Sec. 53a-32a. Violation of probation by certain sexual offenders. If a defendant
who entered a plea of nolo contendere or a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine to a
violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to
October 1, 2000, subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, and was ordered to undergo sexual
offender treatment as a condition of probation, becomes ineligible for such treatment
because of such defendant's refusal to acknowledge that such defendant committed the
act or acts charged, such defendant shall be deemed to be in violation of the conditions
of such defendant's probation and be returned to court for proceedings in accordance
with section 53a-32.
(P.A. 97-151, S. 2; P.A. 01-84, S. 16, 26.)
History: P.A. 01-84 replaced reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of subdivision
(2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000," included a violation of "subdivision (2) of
subsection (a) of section 53-21" and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.
Trial court not required to notify defendant, upon entering guilty plea under Alford doctrine, that failure to acknowledge
his guilt could result in violation of condition of his probation requiring sex offender treatment. 268 C. 174.
Statute can be applied only prospectively. 69 CA 421. Trial court improperly considered defendant's refusal to admit
to guilt during sexual offender treatment as a violation of probation. Id. (judgment reversed, see 268 C. 174).
Sec. 53a-33. Termination of probation or conditional discharge. The court or
sentencing judge may at any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge,
after hearing and for good cause shown, terminate a sentence of probation or conditional
discharge before the completion thereof, except a sentence of probation imposed for
conviction of a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in
effect prior to October 1, 2000, subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or
section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 33; P.A. 92-260, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 11; P.A. 01-84, S. 17, 26.)
History: P.A. 92-260 added "a sentence of"; P.A. 95-142 specified that a sentence of probation or conditional discharge
may be terminated "before the completion thereof" and precluded termination of a sentence of probation imposed for
conviction of a violation of Subdiv. (2) of Sec. 53-21 or Sec. 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b; P.A. 01-84
replaced reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000," and included a violation of "subdivision (2) of subsection (a)
of section 53-21", effective July 1, 2001.
Cited. 165 C. 73. Cited. 170 C. 128. Cited. 219 C. 752, 762. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306. Cited. 225 C. 46, 50.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Sec. 53a-31 et seq. cited. 36 CA 440, 446.
Sec. 53a-34. Unconditional discharge: Criteria; effect. (a) The court may impose a sentence of unconditional discharge in any case where it is authorized to impose
a sentence of conditional discharge under section 53a-29, if the court is of the opinion
that no proper purpose would be served by imposing any condition upon the defendant's
release.
(b) When the court imposes a sentence of unconditional discharge, the defendant
shall be released with respect to the conviction for which the sentence is imposed without
imprisonment, probation supervision or conditions. A sentence of unconditional discharge is for all purposes a final judgment of conviction.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 34.)
Cited. 170 C. 128. Cited. 180 C. 557, 561. Cited. 188 C. 557, 559. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 32, 46. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Sec. 53a-31 et seq.
cited. 36 CA 440, 446.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 182 C. 595, 603.
Sec. 53a-35. Imprisonment for any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981:
Indeterminate sentences; maximum and minimum terms. (a) For any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be an indeterminate
sentence, except as provided in subsection (d). When such a sentence is imposed the
court shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the provisions of subsection
(b) and the minimum term shall be as provided in subsection (c) or (d).
(b) The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be fixed by the court and
specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a class A felony, life imprisonment; (2) for
a class B felony, a term not to exceed twenty years; (3) for a class C felony, a term not
to exceed ten years; (4) for a class D felony, a term not to exceed five years; (5) for an
unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of
the general statutes that defines the crime; and (6) for a capital felony, life imprisonment
unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) the minimum term of an indeterminate
sentence shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a
class A felony, the minimum term shall not be less than ten nor more than twenty-five
years; (2) for a class B, C or D felony the court may fix a minimum term of not less
than one year nor more than one-half of the maximum term imposed, except that (A)
where the maximum is less than three years the minimum term may be more than one-half the maximum term imposed or (B) when a person is found guilty under section
53a-59(a)(1), section 53a-59a, 53a-101(a)(1) or 53a-134(a)(2), the minimum term shall
be not less than five years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced, or when
a person is found guilty under section 53a-60c, the minimum term shall be not less than
three years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced, or when a person is
found guilty under section 53a-60b,the minimum term shall be not less than two years
and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced; (3) for an unclassified felony, a
term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that
defines the crime.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c), except as provided
in subdivision (2) of said subsection (c), when a person is sentenced for a class C or D
felony or for an unclassified felony, the maximum sentence for which does not exceed
ten years, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of
one year or less; except when a person is found guilty under sections 53a-55a, 53a-56a,
53a-60a, 53a-70a, 53a-72b, 53a-92a, 53a-94a, 53a-102a and 53a-103a, the court shall
not fix a term of less than one year.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 35; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 13; P.A. 73-137, S. 8; P.A. 74-186, S. 9, 12; P.A. 75-380, S. 14; 75-411, S.
3; P.A. 76-435, S. 2, 82; P.A. 77-422, S. 5; P.A. 80-442, S. 9, 28; P.A. 83-587, S. 76, 96.)
