited. Id., 306-308. Cited. Id., 474, 475. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited.
29 CA 59, 60, 62. Cited. Id., 207, 211. Cited. Id., 843, 844, 858. Cited. 30 CA 232, 234. Cited. Id., 550, 551, 557. Cited.
31 CA 370, 371. Cited. 32 CA 842, 843. Cited. 33 CA 122, 123. Cited. Id., 339, 340; judgment reversed on issues of
sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 409, 410. Cited. Id., 647, 648, 650, 657.
Cited. 34 CA 58, 59; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 96, 97; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et
seq. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. Id., 751, 753; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 740, 742. Cited. 36
CA 41, 42. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 454, 455. Cited. Id., 483, 484. Cited. Id., 488, 489. Cited. Id., 556, 557. Cited.
Id., 672, 673. Cited. Id., 753, 755. Cited. 37 CA 156, 158. Cited. Id., 360, 361. Cited. Id., 456, 458; judgment reversed,
see 236 C. 176 et seq. Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. 38 CA 434, 435. Cited. Id., 481, 483. Cited. Id., 536, 538. Cited. Id.,
777, 778. Cited. 39 CA 63, 64. Cited. Id., 224, 226. Cited. Id., 242, 244. Cited. Id., 333, 336. Cited. Id., 526, 528. Cited.
Id., 550, 553. Cited. Id., 579, 580, 599. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. 40 CA 47, 48. Cited. Id., 515, 516. Cited. Id., 526, 527,
533. Cited. 41 CA 147, 148. Cited. Id., 495. Cited. 42 CA 500. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 687. Cited. 43 CA 488. Cited.
Id., 830. Cited. 44 CA 338. Cited. Id., 499. Cited. 45 CA 270. Cited. 46 CA 640. Conviction for conspiracy to sell a
controlled substance within one thousand five hundred feet of a public housing project reversed where trial court instructed
that jury must find that conspiracy occurred within one thousand five hundred feet of public housing project. The law is
not concerned with where the plan was hatched, but with where conspirators proposed to carry out its unlawful purpose.
73 CA 386.
Cited. 44 CS 490.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 40 CA 526, 532, 533.
Sec. 53a-49. Criminal attempt: Sufficiency of conduct; renunciation as defense. (a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of
mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in
conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes
them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step
in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
(b) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subdivision (2)
of subsection (a) of this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal
purpose. Without negating the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly
corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter
of law: (1) Lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the
crime; (2) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to
the place contemplated for its commission; (3) reconnoitering the place contemplated
for the commission of the crime; (4) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure
in which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; (5) possession of materials
to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such
unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances;
(6) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of
the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession,
collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances;
(7) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the
crime.
(c) When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under subsection (a) of this section, it shall be a defense that he abandoned his effort to commit
the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a
complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 50; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 17; P.A. 92-260, S. 25.)
History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (c) to remove reference to "affirmative" defense; P.A. 92-260 made technical
changes.
See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.
Cited. 169 C. 377, 380. Cited. Id., 581. Cited. 173 C. 254, 255. Cited. Id., 317, 318, 325. Cited. Id., 360, 362, 363.
Cited. 174 C. 16, 17. Cited. Id., 142, 144. Cited. 175 C. 398, 399. Cited. 179 C. 1, 2. Cited. 180 C. 481, 482. Cited. 182
C. 207, 208; Id., 430, 432; Id., 595, 596, 598, 600. Cited. 183 C. 29, 30. Cited. 184 C. 157, 158. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164;
Id., 199, 200. Cited. 186 C. 261, 262. Cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Cited. 189 C. 383, 385. Cited. 193 C. 70, 76. Cited. 193 C.
602, 603. Cited. 194 C. 233, 234. Cited. Id., 241, 242. Cited. Id., 408-410, 412. Cited. 195 C. 611, 612, 618. Cited. 196
C. 36, 38. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 198 C. 124, 126. Cited. 199 C. 14, 16. Cited. Id., 155, 159. Cited. Id., 591, 593. Cited.
200 C. 30, 31. Cited. 201 C. 174, 176. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 289, 294, 297, 300. Cited. Id., 605, 606. Cited. 202
C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 509, 510. Cited. Id., 520, 527, 529. Cited. 203 C. 445, 446. Cited. Id., 484, 486. Cited. 204 C. 630,
636, 637. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Cited. Id., 616, 617. Cited. 206 C. 213, 214. Cited. 207 C. 1, 10, 12. Cited. 209 C. 34, 41,
42, 44. Cited. 210 C. 519, 521. Cited. Id., 652, 689, 692. Cited. 214 C. 454, 457. Cited. 215 C. 695, 698. Cited. Id., 716,
718. Cited. 216 C. 585, 586, 602. Cited. Id., 647, 649, 661. Cited. 218 C. 747, 748. Cited. 220 C. 384, 385. Cited. Id., 765,
767, 768, 774. Cited. 221 C. 109, 112. Cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Cited. 222 C. 718, 719, 724. Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited.
227 C. 301, 302, 311, 316, 318-320. Cited. 228 C. 384, 385. Cited. Id., 393, 395, 396. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. 231
C. 235, 237. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458. Cited. 235 C. 397, 398. Cited. Id., 405, 406. Cited. Id., 469, 470. Cited. Id., 502, 503,
505, 516, 518. Cited. Id., 748, 750. Cited. 236 C. 266, 267. Cited. 237 C. 501. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 748. Cited. 238
C. 389. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 413. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 389. Cited. Id., 648.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 345. Cited. 2 CA 333, 334. Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Cited. 6 CA 24, 25. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id.,
257, 258. Cited. Id., 367, 370. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. Id., 701, 702. Cited. 8 CA 351, 352. Cited. Id., 496, 497, 504,
506. Cited. Id., 545, 548. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. 9 CA 169, 171; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Cited. Id.,
587, 588. Cited. 10 CA 130, 131. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. 12 CA 32, 33. Cited. Id., 163, 170. Cited. Id., 217. Cited. Id.,
395, 396. Cited. Id., 604-606. Cited. Id., 685. Cited. 13 CA 69, 74, 75. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 15 CA 531, 532.
Cited. Id., 704, 705, 712. Cited. 16 CA 38, 39. Cited. Id., 284, 285. Cited. 17 CA 359, 360. Cited. 19 CA 618, 619. Cited.
Id., 631, 633. Cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Cited. 21 CA 326. Cited. Id., 386, 387, 403. Cited. 22 CA 199, 201. Cited. Id., 340,
341. Cited. Id., 449, 450. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. 24 CA 13, 14. Cited. Id., 624, 625, 627. Cited.
Id., 697, 698. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106, 110. Cited. Id., 298, 300. Cited. Id., 334, 335. Cited. Id., 433, 434, 441. Cited. Id.,
578, 579, 582. Cited. Id., 725, 726. Cited. 27 CA 73, 74 92. Cited. Id., 403, 404. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 28 CA 34, 35.
Cited. Id., 64, 66. Cited. Id., 469. Cited. 30 CA 26, 28, 29, 35. Cited. 30 CA 406, 407; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335
et seq. Cited. 31 CA 370, 371, 376. Cited. 33 CA 339, 350; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment
reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 103, 104. Cited.
Id., 223, 224, 226. Cited. 35 CA 51, 53. Cited. Id., 138, 139, 148, 153. Cited. Id., 740, 743. Cited. 36 CA 161, 162. Cited.
Id., 336, 337. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. Id., 805, 807. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Cited. 37 CA 62, 63;
judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501 et seq. Cited. Id., 733, 735. Cited. 38 CA 777, 779. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. 39 CA
1, 5. Cited. Id., 18, 19, 23. Cited. Id., 267, 268, 271. Cited. Id., 333, 335. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Cited. Id., 810, 811. Cited.
40 CA 60, 61. Cited. Id., 374, 376. Cited. Id., 483, 484. Cited. 41 CA 515, 517. Cited. Id., 751-753. Cited. 42 CA 472.
Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 252. Cited. Id., 599. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. Id., 70. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 476. Cited. 45
CA 390. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 734.
Cited. 33 CS 599. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756. Cited. 38 CS 464, 465. Cited. 39 CS 347, 353.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 177 C. 140, 141. Subdiv. (2) cited. 178 C. 689, 690, 694. Cited. 182 C. 176, 177. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 430, 435.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 585, 587; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled
on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had
had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 585-588, 592, 594; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz,
in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly
added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 188 C. 574,
576. Subdiv. (1) cited. 189 C. 61. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 303-305. Cited. 189 C. 303, 307, 309. Subdiv. (2) cited. 190 C.
822, 832. Cited. 194 C. 258, 272, 276. Cited. Id., 258, 259, 271, 272, 275. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 258, 272, 276, 277. Cited.
195 C. 651, 655. Cited. 198 C. 53, 54, 62. Cited. 199 C. 255, 257. Cited. 200 C. 30, 35. Cited. Id., 44, 45. Cited. Id., 607.
Cited. 201 C. 289, 290. Cited. 202 C. 509, 514. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 520, 526. Cited. Id., 520, 528. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205
C. 528, 532. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 616, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 673-675. Subdiv. (2) cited. 207 C. 646, 647. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 208 C. 202, 203. Cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 733, 736. Cited. 210 C. 652, 687. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 652, 689. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 18, 20, 25, 27. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 441, 442. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582, 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. 212 C. 31-33. Cited. Id., 50, 52. Cited. 216 C. 492, 493. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 585, 593. Subdiv. (2) cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Subdiv. (2) cited. 220 C. 408. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 652, 653.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 765, 774. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 928. Cited. 221 C. 402, 403. Cited. Id., 915. Subdiv. (2) cited. 222
C. 556, 558. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 718, 721-726. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 718, 721, 722, 724. Cited. Id., 718, 722, 726.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 224 C. 397, 399, 403, 414, 417. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 524-526. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 616, 619.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 234, 235. Subdiv. (2) cited. 229 C. 60, 62. Cited. Id., 125, 127. Cited. Id., 839, 840. Cited. 232
C. 431, 433, 434; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 431, 440;
judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Cited. 235 C.
502, 505, 517. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 502, 515. Cited. 238 C. 313. Subdiv. (2) cited. 240 C. 395. Subdiv. (2) cited. 241 C.
322. Cited. Id., 502. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 802. Subdiv. (2) cited. 242 C. 485. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a
murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or
following act of perpetration was insufficient to support conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 346. Cited. 5 CA 586, 587, 589. Cited. 6 CA 164, 165. Cited. Id., 476, 477. Cited. 7 CA 149, 150.
Cited. Id., 257, 260, 261. Subdiv. (2) cited. 8 CA 496, 505. Cited. Id., 545, 546. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 545, 547. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 462, 463. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 163,
164, 170. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 221, 222. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 12. Cited. Id., 69, 74. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
237, 238. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 222, 225; Id., 416,
417; Id., 704, 708. Cited. 21 CA 386, 401. Cited. 22 CA 449, 452. Subdiv. (2) cited. 23 CA 160, 161. Cited. Id., 663, 664.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 692, 693. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 27, 28, 35; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652 et seq. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 264, 266, 267. Cited. Id., 624, 637-639. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 624, 639, 640. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 25 CA
104, 105, 110. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 104, 106, 110, 111. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 104, 110, 111. Cited. Id., 298, 305. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 433, 441-443. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 441-444. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 578, 582. Subdiv. (2) cited. 26 CA
52, 53. Cited. Id., 65, 66. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 114, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242-244. Cited. Id., 242, 244. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 433, 434. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 779, 780. Cited. Id., 73, 74. Cited. 27 CA 601,
602. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 290, 301, 302. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 306, 308. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 404. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 548, 549, 551, 556. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 39, 60, 63-65. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 262, 263. Subdiv. (2) cited.
30 CA 9, 10. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 26, 29, 31. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 470, 471, 476. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 606, 607, 610, 611. Cited. 31 CA 120, 121. Cited. Id., 385, 386. Cited. 33 CA 339, 340, 350; judgment
reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see
235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 368, 369. Subdiv. (1) Id., 647, 650. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 743, 748B; judgment
reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 279, 280. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 699, 700. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 41, 42.
Cited. Id., 161, 162. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. Id., 718, 720, 734. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 536, 537.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 18, 19, 24. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 224, 226. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242, 244. Cited.
Id., 333, 335. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 333, 340. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 333, 341. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 40
CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 387, 388. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 624, 625, 627. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 287, 288, 294, 294, 296. Cited. 42 CA 264. Subdiv. (2) cited. 43 CA 488.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 578. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 619. Cited. Id., 680. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 785. Cited. 44 CA 6. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 499. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45
CA 658. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 756. Proof of prior plan or premeditation not necessary to establish criminal liability for
attempted murder. 47 CA 401. Subdiv. (2) cited re testimony of sole witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. 49 CA 486. Subdiv. (2) cited re showing that victim had custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient
to support a charge of larceny. Id. Subdiv. (2): Defendant took substantial step in hiring an agent to commit an arson even
though agent was not actually paid. To constitute a substantial step, consummation of the deed is not required. 59 CA 362.
Statutory provisions codified common law distinction between the acts of solicitation and attempt and an attempt not a
solicitation under Sec. 53a-179a. 65 CA 145. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant
intended to force victim to have sexual intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or
the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447. To be guilty of crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree defendant must
be shown to have had the mental state required to commit assault in the first degree and fact that the wounds actually
inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to
inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646. Evidence which established that defendant arranged for sale of heroin to undercover
police officer then left his residence and traveled in the direction of designated meeting place for the sale was sufficient
to find defendant guilty of attempt to commit a crime, in particular, the sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug
dependent in violation of Sec. 21a-278(b). 82 CA 111.
Cited. 41 CS 229, 232. Cited. 43 CS 46, 64.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 430, 435. Cited. 194 C. 258, 277. Cited. 205 C. 616, 617, 620. Cited. 209 C. 34, 41, 43. Cited. 211 C.
555, 587, 588.
Cited. 15 CA 704, 706, 708, 709, 711-713, 715.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 200 C. 30, 35. Cited. 221 C. 915.
Cited. 17 CA 128, 130. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant
failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that
defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.
Sec. 53a-50. Effect of motivation on renunciation. For purposes of this part, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part,
by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more
difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if
it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct or to transfer the criminal
effort to another but similar objective or victim.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 51.)
Cited. 182 C. 595, 600.
Cited. 17 CA 128, 130. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant
failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that
defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.
Sec. 53a-51. Classification of attempt and conspiracy. Attempt and conspiracy
are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted
or is an object of the conspiracy, except that an attempt or conspiracy to commit a class
A felony is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 52.)
Cited. 182 C. 595, 598, 600-602. Cited. 184 C. 369, 377. Cited. 195 C. 183, 185. Cited. 202 C. 520, 527. Cited. 204
C. 630, 637. Cited. 211 C. 18, 26. Cited. 213 C. 708, 713. Cited. 235 C. 502, 515, 517. Defendant guilty of conspiracy to
commit robbery in the first degree is subject to the minimum nonsuspendable sentence in Sec. 53a-134(b). 264 C. 593.
Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 10 CA 447, 456. Cited. 21 CA 299, 309. Cited. 22 CA 567, 578. Cited. 29 CA 843, 859-
861. Cited. 33 CA 253, 261, 262. Cited. 36 CA 190, 205.
Sec. 53a-52. Conviction; sentencing. Section 53a-52 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 53; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
PART IV*
HOMICIDE
*Annotations to former section 53-9:
Necessity of stating degree of crime in indictment; 38 C. 399; 47 C. 117; of alleging deliberation and premeditation
where it alleges first degree. 50 C. 198. Unlawful homicide perpetrated in commission of rape is in the first degree; 72 C.
729; so in commission of robbery or in attempt to rob. 110 C. 307; id., 559; 123 C. 670; 126 C. 59; 132 C. 44. Homicide
caused by driving automobile recklessly. 82 C. 671; 83 C. 437; 109 C. 491. What mental capacity necessary for first degree
murder; 57 C. 509; charge as to defense of insanity; 87 C. 7; 96 C. 242; burden of proof; id., 639; when court need not
charge as to it. 87 C. 285. Actual malice must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 43 C. 518; 64 C. 305; 78 C. 25. Malice
is implied, if homicide is willful, deliberate and premeditated; 46 C. 336; 109 C. 138; but not in the case of sufficient
provocation or uncontrollable passion. 74 C. 181. Malice is implied where an unlawful homicide is unattended by extenuating circumstances. 110 C. 307; id., 559. What constitutes malice; 64 C. 305; 74 C. 181; 128 C. 44; charge as to it; 79 C.
590; 84 C. 472; 87 C. 5; 98 C. 463; 103 C. 484; 106 C. 351; rebutted by reasonable belief that victim committed adultery
with accused's wife; 74 C. 177; 87 C. 5; 92 C. 71; evidence of statements by accused and feeling towards victim; 74 C.
177; 83 C. 261; 84 C. 472; 87 C. 5; 88 C. 177; malice presumed from circumstances of atrocity. 84 C. 152. Theft as motive.
79 C. 590; 90 C. 126. Intoxication admissible on question of deliberation; 40 C. 143; 41 C. 587; 49 C. 382; where indulged
in to nerve person to carry out preconceived plan; 48 C. 97; as bearing on malice; 64 C. 305; as a defense. 83 C. 165; 87
C. 291; 88 C. 208. Self-defense; 57 C. 313; 79 C. 590; 83 C. 261; 106 C. 455; 105 C. 349; or defense of home; 57 C. 313;
88 C. 360. Suicide of victim as a defense; her statements as to intent. 77 C. 267. Alibi. 84 C. 152; 98 C. 466. Charge as to
corpus delicti. 81 C. 22. See note re 152 C. 15, infra. Burden and amount of proof; reasonable doubt; 77 C. 267; 79 C. 590;
81 C. 22; 87 C. 573; 109 C. 139; as to malice. 78 C. 25. Homicide in general; nature and definition of degrees. 72 C. 729;
74 C. 180. When court should charge as to excuse, justification or extenuation. 84 C. 470; 87 C. 285; 98 C. 463; 103 C.
484. Murder in second degree; 87 C. 5; 128 C. 44; 131 C. 60; in case of poisoning; 19 C. 393. What facts will reduce crime
to manslaughter. 74 C. 180; 78 C. 18; 79 C. 590; 87 C. 585. Under indictment for murder accused cannot be found guilty
of any crime except murder in first or second degree or manslaughter. 132 C. 41. Bad prison food no justification. 38 C.
127. Effect of plea of not guilty; 87 C. 285; of plea of guilty; 78 C. 18; 88 C. 208. Confession or admissions by accused;
18 C. 180; 78 C. 18; 92 C. 65 et seq.; 103 C. 478; declarations before grand jury. 56 C. 413. Momentary absence of accused
from trial. 82 C. 59. Evidence equivalent to that of two witnesses; for jury to determine. 78 C. 18; 90 C. 126; 93 C. 246;
103 C. 467; 106 C. 714. Appeal as supersedeas; 82 C. 59; if decided before time set for execution by reprieve, supreme
court need not set another day. 81 C. 22. Clothes of victim as evidence; 82 C. 59; so empty cartridge shells found in
accused's room. 74 C. 649. Where four indicted together, charge that state had not made out a case as to three upheld. 87
C. 285. Abandonment of enterprise by one before murder. 47 C. 139; 97 C. 329; 110 C. 309. Evidence of other unconnected
crimes generally inadmissible; when such evidence is admissible. 92 C. 530; 97 C. 266; 103 C. 480; 120 C. 631. When
separate trials should be given persons jointly accused. 92 C. 62; 97 C. 323; 98 C. 461; 147 C. 194. Time required for
deliberation. 93 C. 246; 110 C. 561; 120 C. 629. Degree of murder is for jury; power of court to set aside. Id., 244; 106 C.
705. Admissibility of dying declarations. 90 C. 387; 93 C. 337. Mental tests of accused; expert testimony as to insanity;
reading medical textbooks. 96 C. 250. Conspiracy to steal; homicide in perpetration; abandonment of enterprise by some
of conspirators. 97 C. 329. Change of venue; alibi; testimony of accomplice. 98 C. 466; 105 C. 333. When witnesses should
be segregated. 103 C. 473. Premeditation is necessary for first degree murder. 106 C. 352. As to use and effect of verdict
of not guilty on ground of insanity, see 39 C. 595; 96 C. 243. Possession of a deadly weapon as bearing on existence of
malice. 109 C. 138; 110 C. 308. An inference of guilt may be drawn from failure of accused to take stand and deny facts
within his knowledge which tend to prove his guilt; 109 C. 144, 496; 108 C. 463; but failure of accused to take stand must
not be commented on. Id. In prosecution for homicide by reckless operation of an automobile, conduct of accused in
leaving victims lying in road without stopping, unexplained, supports an inference of guilt. 109 C. 494. Rule concerning
responsibility of conspirators to commit an unlawful act for a homicide by one of them in carrying it out. 126 C. 59; 132
C. 44, 45. Has not changed common-law definition of murder but provides more severe penalty when certain features are
present. 128 C. 44. Actual intent to kill not necessary in second degree murder. 131 C. 60. Jury may determine case under
original charge by finding accused guilty of a lesser offense where such a conviction is warranted and is the only one
warranted upon the evidence. 137 C. 114. Unskillful or improper treatment of wound by surgeons does not relieve defendant
of responsibility for his crime. Id. Distinction between murder and manslaughter is the presence of malice in the one and
its absence in the other. Court's charge held sufficient. 139 C. 89. Charge on intoxication and alcoholic psychosis sustained.
Id., 317. A killing in an attempted robbery is murder in the first degree even though killing itself is accidental. Id., 475.
Cited. 141 C. 656; 143 C. 167; 145 C. 60; 154 C. 272, 286. A wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder in the
first degree. 142 C. 117. Court refuses to adopt "Durham" rule. 146 C. 137. Assault with intent to rob within perpetration
or attempted perpetration of a robbery. Id., 227. Even if there is a confession, there must be extrinsic corroborative evidence
which will, when taken in connection with the confession, establish the corpus delicti in the mind of the trier beyond a
reasonable doubt. 147 C. 95. Standard to determine sanity or mental capacity of the defendant to commit murder. Id.
Adoption of Wigmore definition of "corpus delicti". Previous definitions overruled. 152 C. 15. Charge re what constitutes
malice upheld. 152 C. 81. History discussed; claim that guilty plea to second degree murder should have been taken before
three judges, that jury should have determined degree of homicide and that sentence should have been imposed by three
judges, disallowed. 153 C. 320 et seq. Absence of element of wilful, deliberate and premeditated murder in indictment for
murder in first degree justifies jury verdict of guilty of murder in second degree. 154 C. 624. Malice aforethought defined.
Id., 627. Court should have permitted defendant to change his plea where it appeared trial court's concern that defendant
be exposed to possible electrocution if found guilty on trial for first degree murder was prime basis for denial; defendant
must decide risk. 157 C. 492. Length of time necessary to form specific intent may be long or short. 158 C. 341. Voluntary
drunkenness, while no excuse for crime, may make person mentally incapable of intent of premeditation which is element
of murder in first degree. Id. Preconviction bail in capital cases is governed by section 8 of article first of constitution as
well as Sec. 54-53. Cited. 159 C. 264. Evidence produced by state was adequate to show defendants were in danger of
being convicted of capital offense under this section, hence bail could be denied under exception provided in section 8 of
article I of state constitution. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 347. Cited. 161 C. 219. Cited. 166 C. 630. Trial judges direction to jury
not coercive in context of circumstances in which given. 167 C. 408.
Where accused pleaded guilty to second degree murder, fact that court in imposing sentence did not consist of a presiding
judge and two other judges and that no witnesses were heard and that the degree of crime was not determined by a majority
of the judges did not invalidate the conviction. 20 CS 127. Cited. 26 CS 175.
Annotations to former section 53-10:
Failure of deceased to exercise due care not a defense. 110 C. 61. Act of accused need not be immediate cause of the
death. Id., 62. Cited. 139 C. 401; 141 C. 656; 150 C. 459; 152 C. 344; 154 C. 272, 275. Not retroactive. 142 C. 29.
Constitutionality of statute re recommendation for life imprisonment. 145 C. 60. Death penalty does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of eighth amendment to U. S. constitution and court will not vitiate legislative determination of punishment for crimes. 158 C. 341. Preconviction bail in capital cases is to be governed by Sec. 54-53 in light
of section 8 of article first of state constitution. 159 C. 264. Cited. 161 C. 219. Cited. 169 C. 13.
Annotations to former section 53-11:
Court had authority to impose consecutive life sentences for two second degree murders. 152 C. 600-602. Cited. 154
C. 622, 624.
Cited. 25 CS 473.
Annotation to former section 53-13:
The intentional inflicting of a wound from which death ensues within a year and a day may be either murder or manslaughter. 44 C. 540. If blow produces condition which results in death, this sufficient; reasonable doubt. 87 C. 573. By reckless
driving of automobile. 82 C. 671; 83 C. 457; 109 C. 491. One who engages with others in a common purpose to carry on
an activity in a reckless manner or with wanton disregard for the safety of others is guilty of involuntary manslaughter,
even though he is not present when the homicide occurs. 138 C. 281. Distinction between murder and manslaughter is the
presence of malice in the one and its absence in the other. 139 C. 89. Cited. 153 C. 325. Cited. 163 C. 305.
Cited. 22 CS 175; id., 497, 499; 23 CS 248; 25 CS 473; 26 CS 216; 27 CS 73. Sentence of not less than five nor more
than ten years in state prison confirmed by review division where defendant had in jealousy killed woman with whom he
lived after observing her with another man. Id., 353. Sentence of not less than five nor more than ten years should stand
where defendant entered a fight between his two companions, knocked victim to the ground and stabbed him with his
knife. Id., 370.
Annotations to former section 53-17:
What constitutes "gross negligence". 120 C. 234. Cited. 130 C. 147. Contributory negligence no defense to gross or
wilful misconduct or gross negligence. 154 C. 23. Age of accused not a criterion in determination of his gross or wilful
misconduct or his gross negligence. Id. Statute does not require actual contact between accused's vehicle and deceased or
vehicle in which deceased was riding. Id.
Cited. 25 CS 84; 26 CS 36; 27 CS 232.
Annotations to chapter 952, part IV:
Unconstitutionally broad discretion. 164 C. 162. Cited. 184 C. 597, 598.
Sec. 53a-54a et seq. cited. 45 CA 591.
Cited. 40 CS 498, 501.
Secs. 53a-53 and 53a-54. Homicide defined. Murder defined; affirmative defenses; evidence of mental condition; classification. Sections 53a-53 and 53a-54 are
repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 54, 55; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)
Sec. 53a-54a. Murder. (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause
the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or
causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prosecution under this
subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed
act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a
reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from
the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the
first degree or any other crime.
(b) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease, mental defect or
other mental abnormality is admissible, in a prosecution under subsection (a) of this
section, on the question of whether the defendant acted with intent to cause the death
of another person.
(c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of
section 53a-35a unless it is a capital felony or murder under section 53a-54d.
(P.A. 73-137, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 15, 28; P.A. 83-486, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 26.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to specify punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(2), deleting reference
to death penalty imposed as provided by Sec. 53a-46a for capital felony, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 83-486 amended
Subsec. (a) by replacing "acted" with "committed the proscribed act or acts"; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) to add
exception for murder under Sec. 53a-54d.
See Sec. 53a-54b re capital felony.
See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.
Cited. 171 C. 241. Cited. 173 C. 414, 415. Cited. 176 C. 508, 509; 177 C. 1, 2, 8-10. Cited. 178 C. 450, 452, 460; Id.,
626, 627. Cited. 179 C. 1, 2; Id., 431, 432. Cited. 180 C. 141, 142. Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find a defendant
indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of
mind required is different. Id., 382, 383. Cited. Id., 589, 590. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66; Id., 388-390; Id.,
497, 498; Id., 603, 604, 606. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164. Cited. 186 C. 261, 262; Id., 476, 477. Cited. 188 C. 626, 629, 642.
Cited. 189 C. 303, 304, 308; Id., 346, 347. 190 C. 639, 642. Cited. 191 C. 233, 235; Id., 545, 546. Cited. 194 C. 408-411.
Cited. Id., 416, 419. Cited. Id., 483. Cited. Id., 530, 560. Cited. 195 C. 475, 476. Cited. 196 C. 667, 676. Cited. 197 C. 60,
61. Cited. Id., 180, 181. Cited. Id., 337, 340. Cited. Id., 436, 438, 460. Cited. Id., 507, 509, 522. Cited. 198 C. 124, 126.
Cited. Id., 209, 210. Cited. Id., 397, 398. Cited. Id., 542, 543. Cited. Id., 560. Cited. Id., 573, 574. Cited. Id., 644, 646.
Cited. 199 C. 102. Cited. Id., 155, 159. Cited. Id., 163, 164, 166, 178, 179. Cited. Id., 631, 633. Cited. Id., 718, 720. Cited.
200 C. 553, 558. Cited. 201 C. 174, 175. Cited. Id., 190, 191, 198. Cited. Id., 276, 280. Cited. Id., 368, 369. Cited. Id., 605,
606. Cited. 202 C. 18, 19. Cited. Id., 75. Cited. Id., 86, 91. Cited. Id., 316, 317. Cited. 203 C. 212, 213. Cited. Id., 641,
642. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242, 257. Cited. 205 C. 279, 280, 282. Cited. Id., 298, 300. Cited. Id., 507, 508. Cited. Id., 616,
619. Cited. 206 C. 182, 183. Cited. Id., 213, 214. Cited. Id., 323, 325. Cited. Id., 346, 348, 349. Cited. Id., 512, 513. Cited.
Id., 678. Cited. 207 C. 374, 377. Cited. Id., 646-648. Cited. 208 C. 125, 127, 145. Cited. 209 C. 225, 229, 239. Cited. Id.,
290, 292. Cited. Id., 622, 623. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81, 106. Cited. Id., 304, 305. Cited. Id., 519, 521. Cited. Id., 631, 632.
Cited. Id., 652, 654, 696. Cited. 211 C. 215, 216. Cited. Id., 289, 292, 296, 316. Cited. Id., 441, 442. Cited. 212 C. 325,
326. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. Id., 612, 613. Cited. 213 C. 97, 98. Cited. Id., 243, 244, 255. Cited. Id., 388, 389. Cited.
Id., 405, 406. Cited. Id., 579, 580. Cited. Id., 593, 594. Cited. Id., 708, 721. Cited. 214 C. 57, 59. Cited. Id., 77, 78, 82.