History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to minimum sentence terms in Subsec. (d), required that sentence
be specified in the sentence in Subsec. (b), amended Subsec. (c) to add exception re Subsec. (d), to raise minimum term
for Class A felony from one to ten years and maximum term from ten to twenty-five years, to clarify exception re maximum
term of three years by specifying minimum terms and to add Subdiv. (3) re unclassified felonies and amended Subsec. (d)
to add exception re Subsec. (c)(2) and to include applicability re unclassified felonies; P.A. 73-137 removed reference to
death sentence imposed for class A felony in accordance with Sec. 53a-46 in Subsec. (b)(1) and added Subdiv. (6) re capital
felonies; P.A. 74-186 removed reference to guilt under Subdivs. (2) or (4) of Sec. 53a-60(a) in Subsec. (c)(2)(B); P.A. 75-380 added exception in Subsec. (d) re required one-year term; P.A. 75-411 deleted reference to guilt under Sec. 53a-135(a)(2) in Subsec. (c)(2)(B); P.A. 76-435 added exception in Subsec. (d) as amended by P.A. 75-380; P.A. 77-422
expanded exception in Subsec. (c)(2)(B) re required three-year and two-year minimum terms and added reference to guilt
under Sec. 53-59a; P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (a) to limit applicability to felonies committed prior to July 1, 1981,
effective on that date; P.A. 83-587 substituted "53a-59a" for "53-59a" in Subsec. (c).
Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. 176 C. 270, 271. Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 182 C. 595, 597-599, 602. Cited. 190
C. 327, 335; Id., 639, 642. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 734. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 403-406. Cited. 19 CA 440, 443, 444. Cited.
Id., 571, 574, 575. Cited. Id., 631, 635. Cited. 24 CA 612, 617. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231, 232.
Courts may impose a definite sentence for a felony of one year or less. 31 CS 350. Cited. 33 CS 705.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 171 C. 278. Cited. 189 C. 114, 116. Cited. 196 C. 655, 658.
Cited. 12 CA 403, 405. Cited. 19 CA 571, 575.
Subsec. (b):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 114, 116, 117. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151. Subdiv. (1) cited. 195 C. 326, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited.
195 C. 326, 328. Subdiv. (4) cited. 199 C. 121, 124. Cited. 211 C. 591, 612. Subdiv. (4) cited. 231 C. 545, 556. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 545, 557.
Cited. 19 CA 571, 575. Subdiv. (1) cited. 24 CA 612, 615, 623. Cited. Id., 612, 618, 619. Cited. 46 CA 450.
Subsec. (c):
Subdiv. (2)(B): Rational relationship exists between the protection of public health and safety and the imposition of
nonsuspendable sentence for violent crime of second degree robbery, an essential element of which is threatened use of a
deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. 171 C. 677, 681. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 595, 599; 189 C. 114, 117. Subdiv.
(2)(B) cited. 182 C. 595, 601, 603. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 144, 153. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 195 C. 326, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 197 C. 413, 427. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 485, 488, 502,
503. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 121, 124. Subdiv. (2) cited. 202 C. 343, 345. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 591, 612.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 12 CA 403, 405, 406. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 403, 406. Cited. 24 CA 612, 618.
Sec. 53a-35a. Imprisonment for any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981:
Definite sentences; terms authorized. For any felony committed on or after July 1,
1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be a definite sentence and the term shall be
fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a capital felony, a term of life imprisonment without
the possibility of release unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section
53a-46a; (2) for the class A felony of murder, a term not less than twenty-five years nor
more than life; (3) for a class A felony other than murder, a term not less than ten years
nor more than twenty-five years; (4) for the class B felony of manslaughter in the first
degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a, a term not less than five years nor more
than forty years; (5) for a class B felony other than manslaughter in the first degree with
a firearm under section 53a-55a, a term not less than one year nor more than twenty
years, except that for a conviction under section 53a-59(a)(1), 53a-59a, 53a-70a, 53a-94a, 53a-101(a)(1) or 53a-134(a)(2), the term shall be not less than five years nor more
than twenty years; (6) for a class C felony, a term not less than one year nor more than
ten years, except that for a conviction under section 53a-56a, the term shall be not less
than three years nor more than ten years; (7) for a class D felony, a term not less than
one year nor more than five years, except that for a conviction under section 53a-60b
or 53a-217, the term shall be not less than two years nor more than five years, for a
conviction under section 53a-60c, the term shall be not less than three years nor more
than five years, and for a conviction under section 53a-216, the term shall be five years;
(8) for an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the
section of the general statutes that defines the crime.
(P.A. 80-442, S. 10, 28; P.A. 86-220; P.A. 92-260, S. 15; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 80-442 effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 86-220 amended Subdiv. (1) to add "imprisonment without the
possibility of release" to reflect revision made by P.A. 85-366; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (6) to add reference to "Sec.
53a-217" and provision that "for a conviction under section 53a-216, the term shall be five years", to reflect existing
minimum mandatory sentences prescribed in said sections; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 added a new Subdiv. (4) to provide a
term of not less than five years nor more than forty years for the class B felony of manslaughter in the first degree with a
firearm under Sec. 53a-55a, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and amended Subdiv. (5) to provide that
the specified sentence is for a class B felony "other than manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a" and delete a reference to Sec. 53a-55a, reflecting the separate sentencing provisions established for Sec. 53a-55a in
Subdiv. (4).