Cited. Id., 118. Cited. Id., 454, 457. Cited. Id., 476, 477. Cited. Id., 493, 495. Cited. Id., 616, 617. Cited. 215 C. 231, 232,
253. Cited. Id., 277, 278, 281. Cited. 215 C. 570, 579, 580. Cited. Id., 646-648. Cited. Id., 695, 697. Cited. Id., 739, 742.
Cited. 216 C. 139, 140, 142, 148, 149. Cited. Id., 188, 189. Cited. Id., 282, 296. Cited. Id., 301, 302. Cited. Id., 585, 602.
Cited. Id., 699, 710, 718. Cited. 218 C. 349, 350. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. Id., 714, 717. Cited. 219 C. 16, 20. Cited. Id.,
596, 597. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. Id., 270, 272. Cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 602-604, 606.
Cited. Id., 765, 767, 771, 774. Cited. 221 C. 58, 59. Cited. Id., 93, 94. Cited. Id., 109, 111, 112. Cited. 222 C. 506, 510.
Cited. 223 C. 273, 274. Cited. Id., 674, 675, 678. Cited. 224 C. 63, 64. Cited Id., 168, 171. Cited. Id., 372, 373, 378. Cited.
225 C. 55, 56, 74. Cited. Id., 114, 116, 120. Cited. Id., 524-526. Cited. Id., 609, 610. Cited. 226 C. 20, 28. Cited. Id., 237,
238. Cited. Id., 497, 499. Cited. 227 C. 231, 233. Cited. Id., 301, 302, 309-311, 316, 318-320. Cited. Id., 417, 419. Cited.
Id., 456, 457, 476. Cited. Id., 566, 567. Cited. 228 C. 62, 76. Cited. Id., 118, 128. Cited. Id., 281, 282, 303. Cited. Id., 412,
414. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 328, 333. Cited. Id., 691, 694, 701. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited.
Id., 115, 116. Cited. Id., 235, 237. Cited. 233 C. 44, 51. Cited. Id., 215, 216. Cited. 234 C. 139, 142. Cited. Id., 324, 334,
339, 350. Cited. Id., 381, 382. Cited. Id., 683, 684. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209. Cited. Id., 274, 275, 322. Cited. Id., 397, 398.
Cited. Id., 413, 414. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Cited. 236 C. 189, 196. Failure of trial court to instruct jury on extreme emotional
disturbance was error; judgment of appellate court affirming judgment of trial court in State v. Person, 36 CA 448 reversed,
Id., 342, 351. Affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance cited. Id. Cited. Id., 514, 516, 517. Cited. 237 C. 58,
59. Cited. Id., 339, 340. Cited. Id., 364, 368. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 694. Under appropriate circumstances defendant
can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, the same person; judgment of appellate court
in State v. Williams, 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. Id., 588. Cited. 239 C. 56. Cited. Id., 481. Cited.
240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 727. Cited. Id., 743. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 605. Cited.
Id., 666. Cited. 247 C. 318. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional
facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or following act of perpetration was insufficient to support
a conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 181, 184. Cited. Id., 223, 224. Cited. Id., 470, 472. Cited. 10 CA 357. Cited. 12 CA 32, 33. Cited. Id.,
217. Cited. 17 CA 502, 504; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. Id., 602, 623. Cited. 19 CA 111, 144; judgment
reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 440-442. Cited. Id., 609, 612. Cited. Id., 674, 675, 682. Cited. 22 CA 669, 670.
Cited. 24 CA 115, 116. Cited. Id., 244, 245. Cited. Id., 692, 693. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106. Cited. Id., 433, 444. Cited. Id.,
456, 461. Cited. 26 CA 259, 260, 262, 265. Cited. 27 CA 1-3. Cited. Id., 520, 521. Cited. 28 CA 416. Cited. Id., 548, 549,
556. Cited. Id., 425, 426. Cited. Id., 608, 609, 611. Cited. Id., 771, 772, 774. Cited. 29 CA 386, 388. Cited. Id., 452, 453.
Cited. Id., 499, 501, 504. Cited. 30 CA 677, 679, 681. Cited. 32 CA 170, 172. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. Id., 763. Cited.
34 CA 103, 104. Cited. Id., 317, 318. Cited. 35 CA 438, 439, 444, 447. Cited. Id., 541, 543. Cited. Id., 762, 763. Cited. 36
CA 250, 251. Cited. Id., 345, 346. Cited. Id., 364, 365, 370, 371. Cited. Id., 448, 449; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342
et seq. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Cited. Id., 506, 507. Cited. Id., 516, 517. Cited. Id., 556, 558. Cited. 37 CA 749, 750, 754.
Cited. 38 CA 371, 374. Cited. Id., 434, 435. Cited. 39 CA 18, 19, 23; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748 et seq. Cited. Id.,
242-244, 252. Cited. Id., 224-226, 236. Cited. Id., 632, 633. Cited. 40 CA 151, 163. Cited. Id., 318, 322. Cited. Id., 387,
388. Cited. 41 CA 604, 613. Cited. Id., 809. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 549. Cited. 44
CA 6. Cited. Id., 70. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 476. Cited. Id., 790. Cited. 45 CA 148. Cited. Id., 207. Cited. Id., 261.
Cited. Id., 584. Cited. 46 CA 216. Cited. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 578. Cited. Id., 640. Cited. Id., 684. Cited. Id., 734. Evidence
was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to conclude that defendant intended to cause victim's death. 55 CA 469. It is
possible to commit attempted murder without creating risk of any physical injury to another person. 56 CA 592. Failure
of trial court to inform defendant of intent requirement under statute not plain error. 65 CA 234.
Cited. 40 CS 38. Cited. Id., 498, 500. Cited. 42 CS 10, 11. Cited. Id., 426, 427, 432. Cited. 43 CS 367, 370.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 172 C. 65, 69. "Extreme emotional disturbance" guidelines. 177 C. 1, 3, 4, 7. Cited. Id., 487, 489, 491, 512.
Cited. 180 C. 171, 173, 177. Cited. 181 C. 268; Id., 284, 285; Id., 406, 408. Cited. 182 C. 66, 68; Id., 142, 168; Id., 388,
395; Id., 585, 587, 592; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on
remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had
had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.; Id., 603, 607. Cited. 184 C. 121, 122, 125. Cited. 186 C. 414, 415, 419,
422, 423; id., 574-576, 585, 586. Cited. 187 C. 6, 8. Cited. 189 C. 303, 304, 306. Cited. 190 C. 219, 233. Cited. 191 C.
27, 28. Cited. 192 C. 700. Cited. 193 C. 474, 475. Cited. Id., 646, 667. Cited. 194 C. 376, 380, 383, 387. Cited. Id., 392,
393. Cited. Id., 416, 418. Cited. Id., 530, 559. Cited. 195 C. 166, 167, 170. Cited. Id., 232, 233. Cited. Id., 651, 652, 655.
Cited. 196 C. 557, 558. Cited. 197 C. 106-108. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. 198 C. 53, 62. Cited. Id., 77, 79. Cited. 199 C.
102, 104. Cited. 200 C. 224, 225. Cited. Id., 553-555, 560. Cited. Id., 607, 608. Cited. Id., 642, 643, 650. Cited. Id., 743,
744. Charge on this defense was inadequate under the circumstances. 201 C. 174-176, 179, 180. Cited. Id., 244, 245. Cited.
Id., 368, 372, 373. Cited. Id., 534, 535. Cited. 202 C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 429, 430. Cited. 204 C. 207, 208. Cited. Id., 259,
260. Cited. 205 C. 370, 371. Cited. Id., 578. Cited. Id., 723, 724. Cited. 206 C. 229, 231, 239. Cited. Id., 300, 301. Cited.
Id., 391, 392. Cited. 207 C. 374, 385. Cited. 208 C. 125, 128. Cited. Id., 455, 456. Cited. 209 C. 596, 597. Cited. 210 C.
481, 483. Cited. Id., 619-621. Cited. 211 C. 441, 442. Cited. 212 C. 258, 259. Cited. Id., 351, 352. Cited. Id., 593, 594.
Cited. 213 C. 708, 710, 711. Cited. 214 C. 122, 123. Cited. Id., 146, 147, 149. Cited. Id., 161, 162. Cited. Id., 344, 347.
Cited. Id., 540, 541. Cited. 215 C. 739, 740, 743. Cited. 216 C. 492, 493. Cited. Id., 585-587, 593. Cited. Id., 699, 701,
702, 708, 717. Cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Interpretation of section not to require reasonableness of a defendant's extreme
emotional disturbance to be determined solely from his subjective viewpoint. Id., 648, 649, 651-655, 657, 658. Cited. 218
C. 349, 351, 383. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. Id., 714, 716. Cited. Id., 747, 748. Cited. Id., 766-768. Cited. 219 C. 16, 17,
19. Cited. Id., 234, 235. Cited. Id., 295, 296. Cited. 220 C. 285, 298. Cited. Id., 385, 388. Cited. Id., 408. Cited. 221 C.
128, 129. Cited. Id., 430, 431. Cited. 222 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 506, 508. Cited. Id., 718-720, 725, 726. Cited. 223 C. 41, 42,
44. Cited. Id., 127, 128. Cited. Id., 207, 209. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. Id., 384-386. Cited. Id., 411, 412. Cited. Id., 535,
537. Cited. Id., 635, 637. Cited. 224 C. 196, 197. Cited. Id., 325, 326. Cited. 225 C. 114, 116, 118, 122, 127. Cited. Id.,
609, 610, 627. Cited. 226 C. 237, 253. Cited. 227 C. 301, 309. Cited. Id., 389, 391. Cited. Id., 448, 449. Cited. 228 C. 62,
63. Cited. Id., 118, 119. Cited. Id., 384, 385. Cited. 229 C. 328, 329. Cited. 230 C. 183, 223. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited.
232 C. 537, 538. Cited. 233 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 106, 108. Cited. Id., 174, 189. Cited. Id., 517. Cited. Id., 813, 815. Cited.
235 C. 206, 209, 251. Cited. Id., 397, 398. Cited. Id., 413, 414. Cited. 236 C. 189, 191, 202. Cited. Id., 342, 343, 345, 356.
Cited. Id., 388, 390. Cited. 237 C. 518. Cited. 238 C. 253. Cited. Id., 313. Cited. 239 C. 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id.,
395. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 322. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. Id., 665. Cited. 242 C. 409. Cited. Id., 485. Cited. 243 C. 205.
Term "death" as used in Penal Code includes irreversible cessation of functioning of brain. 244 C. 761. Section incorporates
the doctrine of transferred intent and holds both a principal and an accomplice liable for death of an unintended victim.
253 C. 354. Re jury charge on extreme emotional disturbance, it was proper for trial court to refuse to instruct jury to
consider defendant's unique mental and emotional characteristics and impact of those characteristics on defendant since
the statute incorporates a standard that is objective as to its overview, but subjective as to the defendant's belief. 261 C.
336. Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter as set forth in section 53a-55(a)(1). 262 C. 453.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 182. Cited. Id., 367, 370. Cited. Id., 457-459. Cited. 8 CA 496, 497, 504-506. Cited. Id., 147, 148;
judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278 et seq. Cited. Id., 169, 171; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Cited. 10 CA 697,
699. Cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Cited. Id., 628, 630. Cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Cited. 21 CA 801. Cited. 22 CA 199, 201. Cited. Id.,
507, 508. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 23 CA 692, 693. Cited. 24 CA 624, 625, 627. Cited. Id., 692, 693. Cited. 25 CA 433,
434. Cited. 26 CA 242-245. Cited. Id., 259, 260. Cited. 27 CA 73, 74, 92. Cited. Id., 403, 404. Cited. Id., 643, 644. Cited.
28 CA 231, 238. Cited. Id., 416. Cited. Id., 469. Cited. 29 CA 499, 501. Cited. 29 CA 573, 574. Cited. 30 CA 406, 407;
judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 385, 386. Cited. 32 CA 438-440. Cited. Id., 687, 689. Cited. Id.,
759, 761. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. Id., 122, 123. Cited. Id., 782, 783. Cited. 34 CA 58, 59, 93; judgment reversed, see
232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 96, 97; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 317, 318, 321. Cited. Id., 368,
369; see also 233 C. 517 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 138, 139, 153. Cited. Id., 374, 375; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413 et
seq. Cited. Id., 541, 543. Cited. 36 CA 336, 337. Cited. Id., 364, 365. Cited. Id., 417, 418. Cited. Id., 516, 517. Cited. Id.,
805, 806. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Cited. 37 CA 252, 253; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 388 et seq. Cited. Id., 404, 405, 414.
Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. Id., 749, 753. Cited. 38 CA 371, 374. Cited. 39 CA 18, 19, 24; judgment reversed, see 237 C.
748 et seq. Cited. Id., 224, 238. Cited. 40 CA 47, 48. Cited. Id., 60, 61. Cited. Id., 374, 376. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited.
Id., 470, 471. Cited. 41 CA 361, 362, 365-367. Cited. Id., 495. Cited. Id., 515, 517. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 555.
Cited. 43 CA 252. Cited. Id., 830. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. Id., 198. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 338. Cited. Id., 790. Cited.
45 CA 148. Cited. Id., 207. Cited. Id., 297. Cited. 46 CA 216. Cited. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 600. Cited. Id., 640. Cited. Id.,
684. Statute sets forth a standard that is objective in its overview, but subjective as to defendant's belief. 48 CA 784. Trial
court's instruction re extreme emotional disturbance defense was proper. 55 CA 469. Cited. 57 CA 734.
Subsection must be read without the word "affirmative". The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
elements of the offense charged without imposing any burden on the defendant. 33 CS 28, 81. Unborn not included in
definition of "person". 40 CS 498, 499. Cited re ineffective counsel claim. 46 CS 344.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 603, 606. Evidence of mental capacity admissible when defendant is charged with commission of crime
under which state must prove defendant acted recklessly. 195 C. 232, 240, 241. Cited. 218 C. 349, 351, 379.
Cited. 17 CA 602, 623. Cited. 44 CA 70.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 180 C. 171, 173. Cited. 181 C. 151, 153. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151, 153. Cited. Id., 350, 352. Cited. 194 C. 376,
380, 383. Cited. Id., 392, 393. Cited. Id., 416, 418. Cited. Id., 530, 559, 560. Cited. 196 C. 655, 661, 662. Cited. 200 C.
721, 722. Cited. 201 C. 244, 245. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 401. Cited. 205 C. 616, 619. Cited. Id., 638-640. Cited. 214 C. 378,
385. Cited. 216 C. 282, 285, 294, 295. Cited. 218 C. 486, 488.
Cited erroneously as Sec. 53a-54(c). 41 CA 530, 532.
Sec. 53a-54b. Capital felony. A person is guilty of a capital felony who is convicted of any of the following: (1) Murder of a member of the Division of State Police
within the Department of Public Safety or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state marshal who is exercising
authority granted under any provision of the general statutes, a judicial marshal in performance of the duties of a judicial marshal, a constable who performs criminal law
enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, a conservation
officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Environmental
Protection under the provisions of section 26-5, an employee of the Department of
Correction or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of such employee's or person's employment
or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility, or any firefighter, while such victim was acting within the scope of such
victim's duties; (2) murder committed by a defendant who is hired to commit the same
for pecuniary gain or murder committed by one who is hired by the defendant to commit
the same for pecuniary gain; (3) murder committed by one who has previously been
convicted of intentional murder or of murder committed in the course of commission
of a felony; (4) murder committed by one who was, at the time of commission of the
murder, under sentence of life imprisonment; (5) murder by a kidnapper of a kidnapped
person during the course of the kidnapping or before such person is able to return or be
returned to safety; (6) murder committed in the course of the commission of sexual
assault in the first degree; (7) murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the
course of a single transaction; or (8) murder of a person under sixteen years of age.
(P.A. 73-137, S. 3; P.A. 77-604, S. 39, 84; 77-614, S. 486, 610; P.A. 80-335; P.A. 85-144; P.A. 92-260, S. 27; P.A.
95-16, S. 4; P.A. 98-126, S. 1; P.A. 00-99, S. 120, 154; P.A. 01-84, S. 10, 26; 01-151, S. 3, 5.)
History: P.A. 77-604 substituted "chief inspector or inspector in the division of criminal justice" for "county detective"
in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 77-614 made state police department a division within the department of public safety, effective January
1, 1979; P.A. 80-335 added Subdivs. (7) and (8) making murder in course of committing sexual assault in first degree and
murder of two or more persons at same time a capital felony; P.A. 85-144 amended Subdiv. (6) by adding "economic"
and deleting the proviso that the seller was not, at the time of such sale, a drug-dependent person; P.A. 92-260 made
technical changes in Subdivs. (1) and (3); P.A. 95-16 added Subdiv. (9) re murder of a person under sixteen years of age;
P.A. 98-126 amended Subdiv. (1) to replace "an official of the Department of Correction authorized by the Commissioner
of Correction to make arrests in a correctional institution or facility" with "an employee of the Department of Correction
or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of
his employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility";
P.A. 00-99 amended Subdiv. (1) to replace reference to sheriff and deputy sheriff with provision re state marshal exercising
statutory authority and judicial marshal in performance of duties, effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-84 replaced "fireman" with "firefighter" and made other technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; P.A.
01-151 amended Subdiv. (1) to include the murder of a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by
the Commissioner of Environmental Protection under the provisions of Sec. 26-5, deleted former Subdiv. (6) re the illegal
sale, for economic gain, of cocaine, heroin or methadone to a person who dies as a direct result of the use of such cocaine,
heroin or methadone, redesignating existing Subdivs. (7), (8) and (9) as Subdivs. (6), (7) and (8), and made technical
changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.
See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.
See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.
Cited. 194 C. 416, 418. Cited. 198 C. 92, 110. Cited. 199 C. 163, 174, 177, 178. Cited. 201 C. 276, 288. Cited. 211 C.
289, 296. Cited. 215 C. 570, 581. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 218 C. 486, 488. Cited. 230 C. 183, 188, 201, 236. Cited.
234 C. 324, 340, 341. Cited. Id., 735, 738. Cited. 235 C. 206. Cited. 237 C. 332, 334. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. Id., 828.
Cited. 240 C. 727. Cited. 241 C. 702. Cited. 242 C. 409. Murder in the course of kidnapping does not require ransom;
murder in the course of sexual assault includes murder to prevent victim from becoming a witness; denial of a bill of
particulars on aggravating factors did not deny fair hearing; meaning of "heinous" and "depraved" discussed; "heinous,
cruel or depraved" as a unitary rather than three separate factors discussed; statute complies with the eighth and fourteenth
amendments; statutory construction and precedent support conclusion that the burden of persuasion applies to both elements
of mitigation; proportionality review still available in this case despite repeal of requirement. 251 C. 285.
Cited. 32 CA 38, 40. Cited. 36 CA 364-366, 370, 377, 378. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. 43 CA 549. Cited. 45 CA 207.
Cited 42 CS 426, 427.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Conviction for felony murder under Sec. 53a-54c cannot serve as the predicate murder
for the crime of capital felony under this section; term "murder" in capital felony statute may be applied only to intentional
murder. 241 C. 702. In order to satisfy the element that police officer had been "acting within the scope of his duties", the
state was only required to prove that police officer was acting in the good faith discharge of his official duties when he
stopped defendant and attempted to subdue him. 264 C. 1.
Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (2):
Capital felony murder discussed. 199 C. 163, 164, 173, 174, 176, 178. Cited. 203 C. 420-422, 424. Cited. 215 C. 570,
576-578, 581-583. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 242 C. 409.
Cited. 19 CA 111, 144; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 234 C. 324-326, 329, 331, 334, 336, 338, 339, 341, 343, 347, 349, 350. Cited. 238 C. 828.
Cited. 41 CA 604, 616, 617. Cited. 45 CA 390.
Subdiv. (4):
Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342.
Subdiv. (5):
Cited. 197 C. 436, 439, 461. Cited. 213 C. 388, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 194, 195, 200-202, 228. Cited. 234 C. 324,
341, 342. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 242 C. 409. Provision does not require that kidnapping be accompanied by a demand
for ransom. 249 C. 645. Trial court properly instructed jury that its verdict of guilty on charge of intentional murder would
provide the predicate for criminal liability under subsection. 263 C. 478.
Cited. 36 CA 364, 378. Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (6):
Cited. 230 C. 183, 201. Cited. 233 C. 174, 189. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 238 C. 828. State need only prove
that the murder in a kidnap-murder or sexual-assault murder was aggravated in order to establish the aggravating factor.
269 C. 213.
Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (7):
Cited. 205 C. 298, 299. Cited. 230 C. 183, 194, 229. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Cited. 242 C. 409. Double jeopardy clause not violated where defendant convicted for two counts of capital felony. Evidence
indicated that the murders occurred in two sets, at distinctly separate times. 260 C. 339.
Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (8):
Cited. 198 C. 92, 110. Cited. 206 C. 213, 214. Cited. 207 C. 374, 377. Cited. 208 C. 125, 127, 145. Cited. 209 C. 225,
230, 239. Cited. 212 C. 258, 259. Cited. 213 C. 708, 711. Cited. 216 C. 699, 701. Cited. 218 C. 349-351. Cited. 221 C.
430, 431. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. 230 C. 183, 194, 195. Cited. 233 C. 813, 815. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited.
235 C. 206, 209. Only an intentional murder can be a predicate murder to capital felony charge under this section. 238 C.
828. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 93. Proper construction to be given to term "in the course of a single
transaction" is that there need only be some nexus between murders, that the murders be connected by a common purpose
or plan in order to be "in the course of a single transaction". Does not require murders to be at the same time in order to
constitute "in the course of a single transaction". Temporal relationship between murders is not an absolute prerequisite
to prosecution under subsection. 254 C. 578. Read together, Sec. 53a-54(a) and this subdiv. provide that conviction of
intentional murder under doctrine of transferred intent may be the predicate for conviction of capital felony under this
subdiv. when victim is under sixteen, regardless of defendant's subjective state of mind. 265 C. 35. Knowledge of the
victim's age is not an element of this subdiv. Id. To limit applicability of subdiv. to cases in which state can prove that
defendant knew or reasonably should have known the age of his victim would be both impracticable and inconsistent with
the legislative intent. Id.
Cited. 36 CA 364, 365, 377, 380. Cited. 38 CA 581, 582. Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Sec. 53a-54c. Felony murder. A person is guilty of murder when, acting either
alone or with one or more persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary,
kidnapping, sexual assault in the first degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the third degree, sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm,
escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree and, in the course of and in
furtherance of such crime or of flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if any, causes
the death of a person other than one of the participants, except that in any prosecution
under this section, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying
crime, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant: (1) Did not commit the
homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the
commission thereof; and (2) was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any dangerous
instrument; and (3) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was
armed with such a weapon or instrument; and (4) had no reasonable ground to believe
that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious
physical injury.
(P.A. 74-186, S. 11, 12; P.A. 76-336, S. 21; P.A. 79-570, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 28.)
History: P.A. 76-336 replaced rape in first degree, deviate sexual intercourse in first degree and sexual contact in first
degree with sexual assault in first degree, sexual assault in first degree with firearm, sexual assault in third degree and
sexual assault in third degree with firearm; P.A. 79-570 removed murder resulting from commission of or attempt to
commit arson from purview of section; P.A. 92-260 replaced obsolete reference to offense of "sexual assault in the first
degree with a firearm" with revised name of "aggravated sexual assault in the first degree"; (Revisor's note: In 1995 the
indicators (A), (B), (C) and (D) were changed editorially by the Revisors to (1), (2), (3) and (4) respectively for consistency
with statutory usage).
See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.
See Sec. 53a-54b re capital felony.
Cited. 171 C. 683, 687. Cited. 176 C. 257, 258. Cited. 177 C. 677, 679. Cited. 178 C. 116, 118. Cited. 179 C. 78-80.
Court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on lesser offenses of first degree burglary and first degree robbery since element
of causation, which differentiates felony murder from the lesser offenses, was not sufficiently in dispute. 180 C. 599, 601,
602, 604. Cited. 181 C. 151, 153; id., 187, 188. Cited. 182 C. 419, 420; id., 580. Cited (1975 revision). 183 C. 299, 300,
311. Cited. 186 C. 1, 2, 7. Cited. 188 C. 542, 543, 545, 550. Cited. 189 C. 346, 347. Cited. 191 C. 636, 638-641, 644; id.,
659-663. Cited. 193 C. 70, 72, 75. Cited. Id., 144, 145, 151. Cited. Id., 350, 352. Cited. 194 C. 223, 224. Cited. Id., 279,
285. Cited. Id., 416, 419. Cited. Id., 530, 559, 565. Cited. 195 C. 505, 506. Manslaughter is not a lesser included crime
otherwise of felony murder. 196 C. 421, 423, 429. Cited. 197 C. 396, 397, 401. Cited. Id., 436, 438, 460. Cited. Id., 588,
591. Cited. 198 C. 92, 110. Cited. Id., 255, 256, 269. Cited. Id., 386, 387. Cited. Id., 397, 399. Cited. Id., 435, 436. Cited.
Id., 506, 507, 515. Cited. Id., 517, 518, 537. Cited. Id., 638. Cited. Id., 644, 646. Cited. 199 C. 110, 111. Cited. 200 C. 323,
324, 336. Cited. Id., 721. Cited. 201 C. 34, 35, 37. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 399, 401, 416-418. Cited. Id., 462, 464, 465. Cited.
202 C. 18, 19, 21, 24, 26. Cited. Id., 39, 40. Cited. 203 C. 4-6. Cited. Id., 212, 213, 217, 239, 243. Cited. 204 C. 377-379,
385, 387. Cited. 205 C. 298, 300. Cited. Id., 485, 486. Cited. Id., 507, 508. Cited. Id., 616, 619. Cited. Id., 638-640. Cited.
206 C. 157, 158. Cited. Id., 657, 667. Cited. 207 C. 1, 2, 12, 13. Cited. 208 C. 52, 54. Cited. 209 C. 34, 35. Cited. Id., 75,
76, 78. Cited. Id., 290-292. Cited. Id., 564, 565. Cited. Id., 636, 637. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81. Cited. Id., 652, 654, 696, 697.
Cited. Id., 751, 752. Cited. 211 C. 289, 296. Cited. 212 C. 387, 389. Cited. 213 C. 388, 389. Cited. 214 C. 132, 133. Cited.
Id., 454, 457. Cited. Id., 493-495, 501. Cited. 215 C. 695, 698. Cited. 216 C. 282-285, 293, 295-297. Cited. Id., 367, 368.
Cited. Id., 699, 700, 708, 710, 715, 717-719, 726. Cited. 218 C. 85, 87. Cited. Id., 151, 152. Cited. Id., 309, 310. Cited.
Id., 447, 448. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. 219 C. 743, 744. Cited. 220 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 385, 386, 388. Cited. Id., 417, 418,
420, 426, 428, 429, 431. Cited. 221 C. 315, 316. Cited. Id., 635-637. Cited. Id., 643, 644, 666, 668. Cited. Id., 685, 687.
Cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Cited. 223 C. 299, 301. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. Id., 635, 637. Cited. Id., 834-836. Cited. 225
C. 270, 271, 277. Cited. Id., 347, 348, 350-352. Cited. 227 C. 101, 102. Cited. 229 C. 691, 694. Cited. 230 C. 88, 90. Cited.
Id., 183, 201, 224. Cited. Id., 351, 352, 354, 362. Cited. 233 C. 44, 52. Cited. 234 C. 97, 98. Cited. 235 C. 595, 596. Cited.
Id., 748, 749. Cited. Id., 802-804. Cited. 237 C. 390, 392. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 694. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. Id.,
828. Cited. 240 C. 727. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 322. Conviction for felony murder under this section cannot serve as
predicate for the crime of capital felony under Sec. 53a-54b(1). Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 93. Cited. Id., 125. Cited. Id., 409.
Cited. Id., 666. Cited. 247 C. 662. It is inconsistent with purpose of this statute to allow defendant who causes a death in
the course of a felony to claim self-defense because victim attempted to thwart the felony. 254 C. 184. The defense of self-defense does not apply to charge of felony murder as a matter of law. Id., 202.
Cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Cited. 12 CA 385. Cited. 24 CA 723. Cited. 27 CA 794, 795. Cited. 29 CA 573, 574. Cited. Id.,
771, 772. Cited. 30 CA 381, 383. Cited 31 CA 771, 773; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 88-90, 92, 94. Cited. 32 CA 38,
40. Cited. Id., 431-433. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. 35 CA 762, 766. Cited. 36 CA 364, 365, 370, 375. Cited. Id., 506,
507. Cited. Id., 556, 558. Cited. 38 CA 581, 582. Cited. 41 CA 515-517. Self-defense not available as a defense to charge
of felony murder. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 472. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. 45 CA 32. Cited. Id., 187. Cited. Id., 390. Cited. Id.,
658. Reaffirmed prior holding that self-defense not a valid defense to charge of felony murder. 51 CA 798. Court rejects
defendant's argument that killing of victim who resisted a robbery attempt by walking away is not committed "in the course
of and in furtherance of" the attempted robbery because the attempted robbery had ceased. 64 CA 596.
Cited. 36 CS 141. Cited. 41 CS 385-387. Cited 42 CS 426, 427.
Sec. 53a-54d. Arson murder. A person is guilty of murder when, acting either
alone or with one or more persons, he commits arson and, in the course of such arson,
causes the death of a person. Notwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes,
any person convicted of murder under this section shall be punished by life imprisonment
and shall not be eligible for parole.
(P.A. 79-570, S. 1.)
Cited. 191 C. 636, 644. Does not violate defendant's right to due process and equal protection. 196 C. 655-665. Cited.
Id., 667, 668, 670, 675. "... when two or more persons are the victims of a single episode there are as many offenses as
there are victims." 198 C. 92-94, 103, 110. Cited. 204 C. 377, 386. Cited. 210 C. 22. Cited. Id., 519, 526. Cited. 211 C.
258, 283, 284. Cited. Id., 289, 296. Cited. 213 C. 161, 162. Cited. 214 C. 378, 385. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 237 C.
694. Cited. 238 C. 828. Cited. 240 C. 727. Cited. 241 C. 702.
Cited. 41 CA 476, 478, 479.
Cited. 42 CS 426, 427.
Sec. 53a-55. Manslaughter in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is
guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical
injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2)
with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person
or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he
committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as provided in subsection (a) of section 53a-54a, except that the fact that homicide
was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not
be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subsection; or (3) under circumstances
evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another
person.
(b) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 56; P.A. 73-137, S. 9; P.A. 83-486, S. 5.)
History: P.A. 73-137 substituted reference to Sec. 53a-54a for reference to Sec. 53a-54 in Subdiv. (2); P.A. 83-486
amended Subsec. (a)(2) by replacing "acts" with "committed the proscribed act or acts".
Cited. 168 C. 610. Cited. 169 C. 309, 322. Cited. 170 C. 81. Cited. 180 C. 171, 177. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 182
C. 66, 68, 77. Cited. 188 C. 542, 544. Cited. 190 C. 639, 650. Cited. 192 C. 85, 87. Cited. 193 C. 632, 640. Cited. Id., 646,
666, 668. Cited. Id., 695, 697, 704, 730. Manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421, 428.
Cited. 200 C. 553, 558. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. 202 C. 429, 430. Cited. 210 C. 78, 106. Cited. Id., 652, 654. Cited.
211 C. 591, 592. Cited. 213 C. 38, 40. Cited. 215 C. 695, 697. Cited. 216 C. 699, 701, 708-710. Cited. 217 C. 498-500.
Cited. 223 C. 273, 274. Cited. 225 C. 559, 561. Cited. 226 C. 237. 250. Cited. 233 C. 174-176, 189, 192. Cited. 234 C.
139, 161. Cited. 236 C. 342, 351.
Cited. 7 CA 223, 224, 233. Cited. 8 CA 307. Cited. 15 CA 74, 76, 82; judgment reversed, see 211 C. 591. et seq. Cited.
16 CA 223. Cited. 24 CA 115, 117. Cited. 37 CA 722, 728. Cited. 40 CA 189, 191. Cited. Id., 374, 376. Cited. 41 CA 565,
566. Cited. Id., 604, 613. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. 44 CA 62. Cited. 46 CA 216.
Cited. 33 CS 28.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1): It is incumbent upon the state to prove a specific intent to cause serious physical injury as intent to achieve
a result is an element of the crime charged. 165 C. 400, 403. Cited. 174 C. 89, 90, 95-98. Cited. 176 C. 107, 108. Subdiv.
(3): The conduct proscribed does not require infliction of a physical blow. 176 C. 227-229, 231-233, 236. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 177 C. 538, 539. Subdiv. (3) cited. 179 C. 381, 382. Subdivs. (1) and (3); Manslaughter is a lesser included offense
of murder although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382, 403, 408, 409. Subdiv. (1) cited. 181 C. 187, 200;
id., 406, 408, 417. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 66, 71. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 66, 72, 73. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited.
182 C. 403, 404; 183 C. 394, 395; 185 C. 63, 65. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Cited. 188 C. 237, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 653,
654. Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 303, 308, 309. Subdiv. (1): Attempt to commit is not cognizable. Id., 303-310. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 190 C. 219, 220; id., 576, 577. Cited. Id., 639, 650-652. Subdiv. (3) cited. 193 C. 632-634, 639, 643. Cited. 646,
667, 668. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 646, 668. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 646, 669. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 729. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 695, 729, 731. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 120, 127. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 279-281, 294. Cited. Id., 376, 377. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 408, 412. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., Subdiv. (1) cited. 196 C. 519, 520, 526. Cited. 198 C. 53, 54. Cited. Id., 209,
210. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 220, 221. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. Id., 454, 458, 459. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 454,
459. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 454, 459, 461, 462. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 454, 459, 462, 463. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 155,
158, 159, 161. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 155, 159. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 383, 384. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
417, 419, 446. Subdiv. (2) cited. 200 C. 224, 225. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 453, 454; Id., 453, 458; 201 C. 534, 556, 558, 559.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 534, 556, 558, 559. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 598, 601. Subdiv. (3) cited. 202 C. 520, 523, 524. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 520, 526. Subdiv. (3): Not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629, 631, 635, 641-643.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 203 C. 466, 467; 204 C. 120, 121. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205 C. 279-281. Subdiv. (1) cited. 206 C. 278, 279.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 207 C. 276, 278. Subdiv. (1) cited. 209 C. 133, 135. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 441-444. Subdiv. (1) cited.
212 C. 612, 613. Subdiv. (2) cited. 213 C. 500, 502. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 579, 580. Subdiv. (3) cited. 214 C. 57, 61, 66.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 57, 65. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 77, 85, 87. Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 220, 221. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
699, 701, 708, 709, 715, 717. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 699, 708, 709. Subdiv. (1) cited. 217 C. 498, 501, 503. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id., 498-503. Subdiv. (2) cited. 218 C. 766, 769. Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 16, 21. Subdiv. (3) cited. 220 C. 169, 172.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 285, 288, 298, 299. Subdiv. (3) cited. 222 C. 444, 447, 448. Cited. 223 C. 273, 274. Subdiv. (1) cited.
224 C. 546, 547. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 55, 63, 69. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 55, 63, 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 55, 64.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 456, 476. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 456, 476. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 566, 567, 570, 575. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id., 611, 612. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 118, 127. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 147, 148. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id., 147, 148. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 281, 303. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. 229 C. 193, 194. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 397, 399. Subdiv. (2) cited. 230 C. 183, 223. Subdiv. (1) cited. 231 C. 115, 137. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv
(2) cited. Id., 115, 139. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 484, 486. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 106, 118. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 174, 175, 189, 190. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 174, 189. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 215, 223.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 517. Subdiv. (3) cited. 235 C. 413, 414. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 473, 474. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. 236 C. 189, 198. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 342, 344. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
342, 344, 345. Subdiv. (3) cited. 238 C. 253. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 313. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 240 C.
395. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 727. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 743. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 799. Subdiv. (3) cited. 241 C. 502. Motion
to dismiss on grounds that Subdiv. (3) is unconstitutionally vague because legislature failed to define phrases "extreme
indifference to human life" and "grave risk of death" and defendant was not given "fair warning" and statute is susceptible
to "arbitrary enforcement" fails to meet burden of proof because person of ordinary intelligence would have had fair
warning that defendant's actions were proscribed and was properly denied by trial court. 257 C. 544. Based on established
principles concerning how evidence is construed, and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, evidence was sufficient
to support trial court's verdict of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. Id. Defendant who was convicted of
murder pursuant to Sec. 53a-54a(a) was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter as set
forth in subdiv. (1). 262 C. 453.
Subdiv. (3): To be guilty of violating this statute "a person must have the general intent to engage in the proscribed
conduct." 5 CA 571-573, 576-578. Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA 457, 458, 560. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 656. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8
CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 9 CA 147, 148; judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278 et seq. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 11 CA 425, 427; Id., 628, 630, 631. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 628-631; 13 CA 175, 176. Subdiv. (1) cited. 17 CA
502, 504; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 602, 604, 605. Subdiv. (3) cited. 18 CA 423,
424. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 576, 577. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 609, 610, 612. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 674, 682. Subdiv. (3)
cited. 20 CA 410, 411. Subdiv. (3) cited. 21 CA 138, 145. Subdiv. (3) cited. 22 CA 265, 266. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 321,
322. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 340, 341, 344, 350. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 507, 508. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 521, 522. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 669, 670. Subdiv. (3) cited. 23 CA 431, 432. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 502-505. Subdiv. (1) cited. 24 CA 115, 117.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 586. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 586, 587. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 692, 694, 695. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 692,
695. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA 456, 457, 460-462. Cited. Id., 456, 461. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 456, 467. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 734, 735. Subdiv. (3) cited. 26 CA 165, 166. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 242, 243. Cited. Id., 259, 261.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 259, 266-268, 278. Subdiv. (1) cited. 27 CA 1-3, 5, 10. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 520, 521. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 643, 644. Subdiv. (3) cited. 28 CA 34, 35, 37, 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 81, 82, 87-89. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
231, 233. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 771, 773. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 771-775, 777, 778. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 825-827, 829-
831. Cited. 29 CA 68, 69; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 566 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 162, 163; judgment reversed,
see 229 C. 397 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 394, 396. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 452, 453. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 533, 534.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 754, 755, 758. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 773, 774. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 26, 27. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 232, 234. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 385, 386. Subdiv. (3) cited. 32 CA 687, 688, 695-697. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 687,
695. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 854-856. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 116, 117. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 782, 783, 791, 792. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 34 CA 236, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 368, 369; see also 233 C. 517 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. 35 CA 138, 139,
141. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 374, 375; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 438, 439, 444, 446.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 438, 444. Cited. 37 CA 180, 181. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 180, 184, 185. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 404, 414. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 473, 474. Cited. Id., 722, 723. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 722, 728, 729. Cited. 38 CA 801,
802. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 815, 818. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 224, 240, 242. Subdiv. (1) cited Id., 242, 253. Subdiv. (3)
cited. 40 CA 151, 152, 164. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 831, 832. Subdiv. (1) cited. 42 CA 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 382.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 43 CA 252. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 488. Cited. 44 CA 790. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 731. Subdiv. (1) cited.
46 CA 216. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Evidence presented at trial concerning a healthy one-year-old left
in defendant's care was sufficient to support conviction. 47 CA 188. Subdiv. (1): Criminal liability as an accessory to
manslaughter in the first degree has long been recognized under this state's jurisprudence. 49 CA 121. To be guilty under
this subsection, it must be established that defendant must have had the general intent to engage in the proscribed conduct.
56 CA 742. Subdiv. (3): Action of defendant in entering house, after car chase, obtaining loaded shotgun, walking 100
feet to edge of driveway and shooting victim showed an extreme indifference to human life. 61 CA 463.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 44 CS 417.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 211 C. 591, 612.
Sec. 53a-55a. Manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm: Class B felony:
Five years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree
with a firearm when he commits manslaughter in the first degree as provided in section
53a-55, and in the commission of such offense he uses, or is armed with and threatens
the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol,
revolver, shotgun, machine gun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be found guilty
of manslaughter in the first degree and manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm
upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such
offenses upon the same information.
(b) Manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm is a class B felony and any person
found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in accordance with subdivision (4) of section 53a-35a of which five years of the sentence imposed
may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 3; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 1.)
History: July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision that any person found guilty under this section
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(4) and increase the nonsuspendable sentence
from one year to five years.
Cited. 190 C. 639, 640, 650, 653. Cited. 192 C. 85, 87. Cited. 193 C. 695, 730, 731. Cited. 198 C. 77, 78. Cited. Id.,
454, 455, 458, 475. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 225 C. 559, 561.
Cited. 10 CA 357. Cited. 11 CA 425, 427. Cited. 17 CA 97, 98. Cited. 21 CA 801. Cited. 23 CA 502-505. Cited. 25
CA 734, 735. Cited. 26 CA 259, 260, 262, 265, 278. Cited. 33 CA 116, 117. Cited. 37 CA 722, 723, 728. Cited. 39 CA
224, 226, 236. Cited. Id., 242, 244, 252.
Subsec. (a):
Court's instructions on intent as element of manslaughter unconstitutional since they could be interpreted as creating
a conclusive or burden-shifting presumption. 180 C. 171, 173, 177. Cited. 195 C. 160, 161. Cited. 199 C. 383, 384. Cited.
203 C. 466, 467. Cited. 206 C. 346, 348, 350. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295. Cited. 33 CA 116, 117.
Cited. 26 CA 259, 260. Subdiv. (1) cited. 27 CA 263, 265. Cited. 37 CA 722, 723. Cited. 39 CA 224, 238.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 206 C. 346, 358. Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Cited. 7 CA 223, 235.
Sec. 53a-56. Manslaughter in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person
is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: (1) He recklessly causes the death
of another person; or (2) he intentionally causes or aids another person, other than by
force, duress or deception, to commit suicide.
(b) Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 57.)
Cited. 169 C. 309, 322. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 188 C. 542, 544, 545. Cited. 195 C. 232, 234. Manslaughter is
not a lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421, 428. Cited. 199 C. 631, 633. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited.
202 C. 629, 632. Cited. 210 C. 78, 106. Cited. 212 C. 593, 607. Cited. 213 C. 579, 583. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 217
C. 498, 500. Cited. 226 C. 237, 250. Cited. 227 C. 566, 570. Cited. 236 C. 342, 344.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 181, 183. Cited. 11 CA 425, 426, 428. Cited. 19 CA 674, 682. Cited. 21 CA 654, 655. Cited. 24 CA
586, 588. Cited. 26 CA 448, 454. Cited. 32 CA 687, 695. Cited. Id., 759, 761, 764. Cited. 37 CA 722, 729. Cited. 42 CA
348. Cited re evidence sufficient to sustain conviction. 51 CA 814.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 174 C. 89, 90, 95. Subdiv. (1): Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder although the state
of mind required is different. 180 C. 382, 403, 408. Subdiv. (1) cited. 185 C. 63, 66. Cited. 187 C. 6, 29. Subdiv. (1) cited.
193 C. 632, 640. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 127. Subdiv. (1) cited. 195 C. 232, 237. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 155, 159.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 202 C. 629, 635, 660. Subdiv. (1) cited. 206 C. 657, 667. Subdiv. (1) cited. 212 C. 593, 608. Cited. 213
C. 579, 585. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 579, 585, 586. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 57, 61, 66. Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 16, 18, 21.
Cited. Id., 16, 22. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 444, 447. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 55, 63, 64, 69. Cited. 226 C. 20, 21. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 20, 22, 31. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 118, 127. Cited. Id., 147, 149, 152, 155. Subdiv. (1) cited. 231 C. 115,
137. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 253.
Cited. 5 CA 157, 158. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 338. Cited. 7 CA 180, 183. Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 628-632. Cited. 17
CA 502, 511; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 20 CA 430, 431. Cited. 24 CA 586, 588. Cited.
25 CA 456, 467. Subdiv. (1) cited. 26 CA 448, 449, 458. Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 771, 773. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 825,
830. Cited. 30 CA 95, 96, 99, 101; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 854, 855. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 37 CA 722, 729. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 815, 818. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 47, 48.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 202 C. 629, 638.
Sec. 53a-56a. Manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm: Class C felony: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second
degree with a firearm when he commits manslaughter in the second degree as provided
in section 53a-56, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and
threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses
a pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be found
guilty of manslaughter in the second degree and manslaughter in the second degree with
a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted
for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm is a class C felony for which
one year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 4.)
Cited. 199 C. 631, 633, 636, 643. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. 207 C. 191, 192. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 227
C. 456, 476. Cited. 228 C. 281, 303.
Cited. 10 CA 697-699.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-56b. Manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class
C felony. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor
vehicle when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or any drug or both, he causes the death of another person as a consequence of the effect
of such liquor or drug.
(b) Manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle is a class C felony and
the court shall suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating
privilege of any person found guilty under this section for one year.
(P.A. 82-403, S. 1; P.A. 83-534, S. 8; P.A. 85-147, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 83-534 amended Subsec. (b) to require the court to suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or
nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty for one year; P.A. 85-147 deleted "while intoxicated" from the
title of the offense and a provision that defined "intoxication" to include intoxication by alcohol or by drug or both, and
replaced elements of offense of "when, in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle, he causes the
death of another person" with "when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any
drug or both, he causes the death of another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor or drug".
See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.
Cited. 193 C. 632, 640. Cited. 213 C. 74, 76, 80. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 219 C. 752, 757. Cited. 229 C. 228,
230. There is no language in section to indicate expressly that legislature intended that a person convicted of second degree
manslaughter with a motor vehicle could not also be convicted of first degree manslaughter. 263 C. 390.
Cited. 5 CA 378, 379. Cited. 9 CA 686, 730. Cited. 11 CA 122, 123, 125-128, 130, 132. Cited. Id., 473, 481. Cited.
12 CA 129, 130. Cited. Id., 294, 295, 297, 298, 300-303. Cited. 16 CA 358, 360-363, 365, 366. Cited. 18 CA 223-225.
Cited. 21 CA 138, 139, 144, 145. Cited. 22 CA 108, 109. Cited. 23 CA 215, 216. Cited. Id., 720, 722. Cited. 29 CA 825,
831, 834. Cited. 34 CA 557, 564. Cited. Id., 655, 664. Cited. 36 CA 710, 713. Cited. 40 CA 359, 360.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 11 CA 122-124, 126. Sec. 53a-57 not a lesser included offense. Id., 473, 474, 481. Cited. 20 CA 495, 496. Cited.
21 CA 138, 139, 141, 143, 144. Cited. 29 CA 825, 831, 834.
Sec. 53a-57. Misconduct with a motor vehicle: Class D felony. (a) A person is
guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle when, with criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, he causes the death of another person.
(b) Misconduct with a motor vehicle is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 58; P.A. 76-16; P.A. 82-403, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 76-16 defined "intoxication" for purposes of section; P.A. 82-403 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting the
provision that a person is guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle when he causes the death of another person "in
consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle" and by deleting the definition of "intoxication".
See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.
Cited. 174 C. 112, 113, 116. Cited. Id., 118. Cited. 176 C. 445, 446; id., 451, 454, 455, 459. Cited. 188 C. 620, 621.
Cited. 202 C. 629, 638-640. Cited. 207 C. 336, 337. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 222 C. 444, 449. Cited. 229 C. 228, 230.
Cited. 3 CA 137, 138. Violation of Sec. 14-222a, negligent homicide with a motor vehicle, is a lesser included offense
of misconduct with a motor vehicle. 9 CA 686-689, 695, 710, 721, 723. Not a lesser included offense of Sec. 53a-56b(a).
11 CA 473, 474, 481, 482. Cited. 15 CA 392, 393. Cited. 16 CA 497, 507. Cited. 21 CA 138, 144. Cited. 22 CA 108, 111.
Cited. 23 CA 720. Cited. 28 CA 283, 284, 289. Cited. 29 CA 825, 826, 831, 833-835, 837, 839. Cited. 30 CA 428, 429.
Cited. 34 CA 655, 665. Conviction upheld where defendant became aware that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was
impaired, yet continued to operate the motor vehicle. 64 CA 631.
Cited. 35 CS 519, 521. Cited. 36 CS 527, 529.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 176 C. 451, 452, 454.
Cited. 3 CA 137, 138. Cited. 11 CA 473, 474. Cited. 20 CA 495, 497. Cited. 23 CA 720, 723. Cited. 29 CA 825, 826,
832. This subsec. and Sec. 14-223(b) contain multiple elements that are dissimilar, and the clear language of the statutes
themselves is sufficient for conclusion that they do not impose two punishments for the same act. 84 CA 351.
Sec. 53a-58. Criminally negligent homicide: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes
the death of another person, except where the defendant caused such death by a motor
vehicle.
(b) Criminally negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 59.)
Cited. 174 C. 89, 95. Criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of murder although the state of mind
required is different. 180 C. 382, 403, 408. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 185 C. 63, 76, 78. Cited. 187 C. 6, 29. Cited.
195 C. 232, 242. Cited. 202 C. 520, 521, 525. Cited. Id., 629, 640, 641. Cited. 204 C. 410, 411, 426. Cited. Id., 429, 433.
Cited. 212 C. 593, 607, 608. Cited. 213 C. 579, 590, 592. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 223 C. 273, 275. Cited. 226 C.
237, 250. Cited. 227 C. 456, 476. Cited. 228 C. 118, 127. Trial court improperly refused to instruct jury on this lesser
included offense. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Ray, 30 CA 95, reversed. Id., 147, 149, 155. Cited. Id., 281, 303.
Cited. 238 C. 253.
Cited. 17 CA 502, 519; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 586, 588. Cited. 26 CA 448, 454. Cited.
28 CA 388, 389. Cited. Id., 771, 773. Cited. 30 CA 95, 99, 101, 103; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Cited. Id.,
232, 243. Cited. 32 CA 687, 695. Cited. 35 CA 438, 444.
Cited. 40 CS 498, 501.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 201 C. 174, 187-189. Cited. 202 C. 629, 639. Cited. 213 C. 579, 590. Cited. 214 C. 57, 61, 68. Cited. 223 C.
273, 275. Cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Cited. 231 C. 115, 137.
Cited. 24 CA 586, 588. Cited. 34 CA 368, 382; see also 233 C. 517 et seq.
Sec. 53a-58a. Negligent homicide with a motor vehicle. Section 53a-58a is repealed.
(P.A. 73-639, S. 5; P.A. 81-26, S. 2.)
See Sec. 14-222a re negligent homicide with a motor vehicle.
PART V*
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-11:
Court had authority to impose consecutive life sentences for two second degree murders. 152 C. 600-602. Cited. 154
C. 622, 624.
Cited. 25 CS 473.
Annotations to former section 53-12:
Person charged with assault with intent to murder may be convicted of assault with intent to kill. 8 C. 498; 9 C. 260;
19 C. 392; 90 C. 383. A man who is assailed under such circumstances as to authorize a reasonable belief that the assault
is with design to take his life is justified in killing his assailant. 32 C. 83; 105 C. 349; 106 C. 455. Evidence of threats by
third party against party assaulted, inadmissible. 53 C. 536; but see 63 C. 47. Assault with intent to murder may be prosecuted
by information of state's attorney. 60 C. 92. What constitutes; ill-will towards victim; malice and intent. 84 C. 470; 106
C. 351. Specific intent necessary; insanity as a defense. 84 C. 81. Malice aforethought required, but intent need not be
premeditated. 106 C. 351. Definition of malice aforethought. Id. Reputation of deceased for violence, where accused claims
self-defense, is admissible only when such reputation was known to accused; and only when hostile demonstrations of
deceased would not have warranted extreme defensive measures except when considered in light of such knowledge. Id.,
456. Reputation may never be shown by proof of specific acts of violence; id., 457; nor to establish probability that deceased
was the aggressor. Id., 459. Cited. 140 C. 398; 149 C. 656; 154 C. 41, 42; id., 302, 303, 156 C. 341. Evidence of other
subsequent criminal acts committed by defendants against person whom they are charged with assaulting may be received
in evidence as admission by conduct. 159 C. 169. Cited. 167 C. 539. Cited. 178 C. 534, 536.
Annotations to former section 53-14:
Facts of assault held to justify inference of intention to maim and disfigure. 95 C. 145. General verdict of guilty where
information is under this statute and also charges aggravated assault under Sec. 53-16. Id. Failure to charge that verdict of
simple or aggravated assault was possible held no error when verdict of robbery by violence returned: lesser crime necessarily included in verdict as returned. 105 C. 765. There is a distinction between force used by a robber in removing property
from the person and the violence which aggravates a simple robbery and makes it robbery with violence. The latter force
may be exercised at any time, so long as it forms a part of the transaction in which the robbery is committed. 143 C. 368.
Cited. 140 C. 613; 149 C. 694; 152 C. 628; 153 C. 584; 155 C. 593. Plaintiff's plea of guilty entered knowingly, voluntarily
and on advice of counsel was waiver of defective bench warrant on which he was arrested as it was consent to jurisdiction
of the court. 157 C. 143. Jury could reasonably find violent intent required by this section where defendant committed
robbery with gun. History of section reviewed. 157 C. 464. Pretrial lineup identification of defendant by storeowner he
had robbed two hours before was proper evidence. 159 C. 143. Cited. 160 C. 37. Cited. 160 C. 85. Cited. Id., 519. Cited.
165 C. 104. Cited. 169 C. 38.
Cited. 22 CS 493; 23 CS 82; 24 CS 120; 305; 386; 26 CS 53; 77. Brutality of defendant in repeatedly clubbing his
victim with a tire iron justified sentence of court below as the least protection to which society is entitled. 27 CS 340.
Where seventeen-year-old defendant had robbed a grocery store and violently attacked its seventy-three-year-old proprietor, sentence of indefinite term at Connecticut Reformatory was affirmed as defendant had prior extensive juvenile record.
Id., 360. Cited. 28 CS 15; id., 196.
Annotation to former section 53-15:
Cited. 162 C. 6.
Annotations to former section 53-16:
Razor may be found to be a deadly or dangerous weapon. 95 C. 145; and so may a sawed-off billiard cue. 106 C. 352.
Accused entitled to instruction as to simple assault, when. 131 C. 135. Cited. 140 C. 398; 154 C. 41, 42; id., 302, 303.
Elements of crime discussed. 146 C. 527. Defendant who rushed three men to scene of assault, himself wrestled with police
officers and otherwise resisted their authority could reasonably have been found by trial jury to have abetted his son in
committing aggravated assault on one of the officers. 155 C. 531. Intent is a question of fact, determination of which should
stand unless conclusion drawn by trier is unreasonable. 157 C. 351. Subsequent assaults by defendant on his wife and
officers called in to protect her were admissible evidence where defense was self-defense and accidental injury. 158 C.
149. Cited. 165 C. 61. Cited. 167 C. 539.
Cited. 22 CS 208; 24 CS 355; 27 CS 430.
Razor found deadly and dangerous within meaning of statute. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 446, 448. Fact that assault was not
directed against actual victim does not excuse or mitigate crime. Id. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 652.
Annotation to former section 53-19:
Cited. 169 C. 38.
Annotations to former section 53-174:
An assault with "intent to drown and suffocate" not within this statute. 5 C. 330. A breach of the peace under this section
may be committed without assault or battery. 29 C. 72. Assailing party with scurrilous and abusive language is a "mocking"
under this section. 34 C. 279. Effect of provision concerning libelous publications. 90 C. 98. Elements necessary where
offense is tumultuous behavior. 75 C. 205. Interrupting a school under former statute. 26 C. 607; 28 C. 232; 82 C. 321.
Does not define breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it; it may be committed in other ways.
126 C. 5. Not necessary that information contain an allegation that publications were maliciously made if there is no
mention of privilege. 148 C. 208. Not necessary to prove a breach of the peace to support a conviction of libel. Id. Cited.
97 C. 138; 124 C. 557; 145 C. 124; 147 C. 704; 148 C. 77; 153 C. 208; 157 C. 226. Cited. 162 C. 383. Cited. 165 C. 288,
291, 294.
Annotations to former statute prohibiting acts calculated to intimidate: To threaten and use means to intimidate a
company against its will to abstain from keeping in its employ workmen of its own choice is within the prohibition of the
statute. 55 C. 70, 71; 92 C. 168. Statute as applied to strike. 77 C. 237; 79 C. 13; id., 416. Necessary allegations of
information; intimidation need not result. 80 C. 614; 81 C. 696. Notice by bricklayers' union to contractors and employers
that members would not work if nonunion men were employed held no violation of this statute on particular facts. 92 C.
168. Does not require proof of assault and battery. No specific intent is essential. It is sufficient that the acts intentionally
committed cause serious disquietude on the part of those in the vicinity. 140 C. 586. Cited. 142 C. 605.
Cited. 5 CS 507; 22 CS 361; 23 CS 294; id., 344; id., 455; 24 CS 354; 25 CS 483; 27 CS 128. "Peace" defined: It is
not the law that there is no breach of the peace unless public repose is disturbed. Numerous abusive and indecent telephone
calls held breach of the peace. (Now see Sec. 53a-183.) Where minor defendant was committed to reformatory for violation
of this section, there should have been presentence investigation and report as defendant could have been detained therein
for as much as two years. 26 CS 504, 505. Petitioner by habeas corpus petition challenged her commitment for indefinite
term for breach of peace, when section 17-360 provides maximum sentence of one year for this misdemeanor and sentence
ordered modified. 28 CS 9.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 200; id., 611; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 224, 227; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 68; id., 90; id., 413, 416; id., 476, 477;
id., 538. Abusive and threatening language uttered over telephone constituted violation. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 288. (Now see
Sec. 53-174a.) Defendant's contention that conduct involving one or two persons and occurring in an isolated place could
not constitute breach of the peace was without merit. Id., 648. Time is not an essential element of crime of breach of peace
unless date is material to the defense. Id., 649. Mere presence of defendant as inactive companion would not make him an
accessory to breach of peace. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 138. Breach of peace may be found if alleged offensive act is of such a
character that it naturally tends to cause serious disquietude on part of those in vicinity where act is likely to exercise its
malignity. Id., 423. "Provokes contention" does not require that blows be struck. Id., 550, 552. Statute provides its own
definition of "mocking". Id. Although defendant did not take part in assault, he is guilty under statute because everyone
is party to an offense who directly or indirectly counsels or procures any person to commit the offense or do any act forming
a part thereof. Id., 610, 613. Defendant properly charged with breach of peace when he violated curfew imposed by mayor
of New Haven when riotous conditions existed in the city. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22. Right to constitutional procedural safeguards
applicable to charges of misdemeanor. Id., 178. Evidence of defendant magazine salesman's forcible amorous assault on
complainant housewife in her home warranted his conviction of crime of breach of peace by assault. Id., 186. Statute does
not define crime of breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it and defendant garage owners
threatened assault on complaining witness in his shop warranted his conviction under it. Id., 298. Constitutionality of this
statute properly raised by demurrer upon ground it is unconstitutionally vague. Demurrer overruled as language used in
statute is plain and unambiguous and legislative intent clearly expressed. Id., 384. Cited. Id., 311; 517. Section does not
define crime of breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it. It may be committed in ways other
than those specified. Offensive acts must be of such character that they tend naturally to cause serious disquietude on part
of those in vicinity. Id., 583. Evidence of prior altercation between defendant and victim's son which led immediately to
attack on the father admissible on question of motive. Id., 607. There was sufficient evidence on which trial court found
defendant had committed assault and battery and appeal court cannot retry case. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 14. Defendant in resisting
an unlawful arrest was not guilty of breach of peace. Id., 42. Cited. Id., 90, 402, 403, 404, 405, 431.
Annotations to former section 53-207:
Cited. 23 CS 427, 428, 429.
Annotations to former section 54-117:
Averment "against statute" does not vitiate and may be rejected as surplusage. 3 D. 103. Assault with intent to kill, a
high crime and misdemeanor at common law. 3 C. 114; 5 C. 330. High crime and misdemeanor is an immoral and unlawful
act, not strictly a felony. 6 C. 217; id., 476. Nuisance does not constitute. 6 C. 418; but see 7 C. 431. Solicitation to commit
adultery a high crime and misdemeanor at common law. 7 C. 270. Escape from prison without prison breach or violence
an offense at common law. Id., 452. Attempt to steal offense at common law. 30 C. 500. Conspiracy a crime at common
law; and punishable under this statute. 69 C. 725; 75 C. 210; 77 C. 227; 86 C. 434; 124 C. 562; 126 C. 84; 127 C. 604. High
crime, felony, misdemeanor, defined. 86 C. 434; id., 627. Conspiracy to commit assault is high crime and misdemeanor. 86
C. 434. Conspiracy to commit crime is not merged in crime itself. 99 C. 114. Definition of merger; when merger exists;
is a doctrine of very limited application. 108 C. 215. Identity of offenses. Id., 214. Cited. 162 C. 2.