See Sec. 53a-41 re fines for felonies.
Cited. 196 C. 655, 659. Cited. 197 C. 337, 353, 355, 357. Cited. 198 C. 92, 94. Cited. 200 C. 268, 279. Cited. Id., 664,
674. Cited. 201 C. 598, 600. Cited. 210 C. 519, 525. Cited. 211 C. 258, 282-285. Cited. 212 C. 31, 47. Definite sentencing
scheme for any felony under this section implicitly repealed indeterminate sentencing aspect of Sec. 21a-278(a). 214 C.
378, 382-384, 386-388. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. 225 C. 559, 562. Cited. 230 C. 109, 114,
115, 118. Cited. 234 C. 139, 143, 166. Cited. Id., 735, 748. Cited. 235 C. 502, 517. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 6 CA 680, 681. Cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720, 731. Cited. 10 CA 659, 665. Cited.
12 CA 403-407. Cited. 19 CA 571, 573-575. Cited. 23 CA 201, 205. Cited. 32 CA 759, 764. Cited. 35 CA 714, 720. Cited.
42 CA 348.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 392, 393. Cited. 235 C. 206, 227. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 285, 294, 295. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759.
Cited. 34 CA 58, 93; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 674. Cited. 235 C. 679, 681.
Cited. 8 CA 177, 178.
Subdiv. (4):
Cited. 202 C. 93, 99. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759.
Cited. 15 CA 416, 444.
Subdiv. (5):
Cited. 6 CA 680, 681.
Subdiv. (6):
Cited. 218 C. 273, 275.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 728. Cited. 10 CA 486, 493.
Subdiv. (7):
Cited. 211 C. 258, 284. Cited. 214 C. 378, 385.
Sec. 53a-35b. "Life imprisonment" defined. A sentence of imprisonment for life
shall mean a definite sentence of sixty years, unless the sentence is life imprisonment
without the possibility of release, imposed pursuant to subsection (g) of section 53a-46a, in which case the sentence shall be imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's natural life.
(P.A. 80-442, S. 11, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 3; P.A. 95-19, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 80-442 effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added provision re life imprisonment without the possibility
of release; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change.
See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
Cited. 198 C. 92, 94. Cited. 201 C. 276, 277. Cited. 207 C. 374, 386. Cited. 215 C. 231, 232. Cited. 216 C. 282, 285.
Cited. 219 C. 752, 759. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 234 C. 139, 144, 166.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 24 CA 612, 618, 622.
Sec. 53a-35c. Availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release
shall not be available as a sentence for an offense committed prior to October 1, 1985.
(P.A. 85-366, S. 4.)
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.
Sec. 53a-36. Imprisonment for misdemeanor: Maximum and minimum sentences. A sentence of imprisonment for a misdemeanor shall be a definite sentence and
the term shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, a term
not to exceed one year except that when a person is found guilty under section 53a-61(a)(3) or 53a-61a, the term shall be one year and such sentence shall not be suspended
or reduced; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, a term not to exceed six months; (3) for a
class C misdemeanor, a term not to exceed three months; (4) for an unclassified misdemeanor, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general
statutes that defines the crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 36; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 14; P.A. 77-422, S. 6; P.A. 92-260, S. 16.)
History: 1971 act added exception re guilt under Sec. 53a-61(a)(3) in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 77-422 expanded exception to
include guilt under Sec. 53a-61a; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (1) to consolidate statutory references and delete redundant
language.
See Sec. 53a-42 re fines for misdemeanors.
Cited. 169 C. 223. Cited. 178 C. 145, 153. Court in sentencing of defendant found guilty under Sec. 53a-61a must
impose a mandatory nonsuspendable term of imprisonment and does not have option of imposing a fine or a sentence of
unconditional discharge. 180 C. 557, 559-561, 564. Cited. 194 C. 198, 209. Cited. 217 C. 73, 90. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275.
Cited. 223 C. 635, 666.
Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720, 731. Cited. 19 CA 631, 635. Cited. 32 CA 656, 660;
judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 189 C. 114, 117.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 727.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 184 C. 434, 438.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 722.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 194 C. 198, 199.
Cited. 12 CA 481, 494.
Sec. 53a-37. Multiple sentences: Concurrent or consecutive, minimum term.
When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time,
or when a person who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at
a previous time by a court of this state is sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment,
the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall run either concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other and to the undischarged term or terms in such manner
as the court directs at the time of sentence. The court shall state whether the respective
maxima and minima shall run concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other,
and shall state in conclusion the effective sentence imposed. When a person is sentenced
for two or more counts each constituting a separate offense, the court may order that
the term of imprisonment for the second and subsequent counts be for a fixed number
of years each. The court in such cases shall not set any minimum term of imprisonment
except under the first count, and the fixed number of years imposed for the second and
subsequent counts shall be added to the maximum term imposed by the court on the
first count.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 37; P.A. 73-639, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 73-639 added provisions clarifying court's sentencing powers in cases where person is to be sentenced
for two or more counts each of which constitutes a separate offense.
Cited. 178 C. 427, 432, 436. Statute provides for three sentencing options where multiple sentences are imposed at
same time. Id., 634-639. Section authorizes multiple sentences with consecutive minimum and maximum terms. 179 C.