Cited. 29 CS 305. Obstructing justice offense restricted in application. 29 CS 305.
Sec. 53a-59. Assault in the first degree: Class B felony: Nonsuspendable sentences. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause
serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a
third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (2) with intent
to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable
permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such injury to such person or to
a third person; or (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human
life he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to another person,
and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person; or (4) with intent to cause
serious physical injury to another person and while aided by two or more other persons
actually present, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (5) with
intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person
or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm.
(b) Assault in the first degree is a class B felony provided (1) any person found guilty
under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court
and (2) any person found guilty under subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or
reduced by the court if the victim of the offense is a person under ten years of age or if
the victim of the offense is a witness, as defined in section 53a-146, and the actor knew
the victim was a witness.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 60; P.A. 80-442, S. 16, 28; P.A. 92-87, S. 1; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 3; P.A. 95-142, S. 12; P.A.
99-240, S. 13.)
History: P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (b) requiring at least five years' imprisonment for person found guilty
under Subsec. (a)(1), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 92-87 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re causing serious
physical injury to another person while aided by two or more other persons actually present; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2
amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (5) re causing physical injury to another person or to a third person by means of
the discharge of a firearm; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (b) by adding Subdiv. (2) requiring the defendant to be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the
victim is under ten years of age; P.A. 99-240 amended Subsec. (b) to make the nonsuspendable sentence of Subdiv. (2)
applicable if the victim of the offense is a witness, as defined in Sec. 53a-146, and the actor knew the victim was a witness.
Cited. 171 C. 264. Whether physical injury sustained by victim was "serious" was question of fact for the jury. 175 C.
204, 207. Cited. 191 C. 142. Cited. 193 C. 333, 334. Cited. 196 C. 18, 21. Cited. 200 C. 607, 608. Cited. 203 C. 484, 486,
488. Cited. 207 C. 233, 234. Cited. 209 C. 34, 38. Cited. 211 C. 441, 449. Cited. 215 C. 739, 743. Cited. 221 C. 402, 405.
Cited. 227 C. 301, 302, 312. Cited. 239 C. 467. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 389.
Cited. 3 CA 607, 623. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 11 CA 621, 623, 625. Cited. Id., 699,
700, 703, 706. Cited. 13 CA 139, 140. Cited. 14 CA 244, 245. Cited. Id., 309, 320. Cited. 17 CA 200, 201. Cited. 19 CA
654, 656. Cited. 20 CA 437, 438. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 21 CA 557, 565. Cited. 25 CA 171, 172. Cited. 34 CA 103,
116. Cited. 35 CA 107, 109, 110. Cited. Id., 609, 615. Cited. Id., 762, 763, 766. Cited. 36 CA 336, 337. Cited. 37 CA 180,
185. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 777, 779. Cited. 39 CA 333, 336. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. 42 CA 624. Cited. 43
CA 549. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. 46 CA 691. Assault statute provides for intent to be transferred and does not require that
defendant be aware of the presence of unintended victim. 84 CA 263.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 348.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 169 C. 428, 429, 431. Cited. 172 C. 94, 95. Cited. Id., 275. Cited. 173 C. 254-256. Evidence victim
suffered various broken facial bones and spent eleven days in hospital was sufficient to show the "serious physical injury"
required for conviction. Id., 389. Cited. 174. C. 16, 17. Cited. Id., 604, 605. Subdiv. (3) cited. 175 C. 204, 205, 207; 176
C. 138, 139. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 116, 118; id., 448-450; 180 C. 481, 482; id., 557, 560. Subdiv. (1) cited. 182 C. 449,
451, 460, 467; id., 501. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 585, 586, 588, 594; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had
ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other
charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.; Subdiv. (1) cited. 183 C. 29, 30.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 184 C. 400, 402-404. Subdiv. (1) cited. 185 C. 63, 65. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 372,
373; 186 C. 1, 2, 7; id., 17, 18, 25; id., 654-657, 663, 664, 673; 187 C. 199, 200, 201, 214 (Diss. Op.); id., 681, 683; 189
C. 61; id., 303, 306, 310; 190 C. 219, 233. Subdiv. (3) cited. 191 C. 12, 13. Subdiv. (1) cited. 193 C. 48, 51. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 474, 475. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 632-634, 639, 643. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 89, 90. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 119, 126. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 119, 127. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 408, 412. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 195 C. 475, 476. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 651, 652, 655. Subdiv. (1) cited. 196 C. 395, 401. Cited. 197 C. 602, 603.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 602, 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 23, 24. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 23, 31. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199
C. 155, 159. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 322, 327. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 322, 327, 328. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 322, 327, 329. Subdiv. (1) cited. 200 C. 642, 643, 650; 202 C. 259, 260; Id., 463, 464, 488. Subdiv. (3): Not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629, 631, 635. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C. 207, 208. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 523, 524. Subdiv. (1) cited. 205 C. 370, 371; Id., 673, 675. Subdiv. (3) cited. 208 C. 38-41. Subdiv. (1) cited. 209 C.
322, 323. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 619, 621. Subdiv. (3) cited. 211 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 441, 443-445. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 212 C. 50, 52. Subdiv. (1) cited. 213 C. 97, 98. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 122, 123; Id., 344, 347. Cited. Id., 717,
720. Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 188, 189; Id., 492, 493. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 585, 586, 592, 593, 602. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
647, 649; 217 C. 243, 244, 248, 250. Subdiv. (3) cited. 218 C. 747, 748. Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 16, 21. Cited. Id., 363,
365. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 363, 365, 367-370. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 220 C. 385, 388; Id., 408, 409; 221
C. 402, 403, 405; Id., 915. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 444, 447, 448. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
718, 720. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 450, 452, 455. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 524-526. Cited. 227 C. 301, 311, 312. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 301, 312, 315, 316, 318-320. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Assault statute cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 518, 519. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 711, 713. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 751, 752. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 751-753. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 234, 235. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 335, 336. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 178, 179. Subdiv. (3) cited. 230 C. 608, 610. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 231 C. 235, 237. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 473, 474. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.,
746. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 748, 750, 751. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 694. Subdiv. (1): Under appropriate circumstances a
defendant can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, same person; judgment of appellate
court in State v. Williams, 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 239
C. 467. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 481. Subdiv. (1) cited. 240 C. 395. Subdiv. (1) cited. 241 C. 665. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 802. Subdiv. (3) cited. 242 C. 143. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 389. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 485. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 723. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 745. Subdiv. (3): Criminal conduct can arise by an omission to act when there is a legal
duty to do so and defendant who had established a familial relationship with victim's mother and her children, had assumed
responsibility for the welfare of the children and had taken care of the children as though he were their father, had a legal
duty to protect victim from abuse and breach of that duty exposed defendant to criminal liability. 245 C. 209. Subdiv. (5)
cited. 247 C. 662. Defendant was not without fair warning and his due process rights were not denied by court's holding
construing a common law duty to act under section. 260 C. 93. Evidence that child abuse victim had sustained obvious
injuries was sufficient to support defendant's conviction based on his failure to act. Id. Re double jeopardy claim, defendant
failed to meet his burden of proving that his conviction with regard to different injuries arose out of the same act. Id. This
section and Sec. 53-21 do not stand in relationship to each other as greater and lesser included offenses and are not the
same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 1 CA 609, 616. Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 607, 608. Subdiv. (1) cited. 5 CA 40,
42, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 590, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 124, 125, 140, 141. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 124, 138, 140.
Cited. Id., 124, 138, 141. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 124, 140, 141. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 469. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 476, 477.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA 309, 310. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 119, 120. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 176, 177. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.,
545, 547-549. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 545, 548, 549; Id., 631, 632. Subdiv. (3) cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
169, 170; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 330, 331. Subdiv. (3) cited. 10 CA 103, 104.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 176, 177; Id., 302, 303; Id., 462-464; Id., 643, 645. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 643-645, 651. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 11 CA 499; Id., 621, 622, 625. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 699-702. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 217; Id., 655, 656; 13 CA
12; Id., 120, 121; Id., 237, 238. Id., 237, 238; Id., 687, 688; Id., 824. Subdiv. (3) cited. 14 CA 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
140; Id., 309, 310. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 493, 494, 496. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 511, 512; 15 CA 34, 35, 47. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 416, 417. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 531, 532, 534. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704, 706, 710, 711, 712, 715. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 16 CA 184, 186. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 206, 207. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 346, 347. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 390, 391.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 17 CA 391, 394. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 477, 478. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 174, 175. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 654, 656. Subdiv. (1) cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. 21 CA 688, 689,
716; 22 CA 199, 201. Subdiv. (1) cited. 22 CA 340, 341. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 610-613. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610-611;
23 CA 28, 29; Id., 315, 316; Id., 663, 664; Id., 692, 693; 24 CA 152, 153; Id., 264, 266; Id., 316, 318; Id., 556, 559; Id.,
563, 567-569; Id., 624, 625, 627; 25 CA 171, 173, 175. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 171, 173, 175; Id., 243, 245. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 275, 276, 278, 279. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 434; Id., 578, 579, 582; Id., 619-621. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 26 CA 52, 53; Id., 114, 116, 124; Id., 145, 146. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 331, 332, 337, 340. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
367, 368; Id., 433, 434, 436; Id., 641, 642, 647, 653, 654; 27 CA 73, 74, 92, 93. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 73, 93. Cited. Id.,
322-324. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322, 324, 330. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 322-327, 330, 332, 333. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 654, 655, 665. Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 34, 35. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 290, 291, 302, 304. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 290, 301, 302. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 402, 404, 413. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 548, 549. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 825, 829,
830. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 833, 834; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 518 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 29 CA 59, 60, 62-64.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 262, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704, 705. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 744, 745. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA
9, 10. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 232, 234, 237, 239.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 359, 360. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 406, 407; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 606, 607, 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 58, 59. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 553, 559. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 33 CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 122, 123. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 743, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C.
502 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 103, 104. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 223, 224, 226, 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 261, 262,
271. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 691, 692. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 807, 808, 812. Subdiv. (1) cited.
35 CA 51, 53. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 51, 52, 59, 61, 63. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 138, 139. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 279, 280.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 609, 616. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 699, 700. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 740, 743.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 41, 42. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 473, 474. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 484. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 506,
507. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 576, 577. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 697. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 805, 807.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 831, 852. Subdiv. (3) cited. 37 CA 21, 22. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 180-182, 184. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 464, 466. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 749, 752. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 777, 786. Subdiv. (3) cited. 39
CA 18, 19; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 18, 19, 23, 24. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 333, 335.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 563, 564. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 645, 646. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 40 CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 387, 388, 395. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 484. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 515-517.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 624, 625. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 515, 517. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 565, 566. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
831, 832. Subdiv. (4) cited. 42 CA 307. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 371. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 205.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 488. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 578. Cited. 44 CA 6. Subdiv. (1) cited. id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. id., 26. Cited. Id., 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 476. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 499. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 45 CA 270. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 591. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 684. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 734. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id. Offenses described in Subdivs. (1) and (4) are two separate offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 53 CA 581. To
secure conviction for assault in the first degree under Subdiv. (1), state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to another person, did, in fact, cause serious physical injury to that
person and caused that injury by means of a dangerous instrument. 70 CA 232. There was sufficient evidence from which
jury reasonably could have found victim had suffered serious and permanent disfigurement and that defendant intended
to cause such serious and permanent disfigurement where defendant butted victim's face with his head, bit her face, struck
her on the head with a hairdryer, kicked her and attempted to choke her, resulting in scars to victim's face. 74 CA 633.
Defendant's actions in shaking infant with such violence as to cause injuries consistent with "shaken baby syndrome" was
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a reasonable person would observe and evinced extreme indifference to
human life. Id., 736. Subdiv. (2): Fact that the wounds actually inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean
that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 219 C. 363, 365. Cited. 221 C. 402, 405.
Cited. 8 CA 545, 548.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CS 347, 353.
Sec. 53a-59a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the first degree: Class B felony: Five years not suspendable. (a)
A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded
person in the first degree, when such person commits assault in the first degree under
section 53a-59(a)(2), 53a-59(a)(3) or 53a-59(a)(5) and (1) the victim of such assault
has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in
section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with mental
retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an
elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the first degree upon
the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both
such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the first degree is a class B felony and any person found guilty under this section shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed
may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 17, 28; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 4; P.A. 99-122, S. 1; 99-186, S. 14.)
History: P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (c) requiring five years' imprisonment for persons found guilty under
section provisions, effective July 1, 1981; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to Sec. 53a-59(a)(5); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the first degree" to "assault
of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the first degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to
add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor
is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution
based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the actor did not know the victim was a person with mental
retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a
victim sixty or older in the first degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the first degree"
where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added
new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did
not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors
recodified new Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person.
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 211 C. 1, 2. Cited. 230 C. 608, 610.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 14 CA 1, 2. Cited. 20 CA 467. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 35 CA 609, 615, 616.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 235 C. 502, 517.
Cited. 28 CA 402, 403. Cited. 40 CA 387, 388.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-59b. Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the
first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an employee of the
Department of Correction in the first degree when he is in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction or confined in any institution or facility of the Department of Correction and commits assault in the first degree under section 53a-59 and the victim of such
assault is an employee of the Department of Correction acting in the performance of
his duties.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an
employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree upon the same incident of
assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the
same information.
(c) Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree is a
class B felony. If any person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a violation of
this section which occurred while such person was confined in an institution or facility
of the Department of Correction, such term of imprisonment shall run consecutively to
the term for which the person was serving at the time of the assault.
(P.A. 93-246, S. 2.)
See Sec. 53a-167c re assault of an employee of the Department of Correction, employee or member of the Board of
Pardons and Paroles or probation officer.
Sec. 53a-59c. Assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault of a pregnant woman resulting
in termination of pregnancy when such person commits assault in the first degree as
provided under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-59 and (1) the victim
of such assault is pregnant, and (2) such assault results in the termination of pregnancy
that does not result in a live birth.
(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative
defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the
offense, did not know that the victim was pregnant.
(c) Assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy is a class A
felony.
(P.A. 03-21, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-60. Assault in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of assault in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury
to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) with
intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person
or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than
by means of the discharge of a firearm; or (3) he recklessly causes serious physical
injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
(4) for a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally
causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person
by administering to such person, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation
capable of producing the same; or (5) he is a parolee from a correctional institution and
with intent to cause physical injury to an employee or member of the Board of Pardons
and Paroles, he causes physical injury to such employee or member.
(b) Assault in the second degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 61; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 18; P.A. 73-639, S. 20; P.A. 84-236, S. 4; P.A. 93-246, S. 3; July Sp. Sess.
P.A. 94-2, S. 5; P.A. 04-234, S, 2.)
History: 1971 act added Subdiv. (6) in Subsec. (a) re physical injury to employee of department of correction or member
of parole board; P.A. 73-639 deleted former Subdiv. (3) re physical injury to peace officer or fireman resulting from
intentional attempt to prevent such person from performing his duty, renumbering accordingly; P.A. 84-236 amended
Subdiv. (5) of Subsec. (a) by changing "committed to" to "in the custody of" and adding phrase "confined in any institution
or facility of the department of correction"; P.A. 93-246 amended Subdiv. (5) of Subsec. (a) to delete from the scope of
the offense a person who is in the custody of the commissioner of correction or confined in any institution or facility of
the department of correction and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee of the department of correction causes
physical injury to such employee; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) to add "other than by means
of the discharge of a firearm" to reflect changes made to Sec. 53a-59 by same public act; P.A. 04-234 replaced Board of
Parole with Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective July 1, 2004.
Illegal confinement is no defense to assault on correctional officer. 169 C. 438, 441. Cited. 171 C. 264. Cited. 172 C.
275. Cited. 173 C. 254, 258, 259. Cited. 184 C. 157, 166; id., 520, 522. Cited. 193 C. 144, 145, 153. Cited. Id., 232, 243.
Cited. 197 C. 602, 603. Cited. 198 C. 23, 24. Cited. 199 C. 146, 147, 153. Cited. 216 C. 647, 661, 664. Cited. 222 C. 331,
335. Cited. 231 C. 545, 546, 555, 556, 560, 562, 563. Cited. 237 C. 238, 239.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. Id., 612-615. Cited. 7 CA 701, 702. Cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Cited. Id., 320, 321.
336. Cited. Id., 679, 681. Cited. 13 CA 667, 671. Cited. 17 CA 200, 201. Cited. 20 CA 75, 76, 80. Cited. 24 CA 13, 14.
Cited. 32 CA 224, 239, 240. Cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Cited. 35 CA 138, 148. Cited. Id., 431, 432. Cited. 36 CA 59, 60. Cited.
37 CA 338, 346. Cited. 38 CA 598, 599. Cited. 46 CA 486. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 741.
Cited. 34 CS 531, 540, 541.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 171 C. 395, 397. Cited. 175 C. 155-157, 160, 164. Subdiv. (2) cited. 184 C. 520, 521. Subdiv. (3)
cited. 185 C. 63, 66, 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 574, 576. Subdiv. (5) cited. 190 C. 143, 144. Subdiv. (1) cited. 193 C.
48, 56. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 126. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 119, 127.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 408, 412. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 195 C. 636. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 651, 653. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 405, 406. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 424, 425. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 322, 327. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 322, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited. 201 C. 103, 104; Id., 289, 290; 202 C. 520, 523, 524; 204 C. 207, 208; Id., 714,
716. Subdiv. (1) cited. 209 C. 733, 736. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 151, 154. Subdiv. (2) cited. 219 C. 721, 722; 220 C. 385,
388; 221 C. 447, 449. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 556, 559. Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 243, 244, 264. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
243, 245, 246, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. 226 C. 618, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 153, 155. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 711, 713.
Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 751, 753. Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 147, 149, 152. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 910. Subdiv. (5) cited. 230
C. 591, 593. Subdiv. (5) cited. 231 C. 545-549, 551-563. Cited. Id., 545, 556, 557, 559. Subdiv. (5) cited. 235 C. 748,
751. Subdiv. (5) cited. 237 C. 238, 239. Subdiv. (2) cited. 239 C. 481.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 1 CA 584, 585. Subdiv. (1) cited. 5 CA 40, 49. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 40, 42, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 590, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 701, 702, 706. Subdiv. (2) cited. 7 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 95, 96. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 377, 378. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 35. Subdiv. (2) cited. 9 CA 161, 162, 167, 168; 10 CA 50, 51; Id., 330,
331, 336, 344; Id., 462, 463; Id., 643-645, 652; 11 CA 665, 666; 13 CA 386, 387; 14 CA 463, 464; id., 472-474; Id., 493,
494, 497; Id., 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 704, 710. Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 226,
227. Subdiv. (2) cited. 19 CA 245, 246. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 576, 577. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (2) cited.
20 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 75, 76, 84. Subdiv. (3) cited. 22 CA 586, 587. Subdiv. (5) cited. 23 CA 83, 84. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 447-449. Cited. Id., 447, 450. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 502, 506. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 705, 706. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id., 705, 711. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 264, 266. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 563, 565; Id., 624, 625, 627. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 685, 686, 690. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA 104, 106. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 275, 278. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 565-567; 26
CA 114, 116; Id., 145, 146; Id., 242, 243. Subdiv. (3) cited. 27 CA 73, 88. Cited. Id., 322, 329, 330. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
322, 330. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 290, 302. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 645, 646.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 262, 263. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 95, 96, 99; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 31 CA 58, 59. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 140, 141, 145. Subdiv. (5) cited. 32 CA 224-226, 237-243. Subdiv. (5)
cited. Id., 448, 449. Subdiv. (3) cited. 33 CA 647, 650. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 691. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 35 CA 138, 139, 148, 151, 153. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 138, 148. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA
641, 642. Cited. Id., 805, 807. Subdiv. (2) cited. 37 CA 338, 339, 346, 347. Cited. Id., 338, 346, 347. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 338, 347. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 437, 438. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 247, 248. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
777, 786. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 868, 869, 876. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 789, 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 40 CA 757, 758.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 333-335, 338, 339, 341. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 517. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 565, 567. Cited. 43 CA 205. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 252. Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 125.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 307. Cited. 45 CA 591. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 46 CA 24. Cited.
Id., 741.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CS 494, 497. It is possible to prove assault in the second degree without necessarily proving risk
of injury pursuant to Sec. 53-21(a), so assault in the second degree and risk of injury do not stand in relationship to each
other as greater and lesser offenses. 48 CS 610.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 231 C. 545, 556.
Sec. 53a-60a. Assault in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: One
year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a
firearm when he commits assault in the second degree as provided in section 53a-60,
and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver,
machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be found guilty of assault
in the second degree and assault in the second degree with a firearm upon the same
transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon
the same information.
(b) Assault in the second degree with a firearm is a class D felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 5.)
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 9 CA 648, 649. Cited. 23 CA 502, 506. Cited. 45 CA 591.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 198 C. 424, 425. Cited. 200 C. 642, 643, 650. Cited. 201 C. 368, 369. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-60b. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree: Class D felony: Two years not suspendable.
(a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally
retarded person in the second degree when such person commits assault in the second
degree under section 53a-60 or larceny in the second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3)
and (1) the victim of such assault or larceny has attained at least sixty years of age, is
blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim
of such assault or larceny is a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or larceny in the
second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3) and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled,
pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree upon the same incident of
assault or larceny, as the case may be, but such person may be charged and prosecuted
for all such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the second degree is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed
may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 18, 28; P.A. 92-260, S. 29; P.A. 99-122, S. 2; 99-186, S. 15; P.A. 01-84, S. 6, 26.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to require that two years of sentence imposed must be served, effective July
1, 1981; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault
of a victim sixty or older in the second degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the
second degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where
the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec.
(c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the
actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree" to "assault of an elderly,
blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the
offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution
based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as
Subsec. (d); P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add "or larceny", effective July 1, 2001; (Revisor's note: In 2005, the
Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person.
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 199 C. 146, 147, 153. Cited. 223 C. 243, 248. Cited. 230 C. 400, 402.
Cited. 5 CA 594, 595. Cited. 13 CA 133, 134. Cited. Id., 420, 431. Cited. 33 CA 616.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 33 CA 616. Cited. 44 CA 307.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-60c. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: Three years
not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant
or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm when such person commits assault in the second degree with a firearm under section 53a-60a and (1) the victim
of such assault has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled,
as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person
with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with
mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or assault in the
second degree with a firearm and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or
mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm upon the same incident of
assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all of such offenses upon
the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the second degree with a firearm is a class D felony and any person found guilty under
this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which three years of the
sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 3; P.A. 80-442, S. 19, 28; P.A. 99-122, S. 3; 99-186, S. 16.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to specify that three years of sentence imposed shall not be suspended or
reduced, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in
the second degree with a firearm" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the second degree
with a firearm", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where
the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec.
(c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the
actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree with a firearm" to "assault
of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree with a firearm" where appearing, amended Subsec.
(a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative
defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering
former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate
affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Sec. 53a-60d. Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle when,
while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug
or both, he causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the
effect of such liquor or drug.
(b) Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle is a class D felony and the court
shall suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of
any person found guilty under this section for one year.
(P.A. 82-403, S. 2; P.A. 83-534, S. 9; P.A. 85-147, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 83-534 amended Subsec. (b) to require the court to suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or
nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty for one year; P.A. 85-147 deleted "while intoxicated" from the
title of the offense and a provision that defined "intoxication" to include intoxication by alcohol or by drug or both, and
replaced elements of offense of "when, in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle, he causes
serious physical injury to another person" with "when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug or both, he causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor
or drug".
See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.
Cited. 219 C. 752, 757. Cited. 222 C. 672, 674. Cited. 224 C. 730, 731, 734. Cited. 226 C. 191, 201. Cited. 230 C. 572,
573. Nothing said in General Assembly proceeding concerning an amendment to this section to remedy an unrelated aspect
changed the rule of law; judgment of appellate court in State v. Leroy, 33 CA 232, reversed. 232 C. 1, 2, 5, 13, 14, 16.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 9 CA 686, 730. Cited. 16 CA 472, 475. Cited. 21 CA 138, 143, 144. Cited. 22 CA
142, 144, 159, 165-167, 169, 170. Cited. 23 CA 215, 216. Cited. Id., 720-722. Cited. 25 CA 282, 284, 293. Cited. 26 CA
805, 806, 808. Cited. 32 CA 553, 554, 556, 571. Cited. 33 CA 232, 233; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 34
CA 557, 564. Cited. Id., 655, 665. Cited. 36 CA 710, 713. Cited. 38 CA 282, 283. Cited. 40 CA 359, 360, 364, 365. Nothing
in Sec. 14-227a prohibits evidence of consciousness of guilt based on defendant's refusal to take a breath test being
considered in a prosecution under this section. 63 CA 433.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 232 C. 1, 2.
Cited. 16 CA 472, 473, 477. Cited. 32 CA 553, 554. Cited. 33 CA 232, 233; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 1 et seq.
Cited. 34 CA 655, 666. Cited. 38 CA 282, 283.
Sec. 53a-61. Assault in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of assault in the third degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical injury to
another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) he
recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person; or (3) with criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon, a
dangerous instrument or an electronic defense weapon.
(b) Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty
under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of one year which may not be suspended or reduced.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 62; P.A. 86-287, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 30.)
History: P.A. 86-287 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to electronic defense weapons; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec.
(b) by adding provision re one-year mandatory nonsuspendable sentence for conviction under Subsec. (a)(3) to reflect
preexisting sentencing requirement of Sec. 53a-36(1).
See Sec. 53a-36 re mandatory nonsuspendable sentence for conviction under Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a).
Cited. 170 C. 162. Cited. 171 C. 264. Cited. 173 C. 254, 259. Cited. 184 C. 157, 158, 162. Cited. 189 C. 1, 7. Cited.
190 C. 428, 429. Cited. 194 C. 347, 349. Cited. Id., 408, 412. Cited. 196 C. 430, 431. Cited. 198 C. 190, 191. Cited. 200
C. 544, 545. Cited. 202 C. 520, 521, 524. Cited. Id., 629, 631. Cited. 205 C. 352. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. Id., 52, 53.
Cited. 222 C. 299, 302. Cited. Id., 331, 335. Cited. 227 C. 677, 680. Cited. 228 C. 487, 488. Cited. Id., 582, 584. Cited.
233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 234 C. 78, 81.
Cited. 1 CA 697, 698. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 6 CA 189, 190. Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 9 CA 59, 60, 70.
Cited. Id., 631, 632; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. 11 CA 499, 501. Cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Cited. Id.,
585, 587. Cited. 13 CA 708, 709. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 17 CA 234, 235. Cited. 20 CA 6, 8. Cited. Id., 75, 80.
Cited. 21 CA 411, 412. Cited. 24 CA 57, 58. Cited. Id., 556, 577. Cited. 25 CA 421, 422; judgment reversed, see 222 C.
299 et seq. Cited. Id., 472, 473. Cited. 26 CA 157, 162. Cited. Id., 439, 440. Cited. 27 CA 786, 787. Cited. 28 CA 581,
583, 588-590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. Id., 683, 684. Cited. 30 CA 346,
348. Cited. 31 CA 497, 502. Cited. 35 CA 107, 109. Cited. 36 CA 106, 108; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78 et seq. Cited.
37 CA 338, 348. Cited. Id., 733, 743. Cited. 39 CA 810, 811. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806, 828, 829. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited.
42 CA 810. Cited. 43 CA 76. Cited. 45 CA 282. Cited. 46 CA 131.
Cited. 37 CS 664, 665. Cited. 39 CS 347, 348. Cited. 41 CS 505, 508.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 177 C. 248; 180 C. 167, 168. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 557, 560. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 353, 355.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 184 C. 366. Subdiv. (3) cited. 185 C. 63, 76, 78, 79. Subdiv. (1) cited. 189 C. 114, 115; 193 C. 48, 56.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 126, 127. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 195 C. 232,
243. Cited. 197 C. 115, 117. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 147, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. 202 C. 629, 635, 660. Subdiv. (1) cited.
206 C. 40, 43. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 657, 667. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 110, 112. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 672, 674.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 160, 161; 220 C. 487, 489; Subdiv. (2) cited. 222 C. 444, 447. Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 41, 42.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 519, 520. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Tanzella, 28
CA 581, 590, reversed. 226 C. 601, 602, 606, 613. Cited. Id., 601, 602, 612. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 606, 613, 615.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 610, 612. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 813, 815.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 3 CA 374, 375. Cited. 5 CA 40, 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 40, 41, 49, 50. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 40, 49, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 590, 591, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 407, 408. Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA
27, 31. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 257, 258. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 545, 547; 10 CA 330, 336. Cited. 10 CA 709-712. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 499-502. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 655, 656; 13 CA 386, 387; Id., 667,
668. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 554, 555. Subdiv. (1) cited. 20 CA 75, 77, 86; Id., 101, 102. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 663,
664; 24 CA 518, 519; 26 CA 114, 116; Id., 259, 260. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 331, 332, 346, 348; 27 CA 322, 327, 330. Cited.
Id., 322, 329, 330. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322, 330. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 581, 585-588, 592;
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 581, 586-588, 603; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et
seq. Cited. Id., 581, 588-590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited 29 CA 524, 525. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 704,
705. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 126. Subdiv. (2) cited. 35 CA 51, 59, 61, 65. Cited. 37 CA 338, 340. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
338, 348. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 733, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 193, 194. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 419, 420. Subdiv.
(1) cited Id., 832, 833. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 565, 567. Subdiv. (1) cited. 42 CA 445. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 768. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 76. Cited. 45 CA 591. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. This is not a cognizable offense
and therefore not a lesser included offense of attempted assault in the first degree. 56 CA 592.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CS 520, 521. Elements of Sec. 53a-64 are so consistent with elements of Subdiv. (2) that the court
is precluded by principles of double jeopardy from entering a finding of guilty as to both charges. 46 CS 130. Subdiv. (2):
Defendant's recklessly placing his hands around victim's throat and causing her to lose consciousness for a brief period
of time constituted "serious physical injury". Id. It is possible to prove assault in the third degree without necessarily
proving risk of injury pursuant to Sec. 53-21(a), so assault in the third degree and risk of injury do not stand in relationship
to each other as greater and lesser offenses. 48 CS 610.
Sec. 53a-61a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or
mentally retarded person in the third degree when such person commits assault in the
third degree under section 53a-61 and (1) the victim of such assault has attained at least
sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with mental retardation, as defined in
section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the third degree and assault of an
elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree upon
the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both
such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being
pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any
prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with
mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person
with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in
the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under this section
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year which shall not be suspended
or reduced.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 31; P.A. 99-122, S. 4; 99-186, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) by adding provision re one-year mandatory nonsuspendable sentence to
reflect preexisting sentencing requirement of Sec. 53a-36(1); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault
of a victim sixty or older in the third degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the
third degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where the
victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec.
(c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the
actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the third degree" to "assault of an elderly,
blind, disabled or pregnant person in the third degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense
an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution
based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as
Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses
established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186).
See Sec. 53a-36 re mandatory nonsuspendable sentence.
See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person.
Court, in sentencing a defendant convicted under this section, must impose a one-year mandatory nonsuspendable term
of imprisonment and does not have option of imposing a fine or a sentence of unconditional discharge. 180 C. 557-559.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 13 CA 420, 421, 431. Cited. 16 CA 318, 319. Cited. 21 CA 248, 249. Cited. 29 CA
524, 525. Cited. 31 CA 312, 314. Cited. 32 CA 178, 179.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 12 CA 239, 240. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 31 CA 312, 314.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Secs. 53a-61b to 53a-61z. Reserved for future use.
Sec. 53a-61aa. Threatening in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is
guilty of threatening in the first degree when such person (1) (A) threatens to commit
any crime involving the use of a hazardous substance with the intent to terrorize another
person, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit
such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, evacuation or inconvenience, or (2) (A) threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to cause
evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit such crime in
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "hazardous substance" means any physical,
chemical, biological or radiological substance or matter which, because of its quantity,
concentration or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics, may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or
incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to
human health.
(c) Threatening in the first degree is a class D felony.
(Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 7, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 15; P.A. 03-22, S. 1.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to delete in Subdivs.
(1) and (2) provisions re threatening to commit a crime of violence; P.A. 03-22 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing
elements of crime as Subdiv. (1), redesignating existing Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B), respectively, and
adding new Subdiv. (2) to restore provisions re threatening to commit a crime of violence with the intent to cause evacuation
of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and
threatening to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience.
Sec. 53a-62. Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A
person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such
person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent
serious physical injury, (2) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with
the intent to terrorize another person, or (3) such person threatens to commit such crime
of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.
(b) Threatening in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 63; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 8, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 16.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 renamed offense by replacing "threatening" with "threatening in the second degree"
where appearing and amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, delete Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit a crime
of violence with the intent to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public
transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and delete Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such
crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience, said provisions being reenacted as part of
Sec. 53a-61aa by same act, effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re
a person, by physical threat, intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical
injury as Subdiv. (1), add Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another
person and add Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing
such terror.
Cited. 175 C. 204, 205. Cited. 182 C. 585, 592; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a
defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of
which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 193 C. 602, 612. Cited. 195 C. 636. Cited.
201 C. 115, 116. Cited. 202 C. 343, 344. Cited. 205 C. 262, 264. Cited. 207 C. 565, 567. Cited. 208 C. 689, 695. Cited.
209 C. 34, 38. Cited. Id., 52, 53. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 224 C. 494, 496. Cited. 227 C. 829, 832. Cited. 241 C. 413.
Cited. 242 C. 648.
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 3 CA 289, 290. Cited. 8 CA 190, 191. Cited. Id., 496, 500, 504-506. Cited. 9 CA 161, 162.
Cited. 14 CA 6, 7. Cited. Id., 526, 527. Cited. 25 CA 149, 150. Cited. Id., 334, 336. Cited. 26 CA 481, 482, 487; judgment
reversed, see 224 C. 494 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 581, 583, 588-590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. Id.,
708, 712. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498. Cited. 33 CA 103, 104. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Words of defendant's
threat to young victim, along with surrounding circumstances of the threat, were such that it was reasonable for jury to
infer that defendant had placed the victim in fear of "imminent" serious physical injury. 75 CA 103. Evidence was sufficient
to sustain conviction. 83 CA 489.
Cited. 37 CS 664, 665. Cited. 42 CS 574, 575. Cited. 43 CS 46, 52.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 169 C. 566, 567. Cited. 175 C. 204, 205. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 182 C. 585, 588; part of ruling in State
v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to
a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 485, 486. Subdiv. (1) cited. 201 C. 462, 468. Subdiv. (2) cited. 208 C. 689, 690. Cited. 226 C.
601, 603. Subdiv. (1) cited. 226 C. 601, 603, 606, 613. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Tanzella, 28 CA 581, 590,
reversed. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 601, 606. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 613, 615. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 153, 155.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 707, 709. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 403, 409.
Subdiv. (2): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser
included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647, 649. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 496, 504. Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 13 CA 386, 387; Id., 438, 439. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 643, 644. Subdiv. (3) cited. 28 CA 581, 586, 592;
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 581, 586, 603; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq.
Cited. Id., 581, 589, 590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 95, 96; judgment reversed,
see 228 C. 147 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 184, 186; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35
CA 262, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 276, 277. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 733, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 306, 307. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 306, 307, 313. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 777, 785. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 617, 618. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA
515, 517. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 584, 585, 592. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 701, 702. Subdiv. (2) was not unconstitutionally
vague on its face. Statute's application to defendant's conduct was proper and did not interfere with his duty to protect his
child and statute was not vague as applied to facts of case. 81 CA 248. There is no indication that legislature did not intend
to create separate crimes prohibited by Secs. 53a-181 (a)(3) and Subdiv. (2). Id.
Sec. 53a-63. Reckless endangerment in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, with extreme
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of
serious physical injury to another person.
(b) Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 64.)
Cited. 179 C. 617, 618. Cited. 194 C. 408, 412. Cited. 200 C. 607, 608. Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited. 233 C. 502, 513.
Cited. 238 C. 313. Cited. 241 C. 413. Cited. 242 C. 648.
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 3 CA 163. Cited. 8 CA 496, 500, 501. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. 32 CA 84, 86. Cited. 33 CA
103, 104. Cited. Id., 743, 749; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited. 43 CA 578. Cited.
44 CA 6. Under this section, jury has to consider objectively the nature and degree of the risk and defendant's subjective
awareness of that risk. 75 CA 432.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 348; id., 359, 360. Cited. 42 CS 574, 575.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 227 C. 301, 320. Cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Cited. 237 C. 348, 352.
Cited. 3 CA 289, 290. Cited. 8 CA 153, 155. Cited. 10 CA 659, 661. Cited. 18 CA 477, 478. Cited. 24 CA 330, 331.
Cited. 26 CA 145, 146. Cited. 40 CA 515, 517. Cited. Id., 643, 645. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 354.
Sec. 53a-64. Reckless endangerment in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person.
(b) Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 65.)
Cited. 194 C. 408, 412.
Cited. 8 CA 342, 343. Cited. 14 CA 6, 7. Cited. Id., 10, 12, 16, 20, 27. Cited. Id., 804. Cited. 23 CA 123, 125. Cited.
31 CA 497, 498, 502.
Cited. 35 CS 570, 573. Cited. 37 CS 661. Cited. 38 CS 619-621. Cited. 40 CA 643, 645. Defendant's recklessly placing
his hands around victim's throat and causing her to lose consciousness for a brief period of time constituted "serious
physical injury" in violation of the statute. 46 CS 130.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 223 C. 618, 625.
Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Cited. 24 CA 662, 665; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 618 et seq.
PART VI*
SEX OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-217:
Cited. 118 C. 505; 139 C. 247; 140 C. 610; 152 C. 197. Corroboration is not essential but in its absence court should
weigh complainant's credibility with care. 128 C. 126. Assault in this statute includes a touching; consent not a defense.
129 C. 603. Not required to plead over to complaint amended re date of alleged commission. 151 C. 189. Defendant could
put his character in issue but only as to sexual morality and decency, the specific traits involved in action. 157 C. 99. Cited.
160 C. 366; 161 C. 303.
Cited. 25 CS 433; 27 CS 44.
Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 45.
Annotations to former section 53-218:
Marriage in fact must be proved. 6 C. 446. Solicitation to commit adultery a crime. 7 C. 270. Testimony of more than
one act inadmissible under single charge of adultery. 10 C. 373. What evidence held inadmissible to prove marriage. 40
C. 145. Involves moral turpitude and is an infamous crime. 112 C. 274.
Although this statute specifies conduct is adulterous only if woman is married, in action for divorce from husband
based on adultery, marital status of other woman irrelevant. 22 CS 147.
Annotations to former section 53-219:
What constitutes offense of lascivious carriage. 5 D. 81. Meaning of "lascivious". 120 C. 166. Cited. 129 C. 603.
Cited. 9 CS 165; 23 CS 299. Meaning of lascivious conduct discussed. 24 CS 99.
History discussed. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 187 to 189. Statute was intended to apply only to conduct between persons of
different sexes. Id., 190. Fact that sexual activity is conducted privately behind locked doors between a willing male and
female is no defense. Id., 698. Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 57. In police investigation of defendant's conduct in violation of this
section, officer's observance of defendant through her bedroom window and subsequent arrest on speedy information held
no invasion of her constitutional rights. Disclosure of identity of informant was not required. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 35. Cited.
Id., 42.
Annotations to former section 53-224:
Definition of seduction. 27 C. 320; 76 C. 136.
Annotations to former section 53-226:
Cited. 125 C. 328. No justification for reading into the statutory crime of lewdness any unexpressed additional requirement of openness. 146 C. 365.
Cited. 23 CS 296.
Word "offering" means a mere offering of the body without physical contact. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 597, 598. Lewdness
includes immoral and degenerate conduct between persons of the same sex and the proposal or offer for lewdness as well
as the act itself is a crime. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 31, 32. There was no entrapment of defendant where officer did not solicit
commission of offense but merely offered the opportunity for its commission. Id., 32, 33. Scienter of defendants shown
by facts proved by testimony of police officers of repeated warnings and advice to defendants of prostitutes who frequented
their bar. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 594.
Annotations to former section 53-227:
Elements of crime. 82 C. 216. Cited. 113 C. 291; 128 C. 180.
Conviction under this statute is cause for revocation of license to practice medicine and surgery. 13 CS 144.
Annotations to former section 53-229:
Cited. 113 C. 291.
Cited. 9 CS 166.
Annotations to former section 53-230:
State must prove what facts. 17 C. 472; 38 C. 525; 96 C. 315. Term "house of ill-fame" synonymous with bawdy house.
33 C. 92. In prosecution for disorderly house, not necessary to show reputation of house. Id., 259. Evidence of character
for chastity may be rebutted by showing that accused kept a house of ill-fame. 33 C. 269. Term "house" means any building
kept for purpose named. 36 C. 79. What complaint not bad for duplicity. 38 C. 38; 66 C. 9. To sustain information for
keeping house "reputed" to be one of ill-fame, fact that it is such a house must be proved; 82 C. 111; 96 C. 315; statute is
valid. 83 C. 550; id., 56. Not necessary to prove that accused knew character of house; his knowledge is immaterial. 96
C. 316. Cited. 125 C. 328; 153 C. 149.
Single act of lewdness not enough to constitute lewdness under this statute. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 595.
Annotations to former section 53-231:
Bond must conform to statutory requirements. 9 C. 350. This section constitutional. 31 C. 574. See note to former
section 53-230, supra. Cited. 168 C. 74.
Annotations to former section 53-235:
Cited. 9 CS 166; 23 CS 296.
Annotations to former section 53-238:
Evidence showing constancy in accusation admissible. 8 C. 100; 44 C. 155; 47 C. 466; 93 C. 321. Conviction may be
had on uncorroborated testimony of a nine-year-old girl as to principal fact. 29 C. 389. Evidence as to general good character
of accused admissible. 33 C. 269. Jury must be satisfied that act was without consent of prosecutrix, but there is no rule
of law that she should make the utmost resistance. 45 C. 264; see also 72 C. 44. Rape may be committed on child under
ten years of age. 46 C. 362. Unnecessary to allege that prosecutrix was ten or more years of age. 50 C. 579. Resistance;
putting in fear. 72 C. 44. Intoxication or insanity of complainant; charges by her against other men; liberality in applying
rules, where only she and accused are witnesses. 80 C. 546. What constitutes abuse of minor; 81 C. 97; election between
counts; declarations of victim; id., 1; 93 C. 321; woman may be guilty of abuse of minor, as accessory; 82 C. 213; previous
unchastity or consent no defense; cross-examination of complainant. Id., 454. When husband and wife under age of sixteen
live together voluntarily, the former is not guilty of crime under this section. 113 C. 288, 294. Cited. 113 C. 786; 118 C.
505; 128 C. 324; 132 C. 278; id., 684; 154 C. 302, 303. Joint trial before jury of defendant and another for crimes of rape
against complainant at about the same time and place proper. 154 C. 517. Cited. 155 C. 593. Hospital record of complaining
witness' medical examination on day of rape admitted in evidence as business record pursuant to section 52-180. 158 C.
22, 461. Cited. 162 C. 317. Cited. 175 C. 512, 523.
In case lacking much of brutality, aggravation in assault and surprise attack on wholly innocent victim characteristic
of majority of cases, sentence of eight to twelve years on review reduced to five to twelve years. 22 CS 42. Cited. 22 CS
493; 27 CS 235; 29 CS 94, 187.
Annotation to former section 53-238:
Cited. 166 C. 96.
Annotations to former section 53-239:
Proof of rape will sustain complaint for assault with intent to rape. 7 C. 56. Person charged with rape may be convicted
of assault with intent to rape. 19 C. 392. Any language in complaint charging exertion of physical force sufficient without
use of words "with actual violence". 31 C. 213. This section is in affirmation of common law and a verdict of "attempt to
commit rape" sufficient. 70 C. 114. Various matters of evidence considered; reputation of accused and complainant. 84
C. 222. Is infamous crime within meaning of section 46-13. 128 C. 129. Corroboration of complainant's testimony not
essential to proof of guilt. 133 C. 600. Cited. 152 C. 703; 154 C. 517, 521. Cited. 162 C. 6.
Annotation to former section 53-241:
Statute applies in court where person is originally presented or in court to which he is bound over or appeals. 132 C. 685.
Annotations to chapter 952, part VI:
Cited. 192 C. 154, 158, 163. Secs. 53a-65 through 53a-90 cited. 202 C. 333, 340. Secs. 53a-65-53a-90 cited. 230 C.
43, 78.
Cited. 35 CA 173, 181.
Sec. 53a-65. Definitions. As used in this part, except section 53a-70b, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) "Actor" means a person accused of sexual assault.
(2) "Sexual intercourse" means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or
cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Its meaning is limited to persons not
married to each other. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal
intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal
opening of the victim's body.
(3) "Sexual contact" means any contact with the intimate parts of a person not
married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose
of degrading or humiliating such person or any contact of the intimate parts of the actor
with a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor
or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person.
(4) "Mentally defective" means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect
which renders such person incapable of appraising the nature of such person's conduct.
(5) "Mentally incapacitated" means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable
of appraising or controlling such person's conduct owing to the influence of a drug or
intoxicating substance administered to such person without such person's consent, or
owing to any other act committed upon such person without such person's consent.
(6) "Physically helpless" means that a person is unconscious or for any other reason
is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.
(7) "Use of force" means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual
physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.
(8) "Intimate parts" means the genital area, groin, anus, inner thighs, buttocks or
breasts.
(9) "Psychotherapist" means a physician, psychologist, nurse, substance abuse
counselor, social worker, clergyman, marital and family therapist, mental health service
provider or other person, whether or not licensed or certified by the state, who performs
or purports to perform psychotherapy.
(10) "Psychotherapy" means the professional treatment, assessment or counseling
of a mental or emotional illness, symptom or condition.
(11) "Emotionally dependent" means that the nature of the patient's or former patient's emotional condition and the nature of the treatment provided by the psychotherapist are such that the psychotherapist knows or has reason to know that the patient or
former patient is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact by or sexual intercourse
with the psychotherapist.
(12) "Therapeutic deception" means a representation by a psychotherapist that sexual contact by or sexual intercourse with the psychotherapist is consistent with or part
of the patient's treatment.
(13) "School employee" means a teacher, substitute teacher, school administrator,
school superintendent, guidance counselor, psychologist, social worker, nurse, physician, school paraprofessional or coach employed by a local or regional board of education or a private elementary or secondary school or working in a public or private elementary or secondary school.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 66; P.A. 75-619, S. 1; P.A. 81-27, S. 2; P.A. 85-341, S. 1; P.A. 87-259; P.A. 92-260, S. 32; P.A.
93-340, S. 1; P.A. 94-221, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 75-619 deleted definitions of "deviate sexual intercourse", "female" and "forcible compulsion", added
definitions of "actor", "use of force" and "intimate parts", redefined "sexual intercourse" in detail where previously defined
as having "its ordinary meaning" and made minor changes in wording of remaining definitions; P.A. 81-27 exempted
section 53a-70b from applicability of definitions in this section; P.A. 85-341 amended definition of sexual contact to
include "contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification
of the actor"; P.A. 87-259 amended definition of sexual contact to include contact made for the purpose of degrading or
humiliating the victim; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in the definition of sexual intercourse by repositioning
language; P.A. 93-340 added definitions of "psychotherapist", "psychotherapy", "emotionally dependent" and "therapeutic
deception"; P.A. 94-221 added the definition of "school employee".
Cited. 170 C. 111. Statute includes definition of sexual intercourse and provides that "penetration, however slight, is
sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio ...". It specifically omits cunnilingus, therefore
penetration is not an essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757, 765, 767. Cited. 187 C. 216,
220, 221. Cited. 191 C. 453, 463. Cited. 192 C. 154, 160, 161. Cited. 198 C. 190, 196. Cited. 210 C. 110, 127.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 112, 118. Cited. Id., 316, 322. Cited. 33 CA 133, 139. Cited. 35 CA 173, 174,
180. Smacking victim's buttocks considered to be sexual contact. 59 CA 538.
Former section 53-216 cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 45.
Subdiv. (2):
Court properly defined the term "cunnilingus" since statute contained no specific definitions. Penetration is not an
essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757, 763, 765. Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 194 C.
258, 271, 273. Cited. 198 C. 285, 289. Cited. Id., 617, 621. Cited. 201 C. 211, 215, 216. Cited. 202 C. 509, 514. Cited.
207 C. 646, 652. Cited. 209 C. 733, 740. Cited. 210 C. 110, 115, 117, 123-125, 127-129. Cited. 211 C. 18, 35. Cited. 224
C. 397, 412, 413, 415. Cited. 226 C. 618, 660. Penetration of the labia majora constitutes vaginal penetration. 252 C. 795.
Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when alleged victim is
compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the mouth. 256 C. 517.
Cited. 7 CA 489, 493. Cited. Id., 701, 709. Cited. 11 CA 102, 110, 117-119. Cited. Id., 316, 319. Cited. 14 CA 451,
455. Cited. 23 CA 712, 714. Cited. 26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 626; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq.;
judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.; judgment reversed see 224 C. 656 et seq. Cited. 33 CA 133, 139. Withdrawal
of consent communicated to the other person followed by a compelling use of force to continue sexual intercourse would
constitute sexual assault. 35 CA 173, 180, 181. Cited. 38 CA 56, 59-61. Cited. 41 CA 139, 141. Cited. Id., 287, 296. Cited.
43 CA 785. Applies least penetration doctrine. 50 CA 715.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 619. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. 205 C. 386, 410. Cited. 224 C. 397, 417.
Cited. Id., 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 725, 730. Cited. 8 CA 607, 613. Cited. 11 CA 102, 114. Cited. 15 CA 251, 278. Cited. 20 CA 694,
698. Cited. 25 CA 653, 657, 658; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited. 26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 627,
636; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 224 C.
656 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 402, 408. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282, 291. Cited. 31 CA 452, 454.
Subdiv. (6):
Cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Cited. 205 C. 386, 398.
Subdiv. (7):
Cited. 186 C. 757, 766. Subpara. (B) cited. 189 C. 611, 629. Subpara. (B) cited. 202 C. 509, 514; 205 C. 386, 391, 393.
Cited. 228 C. 552, 570.
Cited. 7 CA 489, 493. Cited. 11 CA 316, 319. Cited. 14 CA 40. Cited. Id., 451, 454. Cited. 16 CA 75, 79. Subpara. (B)
cited. 18 CA 694, 698. Cited. 21 CA 411, 419. Cited. 30 CA 281, 288.
Subdiv. (8):
Cited. 186 C. 757, 767. Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 619. Cited. 192 C. 154, 160. Cited. 207 C. 456, 463.
Cited. 11 CA 316, 321. Cited. 20 CA 694, 697. Cited. 25 CA 653, 657; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited.
26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 627; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 402, 408.
Sec. 53a-66. Lack of consent. Section 53a-66 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 67; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)
Sec. 53a-67. Affirmative defenses. (a) In any prosecution for an offense under this
part based on the victim's being mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged
in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of such condition of the victim.
(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this part, except an offense under section
53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, it shall be an affirmative defense
that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged offense, living
together by mutual consent in a relationship of cohabitation, regardless of the legal status
of their relationship.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 68; P.A. 75-619, S. 2; P.A. 81-27, S. 3; P.A. 90-162.)
History: P.A. 75-619 deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed as affirmative defense the actor's belief that alleged
victim was above the specified age in cases where age is an element of offense unless victim is under fourteen, relettering
Subsec. (c) accordingly; P.A. 81-27 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under section 53a-70b;
P.A. 90-162 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a
or 53a-72b.
Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 190, 196. Cited. 202 C. 86, 91.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388.
Subsec. (b):
Discussion of "cohabitation" and burden of producing evidence thereof for entitlement to a charge on the affirmative
defense under statute. 181 C. 426, 432-434. Cited. 198 C. 190, 191, 193, 195, 199. Cited. 209 C. 733, 739-741, 752. Cited.
233 C. 813, 850.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 730. Cited. 10 CA 709, 712, 716. Cited. 11 CA 102, 116. Sec. 53a-67(c) (Revised to 1972) cited. Id.
Cited. 25 CA 384, 389. Cited. 28 CA 581, 591; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619.
Secs. 53a-68 and 53a-69. Corroboration; exceptions. Time limitation for complaint. Sections 53a-68 and 53a-69 are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 69, 70; P.A. 74-131; P.A. 76-216; P.A. 87-223.)
Sec. 53a-70. Sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony. (a) A person
is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels another
person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or
a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a
third person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person
or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such
other person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older
than such person, or (3) commits sexual assault in the second degree as provided in
section 53a-71 and in the commission of such offense is aided by two or more other
persons actually present, or (4) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and
such other person is mentally incapacitated to the extent that such other person is unable
to consent to such sexual intercourse.
(b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, sexual assault in
the first degree is a class B felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not
be suspended or reduced by the court or, if the victim of the offense is under ten years
of age, for which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced
by the court.
(2) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony if the offense is a violation
of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the victim of the offense is under
sixteen years of age or the offense is a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of
this section. Any person found guilty under said subdivision (1) or (2) shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be
suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under ten years of age or of which
five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the
victim is under sixteen years of age.
(3) Any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which
together constitute a sentence of at least ten years.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 71; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 19; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 78; P.A. 75-619, S. 3; P.A. 82-428, S. 2; P.A. 89-359;
P.A. 92-87, S. 3; P.A. 93-340, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 13; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 49; P.A. 00-161, S. 1; P.A. 02-138,
S. 5.)
History: 1971 act replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators in Subsec. (a) with numeric indicators; 1972 act changed
applicable age in Subsec. (a)(1) from twenty-one to eighteen reflecting lowered age of majority; P.A. 75-619 reworded
section to reflect changes in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, substituted sexual "assault" for sexual "misconduct" and made the
offense a Class B rather than Class D felony; P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that one year of sentence may
not be suspended or reduced by the court; P.A. 89-359 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (2) re engaging in sexual
intercourse with a person under thirteen years of age; P.A. 92-87 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) re committing
sexual assault in the second degree while aided by two or more other persons actually present; P.A. 93-340 amended
Subsec. (a) by specifying in Subdiv. (2) that the actor be more than two years older than the other person; P.A. 95-142
amended Subsec. (b) to provide that ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if
the victim is under ten years of age; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from one year to two years
the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence imposed when the victim is other than a victim under ten years of age and to
add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant
to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of at least ten years; P.A. 00-161 amended Subsec. (a) by adding
Subdiv. (4) re engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was formerly
classified as sexual assault in the second degree under Sec. 53a-71(a)(2) but was deleted from said section by same
public act; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provision re classification of offense and length of
nonsuspendable sentence as Subdiv. (1) and amending said Subdiv. to add exception re Subdiv. (2), adding new Subdiv.
(2) to classify the offense as a class A felony for a violation of Subsec. (a)(1) when the victim is under sixteen years of
age and for a violation of Subsec. (a)(2) and establish a nonsuspendable sentence for said violations of ten years if the
victim is under ten years of age and five years if the victim is under sixteen years of age and designating existing provisions
re minimum length of a combined sentence of imprisonment and special parole as Subdiv. (3).
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317; id., 398, 399. Repealed section 53a-72 cited. Id., 512, 513, 516. Cited. 182 C. 412, 413. Cited.
184 C. 258, 259. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52; id., 449, 450; id., 521, 522. Cited. 187 C. 216, 217, 218, 220, 221. Cited. 190 C.
20, 21. Cited. 191 C. 604, 615, 616. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 194 C. 114, 115. Cited. Id., 297, 298. Cited. Id., 692-
696, 698. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254. 265. Cited. 197 C. 280, 281. Cited. Id., 298, 299. "Does not include sexual intercourse
with a victim whom the assailant finds unconscious" but does not apply when assailant strangled victim into a state of
unconsciousness. 198 C. 53, 60, 61. Cited. Id., 190, 193. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 281, 282.
Cited. Id., 481, 494. Cited. Id., 693-695, 711. Cited. 200 C. 465, 466. Cited. 201 C. 115, 116. Cited. Id., 659, 660. Cited.
202 C. 343, 344. Cited. Id., 676, 677. Cited. 204 C. 98, 99. Cited. Id., 441, 442. Cited. Id., 571, 572. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63.
Cited. 207 C. 646, 652. Cited. 209 C. 733, 735, 738-741, 743, 744, 747, 748, 750, 752-757. Cited. 210 C. 110, 117, 127,
128. Section not void for vagueness in context of circumstances of case. Id., 132-134, 136, 139, 143, 144. Cited. 211 C.
672, 674. Cited 212 C. 31, 33. Cited. 215 C. 257, 258. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Horne, reversed. Id., 538,
542, 543. Cited. 219 C. 489, 491. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. Id., 345, 347, 348. Cited. 222 C. 556, 558. Cited. 223 C.
180-182. Cited. Id., 731, 733. Cited. 224 C. 397, 399, 403, 414. Cited. Id., 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452
et seq. Cited. 226 C. 601, 602, 610. Cited. Id., 618, 646. Cited. 227 C. 207, 209, 210. Cited. Id., 616, 623. Cited. Id., 677,
679. Cited. 228 C. 456, 458. Cited. 230 C. 43, 47. Cited. 235 C. 711, 713. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242
C. 409. Cited. Id., 689. Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when
alleged victim is compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the
mouth. 256 C. 517.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 345; id., 378, 379. Cited. Id., 724, 725, 735. Cited. 3 CA 148, 149. Cited. Id., 374, 375, 388. Cited.
Id., 650, 652. Cited. 5 CA 424, 425. Cited. Id., 556. Cited. Id., 586, 587, 589. Cited. 7 CA 257, 258, 261-263. Cited. Id.,
701, 702. Cited. 8 CA 44, 45. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 216, 218. Cited. Id., 345, 346. Cited. Id., 399. Cited. Id., 528,
529, 538. Cited. Id., 620, 621, 626. Cited. 10 CA 457, 458. Cited. Id., 520, 521. Cited. Id., 709, 711, 714. Court concluded
the absence of a marital relationship between defendant and victim is not an essential element. 11 CA 102, 112, 118. Cited.
Id., 236. Cited. Id., 238, 239. Cited. Id., 316, 319, 321. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 13 CA 413, 414. Cited. 14 CA 333,
334. Cited. Id., 688, 693. Cited. 15 CA 251, 274. Cited. 16 CA 75, 76, 78, 80. Cited. 17 CA 391, 392. Cited. 18 CA 134,
135, 146. Cited. 19 CA 111, 116, 140, 142, 145. Cited. 20 CA 737, 738. Cited. 22 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 562, 563. Cited.
23 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 221, 222. Cited. Id., 564, 567; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 13,
14. Cited. Id., 24, 25. Cited. Id., 295, 296. Cited. 25 CA 334, 335. Cited. Id., 503, 505. Cited. Id., 653, 654; judgment
reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited. 26 CA 151, 152. Cited. Id., 433, 434. Cited. Id., 674, 676, 678, 680. Cited. 28 CA
548, 551, 556. Cited. Id., 581, 583, 589, 592; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 642, 643. Cited. 32
CA 773, 775. Cited. 34 CA 276, 278. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. Id., 754, 755. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. 38 CA
56, 60. Cited. Id., 777, 779. Cited. 39 CA 267, 268. Cited 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619, 620. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Cited. 44 CA 548. Cited. 46 CA 741. Intent or motive of sexual assault perpetrators, discussed. 47 CA 159. Age of victim
not an element of crime for which jury makes a factual determination but a sentencing factor determined by the courts. 74
CA 376. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to force victim to have sexual
intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447.
Because the necessary elements of this section and Sec. 53-21 are distinct, court's respective findings of not guilty and
guilty of these distinct crimes was not legally inconsistent. 78 CA 25.
Cited. 41 CS 229, 231, 232, 236. Cited 43 CS 46, 66, 67.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 179 C. 328, 329; 180 C. 101, 102; Id., 565. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 449, 451, 455. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 403. Cited. 186 C. 757, 758, 763, 766. Cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 372,
373. Cited. Id., 565, 566. Cited. 188 C. 574, 576. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 697, 703, 713. Cited. 189 C. 106, 107; id., 611,
612, 625, 628-630; id., 631, 633. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 631, 645. Cited. 190 C. 104, 105, 108; id., 327, 329. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 440, 441. Cited. Id., 496, 498. Cited. 191 C. 604, 605. Subdiv. (1) cited. 192 C. 166, 167. Cited. 193 C. 457,
459. Cited. 194 C. 258, 259, 274. Cited. Id., 594, 595. Cited. Id., 692, 694, 696-698. Cited. 197 C. 50-52. Cited. Id., 485,
486. Cited. 198 C. 53, 54, 60. Cited. Id., 190, 191, 200. Cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 314, 315. Cited. Id., 405, 406. Cited.