381-384. Cited. Id., 384-387. Cited. 184 C. 366, 367; Id., 434, 439. Cited. 185 C. 473, 478. Cited. 190 C. 327, 335. Cited.
192 C. 471, 477. Cited. 197 C. 413, 427, 428. Cited. Id., 485, 503. Cited. 206 C. 40, 55. Cited. Id., 685, 701-703. Cited.
207 C. 270, 276. Cited. Id., 276. Cited. 208 C. 420, 422. Cited. 217 C. 568, 577. Does not impose limits on trial court's
common law inherent sentencing power to stay execution of a criminal sentence. 225 C. 46, 52-54. Cited. 228 C. 384,
389. Court was not prohibited from imposing a term of incarceration consecutive to a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of release. 249 C. 645.
Cited. 7 CA 131, 135. Cited. Id., 367, 377. Cited. 9 CA 365-367. Cited. Id., 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 17 CA
307, 311. Cited. 20 CA 572, 575, 576. Cited. 26 CA 10, 12. Cited. 34 CA 503, 507. Application of section is limited to
"offenses" and since criminal contempt is not a criminal offense it is not a matter within the section's scope; however,
legislature did not intend to change existing common law in enacting this section and therefore trial court had inherent
authority to impose criminal sentence that ran concurrently with previous sentence for criminal contempt. 59 CA 145.
Cited. 30 CS 71. Cited. 36 CS 168, 169.
Sec. 53a-38. Calculation of terms of imprisonment. (a) An indeterminate sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody or institution to which he was sentenced.
(b) A definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received
in the custody to which he was sentenced. Where a person is under more than one
definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run
concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has
the longest term to run; (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to
arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.
(c) When a sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on a person is vacated
and a new sentence is imposed on such person for the same offense or for an offense
based on the same act, the new sentence shall be calculated as if it had commenced at
the time the vacated sentence commenced, and all time served under or credited against
the vacated sentence shall be credited against the new sentence.
(d) When a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment escapes, the escape
shall interrupt the sentence and such interruption shall continue until the return of such
person to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 38; P.A. 92-260, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (c).
Calculations of terms of imprisonment discussed. 185 C. 124-129. Cited. 230 C. 17, 18.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 45 CA 566.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 185 C. 124, 131; Id., 124, 126-129, 131.
Cited. 33 CA 205, 213.
Cited. 40 CS 354, 356.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 209 C. 23-26, 28, 32-34. Subdiv. (2) cited. 217 C. 568, 577. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 384, 388, 390. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 384, 390.
Cited. 34 CA 503, 508. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 503, 508, 509. Cited. 45 CA 566.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 202 C. 343, 347-349. Cited. 215 C. 695, 697, 699. Cited. 216 C. 220, 224. Fundamental purpose is to afford
inmate credit toward current sentence for time that he was confined as direct result of his initial trial on same charges and
therefore petitioner entitled to credit toward his prison sentence for time that he was confined in mental health facility.
258 C. 394.
Cited. 30 CA 190, 195, 196. Cited. 39 CA 455, 461, 463, 464.
Sec. 53a-39. Reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant by sentencing
court or judge. Statement by victim. (a) At any time during the period of a definite
sentence of three years or less, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for
good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the
defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed
that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced.
(b) At any time during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years,
upon agreement of the defendant and the state's attorney to seek review of the sentence,
the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the
sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation
or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could
have been originally sentenced.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any portion of a sentence imposed
that is a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense which may not be suspended or
reduced by the court.
(d) At a hearing held by the sentencing court or judge under this section, such court
or judge shall permit any victim of the crime to appear before the court or judge for the
purpose of making a statement for the record concerning whether or not the sentence
of the defendant should be reduced, the defendant discharged or the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this
section. In lieu of such appearance, the victim may submit a written statement to the
court or judge and the court or judge shall make such statement a part of the record at
the hearing. For the purposes of this subsection, "victim" means the victim, the legal
representative of the victim or a member of the deceased victim's immediate family.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 39; P.A. 82-428, S. 1, 4; P.A. 84-505, S. 3, 6; P.A. 85-354, S. 1, 3; P.A. 87-538, S. 1, 3, 5; P.A. 90-261, S. 7, 19; P.A. 94-119; P.A. 95-175, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 82-428 specified applicability to definite sentences "of three years or less"; P.A. 84-505 authorized the
sentencing court or judge to order certain defendants discharged on intensive probation, effective June 13, 1984, to July
1, 1987; P.A. 85-354 added provisions to require applications for the intensive probation program to be referred to the
office of adult probation for assessment and recommendations, to specify that the period of intensive probation shall not
exceed the unexpired portion of the sentence, to authorize the court or judge to place on regular probation a defendant who
successfully completes intensive probation, to specify the period of such regular probation, and to require a defendant
discharged on intensive probation to comply with the probation conditions ordered by the court or required by the office
of adult probation; P.A. 87-538 prohibited the discharge on intensive probation of a defendant sentenced for a class A
felony, authorized the placement in the intensive probation program of a defendant with a definite sentence which includes
suspension of incarceration after a period of at least two years but not more than five years, followed by a period of
probation, if he has served at least one-half of the unsuspended portion of his sentence prior to release, and reenacted and
continued in effect on and after July 1, 1987, the provisions of this section previously effective from June 13, 1984, until
July 1, 1987; P.A. 90-261 deleted all provisions re the discharge of a defendant on intensive probation; P.A. 94-119
designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a), added Subsec. (b) authorizing the sentencing court or judge at any time
during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years to reduce the sentence or order the defendant discharged
and added Subsec. (c) making the section inapplicable to any sentence imposed for an offense carrying a mandatory
minimum sentence; P.A. 95-175 added Subsec. (d) re statement by victim re reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant.
See Sec. 51-195 re sentence review by review division.
Cited. 184 C. 366, 368. Cited. 187 C. 109, 124. Cited. 200 C. 664, 674. Cited. 208 C. 420, 429, 430. Cited. 210 C. 519,
526, 527. Cited. 214 C. 717, 718, 722-725. Does not confer continuing jurisdiction on trial court to entertain a motion for
judgment of acquittal. 230 C. 427, 432-434. Cited. 240 C. 708.
Cited. 3 CA 497-502. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 32, 45. Term "sentence" refers to the aggregate
or total effective sentence. 19 CA 631-639. Cited. 20 CA 467-469. Cited. 21 CA 557, 565. Cited. 22 CA 601, 605. Cited.
23 CA 201, 203, 205, 206. Nothing in this section or any other statute confers on trial court jurisdiction to entertain a
motion for acquittal after service of a sentence has commenced. 32 CA 1, 3-5. Section does not violate separation of
powers doctrine. 39 CA 632-635. A definite sentence includes both its executed and suspended portions. 54 CA 387.
When the original sentence was defective, commitment for violation of probation is illegal. 31 CS 350. Cited. 40 CS
238, 241, 242. Cited. 41 CS 229, 251.
Sec. 53a-39a. Alternate incarceration program. (a) In all cases where a defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony, other than a capital felony, a
class A felony or a violation of section 21a-278, 21a-278a, 53a-55, 53a-56, 53a-56b,
53a-57, 53a-58 or 53a-70b or any other offense for which there is a mandatory minimum
sentence which may not be suspended or reduced by the court, after trial or by a plea
of guilty without trial, and a term of imprisonment is part of a stated plea agreement or
the statutory penalty provides for a term of imprisonment, the court may, in its discretion,
order an assessment for placement in an alternate incarceration program under contract
with the Judicial Department. If the Court Support Services Division recommends placement in an alternate incarceration program, it shall also submit to the court a proposed
alternate incarceration plan. Upon completion of the assessment, the court shall determine whether such defendant shall be ordered to participate in such program as an
alternative to incarceration. If the court determines that the defendant shall participate
in such program, the court shall suspend any sentence of imprisonment and shall make
participation in the alternate incarceration program a condition of probation as provided
in section 53a-30.
(b) An alternate incarceration program includes, but shall not be limited to, an intensive probation program, any community service program approved by the Chief Court
Administrator and any residential or nonresidential program approved by the Chief
Court Administrator which provides care, supervision and supportive services such as
employment, psychiatric and psychological evaluation and counseling, and drug and
alcohol dependency treatment. Any defendant placed in an alternate incarceration program shall comply with any other conditions of probation ordered by the court or required
by the Court Support Services Division, as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of section
53a-30.
(P.A. 89-383, S. 3, 16; P.A. 94-128, S. 1, 3; P.A. 02-132, S. 33.)
History: P.A. 89-383, S. 3 effective July 5, 1989, to July 1, 1994; P.A. 94-128 negated effect of P.A. 89-383, reenacting
and continuing existence of section, effective July 1, 1994; P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing "program to be
conducted by the Office of Adult Probation" with "program under contract with the Judicial Department" and replacing
"Office of Adult Probation" with "Court Support Services Division" and amended Subsec. (b) by replacing "Office of
Adult Probation" with "Court Support Services Division".
Sec. 53a-39b. Special alternative incarceration program for young male defendants. Section 53a-39b is repealed, effective October 1, 2003.
(P.A. 89-390, S. 18, 37; P.A. 90-230, S. 75, 101; 90-261, S. 10, 19; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-9, S. 5, 10; P.A. 03-48, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-39c. Community service labor program. (a) There is established,
within available appropriations, a community service labor program for persons charged
with a violation of section 21a-267 or 21a-279 who have not previously been convicted
of a violation of section 21a-267, 21a-277, 21a-278 or 21a-279. Upon application by
any such person for participation in such program the court may grant such application
and (1) if such person has not previously been placed in the community service labor
program, the court may either suspend prosecution and place such person in such program or, upon a plea of guilty without trial where a term of imprisonment is part of a
stated plea agreement, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation
in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with
section 53a-30; or (2) if such person has previously been placed in such program, the
court may, upon a plea of guilty without trial where a term of imprisonment is part of
a stated plea agreement, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation
in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with
said section 53a-30. No person may be placed in such program who has twice previously
been placed in such program.