Id., 430, 432. Cited. Id., 598, 600. Cited. Id., 617, 618. Cited. 199 C. 62, 63. Cited. Id., 399, 400. Cited. Id., 481, 482, 488.
Cited. 201 C. 559, 560. Cited. 202 C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 509-511, 514. Cited. 203 C. 385, 386. Cited. 204 C. 714, 716.
Cited. 206 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 132, 134, 151. Cited. Id., 437, 439. Cited. Id., 528, 531, 532. Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43.
Cited. 207 C. 646, 647. Cited. 209 C. 143-145. Cited. Id., 416-418. Cited. 210 C. 51, 53. Cited. Id., 110, 112, 115, 123,
127. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. Id., 359, 382. Cited. 211 C. 18, 20, 25. Cited. 212 C. 31-33. Cited. 213 C. 593, 602. Cited.
214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (2) Cited. Id., 717, 719. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Horne, reversed. 215 C. 538, 540.
Cited. 216 C. 563, 565. Cited. 218 C. 447, 448. Cited. 219 C. 269, 271. Cited. Id., 283, 284. Cited. Id., 489, 510. Cited.
220 C. 400, 402. Cited. Id., 487, 489. Cited. Id., 698, 700. Cited. 221 C. 264, 265. Cited. 222 C. 87, 88. Cited. 223 C. 52,
53. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 450, 452. Cited. Id., 519, 520. Cited. 226 C. 601, 602, 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 601,
610, 611. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 611. Cited. Id., 618-620, 644. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 618, 644, 645, 649, 650. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 227 C. 616, 617, 619, 620, 624. Cited. Id., 616, 622. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 393, 395. Cited. Id., 456, 469.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 456, 469. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 456, 472. Cited. Id., 552, 554, 570. Cited. Id., 582, 584. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 756, 757. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 529, 530, 536. Cited. Id., 580, 581. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 557, 559. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 580, 584, 586. Cited. 230 C. 43, 46, 47, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 231 C. 195, 196. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 707,
708. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 403, 409. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 145, 146. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 502, 517. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 659, 661. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 284-286. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 576. Cited. Id., 694. Cited. 241 C. 784. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 823. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 409. Cited. Id., 445. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 523. Medical treatment exception
to the hearsay rule applies to a child sexual assault victim's statements made to a social worker acting in the chain of
medical care if statements were made to obtain medical treatment and were pertinent to the treatment sought. 260 C. 1.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 346. Cited. Id., 724, 735. Cited. 4 CA 514. Cited. Id., 672. Cited. 7 CA 149, 150. Cited. Id., 489, 493.
Cited. Id., 653. Cited. 8 CA 35. Cited. Id., 148, 149. Cited. Id., 177, 178. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. Id., 528, 538, 539,
541. Cited. Id., 620, 625, 626. Cited. 9 CA 208, 209. Cited. Id., 340, 341. Cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Cited. Id., 709, 711, 712,
716, 717. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103, 110, 112. Cited. Id., 316, 320, 322, 323. Cited. Id., 673, 674. Cited. 13 CA 60, 61. Cited.
Id., 67. Cited. Id., 76, 85. Cited. 14 CA 40. Cited. Id., 451, 452. Cited. Id., 657, 658. Cited. Id., 688, 689, 692. Cited. Id.,
710, 712. Cited. 15 CA 222, 225. Cited. 16 CA 75, 80. Cited. 17 CA 525, 526. Cited. 18 CA 134, 135, 137. Cited. Id., 273,
274. Cited. Id., 643, 644. Cited. Id., 730. Cited. 19 CA 111, 116, 140; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id.,
618, 619. Cited. Id., 631, 633. Cited. 20 CA 101, 102. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 737, 753. Cited. 21 CA 411, 412.
Cited. Id., 467, 468. Cited. 22 CA 329, 330. Cited. Id., 477, 478. Cited. 23 CA 564, 565; judgment reversed in part, see
220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 243, 245, 251. Cited. Id., 384. Cited. Id., 653, 654; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et
seq. Cited. Id., 725, 726. Subdiv. (2) cited. 26 CA 81, 82. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 398, 400. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 434,
436. Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. 27 CA 279, 280. Cited. Id., 705, 706. Cited. 28 CA 91, 92. Cited. Id., 195, 196. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 360, 361, 363, 366; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 529 et seq. Cited. Id., 402, 404. Cited. Id., 581, 591;
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 409, 414. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 724, 725. Cited. 30 CA 56. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 281, 282, 285, 287. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 523, 524. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 915. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 178,
179. Cited. Id., 217, 218; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 217, 220; judgment reversed,
see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 485. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 773, 775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 184, 185;
judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Cited. Id., 457, 458. Cited. 34 CA 276, 278. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35 CA 173, 175.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 728-730. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 190, 191, 196, 202. Cited. Id., 216, 217.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 228, 229. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 696. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 56, 58.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 100, 102. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 125, 126, 133. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 231, 232. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
531, 532. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 777, 785, 790. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 45, 46. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 617, 618. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 832, 833. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 132. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 132, 133, 142,
146, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 233, 234. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 250, 252. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 139, 140. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 204, 205. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 255, 257. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 287, 288, 296. Cited. Id., 317, 318. Cited. 42
CA 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 186; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 823 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 552.
Cited. Id., 680. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 715. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 785.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 457. Cited. Id., 548. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45 CA 66. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 116. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 289. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 756. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 810. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint
is not double jeopardy. 47 CA 117. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in commenting on testimony of state's expert
witness concerning inconsistencies in results of victim's rape kit tests, that court having also instructed jury to base findings
on recollection of all evidence presented; defendant's challenge to other aspects of instructions on scientific evidence were
not properly preserved for appellate review. Trial court properly admitted victim's written statement to police as constancy
of accusation evidence; defendant failed to establish that court abused its discretion or that he was prejudiced by admission
of that evidence, and his claim that victim's statement is admissible only if tape recorded was incorrect. 48 CA 135. Subdiv.
(1): Trier of fact reasonably could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant compelled victim to engage
in sexual intercourse by use of force. 52 CA 466. Subdiv. (1): Defendant could not succeed in argument that the evidence
did not support a guilty verdict under section; jury could reasonably have concluded that the facts and inferences established
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 55 CA 412. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. 57 CA 736. Statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 58 CA 585. Evidence was sufficient
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 75 CA 201.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Cited. 23 CA 564, 567; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq.
Sec. 53a-70a. Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony.
(a) A person is guilty of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree when such person
commits sexual assault in the first degree as provided in section 53a-70, and in the
commission of such offense (1) such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses
a deadly weapon, (2) with intent to disfigure the victim seriously and permanently, or
to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of the victim's body,
such person causes such injury to such victim, (3) under circumstances evincing an
extreme indifference to human life such person recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a risk of death to the victim, and thereby causes serious physical injury to such
victim, or (4) such person is aided by two or more other persons actually present. No
person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and aggravated sexual
assault in the first degree upon the same transaction but such person may be charged
and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony or, if the victim
of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class A felony. Any person found guilty
under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of
the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, except that, if
such person committed sexual assault in the first degree by violating subdivision (1) of
subsection (a) of section 53a-70, and the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of
age, twenty years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the
court. Any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a period of special
parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 of at least five years.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 9; P.A. 80-442, S. 20, 28; P.A. 87-246; P.A. 92-87, S. 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 50; P.A. 02-138,
S. 6.)
History: P.A. 80-442 substituted "deadly weapon" for "firearm" and reference to specific firearms where occurring
and increased portion of sentence which may not be suspended or reduced from one year to five years in Subsec. (b),
effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 87-246 changed the name of the offense from sexual assault in the first degree with a deadly
weapon to aggravated sexual assault in the first degree and amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (2) re disfiguring the
victim or destroying, amputating or disabling a member or organ of the victim and Subdiv. (3) re recklessly engaging in
conduct creating a risk of death to the victim and thereby causing serious physical injury to the victim; P.A. 92-87 amended
Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re commission of the offense while aided by two or more other persons actually present;
June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of twenty
years and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class
A felony if the victim is under sixteen years of age, add exception re twenty-year nonsuspendable sentence if the violation
is of Sec. 53a-70(a)(1) and the victim is under sixteen years of age and replace provision that a person found guilty shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole "which together constitute a sentence of twenty
years" with provision that a person found guilty shall be sentenced to a period of special parole "of at least five years".
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 188 C. 697, 699, 713. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242, 257. Cited. 207
C. 412, 416. Cited. 210 C. 110, 117, 127. Cited. Id., 315-317. Cited. 211 C. 672, 674. Judgment of appellate court in State
v. Horne, 19 CA 111, reversed. 215 C. 538, 542, 543. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 118. Cited. 12 CA 179, 180, 187. Cited. 19 CA 111, 113, 116, 139, 140, 145;
judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 36 CA 805, 807. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Cited. 43 CS 211, 212.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43. Cited. 210 C. 110, 112, 115, 123, 128. Cited. Id., 315, 317. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295. Cited. 235
C. 502, 517. Five-week-old fetus constitutes a part of the mother's body and, therefore, is a "member" of her body for
purposes of subdiv. (2). 263 C. 524.
Cited. 19 CA 111, 142, 143; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 725, 726. For purposes of the
offense described in subdiv. (4), it is victim's objective and subjective awareness, and not perpetrator's physical proximity,
that controls the factual determination as to whether perpetrator is "actually present". 75 CA 578.
Sec. 53a-70b. Sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting relationship: Class B
felony. (a) For the purposes of this section:
(1) "Sexual intercourse" means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or
cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient
to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission
of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the
genital or anal opening of the victim's body; and
(2) "Use of force" means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual
physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.
(b) No spouse or cohabitor shall compel the other spouse or cohabitor to engage in
sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other spouse or cohabitor, or by the
threat of the use of force against such other spouse or cohabitor which reasonably causes
such other spouse or cohabitor to fear physical injury.
(c) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class
B felony.
(P.A. 81-27, S. 1.)
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 190, 193, 195, 196, 199. Cited. 209 C. 733, 735, 738-741, 743-745, 747, 748,
750, 752-757. Cited. 210 C. 110, 125. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 10 CA 709, 716. Cited. 11 CA 102, 112. Cited. 31 CA 20, 21, 29. Cited. Id., 497, 498,
501, 503, 506. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 36 CA 718, 720. Cited. 41 CA 604, 620.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 31 CA 497, 503. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 497, 506.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 209 C. 733, 735.
Cited. 10 CA 709-714. Cited. 28 CA 581, 591; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498, 503,
506. Cited. 36 CA 718, 720. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619.
Sec. 53a-71. Sexual assault in the second degree: Class C or B felony. (a) A
person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in
sexual intercourse with another person and: (1) Such other person is thirteen years of
age or older but under sixteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older
than such person; or (2) such other person is mentally defective to the extent that such
other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse; or (3) such other person is
physically helpless; or (4) such other person is less than eighteen years old and the actor
is such person's guardian or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such
person's welfare; or (5) such other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital
or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such
other person; or (6) the actor is a psychotherapist and such other person is (A) a patient
of the actor and the sexual intercourse occurs during the psychotherapy session, (B) a
patient or former patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally
dependent upon the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual
intercourse occurs by means of therapeutic deception; or (7) the actor accomplishes the
sexual intercourse by means of false representation that the sexual intercourse is for a
bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (8) the actor is a school
employee and such other person is a student enrolled in a school in which the actor
works or a school under the jurisdiction of the local or regional board of education which
employs the actor; or (9) the actor is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who
provides intensive, ongoing instruction and such other person is a recipient of coaching
or instruction from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such
coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of
age; or (10) the actor is twenty years of age or older and stands in a position of power,
authority or supervision over such other person by virtue of the actor's professional,
legal, occupational or volunteer status and such other person's participation in a program
or activity, and such other person is under eighteen years of age.
(b) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class C felony or, if the victim of the
offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person found guilty under
this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which nine months of the
sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 72; P.A. 75-619, S. 4; P.A. 82-428, S. 3; P.A. 83-326, S. 1; P.A. 85-341, S. 2; P.A. 93-340, S. 2;
P.A. 94-221, S. 18; P.A. 00-161, S. 2; P.A. 02-106, S. 1; 02-138, S. 7; P.A. 04-130, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 75-619 restated Subsec. (a) to conform with changes made in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, referred to sexual
"assault" rather than to sexual "misconduct" and made the offense a Class C felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor;
P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that nine months of sentence may not be suspended or reduced by the court;
P.A. 83-326 amended Subsec. (a) to impose liability when the victim is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated "to
the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse", redesignated as Subdiv. (3) a victim who is "physically
helpless" and renumbered the remaining Subdivs.; P.A. 85-341 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) to increase the applicable
age from fifteen to sixteen years; P.A. 93-340 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) to specify that the other person be thirteen
years of age or older and the actor be more than two years older than such person, added Subdiv. (6) re sexual intercourse
between a psychotherapist and a patient or former patient and added Subdiv. (7) re sexual intercourse accomplished by
false representation that it is for a bona fide medical purpose; P.A. 94-221 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (8) concerning
school employees and students; P.A. 00-161 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by deleting provision re the act of engaging in sexual
intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was reclassified as sexual assault in the first degree
under Sec. 53a-70 by same public act, and by making a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 02-106
amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (9) re sexual intercourse between a coach or instructor and a person who is a recipient
of such coaching or instruction and is a secondary school student receiving such coaching or instruction in a secondary
school setting or under eighteen years of age; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class B felony
if the victim is under sixteen years of age; P.A. 04-130 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (10) re actor twenty years of
age or older who stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over another person under eighteen years of age
and engages in sexual intercourse with such other person.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 180 C. 54, 56. Cited. 185 C. 199, 200. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52. Cited. 187 C. 73, 74, 91;
id., 348, 349. Cited. 189 C. 321, 325. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Cited. 199 C. 47, 55. Cited. 201 C. 211,
212, 214, 216. Cited. 207 C. 374, 378. Cited. 209 C. 225, 230. Cited. 211 C. 455, 457. Cited. 224 C. 1, 2. Cited. 228 C.
393, 396. P.A. 93-340, Sec. 2 cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 409.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 118. Cited. 13 CA 378, 379. Cited. 14 CA 688, 693. Cited. 15 CA 251, 254,
278. Cited. Id., 289, 290. Cited. 25 CA 270-272; judgment reversed in part, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 527, 534,
535. Cited. 33 CA 133, 134, 139. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. Id., 754, 756. Cited. 36 CA 383, 384. Cited. 38 CA 56,
60. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 45 CA 116. Term "years" in Subsec. (a)(1) means periods of 365 or 356 days, not calendar
years. Subsec. (a)(1) not void for vagueness as applied to defendant in this case despite lack of judicial gloss on meaning
of "years" and does not violate defendant's right to equal protection. 47 CA 68. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 57 CA 736. Pursuant to. Sec. 53-21 (2), risk of injury to or impairing the
morals of a child involves sexual contact with a child younger than the age of sixteen years "in a sexual and indecent
manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child ...." This section contains no such similar provision. Risk of
injury to a child, therefore, contains elements lacking in sexual assault in the second degree. 79 CA 591.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 175 C. 315, 324; 180 C. 167, 168; 181 C. 426, 427, 430. Subdiv. (1) cited. 182 C. 382, 383; 187 C.
73, 91; 188 C. 565, 566; id., 644, 645. Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 321, 327. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3): The terms
"responsibility" and "general supervision" discussed; dissent regarded construction of those terms by majority as much
narrower than origin warranted. Id., 321, 322, 324-328, 330-332. Subdiv. (1) cited. 190 C. 84, 85; 191 C. 453, 454, 463;
192 C. 154, 155, 163. Cited. Id., 154, 164. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 666, 667. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 481, 493, 494. Subdiv. (2) cited. 200 C. 440, 441. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 734, 735. Cited.
201 C. 211, 215. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C. 187, 189. Subdiv. (3) cited. 205 C. 386, 388. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 528, 531,
532. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 51, 53. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 244-246, 250, 265-268, 272, 274, 275. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
359, 362. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 185, 186. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 455, 462. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 215 C. 653, 654; 219 C. 283, 284; 220 C. 345-348, 360. Subdiv. (1) cited. 224 C. 656, 658; judgment reversed,
see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 207, 210, 211. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 393, 396. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
552, 554. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610, 612, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 580, 581. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 839, 840. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 230 C. 43, 46-48, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 321, 322. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 296. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.,
409. Court determined defendant was more than two years older than victim by calculating the difference in age based on
birthdates rather than calendar years. 248 C. 543. Statute not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate defendant's
right to equal protection under the law. Id. Statute does not require physical violence as element of the crime. 260 C. 486.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA 46, 48. Cited. 8 CA 190, 196. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 313. Subdiv. (4) cited. 9 CA 426-428.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 591, 592; 11 CA 236. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 493, 496. Subdiv. (4) cited. 14 CA 244, 245.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 244, 245, 247. Subdiv. (1) cited. 15 CA 222, 224-227. Cited. Id., 222, 229. Subdiv. (1) cited. 17 CA
174, 175. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 186, 187. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 447, 448. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 525, 526. Subdiv. (1) cited.
18 CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 44, 45. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445, 446. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 646, 647. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 20 CA 40, 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 115, 116. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 193, 194. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 263, 264.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 288, 289. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 530, 532. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 737, 738. Cited. Id., 737, 753. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 23 CA 241, 242; Id., 712, 713; 24 CA 146, 147; 25 CA 235, 238. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 243,
245, 251; 26 CA 625, 626, 635, 637; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq;
Id., 674, 676, 679, 680; Id., 758, 759. Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 91, 92. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 527, 528, 531, 533, 534,
536, 539, 540. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 120, 121. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 217, 218; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580
et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 773-775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 205, 206. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 46, 48. Cited. 36 CA
383, 384. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 213, 214. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 125, 126, 133. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 731, 732, 743.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 132, 133, 148. Cited. 41 CA 139, 141. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43
CA 142. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 619. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 667. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 785. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45 CA 289.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 512. Trial court properly refused to instruct jury as requested by defendant on the issue of fraudulent
misrepresentation; no affirmative defense of fraudulent misrepresentation is available under provision of statute prohibiting
sexual intercourse between a person who is between the ages of thirteen and fifteen and a person who is at least two years
older. 63 CA 536.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-72. Rape in the first degree: Class B felony. Section 53a-72 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 73; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 125; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)
Sec. 53a-72a. Sexual assault in the third degree: Class D or C felony. (a) A
person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person (1) compels
another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other
person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person
or against a third person, which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical
injury to himself or herself or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with
another person whom the actor knows to be related to him or her within any of the
degrees of kindred specified in section 46b-21.
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree is a class D felony or, if the victim of the
offense is under sixteen years of age, a class C felony.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 5; P.A. 80-346, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 33; P.A. 02-138, S. 8.)
History: P.A. 80-346 designated previous Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B) in Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a)
and added Subdiv. (2) re incest; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by amending Subsec. (a)(1)(B) to replace "which
reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person" with "which reasonably causes such other person to
fear physical injury to himself or herself" and amending Subsec. (a)(2) to replace "such person" with "the actor" or "him
or her" as appropriate; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class C felony if the victim is under
sixteen years of age.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52. Cited. 187 C. 216, 218, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 618. Cited. 192 C. 154,
164. Cited. 194 C. 258, 271. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. 205 C. 352, 353. Cited. Id., 386, 394. Cited. 207 C. 403, 404.
Cited. 214 C. 89, 91. Cited. 224 C. 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Cited. 240 C. 743. Statute encompasses
adopted relatives. 258 C. 779.
Cited. 1 CA 724-726, 735. Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 6 CA 15, 16. Cited. 9 CA 631, 632; judgment reversed, see
205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. Id., 648, 649. Cited. 10 CA 591. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 35 CA
173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 46 CA 741. Evidence was sufficient to support conviction and court properly instructed
jury on element of intent for conviction of sexual assault in the third degree. 81 CA 189.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 198 C. 147, 148. Cited. 205 C. 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 386, 388. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id.,
386, 391, 393. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 209 C. 416-418. Subdiv. (2) cited. 210 C. 244, 246, 247, 265, 266, 272, 274. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 220 C. 400, 402. Cited. 224 C. 397, 404. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 519, 520.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 580, 581. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 557, 559. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 233 C. 502, 504, 512. Subdiv.
(1)(A) cited. Id., 502, 512, 514. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 237 C. 284-286. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 576. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited.
Id., 694. Court's failure to define "knowledge" or to explain how it pertains to charge of sexual assault in the third degree
did not violate defendant's due process rights where jury instructions, viewed as a whole, adequately informed jury of the
elements of the crime. 258 C. 779.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 734. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 724, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 2 CA 333, 334. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 10 CA
591, 593. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 236. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 244, 245, 247.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 694, 695, 697-699. Subdiv. (2) cited.
20 CA 530, 532. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 23 CA 221, 226. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 564, 565; judgment reversed in part, see
200 C. 400 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 25 CA 653, 657, 658; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(B)
cited. Id., 725, 726; 26 CA 395, 396, 398, 400. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 29 CA 724, 725. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 281, 282,
287. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 217, 218, 220; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 33 CA 743,
748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id., 743, 744, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C.
502 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 36 CA 228, 229. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 100, 102. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 762, 763.
Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 39 CA 657, 658. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 139, 140. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 287, 288, 294. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 43 CA 578. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 45 CA 756.
Sec. 53a-72b. Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm: Class C or B
felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm when
such person commits sexual assault in the third degree as provided in section 53a-72a,
and in the commission of such offense, such person uses or is armed with and threatens
the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person
possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, rifle, shotgun or other firearm. No person
shall be convicted of sexual assault in the third degree and sexual assault in the third
degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and
prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm is a class C felony or, if the
victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person
found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which
two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and
a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together
constitute a sentence of ten years.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 10; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 51; P.A. 02-138, S. 9.)
History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase the penalty from a class D to a class C felony, increase
from one year to two years the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence and add requirement that any person found guilty
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute
a sentence of ten years and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the
offense as a class B felony if the victim is under sixteen years of age.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-73. Rape in the second degree: Class C felony. Section 53a-73 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 74; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
Sec. 53a-73a. Sexual assault in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor or
class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree when: (1)
Such person intentionally subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) under
fifteen years of age, or (B) mentally defective or mentally incapacitated to the extent
that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual contact, or (C) physically
helpless, or (D) less than eighteen years old and the actor is such other person's guardian
or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such other person's welfare, or
(E) in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has
supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person; or (2) such person subjects
another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent; or (3) such person
engages in sexual contact with an animal or dead body; or (4) such person is a psychotherapist and subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) a patient of the actor and
the sexual contact occurs during the psychotherapy session, or (B) a patient or former
patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally dependent upon
the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual contact occurs
by means of therapeutic deception; or (5) such person subjects another person to sexual
contact and accomplishes the sexual contact by means of false representation that the
sexual contact is for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (6)
such person is a school employee and subjects another person to sexual contact who is
a student enrolled in a school in which the actor works or a school under the jurisdiction
of the local or regional board of education which employs the actor; or (7) such person
is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who provides intensive, ongoing instruction
and subjects another person to sexual contact who is a recipient of coaching or instruction
from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such coaching or
instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of age; or (8)
such person subjects another person to sexual contact and (A) the actor is twenty years
of age or older and stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over such
other person by virtue of the actor's professional, legal, occupational or volunteer status
and such other person's participation in a program or activity, and (B) such other person
is under eighteen years of age.
(b) Sexual assault in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor or, if the victim of
the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class D felony.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 6; P.A. 83-326, S. 2; P.A. 93-340, S. 3; P.A. 94-221, S. 19; P.A. 02-106, S. 2; 02-138, S. 10; P.A. 04-130, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 83-326 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to impose liability when the victim is mentally defective or
mentally incapacitated "to the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual contact", redesignated as Subpara. (C) a
victim who is "physically helpless" and relettered the remaining subparagraphs; P.A. 93-340 amended Subsec. (a) to add
Subdiv. (4) re sexual contact by a psychotherapist with a patient or former patient and Subdiv. (5) re sexual contact
accomplished by means of false representation that it is for a bona fide medical purpose; P.A. 94-221 amended Subsec.
(a) to add Subdiv. (6) concerning school employees and students; P.A. 02-106 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical
change in Subdiv. (1)(B) for purposes of gender neutrality and to add Subdiv. (7) re a coach or instructor subjecting another
person to sexual contact who is a recipient of such coaching or instruction and is a secondary school student receiving
such coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting or under eighteen years of age; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec.
(a) to make technical changes and amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class D felony if the victim is under
sixteen years of age; P.A. 04-130 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (8) re actor twenty years of age or older who stands
in a position of power, authority or supervision over another person under eighteen years of age and subjects that other
person to sexual contact.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Proof of specific interest required under statute precludes this from being a lesser included
offense under Sec. 53-21. 186 C. 45, 49, 51-53. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 204 C. 683, 685. Cited. 205 C. 386, 394,
396. Cited. 210 C. 396, 397. Cited. Id., 582, 583. Cited. 211 C. 455, 458. Cited. 224 C. 1, 2.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 6 CA 150. Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 11 CA 80, 81. Cited. Id., 102, 118. Cited. 14 CA
40, 41. Cited. 15 CA 251, 254, 278. Cited. Id., 289, 290. Cited. 18 CA 459, 460. Cited. 25 CA 270, 271; judgment reversed
in part, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Judgment of acquittal in State v. Sirimanochanh, (26 CA 625, 221 C. 917 and 224 C. 656)
reversed and case remanded to trial court with direction to render judgment reinstating conviction under this section. 31
CA 452, 454, 455. Cited. 34 CA 473, 474. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 458. Cited. Id., 715. Reiterated previous
holdings touching bare skin not required for sexual contact in the fourth degree. 59 CA 538.
It is undisputable that Connecticut recognizes a clear public policy against sexual misconduct and sexual harassment.
This public policy is evidenced in state criminal statutes, which provide that "a person is guilty of sexual assault in the
fourth degree when ... (2) such person subjects another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent ...."
Thus, arbitration award reinstating police officer who had engaged in sexual misconduct and harassment while on duty
clearly violates established public policy and must be vacated. 48 CS 574.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 183 C. 586. Subdiv. (1) cited. 192 C. 37, 39. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 154-156, 161, 163. Subdiv.
(1)(B) cited. 200 C. 440, 441. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 734, 735. Subdiv. (1)(C) cited. 205 C. 386, 388, 393, 399. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 386, 388, 409, 410. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 386, 409. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211
C. 555, 582. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582. Subdiv. (1)(D) cited. 215 C. 653, 654. Subdiv. (1)(A): Defendant
waived claim that violation of this section is not a lesser included offense of violation of Sec. 53a-71(a)(1). Judgment of
appellate court in State v. Sirimanochanh, 26 CA 625, reversed and case remanded for determination of evidence sufficiency.
224 C. 656, 658; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 227 C. 207, 210, 211. Subdiv. (1)(A)
cited. 230 C. 43, 47, 48.
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 12 CA 395, 396. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 395, 396. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 18 CA 297, 298. Subdiv.
(1)(E) cited. Id., 694, 698. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 19 CA 44, 45. Subdiv. (1)(D) cited. 20 CA 115, 117. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 365, 366. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 530, 532. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 26 CA 625, 627, 636, 637; judgment reversed, see
224 C. 656 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 674, 679. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 409,
410, 414. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 31 CA 452, 454. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 33 CA 205, 207. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 34 CA 428,
429. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 38 CA 125, 126. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 45 CA 116. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited.
Id., 289. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 512. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 613. Subdiv. (1)(A): This offense and the offense of risk
of injury to a child are not the same offense for double jeopardy. 49 CA 409.
Secs. 53a-74 to 53a-81. Rape in the second degree. Deviate sexual intercourse
in the first and second degree. Sexual contact in the first, second and third degree.
Adultery: Class A misdemeanor. Sections 53a-74 to 53a-81, inclusive, are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 75-82; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 126-129; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 79, 80; P.A. 75-619, S. 7; P.A. 91-19, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-82. Prostitution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with
another person in return for a fee.
(b) Prostitution is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 83.)
Meaning of statutory language is clear and is sufficient to warn ordinary person of the prohibited conduct. 37 CS 506-
509, 511-513. Does not violate right to privacy which has never been extended to encompass prostitutes plying their trade
on the street. Id., 515-517.
Sec. 53a-83. Patronizing a prostitute: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is
guilty of patronizing a prostitute when: (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, he pays
a fee to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged
in sexual conduct with him; or (2) he pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person
pursuant to an understanding that in return therefor such person or a third person will
engage in sexual conduct with him; or (3) he solicits or requests another person to engage
in sexual conduct with him in return for a fee.
(b) Patronizing a prostitute is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 84.)
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 4 CA 520, 530.
Subsec. (b):
Section may be harmonized with Sec. 18-100d re determining controlling sentence where prisoner serving concurrent
sentences for crimes committed both on or after October 1, 1994 and before October 1, 1994, with good time credit
applicable to pre-October 1, 1994 sentence under Sec. 18-7a(c). Determination of controlling sentence not a static concept.
261 C. 806.
Sec. 53a-83a. Patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle when
he, while occupying a motor vehicle: (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, pays a fee
to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged in
sexual conduct with him; or (2) pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person pursuant
to an understanding that in return therefor such person or a third person will engage in
sexual conduct with him; or (3) solicits or requests another person to engage in sexual
conduct with him in return for a fee; or (4) engages in sexual conduct for which a fee
was paid or agreed to be paid.
(b) Patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 93-265, S. 2; P.A. 97-279, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 97-279 amended Subsec. (b) to delete provision that subjected any motor vehicle used in the commission
of the offense to forfeiture to the state in accordance with Secs. 54-36j to 54-36l, inclusive.
Sec. 53a-84. Sex of parties immaterial. In any prosecution for prostitution or
patronizing a prostitute, the sex of the two parties or prospective parties to the sexual
conduct engaged in, contemplated or solicited is immaterial, and it shall be no defense
that: (1) Such persons were of the same sex; or (2) the person who received, agreed to
receive or solicited a fee was a male and the person who paid or agreed or offered to
pay such fee was a female.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 85.)