(b) Any person who enters such program shall pay to the court a participation fee
of two hundred five dollars, except that no person may be excluded from such program
for inability to pay such fee, provided (1) such person files with the court an affidavit
of indigency or inability to pay, (2) such indigency is confirmed by the Court Support
Services Division, and (3) the court enters a finding thereof. All program fees collected
shall be deposited into the alternative incarceration program account.
(c) Any person for whom prosecution is suspended and who is placed in the community service labor program pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall agree to the
tolling of the statute of limitations with respect to such crime and to a waiver of such
person's right to a speedy trial. A pretrial community service labor program established
under this section for persons for whom prosecution is suspended shall include a drug
education component. If such person satisfactorily completes the program of community
service labor to which such person was assigned, such person may apply for dismissal
of the charges against such person and the court, on reviewing the record of such person's
participation in such program and on finding such satisfactory completion, shall dismiss
the charges. If the program provider certifies to the court that such person did not successfully complete the program of community service labor to which such person was assigned or is no longer amenable to participation in such program, the court shall enter
a plea of not guilty for such person and immediately place the case on the trial list.
(d) The period of participation in a community service labor program shall be a
minimum of fourteen days for a first violation and thirty days for a second violation
involving a plea of guilty and conviction.
(P.A. 90-213, S. 3, 56; P.A. 97-248, S. 11, 12; P.A. 99-148, S. 2, 4; P.A. 03-2, S. 50.)
History: P.A. 97-248 amended Subsec. (a) to make ineligible for the program persons who have previously participated
in the drug education program established under Sec. 54-56i, and amended Subsec. (b) to require a pretrial community
service labor program established for persons for whom prosecution is suspended to include a drug education component,
effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 99-148 amended Subsec. (a) to make eligible for the program persons charged with a violation
of Sec. 21a-267, to make ineligible for the program persons who have previously been convicted of a violation of Sec.
21a-267 and to delete the provision that made persons who previously participated in the drug education program established
under Sec. 54-56i ineligible for the program, amended Subsec. (c) to replace provisions that specified differing periods of
participation in the program depending upon whether the violation was of subsection (a), (b) or (c) of Sec. 21a-279 with
provisions requiring a period of participation consisting of a minimum of fourteen days for a first violation and thirty days
for a second violation involving a plea of guilty and conviction, and made technical changes for purposes of gender
neutrality, effective July 1, 1999; P.A. 03-2 added new Subsec. (b) to establish a participation fee of two hundred five
dollars, prohibit the exclusion of a person from the program for inability to pay such fee and require that all program fees
collected be deposited into the alternative incarceration program account and redesignated existing Subsecs. (b) and (c)
as new Subsecs. (c) and (d), respectively, effective February 28, 2003.
Program intended to avoid unnecessary trials and expenditures of resources, so defendant's application for program
when trial nearly complete is justification for denying application. 51 CA 126.
Sec. 53a-39d. Pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program. (a) Not later than
October 1, 1998, the Chief Court Administrator shall establish a pilot zero-tolerance
drug supervision program. Eligibility for participation in the program shall be limited
to (1) individuals who are eligible to be sentenced by the court to a period of probation,
pursuant to section 53a-29, and have been ordered by the court, as a condition of such
probation, to participate in the program, (2) individuals who are eligible to be released
on bail under section 54-63d or 54-64a and have been required by the bail commissioner
or the court, as a condition of release, to participate in the program, (3) individuals who
have been sentenced to a period of probation and, in the judgment of their probation
officers, have violated the conditions of such probation and been referred to the program
by their probation officers pursuant to subsection (a) of section 53a-32, and (4) individuals who have been ordered by the court, as a condition of probation, to participate in
the program pursuant to subsection (d) of section 54-56e or subsection (b) of section
54-76j and shall be based upon criteria, including a limit on the maximum number of
eligible participants, established by the Chief Court Administrator.
(b) Any person entering such program shall, as a condition of participating in such
program, agree to: (1) Submit to periodic urinalysis drug tests, (2) detention in a halfway
house facility for a period of two days each time such test produces a positive result,
(3) comply with all rules established by the halfway house if detained in such facility,
and (4) waive the right to a hearing.
(c) Participants in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program shall submit to periodic urinalysis drug tests. If the test produces a positive result, the participant shall be
detained in a halfway house facility for a period of two days.
(d) Any person who has submitted to a urinalysis drug test pursuant to subsection
(c) of this section that produced a positive result may request that a second urinalysis
drug test be administered, at such person's expense, to confirm the results of the first
test, except that if the participant is determined to be indigent, based upon financial
affidavits, the Judicial Department shall pay the cost of the test. The second drug test
shall be a urinalysis drug test, separate and independent of the initial test. The participant
shall be detained in a halfway house pending the results of the second test. If such second
test does not produce a positive result, the participant, if detained in a halfway house,
shall be released and the fee, if paid by the participant, shall be refunded to the participant.
(e) A participant enrolled in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program as a condition of probation may be charged with a violation of probation, if the participant's
probation officer determines that the participant has violated the conditions of probation
or the conditions of the program. A participant enrolled in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program as a condition of release may be charged with a violation of the conditions
of such person's release, if a bail commissioner determines that the participant has
violated the conditions of such person's release or the conditions of the program.
(P.A. 98-145, S. 3, 4; P.A. 99-187, S. 3; P.A. 02-89, S. 83.)
History: P.A. 99-187 amended Subsec. (a) to expand eligibility for the program by adding Subdiv. (2) to include
individuals eligible to be released on bail who have been required as a condition of release to participate in the program,
adding Subdiv. (3) to include individuals sentenced to a period of probation who have violated the conditions of probation
and been referred to the program by their probation officers, and adding Subdiv. (4) to include individuals ordered by the
court to participate in the program as a condition of probation under the accelerated rehabilitation or youthful offender
programs, and amended Subsec. (e) to make existing provisions applicable to a participant enrolled in the program "as a
condition of probation" and add provision that a participant enrolled in the program as a condition of release may be
charged with violation of the conditions of such person's release if a bail commissioner determines there has been a violation
of the conditions of release or conditions of the program; P.A. 02-89 deleted as obsolete Subsec. (f) requiring the chairman
of the Board of Parole, the Commissioner of Correction and the Chief Court Administrator to submit a report on the program
to the committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to criminal justice not later than January
1, 2000.
See Secs. 18-100e and 54-125f re pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program established by Commissioner of
Correction and chairman of Board of Pardons and Paroles, respectively.
Sec. 53a-40. Persistent offenders: Definitions; defense; authorized sentences.
(a) A persistent dangerous felony offender is a person who:
(1) (A) Stands convicted of manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first
or second degree, or assault in the first degree, and (B) has been, prior to the commission
of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal
correctional institution, for any of the following crimes: (i) The crimes enumerated in
subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii)
murder, sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first
degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, or an attempt to commit any
of said crimes; or (iii) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section
53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or
prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117,
or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9, 53-10, 53-11, 53-12 to 53-16, inclusive,
53-19, 53-21, 53-69, 53-78 to 53-80, inclusive, 53-82, 53-83, 53-86, 53-238 and 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes
in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iv) in any other state, any
crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes
enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph; or
(2) (A) Stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated
sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and
(B) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned
under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this
state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for any of the following
crimes: (i) Murder, manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first or second degree or assault in the first degree, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii)
prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117,
or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9, 53-10, 53-11, 53-12 to 53-16, inclusive,
53-19, 53-21, 53-69, 53-78 to 53-80, inclusive, 53-82, 53-83 and 53-86 of the general
statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or
an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iii) in any other state, any crimes the
essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated
in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph.
(b) A persistent dangerous sexual offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of
sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree
or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of
imprisonment of more than one year, in this state or in any other state or in a federal
correctional institution, for (A) any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this
subsection, or (B) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section
53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or
prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53-238
or 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor
statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes, or (C) in any other
state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of
the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection or this subdivision.
(c) A persistent serious felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a
felony, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present felony, convicted of
and imprisoned under an imposed term of more than one year or of death, in this state
or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for a crime. This subsection
shall not apply where the present conviction is for a crime enumerated in subdivision
(1) of subsection (a) of this section and the prior conviction was for a crime other than
those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section.
(d) A persistent serious sexual offender is a person, other than a person who qualifies
as a persistent dangerous sexual offender under subsection (b) of this section, who qualifies as a persistent serious felony offender under subsection (c) of this section and the
felony of which such person presently stands convicted is a violation of subdivision (2)
of subsection (a) of section 53-21, or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b and the prior conviction is for a violation of section 53-21 of the general
statutes, revised to January 1, 1995, involving sexual contact, committed prior to October
1, 1995, a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes, committed
on or after October 1, 1995, and prior to October 1, 2000, a violation of subdivision (2)
of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b,
53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.
(e) A persistent larceny offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of larceny in
the third degree in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October
1, 1982, or larceny in the fourth, fifth or sixth degree, and (2) has been, at separate times
prior to the commission of the present larceny, twice convicted of the crime of larceny.
(f) A persistent felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a felony
other than a class D felony, and (2) has been, at separate times prior to the commission
of the present felony, twice convicted of a felony other than a class D felony.
(g) It shall be an affirmative defense to the charge of being a persistent offender
under this section that (1) as to any prior conviction on which the state is relying the
defendant was pardoned on the ground of innocence, and (2) without such conviction,
the defendant was not two or more times convicted and imprisoned as required by this
section.
(h) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender,
and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature
and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of
imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of
which such person presently stands convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the
crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July
1, 1981, shall sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than forty
years and, if such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present
crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in
subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section, sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than life.
(i) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous sexual offender,
and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature
and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of
imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of
which such person presently stands convicted, shall sentence such person to a term of
imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of imprisonment for life, as defined in section
53a-35b.
(j) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious felony offender, and
the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and
circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration
will best serve the public interest, the court in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of which such person presently stands
convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the crime of which such person presently
stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981, may impose the sentence of
imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony.
(k) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious sexual offender, and
the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and
circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration
will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands
convicted, may impose a sentence of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute the maximum sentence
specified by section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of felony.
(l) When any person has been found to be a persistent larceny offender, and the
court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best
serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section
53a-36 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the
sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony authorized by section 53a-35, if the crime
of which such person presently stands convicted was committed prior to July 1, 1981,
or authorized by section 53a-35a, if the crime of which such person presently stands
convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981.