Sec. 53a-85. Promoting prostitution: Definitions. The following definitions are
applicable to sections 53a-86 to 53a-89, inclusive:
(1) A person "advances prostitution" when, acting other than as a prostitute or as a
patron thereof, he knowingly causes or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution,
procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons or premises for prostitution
purposes, operates or assists in the operation of a house of prostitution or a prostitution
enterprise, or engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid or facilitate an act
or enterprise of prostitution.
(2) A person "profits from prostitution" when acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for personally rendered prostitution services, he accepts or receives
money or other property pursuant to an agreement or understanding with any person
whereby he participates or is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 86.)
Sec. 53a-86. Promoting prostitution in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A
person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the first degree when he knowingly: (1)
Advances prostitution by compelling a person by force or intimidation to engage in
prostitution, or profits from coercive conduct by another; or (2) advances or profits from
prostitution of a person less than sixteen years old.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the first degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 87.)
Cited. 199 C. 47, 55.
Sentencing under both risk of injury and promoting prostitution statutes not a double jeopardy violation. 53 CA 627.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 185 C. 199, 200; 191 C. 453, 454.
Sec. 53a-87. Promoting prostitution in the second degree: Class C felony. (a)
A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the second degree when he knowingly: (1)
Advances or profits from prostitution by managing, supervising, controlling or owning,
either alone or in association with others, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business
or enterprise involving prostitution activity by two or more prostitutes; or (2) advances
or profits from prostitution of a person less than eighteen years old.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 88; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 81.)
History: 1972 act changed applicable age in Subsec. (a)(2) from nineteen to eighteen, reflecting change in age of
majority.
Cited. 199 C. 47, 55.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 13 CA 732.
Sec. 53a-88. Promoting prostitution in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A
person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the third degree when he knowingly advances or profits from prostitution.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P. A. 828, S. 89.)
Sec. 53a-89. Permitting prostitution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is
guilty of permitting prostitution when, having possession or control of premises which
he knows are being used for prostitution purposes, he fails to make reasonable effort to
halt or abate such use.
(b) Permitting prostitution is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 90.)
Cited. 185 C. 199, 200.
Sec. 53a-90. Transferred to Chapter 961, Part II, Sec. 54-102a.
Sec. 53a-90a. Enticing a minor. Penalties. (a) A person is guilty of enticing a
minor when such person uses an interactive computer service to knowingly persuade,
induce, entice or coerce any person under sixteen years of age to engage in prostitution
or sexual activity for which the actor may be charged with a criminal offense. For purposes of this section, "interactive computer service" means any information service,
system or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access
to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.
(b) Enticing a minor is a class D felony for a first offense, a class C felony for a
second offense and a class B felony for any subsequent offense.
(P.A. 99-113; P.A. 04-139, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 04-139 amended Subsec. (b) to increase penalty for a first offense from a class A misdemeanor to a class
D felony, for a second offense from a class D felony to a class C felony and for any subsequent offense from a class C
felony to a class B felony, effective July 1, 2004.
PART VII*
KIDNAPPING AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-27 and present part VII of chapter 952:
Cited. 155 C. 592. Evidence produced by this state was sufficient to show proof was evident that defendants were in
danger of being convicted of capital offense under this section, hence bail could be denied under section 8 of article I of
state constitution. 159 C. 285. Prosecution where necessary elements of two or more distinct offenses combined in same
act, when. 164 C. 95. Fraudulent restraint in kidnapping, defined. Id., 95. Restraint for sexual gratification within purview
of kidnapping statute. Id., 95. Cited. 166 C. 96. Cited. 169 C. 38. Cited. 206 C. 40, 55.
Cited. 24 CS 386.
Sec. 53a-91. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this part:
(1) "Restrain" means to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully
in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one
place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences
or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent. As used herein "without
consent" means, but is not limited to, (A) deception and (B) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control
or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.
(2) "Abduct" means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by
either (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (B)
using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation.
(3) "Relative" means a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 92; P.A. 92-260, S. 35.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsecs. (1) and (2) to replace Subdiv. indicators "(a)" and "(b)" with "(A)" and "(B)",
respectively.
Language is clear and does not lend itself to any equivocal interpretation. 173 C. 165, 168. Cited. 191 C. 604, 617.
Cited. 200 C. 586, 590. Cited. 211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 216 C. 647, 661. Cited. 219 C. 489, 492. Cited. 226 C. 618, 623.
Terms "restrained" and "abducted" interpreted to include frightening victim to remain in bedroom through repeated physical
and verbal abuse. 258 C. 510.
Cited. 20 CA 437-439. Cited. 55 CA 447.
Subsec. (1):
Cited. 177 C. 335, 342; 179 C. 328, 338; 180 C. 565, 566. Cited. 188 C. 406, 416. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254. Subpara. (a)
cited. 198 C. 147, 152, 153. Cited. Id., 430, 434. Cited. Id., 537, 542, 550. Cited. 202 C. 520, 539. Cited. 209 C. 733, 760.
Cited. 211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 215 C. 173, 178, 180. Cited. Id., 716, 727. Cited. 219 C 489, 502, 503, 510. Cited. 225 C.
347, 350. Cited. 237 C. 284, 313, 314.
Cited. 5 CA 586, 590. Cited. 13 CA 667, 672. Cited. 17 CA 339, 340, 343. Cited. 19 CA 396, 400. Cited. 30 CA 281,
282. Cited. 31 CA 312, 330. Cited. 46 CA 486.
Subsec. (2):
Subdiv. (b): Cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Subdiv. (a): Cited. 177 C. 335, 342. Subdiv. (b): Cited. 177 C. 335, 336, 342; id.,
637, 639, 641; 178 C. 634, 635. Cited. 179 C. 328, 338. Cited. 182 C. 449, 460. Cited. 188 C. 406, 415. Cited. 199 C. 537,
542, 550. Cited. 200 C. 586, 590. Subdiv. (a) cited. Id., 586, 597. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id. Cited. 209 C. 733, 757, 760. Cited.
211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 215 C. 716, 727. Cited. 219 C. 489, 500, 501, 510. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id., 489, 501. Cited. 225 C.
347, 350. Subdiv. (B) cited. 36 CA 190, 196. Cited. 46 CA 486. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id.
To prove unlawful restraint, the state had to prove that defendant abducted alleged victim by restraining her with intent
to prevent her liberation by using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation. 81 CA 320.
Sec. 53a-92. Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is
guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and: (1) His
intent is to compel a third person (A) to pay or deliver money or property as ransom or (B)
to engage in other particular conduct or to refrain from engaging in particular conduct; or
(2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him
or violate or abuse him sexually; or (B) accomplish or advance the commission of a
felony; or (C) terrorize him or a third person; or (D) interfere with the performance of
a government function.
(b) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 93, 94; P.A. 73-137, S. 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 36.)
History: P.A. 73-137 deleted former Subsec. (a)(3) making kidnapping a first degree offense when abducted person
dies during abduction or before his return to safety and provisions in that Subsec. re circumstances which determine the
presumption of death and provisions in Subsec. (b) re imposition of death penalty and re sentence for Class A felony when
accused enters guilty plea and court and state's attorney consent; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to insert Subpara.
indicators and made other technical changes.
Cited. 173 C. 165-167. Cited. 197 C. 436, 461. Cited. Id., 588, 591. Cited. 198 C. 671, 673. Cited. 200 C. 268, 286.
Cited. 201 C. 276, 284. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673. Cited. 212 C. 31, 32. Cited. 225 C. 347, 349. Cited. 227 C. 677, 679. Cited.
235 C. 711, 713. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114.
Cited. 24 CA 13, 14. Cited. 39 CA 632, 633. Cited. 46 CA 691. Cited. Id., 741.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2)(A): Language sufficiently warns ordinary person in clear and concise terms of prohibited conduct intended.
173 C. 165, 168. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 165, 166, 168; 177 C. 335, 343. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 185 C. 339, 340, 354.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 346, 347. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 194 C. 114, 115. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 692, 694, 695. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 197 C. 436, 438. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 588-592. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 198 C. 147, 148, 151. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. Id., 285, 287. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 405, 406. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. Id., 671, 672. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 199 C.
399, 400. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. 200 C. 268, 286. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 586, 587, 591; 201 C. 517, 519; Id., 559, 560;
202 C. 259, 260; Id., 509, 510; 203 C. 385, 386. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. 204 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 240, 242. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited.
Id., 714, 716. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 205 C. 132, 134. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 673-675. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 206 C. 40,
42, 43, 54. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 733, 735, 761. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 210 C.
110-112. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 199, 200. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 315, 316. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv.
(2)(B) cited. 212 C. 31, 32, 38-40. Subdiv. (2) cited. 213 C. 388, 389. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 422, 424. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. 214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 89, 91. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 215 C. 173, 174, 177, 178, 180, 181. Subdiv.
(2)(A) cited. Id., 716, 718, 719, 727; 216 C. 647, 649; 217 C. 243, 244, 248, 250. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.; 219 C. 93, 96.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 160, 161. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.; Id., 269, 271. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 283, 284. Subdiv.
(2)(C) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 489, 491, 492, 494-496, 500-503. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 489, 491, 494-496;
220 C. 270, 272. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 345, 347, 348. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 487, 489. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 698,
700; 221 C. 264, 265; 222 C. 556, 558. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 347, 348, 350.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 450, 452. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 519, 520. Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 618-620. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. 227 C. 1, 9, 11. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 153, 155. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 228 C. 582, 584,
588. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 229 C. 557, 558. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 231 C. 195, 196. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 403, 408. Subdiv.
(2)(A) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 235 C. 145, 147. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Subdiv. (2)(A): Determined to
be not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 237 C. 284-287, 313, 314. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 694.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(C): Section not unconstitutionally vague on its face.
Id., 784. Cited. 239 C. 235. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 242 C. 445. Where defendant also charged with sexual assault, restriction
of movement alone can be basis of kidnapping if defendant, by violent actions, restrained victim with intent to prevent
liberation. 262 C. 179.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 8 CA 177, 178. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 25 CA 428, 430. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 28 CA 195, 196.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 33 CA 457, 458. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 457, 458. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 34 CA 276, 277. Subdiv.
(2)(A) cited. 36 CA 190, 191, 196. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 216, 217. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 641, 642. Subdiv. (2)(A)
cited. Id., 718, 720. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 774, 775. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 37 CA 360, 369. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 464, 465. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 38 CA 777, 778, 785. Cited. 39 CA 579, 580. Subdiv. (2)(B)
cited. Id., 579, 600. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 41 CA 317, 318; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 445 et seq. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited.
43 CA 715. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 44 CA 307. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 46 CA 810. Holding witnesses at gunpoint prior to
firing fatal shot into a murder victim was kidnapping with intent to advance or accomplish the murder. 47 CA 134. Unlawful
restraint as a lesser included offense, discussed. Id., 159. Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under
section. 55 CA 447. Subdiv. (2): Under kidnapping statute, the state had to prove that defendant had abducted and restrained
alleged victim with the intent to inflict physical injury or to sexually attack her. 81 CA 320.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 65.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 674.
Cited. 8 CA 177, 178.
Sec. 53a-92a. Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm: Class A felony:
One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree with
a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the first degree as provided in section 53a-92, and in the commission of said crime he uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver,
machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping
in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm upon the same
transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon
the same information.
(b) Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm is a class A felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 9.)
Cited. 198 C. 671, 673, 676, 678, 679. "Effect of enactment of statute (was) to link a more serious crime with a less
serious penalty"; equal protection rights violated. 200 C. 268, 286, 289. Cited. 204 C. 240, 257. Cited. 205 C. 262, 264.
Cited. Id., 673, 674. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673.
Cited. 40 CA 60, 61.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 679. Cited. 210 C. 110, 111. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
The statute "has created an irreconcilable conflict in the statutes governing mandatory minimum sentences for kidnapping in the first degree ... until the legislature takes corrective action the sentencing provisions of (this statute) govern all
prosecutions for kidnapping in the first degree"; statutory construction discussed. 198 C. 671, 676, 680. Cited. 200 C. 268,
287. Equal protection rights discussed. Id. Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-93. Proceeding to determine sentence for kidnapping in first degree.
Section 53a-93 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 95; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)
Sec. 53a-94. Kidnapping in the second degree: Class B felony: Three years not
suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts
another person.
(b) Kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony for which three years of the
sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 96; P.A. 93-148, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re three-year nonsuspendable sentence.
Cited. 169 C. 242, 243. Cited. 171 C. 47, 48. Cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Cited. 177 C. 335, 336, 342; id., 637, 639, 641.
Cited. 178 C. 549, 550; id., 634, 635. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164. Cited. 186 C. 179, 180. Cited. 188 C. 406, 407; id., 697, 702,
713. Cited. 190 C. 822, 823. Cited. 191 C. 604, 616, 617. Cited. 196 C. 430, 431. Cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Cited. Id., 190,
191. Cited. 199 C. 537, 538. Cited. 200 C. 586, 606. Cited. 202 C. 343, 344. Cited. Id., 520, 521, 523. Cited. 206 C. 40,
53. Cited. Id., 685, 687, 709. Cited. 208 C. 365, 366. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673. Cited. 213 C. 388, 396. Cited. 231 C. 195, 196.
Cited. 1 CA 697, 698. Cited. 12 CA 268. Cited. Id., 613. Cited. 20 CA 437. Cited. 21 CA 411, 412. Cited. 27 CA 786,
787. Cited. 35 CA 740, 744. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 46 CA 486. Cited. Id., 691.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 178 C. 600-602. Cited. 179 C. 328, 329, 338. Cited. 180 C. 565. Cited. 182 C. 449, 451, 460. Cited. 187 C. 681,
683. Cited. 188 C. 406, 415. Cited. 190 C. 327, 329. Cited. 191 C. 604, 605. Cited. 192 C. 166, 167. Cited. 197 C. 485,
486. Cited. 198 C. 314, 315. Cited. 199 C. 537, 550. Cited. 200 C. 586, 588. Cited. 202 C. 520, 523. Cited. 238 C. 784.
There is neither any time requirement for the restraint, nor any distance requirement for the asportation to constitute
the crime of kidnapping. 1 CA 697, 708. By its plain terms, subsec. gives fair warning to the public that if a person abducts
another he is guilty of that offense. 83 CA 142.
Sec. 53a-94a. Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm: Class B felony:
Three years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree
with a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the second degree, as provided in section
53a-94, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens
the use of or uses or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a
pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping in the second degree and kidnapping in the second degree with a
firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for
both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm is a class B felony for which
three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 10; P.A. 92-260, S. 37; P.A. 93-148, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from one
year to three years the length of the nonsuspendable sentence.
Cited. 188 C. 697, 699, 713. Cited. 200 C. 523, 524. Cited. 201 C. 115, 116. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673, 677-679.
Cited. 9 CA 648, 649. Cited. 46 CA 741.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 210 C. 110, 114. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-95. Unlawful restraint in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person
is guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree when he restrains another person under
circumstances which expose such other person to a substantial risk of physical injury.
(b) Unlawful restraint in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 97; P.A. 92-260, S. 38.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "the latter" with "such other person".
Cited. 171 C. 395, 397. Cited. 182 C. 353, 354; id., 366, 367, 382. Cited. 187 C. 216, 217; id., 348, 349. Cited. 191 C.
604, 616, 617. Cited. 194 C. 297, 298. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254, 265. Cited. 197 C. 298, 299. Cited. Id., 309, 310. Cited.
198 C. 430. Cited. 199 C. 193, 194. Cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Cited. 201 C. 659, 660. Cited. 202 C. 676, 677. Cited. 205 C. 352,
353. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 223 C. 180, 182. Cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Cited. 226 C. 601,
603. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Cited. 237 C. 284, 309. Cited. 242 C. 689.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 375. Cited. 5 CA 424, 425. Cited. Id., 586, 587, 590. Cited. 6 CA 334, 335. Cited. 7 CA 701, 702.
Cited. 8 CA 620, 621. Cited. 9 CA 631, 632; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Cited. 13
CA 554-556. Cited. 17 CA 234, 236. Cited. Id., 339, 340, 343. Specific intent required. Id. Cited. Id., 391, 392. Cited. Id.,
490, 491. Cited. 22 CA 477, 478. Cited. 28 CA 581, 583, 592; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 20,
21. Cited. Id., 312, 314. Cited. 36 CA 805, 807. Cited. 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 701, 702. Cited. 42 CA 78. Cited.
Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 46 CA 486.
Cited. 43 CS 211, 212.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 174 C. 500, 501; 176 C. 227, 228. Cited. 179 C. 381, 382. Cited. 185 C. 211, 212. Cited. 186 C. 599, 600. Cited.
190 C. 104, 105. Cited. 197 C. 50-52. Cited. Id., 602, 603. Cited. 198 C. 430-432, 434, 435. Cited. Id., 598, 600. Cited.
Id., 617, 618. Cited. 205 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 61, 63. Cited. Id., 437, 439. Cited. Id., 528, 531. Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43,
53, 54. Cited. 209 C. 143, 145. Cited. 222 C. 87, 88. Cited. 227 C. 32, 49. Cited. Id., 153, 155. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114.
Cited. 241 C. 784. Cited. 242 C. 523.
Cited. 6 CA 697, 698. Cited. 8 CA 387, 388. Cited. Id., 491, 493. Cited. Id., 566, 567. Cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Cited. Id.,
208, 209. Cited. 13 CA 667, 668. Cited. 14 CA 710, 712. Cited. 18 CA 134, 137. Cited. Id., 730, 731. Cited. 19 CA 631,
633. Cited. 21 CA 244, 245. Cited. Id., 467, 468. Cited. 25 CA 725, 726. Cited 26 CA 574, 575. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Cited.
31 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 312, 329. Cited. 32 CA 178, 179. Cited. 38 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 777, 785. Cited. 39 CA 45,
46. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Cited. Id., 832, 833. Cited. 41 CA 255, 257, 279. Cited. Id., 701, 702. Cited. Id., 817, 818. Cited.
42 CA 78. Cited. Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 715. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint is not double jeopardy.
47 CA 117.
Sec. 53a-96. Unlawful restraint in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the second degree when he restrains another
person.
(b) Unlawful restraint in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 98.)
Cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Cited. 191 C. 604, 616, 618. Cited. 197 C. 602, 603. Cited. 206 C. 100, 102. Cited. 211 C. 672,
678. Cited. 224 C. 397, 400. Cited. 231 C. 195, 196.
Cited. 9 CA 656, 657. Cited. 19 CA 396, 397. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498.
Cited. 46 CA 486.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 178 C. 600. Cited. 197 C. 413, 415. Cited. Id., 602, 603.
Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282, 285.
Sec. 53a-97. Custodial interference in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A
person is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree when he commits custodial
interference in the second degree as provided in section 53a-98: (1) Under circumstances
which expose the child or person taken or enticed from lawful custody or the child held
after a request by the lawful custodian for his return to a risk that his safety will be
endangered or his health materially impaired; or (2) by taking, enticing or detaining the
child or person out of this state.
(b) Custodial interference in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 99; P.A. 81-280, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 39; P.A. 95-206, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-280 amended Subsec. (a) by including in Subdiv. (1) risk to a child held after a request by the lawful
custodian for his return; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 95-206 amended Subsec. (a) by classifying
the detention of a child or person out of this state as a violation of custodial interference in the first degree.
Cited. 182 C. 353, 355. Cited. 226 C. 652, 661, 663, 666, 668. Joint custodian is not inherently immune from criminal
prosecution under section solely on basis of his or her status as a joint custodian. 251 C. 656.
Cited. 34 CS 219, 221.
Sec. 53a-98. Custodial interference in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree when: (1)
Being a relative of a child who is less than sixteen years old and intending to hold such
child permanently or for a protracted period and knowing that he has no legal right to
do so, he takes or entices such child from his lawful custodian; (2) knowing that he has
no legal right to do so, he takes or entices from lawful custody any incompetent person
or any person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or institution;
or (3) knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he holds, keeps or otherwise refuses
to return a child who is less than sixteen years old to such child's lawful custodian after
a request by such custodian for the return of such child.
(b) Custodial interference in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 100; P.A. 81-280, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-280 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) concerning the failure to return a child to his lawful
custodian after a request by the custodian for the child's return.
Cited. 226 C. 652, 661, 664, 666, 668.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 652, 664.
Sec. 53a-99. Substitution of children: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of
substitution of children when, having been temporarily entrusted with a child less than
one year old and, intending to deceive a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian of
such child, he substitutes, produces or returns to such parent, guardian or custodian a
child other than the one entrusted.
(b) Substitution of children is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 101.)
PART VIII*
BURGLARY, CRIMINAL TRESPASS, ARSON,
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Burglary:
Annotations to former section 53-68:
Burglary must be charged to have been committed in night season. 16 C. 33. Larceny not merged in burglary. 24 C.
57. Taking of life to prevent a burglary justifiable. 31 C. 485. Error to charge that when building is left secure at night and
found early in morning broken open, presumption is that it was broken open at night. 35 C. 515. Entering with intent to
commit a felony and breaking out is burglary. 43 C. 493. Night season is when there is not enough daylight to discern
features of another. 47 C. 182; 108 C. 405. This crime is one involving moral turpitude. 121 C. 678. Cited. 132 C. 575;
147 C. 296; 153 C. 40. Definition of "nighttime" discussed. Id., 540, 542. Cited. 161 C. 283.
Cited. 23 CS 41; 25 CS 433; 26 CS 71; 27 CS 42. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective
sentence of not more than five years in reformatory for four counts of burglary under this section, in addition to counts of
breaking and entering, larceny and theft of motor vehicle, should stand. Id., 105-107.
Annotations to former section 53-69:
Evidence that person was armed when he emerged from house sufficient to prove that he was armed when burglary
was committed. 47 C. 181. Cited. 154 C. 302, 303; 160 C. 42.
Annotations to former section 53-71:
Essential elements of crime; evidence admissible. 96 C. 162; 97 C. 261; 146 C. 518. Cited. 153 C. 451. Burglars' tools
jettisoned by defendant while he was being observed by witness and found immediately on his apprehension at place of
crime, held properly admitted into evidence. 155 C. 463. Cited. 161 C. 371.
Discovery of burglar's tools sufficient to allow police to search without warrant. 25 CS 216. Cited. Id., 229; 27 CS
323. Requirement that accused prove lawful excuse for having burglar tools in his possession at night is unconstitutional
as defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty and burden of proof is on state. 28 CS 28.
Annotations to former section 53-73:
Cited. 153 C. 540, 541 (fn). Evidence that defendant, immediately after his niece's house was robbed, had bills on his
person in denomination of those stolen and a cut on his wrist, when entry had been made by breaking glass, and had been
seen on premises before the entry, held ample grounds for conviction on trial by jury. 155 C. 297. It must be established
that crime took place in daytime in order to convict defendant. 161 C. 283. Cited. Id., 303.
Cited. 4 CS 260; 27 CS 65. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective sentence of not
more than five years in reformatory for four counts of violations under this section, in addition to counts of burglary,
larceny and theft of a motor vehicle, should stand. Id., 105-107. Review of sentence. Id., 124-126. Cited. 29 CS 471.
Annotation to former section 53-74:
Circumstantial evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. No legal distinction
between direct or circumstantial evidence so far as its probative force is concerned. 158 C. 124.
Annotations to former section 53-75:
Cited. 153 C. 540, 541 (fn). Trial court properly determined as matter of law that breaking and entering locked fur
storage vault within store otherwise open to public was breaking and entering of building. 156 C. 391.
Cited. 27 CS 392.
Garage held to be a "building ... used as place for the custody of property" within meaning of this statute. 3 Conn. Cir.
Ct. 276. Conviction based on identification by witness who observed defendant after crime at request of police officers
upheld. Rulings in
U. S. v. Wade (388 U. S. 318) and
Gilbert v. California (388 U. S. 263) not retroactive. 5 Conn. Cir.
Ct. 172.
Annotations to former section 53-76:
If one confederate gets inside without breaking and entering and opens door to others, all are guilty of breaking and
entering. 125 C. 213. History of statutes concerning burglary. 132 C. 576. Statute may apply to building partly occupied
as dwelling if it is also occupied for custody of certain property. Id., 579. Cited. 143 C. 559; 149 C. 643, 644; 150 C. 489;
152 C. 627, 633; 153 C. 451; id., 540, 541 (fn). Defendant's appeal from admission in evidence of burglary tools found
immediately after he was observed disposing of them denied as trier of facts could have reasonably determined that articles
were in his possession. 155 C. 463. Jury could have inferred from circumstantial evidence that some part of defendant's
body had entered building. Codefendant's statement that he dropped defendant off at premises and half hour later picked
him up was admissible only as to codefendant. 156 C. 378. Motion to suppress evidence obtained after search of defendant's
person on his arrest for disorderly conduct denied. 157 C. 485. Cited. 158 C. 322; 159 C. 434; 161 C. 283; 371; 404. Cited.
162 C. 442. Cited. 165 C. 163. Cited. 166 C. 81, 83.
Discussion of maximum sentence. 17 CS 367. Cited. 19 CS 267; 22 CS 270; 23 CS 5; id., 41; id., 355; 25 CS 451, 454,
457; id., 489; 26 CS 464; 27 CS 42; id., 65; id., 149; id., 237; id., 244; 27 CS 271; 27 CS 285; id., 290; 27 CS 318; 322;
323; id., 341; id., 347; id., 392. Term of not less than three years nor more than four years on basis of fourth felony conviction
was fair and just after conviction under this section. Id., 371. Cited. 29 CS 471.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 553; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 275; 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 530.
Annotations to former section 53-77:
Cited. 19 CS 267. Defendant found guilty hereunder and sentenced to indefinite term in state reformatory resentenced
to term not to exceed two years. 28 CS 132.
In trial for offense under this statute, court held it not mandatory to order mistrial when, on poll of jury, one juror
announced verdict contrary to that announced by foreman. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 153.
Annotations to former section 53-78:
History and construction of this statute. 125 C. 214. Cited. 132 C. 575. Cited. 166 C. 81, 83.
Annotation to former section 53-80:
Cited. 27 CS 244.
Arson:
Annotations to former section 53-82:
Burning of schoolhouse is arson. 2 R. 516; but see 10 C. 145. A barn eighteen rods from dwelling house and separated
by highway not subject of arson at common law; 6 C. 48; but otherwise under Sec. 53-83. 109 C. 31. That building is
property of another must be alleged and proved. 12 C. 489. An unfinished dwelling not subject of arson at common law.
20 C. 247. House burned should be described as house occupied. 29 C. 344; 63 C. 331. Charge of burning with intent to
defraud insurance company. 105 C. 117; id., 328. State need not prove legal corporate existence of insurance company.
45 C. 273. Evidence reviewed and held sufficient to warrant conviction. 105 C. 117; id., 333. Proofs of loss submitted to
insurance company admissible though made by accused after fire. 105 C. 122. Motive need not be proved; and, while
malice is an essential ingredient of crime of arson, it does not require ill-will but merely deliberation and action without
justification or excuse; so, conviction sustained where accused set fire for excitement it would produce. 107 C. 631.
Dwelling is "burned" if the slightest portion is burned or charred as distinguished from being merely smoked or discolored.
Id., 633. Conviction of accessory to arson. 109 C. 394. Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction. 136 C. 201. Cited.
149 C. 25; 150 C. 169. In re latter case, conviction affirmed; proof of voluntariness of confession prerequisite to its
admissibility if made during illegal detention. 151 C. 246. See 371 U. S. 471.
Annotations to former section 53-83:
Evidence held sufficient to warrant conclusion that defendant set fire wilfully and maliciously. 137 C. 179; 149 C. 25;
150 C. 171; 156 C. 328. Cited. 163 C. 176.
Annotations to former section 53-85:
Plea of nolo contendere for attempted arson, which was subsequently nolled, held bar to prosecution of arson as violation
of double jeopardy. 25 CS 96. The two offenses need not be identical in nature, a similarity being sufficient. Id.
Annotation to former section 53-86:
State need not prove legal corporate existence of insurance company. 45 C. 273.
Trespass and injury to property:
Annotations to former section 53-45:
See Sec. 1-1 for definition of "public buildings". Complaint must set out with particularity the "injury". 62 C. 131.
"Wilfully" means in a spirit of wantonness or with an evil intent or guilty purpose. 71 C. 742. An amendatory act is
presumed not to change the existing law further than is expressly declared or necessarily implied. The word "deface" was
removed from statute and only the word "injury" left. Painting a swastika on building held to be an injury. 149 C. 577,
579. Reversed, 375 U. S. 85. (a) Cited. 153 C. 599.
Cited. 22 CS 203.
Annotation to former section 53-81:
Cited. 27 CS 244.
Evidence of witness who on trial contradicted his prior written statements and testimony by defendant held sufficient
to sustain judgment of defendant's guilt. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 423.
Annotations to former section 53-103:
Cited. 124 C. 313; 319 U. S. 147.
Conviction under this statute not admissible to impeach witness's credibility. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 389. Comparison of this
section and Sec. 53-108 in regard to phrase "without right" in former and absence in latter. Id., 524, 532. Whether proof
of scienter is essential is matter of legislative intent. No proof of specific intent to commit crime of trespass needed under
this section. Id. That defendant thought he had lawful right to be where he was does not negate his trespass; honest mistake
of law does not excuse him from consequences of his act. Id.
Annotation to former section 53-105:
Theft of growing vegetables as larceny. 105 C. 536.
Annotation to former section 53-107:
Owner of garden upon which fowls of another trespassed is liable in damages for spreading poison thereon and killing
fowls; force used to repel such trespass must be reasonable; notice to owner of fowls of intent to spread poison no defense.
14 C. 1.
Annotations to former section 53-108:
It is no defense that defendant entered upon lands, etc., for purpose of fishing without guilty intent. 60 C. 229. Cited.
125 C. 214. Prima facie evidence discussed. 148 C. 481.
Comparison of this section and Sec. 53-103 in regard to presence of phrase "without right" in latter and its absence
here. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 524, 532.
Annotations to former section 53-124:
Former statute cited. 66 C. 568; 141 C. 731.
Annotations to former section 53-126:
Cited. 145 C. 124. Cited. 162 C. 53.
Cited. 23 CS 216, 218; 24 CS 378; 27 CS 347. Balance of sentence of defendant suspended by review division where
he had not been represented by counsel at time sentence was imposed and his damage to landlord's property was not more
than one hundred and twenty-five dollars. Id., 387.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 136; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 476.
Annotations to former section 53-127:
Cited. 72 C. 470; 73 C. 117.
Annotation to former section 53-197:
Cited. 23 CS 43.
Sec. 53a-100. Definitions. (a) The following definitions are applicable to this part:
(1) "Building" in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any watercraft, aircraft,
trailer, sleeping car, railroad car or other structure or vehicle or any building with a valid
certificate of occupancy. Where a building consists of separate units, such as, but not
limited to separate apartments, offices or rented rooms, any unit not occupied by the
actor is, in addition to being a part of such building, a separate building; (2) "dwelling"
means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether
or not a person is actually present; (3) "night" means the period between thirty minutes
after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise.
(b) The following definition is applicable to sections 53a-101 to 53a-106, inclusive:
A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises, at the
time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public and when the actor is not
otherwise licensed or privileged to do so.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 102; P.A. 74-186, S. 10, 12; P.A. 79-570, S. 7; P.A. 92-260, S. 40.)
History: P.A. 74-186 included railroad cars in definition of "building"; P.A. 79-570 included buildings "with a valid
certificate of occupancy" in definition of "building"; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in definition of "building".
Cited. 191 C. 180, 184, 185. Cited. 195 C. 598, 601, 603, 606. Cited. Id., 611, 613. Cited. 209 C. 322, 342, 343. Cited.
210 C. 199, 203, 206. Cited. 216 C. 367, 379, 384.
"... failure of the court to define the phrase 'enters unlawfully,' misled the jury ...". 6 CA 24, 25, 28, 30, 31. Cited. 30
CA 95, 107; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 714, 723-726. Cited. 44 CA 62.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 542, 553. Subdiv. (2) cited. 209 C. 322, 342, 343. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 199, 205, 206.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 218 C. 273, 274, 277-280. Subdiv. (1) cited. 240 C. 708. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 523. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 119, 126. Subdiv. (1) cited. 22 CA 440, 443, 444. Cited. 34 CA 823, 824. Subdiv. (3) cited.
38 CA 231, 236. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 1, 4. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 488. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Although it is true that
the crime of burglary in the second degree requires the element of a "dwelling" as opposed to "building," our statutes
define "dwelling" as a type of building "which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a
person is actually present ...." 76 CA 779. An individual apartment, within an apartment home, while a dwelling, also is
a separate building. Id. Subdiv. (1): Under the ordinary definition of a "building", one's home is clearly a building. 78
CA 610.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 210 C. 199, 203, 206, 207. Cited. 216 C. 367, 379, 380.
Cited. 8 CA 528, 540. Cited. 19 CA 179, 188, 192. Cited. 24 CA 563, 571. Cited. 39 CA 1, 4. Cited. 42 CA 507.
Defendant's presence in an apartment that was not his own, his attempts to evade police and his flight were sufficient
evidence from which jury could infer that he had entered apartment unlawfully. 66 CA 357. Restaurant was not open to
the public at time defendant entered and management office was a separate area not open to public and defendant was not
licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon premises. 74 CA 607.
Sec. 53a-101. Burglary in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty
of burglary in the first degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with
intent to commit a crime therein and: (1) He is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon
or dangerous instrument, or (2) in the course of committing the offense, he intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone.
(b) An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing" the offense if it occurs in
an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or commission.
(c) Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty
under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 103; P.A. 80-442, S. 21, 28.)
History: P.A. 80-442 specified in Subsec. (c) that five years of imposed sentence may not be suspended or reduced
when person is guilty under Subsec. (a)(1), effective July 1, 1981.
Cited. 161 C. 283. Cited. 172 C. 74, 75. Cited. 174 C. 500, 506. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500, 509. Cited. 205 C. 456, 463,
467. Cited. 210 C. 199. Cited. 216 C. 563, 565. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 227 C. 32, 48. Cited.
229 C. 691, 694.
1 CA 724, 725, 735. Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 13 CA 133, 134. Cited. 19 CA 245, 254, 255. Cited. 24 CA 563, 568. Cited.
29 CA 704, 705, 712. Cited. 30 CA 416, 418, 424. Cited. 35 CA 107, 110. Cited. Id., 714, 726. Cited. 46 CA 118. There
was sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that defendants took steak knives to arm themselves during the burglary and
thus committed burglary in the first degree. 52 CA 149.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 170 C. 162. Cited. 174 C. 500, 501. Subdiv. (1) cited. 175 C. 398, 399. Subdiv. (1): Presence of a
tire iron used to break into an apartment is insufficient by itself to satisfy statutory definition in section 53a-3(7) to support
finding of attempted burglary in first degree; potential for injury considered only in conjunction with circumstances of
actual or threatened use. 177 C. 140, 141, 146. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 564, 565; 180 C. 481, 482; id., 557, 560. Subdiv.
(2): A lesser included offense of felony murder. Id., 599, 600. Cited. 182 C. 366, 367, 382. Subdiv. (1) cited. 185 C. 211,
212, Subdiv. (2) cited. 186 C. 599, 600. Subdiv. (1) cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 574, 576; 189 C. 383,
384, 398. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 611, 612. Cited. Id., 611, 625, 627, 628. Subdiv. (2) cited. 190 C. 104, 105. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 496, 497, 500, 505-509. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 496, 507, 509. Subdiv. (2) cited. 194 C. 241, 244. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 196 C. 157, 158, 169. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 225-227. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 413, 415. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C.
62, 63. Subdiv. (1) cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Cited. Id., 586, 596. Subdiv. (1) cited. 203 C. 159, 160. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C.
714, 716. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 485, 486. Cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210
C. 199, 200. Cited. Id., 199, 203, 205-207. Subdiv. (2) cited. 214 C. 132, 133. Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 282, 284. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (1) cited. 217 C. 419, 420; 219 C. 269, 271; 221 C. 430, 431. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.; Id.,
447, 449; Id., 685, 687. Subdiv. (1) cited. 223 C. 41, 42. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 243, 245, 257, 263, 265. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 99, 301. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 524, 526. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 32, 48. Cited. Id., 616, 622. Subdiv. (1) cited.
228 C. 234, 235. Subdiv. (2) cited. 230 C. 351, 353. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 455, 457. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 802, 804.
Cited. 241 C. 702. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 784. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 445. Cited. Id., 523. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id. Utility room in rear of gas station convenience store in which defendant sexually assaulted and murdered
victim, being a separate room and structurally distinct from the convenience store that could be reached only through gas
station's garage bay area and not open to the public, reasonably could have been found to be a separate "building" under
statute. 252 C. 274.
Cited. 6 CA 667-669, 674, 675. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 667, 670, 675. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 667, 670, 675. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 697, 698. Cited. Id., 701, 706. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 631, 632. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 208, 209. Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 176. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA
662, 663. Subdiv. (1) cited. 13 CA 554-556. Subdiv. (2) cited. 14 CA 67, 68. Subdiv. (1) cited. id., 657, 658. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 15 CA 342, 343. Subdiv. (2) cited. 16 CA 184, 186. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 318, 319. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 455, 456.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 391, 392. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 179-181, 187. Cited. Id., 179, 192. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 245-
247, 250, 253-255. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 21 CA 244, 245. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 692, 693.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 556, 557, 559. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 556, 559. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 563, 565, 567, 569. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 563, 567, 569. Cited. Id., 563, 568. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA 428-430. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 565-567. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 26 CA 641, 642. Subdiv. (2) cited. 27 CA 73, 75; Id., 786, 787; Id., 794, 795. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 402, 403.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 548, 549. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 704, 705, 709. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited.
31 CA 312, 313, 327. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 751, 752; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35
CA 279, 280. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 774, 775. Subdiv. (1) cited 38 CA 481, 482. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 531, 532. Cited.
39 CA 45, 50. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 45, 46, 51. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 60, 61. Cited. 41 CA 255, 273. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 255, 257, 276, 277. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 255, 270, 276. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 317, 318. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 817,
818, 825. Cited. Id., 817, 825. Subdiv. (2) cited. 42 CA 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 307. Cited. 45 CA 187. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 261. Direct evidence of an entry is not required when evidence is such that the trier of fact
reasonably could infer that something the defendant did inside the building could not have been done without first entering
the building. 78 CA 646.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 190 C. 496, 509.
Cited. 29 CA 704, 711.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Cited. 19 CA 245, 255. Cited. 30 CA 416, 418.
Sec. 53a-102. Burglary in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is
guilty of burglary in the second degree when such person (1) enters or remains unlawfully
in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein, or (2) enters or remains
unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime is actually
present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein.
(b) Burglary in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 104; P.A. 01-83, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 01-83 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, designate existing
provisions re entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein as Subdiv. (1)
and add Subdiv. (2) re entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime
is actually present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein.
Cited. 161 C. 283. Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. Id., 556, 567. Cited. 175 C. 315. Cited. 184 C. 258, 259. Instruction
characterizing burglary as a crime against the person likely to involve danger to life was not in error. 188 C. 542, 553.
Cited. Id., 715, 716. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500. Cited. 195 C. 611, 612. Cited. 197 C. 574, 575, 581. Cited. 198 C. 671, 672.
Cited. 204 C. 1-3. Cited. 205 C. 456, 463, 467. Cited. 215 C. 257, 259. Cited. 216 C. 273, 274. Cited. 220 C. 417, 426.
Cited. 229 C. 285, 287. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458. Cited. 242 C. 523. Cited. Id., 689.
Cited. 5 CA 113, 114. Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 9 CA 133, 134. Cited. Id., 349-351. Cited. Id., 656, 657. Cited. 11 CA
575, 576, 583. Cited. 13 CA 413, 414. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 15 CA 34, 57. Cited. 16 CA 333, 334. Cited. 19 CA
396, 397, 401. Cited. 20 CA 369, 370. Cited. Id., 586, 587. Cited. 23 CA 201, 202. Cited. 29 CA 801, 803, 812; judgment
reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 94, 103. Cited. Id., 370, 376. Cited. 34 CA 599, 600, 606. Cited. 35 CA 714,
726. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 231, 236. Cited. Id., 531, 532. Cited. 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 169, 170. Cited.
Id., 255, 277. The crime proscribed by section is complete once there has been an unlawful entering or remaining in a
dwelling, at night, with intent to commit a crime in that dwelling. 76 CA 779.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 181 C. 172, 173, 177. Cited. 182 C. 207, 208. Cited. 188 C. 542, 543. Cited. 189 C. 631, 633. Cited. 190 C. 440,
442. Cited. 199 C. 88, 89. Cited. 200 C. 523, 525, 538. Cited. 202 C. 676, 677. Cited. 204 C. 377, 378. Cited. 205 C. 456,
459. Cited. 214 C. 493, 495. Cited. 216 C. 699, 701. Cited. 220 C. 400, 402. Cited. 223 C. 635, 637, 638. Cited. 241 C. 784.
Cited. 1 CA 260, 262. Cited. 6 CA 697. Cited. 14 CA 710, 712, 715. Cited. 21 CA 260, 261. Cited. 23 CA 564, 565;
judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 502, 503. Cited. 29 CA 801, 803; judgment reversed, see
229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 606, 607. Cited. 31 CA 370, 371, 376. Cited. 35 CA 262, 263. Cited 36 CA 774, 775.
Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 231, 232. Cited. Id., 531, 532. Cited. Id., 643, 645. Cited. 41 CA 255, 257. Cited. 42 CA
78. Defendant's right to fair trial and unanimous verdict not violated when court made it clear that the jury had to find
each element of crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt and there was ample evidence to support conviction under both
alternate theories of liability. 59 CA 305.
Sec. 53a-102a. Burglary in the second degree with a firearm: Class C felony:
One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree with
a firearm when he commits burglary in the second degree as provided in section 53a-102, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the
use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol,
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of
burglary in the second degree and burglary in the second degree with a firearm upon
the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such
offenses upon the same information.
(b) Burglary in the second degree with a firearm is a class C felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 11; P.A. 76-435, S. 4, 68, 82; P.A. 92-260, S. 41.)
History: P.A. 76-435 made technical corrections, adding simple burglary in the second degree in Subsec. (a) and
specifying in Subsec. (b) that burglary in second degree with a firearm is a Class C, rather than Class B, felony; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 188 C. 697, 699. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500. Cited. 199 C. 255, 275.
Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-103. Burglary in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of burglary in the third degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with
intent to commit a crime therein.
(b) Burglary in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 105.)
Cited. 161 C. 283. Cited. 173 C. 317, 318. Cited. 174 C. 253, 254. Cited. 176 C. 299, 300. Cited. 182 C. 52, 53; id.,
176, 177; id., 242, 243. Cited. 183 C. 225; id., 444, 445. Cited. 184 C. 95, 96; id., 215, 216; id., 369, 377. Cited. 186 C.
648, 649. Cited. 187 C. 6, 8; id., 292, 293; id., 444, 447. Cited. 189 C. 364; id., 717, 718. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500. Cited.
191 C. 146; id., 180, 182, 185. Cited. 193 C. 35-37. Cited. 194 C. 198, 199, 204, 205. Cited. Id., 210. Cited. Id., 213, 214.
Cited. Id., 361, 362. Cited. Id., 438, 439. Cited. Id., 623, 624. Cited. 196 C. 185. Cited. 197 C. 247, 261. Cited. 198 C. 1,
2. Cited. 199 C. 30-32. Cited. Id., 308, 309. Cited. 202 C. 615, 617. Cited. 216 C. 814. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275-277. Cited.
219 C. 489, 491. Cited. 220 C. 417, 418, 429. Cited. 223 C. 731, 733. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458, 459. Cited. 235 C. 679, 682.
Cited. 237 C. 390, 392. Cited. 239 C. 235. Cited. 240 C. 708.
Cited. 2 CA 537, 538. Cited. 3 CA 132, 133. Cited. Id., 359, 362. Cited. Id., 503. Cited. 5 CA 599, 600, 604. Cited. 6
CA 24, 25. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. 8 CA 478, 479, 481, 490. Cited. 9 CA 141, 142, 144. Cited. 10 CA 258, 259. Cited.
Id., 279, 280. Cited. Id., 447, 448, 451. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. 11 CA 805. Cited. 12 CA 1, 3, 19. Cited. Id., 196, 197.
Cited. Id., 375, 376, 383. Cited. 13 CA 214, 215. Cited. Id., 220, 221. Cited. 14 CA 119, 120, 126. Cited. Id., 526, 527.
Cited. 16 CA 184. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 18 CA 368, 369. Cited. 19 CA 48, 50, 52, 60. Cited. 20 CA 205, 207. Cited.
Id., 721, 722. Cited. 22 CA 440, 441. Cited. 23 CA 123, 125. Cited. Id., 151, 152. Cited. Id., 201, 202. Cited. 24 CA 295,
296. Cited. 25 CA 503, 505. Cited. 30 CA 190, 192. Cited. 34 CA 751, 752; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq.
Cited. 35 CA 107, 110. Cited. Id., 405, 406, 409, 412, 420. Cited. Id., 714, 716, 726. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. Id.,
364, 372, 373. Cited. 37 CA 40, 42. Cited. Id., 228, 229, 231, 234. Cited. 38 CA 225, 226. Cited. Id., 481, 482. Cited. 39
CA 1, 2, 4. Cited. Id., 579, 580, 599. Cited. 42 CA 507. Cited. 44 CA 162. Cited. 45 CA 566.
Cited. 33 CS 706. Cited. Id., 750. Cited. 38 CS 407.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 177 C. 140, 147. Cited. 181 C. 254, 255. Cited. 184 C. 369, 370. Cited. 189 C. 461, 462. Cited. 191 C. 180, 181,
184. Cited. 194 C. 213, 216. Cited. Id., 665, 666, 672, 675. Cited. 197 C. 247, 248. Cited. 198 C. 369, 370. Cited. 212 C.
50, 52. Cited. 218 C. 447-449.
Cited. 4 CA 514. Cited. 6 CA 24, 25. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 75, 76. Cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Cited. Id., 528, 540.
Cited. 9 CA 121, 122. Cited. 10 CA 279, 280. Cited. Id., 503, 511. Cited. 13 CA 438, 439. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment
reversed, see 212 C. 50 et seq. Cited. 15 CA 531, 532. Cited. 17 CA 490, 492. Cited. 22 CA 440, 443. Cited. 23 CA 151,
155. Cited. 24 CA 502, 503. Cited. 34 CA 751, 752; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 405, 412.
Cited. Id., 699, 700. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. 37 CA 40, 42. Cited. Id., 228, 229, 233. Cited. 38 CA 225, 226. Cited.
Id., 481, 482. Cited. 39 CA 579, 594. Cited. 44 CA 307.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 184 C. 369, 377.
Sec. 53a-103a. Burglary in the third degree with a firearm: Class D felony:
One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree with
a firearm when he commits burglary in the third degree as provided in section 53a-103,
and in the commission of such offense, he uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver,
shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of burglary
in the third degree and burglary in the third degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the
same information.
(b) Burglary in the third degree with a firearm is a class D felony for which one
year of the sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 12.)
Cited. 177 C. 335, 336; id., 637, 639. Cited. 184 C. 215, 216. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500.
Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 14 CA 710, 717. Cited. 28 CA 369, 370. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295. Cited. 219 C. 93, 95.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-104. Affirmative defense to burglary. It shall be an affirmative defense
to prosecution for burglary that the building was abandoned.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 106.)
Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Sec. 53a-105. Conviction for burglary and other offense authorized, when.
Section 53a-105 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 107; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
Sec. 53a-106. Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools when
he manufactures or has in his possession any tool, instrument or other thing adapted,
designed or commonly used for advancing or facilitating offenses involving unlawful
entry into premises, or offenses involving forcible breaking of safes or other containers
or depositories of property, under circumstances manifesting an intent to use or knowledge that some person intends to use the same in the commission of an offense of such
character.
(b) Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 108; P.A. 92-260, S. 42.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change in the name of the offense.
Cited. 181 C. 172, 180. Cited. 182 C. 242, 243, 250.
Cited. 5 CA 599, 600, 604. Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 11 CA 805. Cited. 28 CA 369, 370. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726. Cited.
37 CA 228, 229.
Cited. 33 CS 706.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 182 C. 366, 367, 382.
Cited. 5 CA 599, 606.
Sec. 53a-107. Criminal trespass in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a)
A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when: (1) Knowing that such
person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains in a building
or any other premises after an order to leave or not to enter personally communicated
to such person by the owner of the premises or other authorized person; or (2) such
person enters or remains in a building or any other premises in violation of a restraining
order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section
46b-38c, 54-1k or 54-82r by the Superior Court; or (3) such person enters or remains
in a building or any other premises in violation of a foreign order of protection, as
defined in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against such person, after notice and
an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, in a case involving the
use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person.
(b) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 109; P.A. 80-58; P.A. 91-381, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 43; P.A. 95-214, S. 4; P.A. 99-240, S. 5; P.A.
03-98, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 80-58 added Subdiv. (2) in Subsec. (a) specifying that entering or remaining in building or other premises
in violation of a restraining order is criminal trespass in the first degree; P.A. 91-381 amended Subsec. (a) by adding
"pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-38c" after "issued"; P.A. 92-260 made
technical changes in Subsec. (a) by replacing references to "such person" with "he" or "him" as appropriate; P.A. 95-214
amended Subsec. (a) to include in Subdiv. (2) a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-1k; P.A. 99-240 amended
Subsec. (a) to include in Subdiv. (2) a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-82r and to make provisions gender
neutral; P.A. 03-98 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) re entry or remaining in a building or other premises in
violation of a foreign order of protection.
Cited. 203 C. 466, 473. Cited. Id., 624, 640. Cited. 204 C. 441, 442.
Cited. 12 CA 172, 173, 175, 177, 178. Cited. 18 CA 303, 310. Cited. 19 CA 245, 254, 255. Cited. 20 CA 599, 606,
607. Cited. 24 CA 195, 196. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726. Cited. 43 CA 1. Conviction reversed; evidence was insufficient to
convict defendant under section. 55 CA 475.
Word "owner" must be given broad meaning so statute serves its legislative purpose to protect any possessor of land
from unwanted intrusions; proof of title not essential element. 35 CS 555, 556, 558, 559. Cited. 37 CS 853.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 647, 649. Subdiv. (2) cited. 236 C. 342, 343.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 24, 25; 12 CA 258, 261. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 303, 304, 306; 19 CA 245, 249, 250, 253,
254. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 45, 46. Cited. 35 CA 262, 263, 267. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 262, 267. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 448, 449; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342 et seq.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 19 CA 245, 255.
Sec. 53a-108. Criminal trespass in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree when, knowing that he
is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in a building.
(b) Criminal trespass in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 110.)
Cited. 203 C. 466, 473. Cited. Id., 624, 640. Cited. 215 C. 257, 259. Section not applicable based on defendant's
knowledge. 245 C. 657.
Cited. 12 CA 375, 383, 384. Cited. 19 CA 245, 256. Cited. 20 CA 599, 606, 607. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited. 24 CA
489. Cited. 31 CA 370, 376. Cited. 35 CA 107, 110. Cited. Id., 714, 726.
Cited. 35 CS 555, 558. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 24 CA 541, 542. Cited. 31 CA 370, 376.
Sec. 53a-109. Criminal trespass in the third degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a)
A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when, knowing that he is not
licensed or privileged to do so: (1) He enters or remains in premises which are posted
in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders,
or fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, or which
belong to the state and are appurtenant to any state institution; or (2) he enters or remains
in any premises for the purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing.
(b) Criminal trespass in the third degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 111; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 20; P.A. 92-260, S. 44.)
History: 1971 act added Subdiv. (2) in Subsec. (a) specifying that person's entering or remaining in premises for purpose
of hunting, trapping or fishing although he knows he is not licensed or privileged to do so is criminal trespass in the third
degree; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes and deleted redundant language in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 203 C. 466, 473. Cited. Id., 624, 640. Cited. 240 C. 708.
Cited. 20 CA 599, 606, 607. Cited. 24 CA 195, 203. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Cited. 35 CS 555, 558.
Subsec. (a):
Evidence that defendant entered building by not using main entrance but instead forcing open a locked door labeled
with a no trespassing sign was sufficient to support conviction under section. 83 CA 377.
Sec. 53a-110. Affirmative defenses to criminal trespass. It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution for criminal trespass that: (1) The building involved in the
offense was abandoned; or (2) the premises, at the time of the entry or remaining, were
open to the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access
to or remaining in the premises; or (3) the actor reasonably believed that the owner of
the premises, or a person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him
to enter or remain, or that he was licensed to do so.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 112.)
Cited. 202 C. 86, 91. Cited. 215 C. 82, 101. Cited. Id., 257, 273.
Cited. 18 CA 303, 311. Cited. 20 CA 599, 606-608. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Cited. 35 CS 555, 563.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 215 C. 257, 273.
Sec. 53a-110a. Simple trespass: Infraction. (a) A person is guilty of simple trespass when, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters any premises
without intent to harm any property.
(b) Simple trespass is an infraction.
(P.A. 83-276, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 45.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
Cited. 12 CA 258-262. Cited. 20 CA 599-608. Cited. 24 CA 195, 196. Cited. 30 CA 45, 46, 50. Cited. 31 CA 370, 378.
Sec. 53a-110b. Transferred to Part XXI, Sec. 53a-223.
Sec. 53a-110c. Transferred to Part XXI, Sec. 53a-223a.
Sec. 53a-110d. Simple trespass of railroad property: Infraction. (a) A person
is guilty of simple trespass of railroad property when, knowing that such person is not
licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains on railroad property without
lawful authority or the consent of the railroad carrier.
(b) Simple trespass of railroad property is an infraction.
(P.A. 00-149, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-111. Arson in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of
arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined
in section 53a-100, he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and (1) the building is inhabited
or occupied or the person has reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied; or (2) any other person is injured, either directly or indirectly; or (3) such fire or
explosion was caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant
loss; or (4) at the scene of such fire or explosion a peace officer or firefighter is subjected
to a substantial risk of bodily injury.
(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 113; P.A. 79-570, S. 3; P.A. 80-229, S. 1; P.A. 82-290, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 79-570 restated Subsec. (a) in greater detail, replacing general language re actor's awareness that person
is in or near building or his lack of knowledge or indifference as to whether another is in or near building; P.A. 80-229
clarified Subsec. (a), adding reference to "building" definition of Sec. 53a-100 and replacing reference to peace officer's
or firefighter's closeness to building with reference to their being at the scene of a fire or explosion; P.A. 82-290 amended
Subsec. (a) to include fire or explosion caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds.
See also annotations to part V.
Cited. 172 C. 298. Cited. 174 C. 135, 136. Cited. 178 C. 67, 68. Cited. 194 C. 279, 281, 283-286. Cited. 197 C. 158,
162-164. Cited. 198 C. 92, 105. Cited. 200 C. 685, 686, 693. Cited. 204 C. 4, 5. Cited. Id., 769, 770. Cited. 210 C. 519-
521. Cited. 216 C. 678, 679. Cited. 219 C. 605, 606. Cited. 220 C. 796, 798. Cited. 222 C. 469, 470. Cited. 227 C. 829,
832. Cited. 235 C. 679, 681, 683. Cited. 236 C. 31, 33. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 828.
Cited. 8 CA 581, 597. Cited. 12 CA 32, 34. Cited. 35 CA 527, 528. Cited. Id., 714, 715, 717, 724. Cited. 36 CA 454,
456-458. Cited. 40 CA 789, 791. Cited. 46 CA 350. Provisions applicable to firefighters on truck injured in accident en
route to fire. Injuries not required to be substantial or foreseeable. 59 CA 507.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 183 C. 1, 2, 5. Subdiv. (1) cited. 187 C. 109, 111. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 513, 514. Subdiv. (1) cited.
191 C. 412, 413. Cited. Id., 636, 638, 645. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 1, 2. Cited. 200 C. 30, 31. Trial court's failure to
consider a suspended sentence violated equal protection because it resulted in a harsher penalty for a defendant who acted
with less culpable intent and caused a less serious result than arson murder. Id., 268, 279, 280. Cited. 202 C. 93, 98. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 204 C. 377, 378. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 769, 775-777, 785. Subdiv. (1) cited. 205 C. 201, 202. Cited. 207 C. 118,
120. Subdiv. (1) cited. 213 C. 161, 162. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 161, 162; Id., 752, 753; 215 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (2) cited.
216 C. 585-587, 595; 218 C. 747, 748. Subdiv. (4) cited. 219 C. 605, 606, 608, 615, 618, 619. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 605,
606, 608, 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 221 C. 713, 715. Subdiv. (4) cited. 227 C. 1, 2, 6-12. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 1, 2, 6-
12, 16. Subdiv. (3) cited. 229 C. 10-12. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Cited. 235 C. 679, 681. Subdiv. (4) cited. 240 C. 708. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 241 C. 57. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Motive not an ultimate issue or element of Sec. 53a-111(a)(4), therefore state is
not collaterally estopped from admitting evidence of insurance despite earlier acquittal of Sec. 53a-111(a)(3). Evidence
supported finding that firefighters were exposed to risk of substantial injury. 243 C. 282.
Cited. 10 CA 147, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. 12 CA 343, 344. Cited. 28 CA 9, 11. Subdiv. (4) cited. 30 CA 164, 165, 168,
179; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 164, 168; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10 et seq.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 823-826, 829. Subdiv. (3) cited. 36 CA 454-456. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 753,
755, 762. Subdiv. (3) cited. 37 CA 360, 369. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 39 CA 800, 801, 803, 805. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 800, 805. Defendant was not deprived of right to fair trial for violation of section because evidence was
sufficient to establish that she possessed requisite intent. Although the prosecutor improperly asked defendant to comment
on other witnesses' veracity, the questioning occurred just once and was not prejudicial; prosecutor's closing statements,
even if found improper, were isolated and not prejudicial. 75 CA 163. Jury instructions were proper. Id.
Sec. 53a-112. Arson in the second degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty
of arson in the second degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as
defined in section 53a-100, (1) he starts a fire or causes an explosion and (A) such act
subjects another person to a substantial risk of bodily injury; or (B) such fire or explosion
was intended to conceal some other criminal act; or (C) such fire or explosion was
intended to subject another person to a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States; or
(2) a fire or explosion was caused by an individual hired by such person to start such
fire or cause such explosion.
(b) Arson in the second degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 114; P.A. 79-570, S. 4; P.A. 80-229, S. 2; P.A. 82-290, S. 2; P.A. 84-4.)
History: P.A. 79-570 made second degree arson a Class B, rather than a Class C felony; P.A. 80-229 added reference
to building definition of Sec. 53a-100; P.A. 82-290 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting (1) intent to destroy or damage a
building of another (2) fires or explosions caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds and (3) subjecting
another building to risk of destruction or damage and adding (1) fires or explosions intended to conceal some criminal act
and (2) fires or explosions caused by person hired to set fire or cause explosion; P.A. 84-4 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec.
(a) by adding Subpara. (C) re a fire or explosion intended to subject another person to a deprivation of certain rights,
privileges or immunities.
See also annotations to part V.
Cited. 172 C. 298. Cited. 178 C. 67, 68. Cited. 189 C. 228, 230. Cited. 191 C. 636, 645. Cited. 194 C. 617-619. Cited.
195 C. 600, 601, 603-605. "... more reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended arsonists to be held culpable (under
the statute) for creating substantial risk to other buildings, regardless of how close such risks come to being fulfilled." 197
C. 158, 159, 161, 162, 164, 165. Cited. 198 C. 92, 105. Cited. 199 C. 389, 399. Cited. 204 C. 769, 776. Cited. 219 C. 605,
615, 616. Cited. 236 C. 375, 379.
Term "another person" includes firefighters. 8 CA 581, 582, 597. Cited. 17 CA 466, 469, 470.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 174 C. 73. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 189 C. 201, 202. Subdiv. (1)(B)(2) cited.
Id., 752, 754. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 195 C. 128, 129. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 598, 599. Cited. 197 C. 158, 159, 162.
Cited. 199 C. 14, 15. Cited. Id., 389, 390. Subdiv. (1) cited. 202 C. 93, 95, 99. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 215 C. 716, 719.
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 10 CA 422, 423. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 17 CA 466, 467. Cited. 28 CA 9, 11. Subdiv. (2): Holding
in State v. Schleifer, that solicitation of another to set a fire was insufficient to establish the crime of attempt to commit
arson, has been legislatively overruled by enactment of P.A. 82