(m) When any person has been found to be a persistent felony offender, and the
court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best
serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section
53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the
sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree
of felony; provided the sentence imposed may not be less than three years, and provided
further three years of the sentence so imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the
court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 40; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 15; P.A. 73-616, S. 40; P.A. 76-336, S. 20; P.A. 80-442, S. 12, 28; P.A. 83-4, S. 1, 2; P.A. 85-603; P.A. 92-260, S. 18; P.A. 94-37, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 48; P.A. 01-84, S. 18, 26.)
History: 1971 act removed requirements that offenders under Subsecs. (a) and (b) have been previously convicted and
imprisoned "two or more times" and "at separate times" and redefined persistent larceny offender as one who stands
convicted of larceny in "the third or fourth degree" rather than in "the second or a lesser degree" in Subsec. (c); P.A. 73-616 corrected section reference re assault with intent to kill, substituting Sec. 54-117 for Sec. 53-117 in Subsec. (a); P.A.
76-336 substituted sexual assault in first or third degree or sexual assault in first or third degree with a firearm for "rape"
in Subsec. (a) and specified applicability of conviction for crimes enumerated in Secs. 53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 prior to
October 1, 1975; P.A. 80-442 specified applicability of Subsec. (b) to persistent "serious" felony offenders, inserted new
Subsec. (d) re persistent felony offenders, relettering as necessary, amended Subsecs. (f) to (h), formerly (e) to (g), re
crimes committed on or after July 1, 1981, and added Subsec. (i) re extended incarceration effective July 1, 1981; P.A.
83-4 amended Subsec. (c) to reflect the establishment of six degrees of larceny pursuant to P.A. 82-271 by including
persons convicted of larceny in the third degree "in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October
1, 1982" and larceny in the "fifth or sixth" degree; P.A. 85-603 made a technical change to Subsec. (h) and rewrote some
of the language of said Subsec. to reflect said change; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace an obsolete reference
to the offense of "sexual assault in the first degree with a firearm" with its revised name of "aggravated sexual assault in
the first degree", and made other minor technical changes in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (d); P.A. 94-37 amended Subsec. (f) to
revise the penalty for a person found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender by replacing the provision that permitted
the court to impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized for a class A felony with the provision requiring the court to
sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than forty years and by adding the provision requiring the
court to sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than life if such person has been twice convicted and
imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in Subsec. (a)(2); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (a) to delete
from category of a persistent dangerous felony offender a person who stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third
degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm and has been
previously convicted and imprisoned for more than one year for any of said crimes or any predecessor statutes, or an
attempt to commit any of said crimes, to revise and restructure Subsec. to reflect such deletion and to revise Subdiv. and
Subpara. indicators accordingly, added new Subsec. (b) re persistent dangerous sexual offender, new Subsec. (d) re persistent serious sexual offender, new Subsec. (i) re penalty for persistent dangerous sexual offender and new Subsec. (k)
re penalty for persistent serious sexual offender, relettering intervening and remaining Subsecs. accordingly, and made
provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (d) to replace in provision re the offense for which the
person presently stands convicted the reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of
subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21", to replace in provision re offenses for which the person was previously
convicted the reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of subdivision (2) of section
53-21 of the general statutes, committed on or after October 1, 1995, and prior to October 1, 2000," and to add reference
to a prior conviction for "a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21", effective July 1, 2001.
Annotations to former section 53-67:
Cited. 157 C. 466. Cited. 168 C. 395.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 176 C. 270, 272. Cited. 180 C. 660, 661. Cited. 184 C. 215, 216. Cited. 188 C. 27, 28. Cited. 191 C. 180, 182.
Cited. 192 C. 471, 475. Cited. 194 C. 573. Cited. Id., 692, 699. Cited. 195 C. 326-330. Cited. 197 C. 280, 281. Cited. 198
C. 158, 159, 166-168. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. 203 C. 506, 519, 521, 523, 524. Cited. 207 C. 619, 620. Cited. 218 C.
273, 275. Cited. 226 C. 601, 611. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 1, 30, 31. Cited. 31 CA 140, 148. Cited. 36 CA 401, 406. Cited. 45
CA 390. Admission of certified copy of judgment sufficient to prove persistent dangerous felony offender. 50 CA 521.
Subsec. (a):
Constitutionality of dangerous felony offender statutes has long been upheld. 173 C. 545, 548, 554, 557. Nothing in
statute precludes state from offering probative evidence to clarify an official judgment of conviction in order to prove
defendant a second offender. 194 C. 573, 574, 586-589. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 573, 586. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
692, 693, 695. No viable basis for challenge to statute on the grounds of vagueness. 195 C. 326, 329-333. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 326, 330. Cited. Id., 475, 476. Cited. 193 C. 273, 275, 282. Cited. 200 C. 350. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 453, 458.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdivs. (1) and (2)(B) cited. 202 C. 509, 511. Cited. 203 C. 81, 82. Cited. Id., 506, 509, 519-522.
Cited. 206 C. 621, 622. Cited. 207 C. 276, 278. Cited. 210 C. 573, 579. Cited. 213 C. 97, 99. Cited. 216 C. 220, 221. Cited.
224 C. 445, 447. Cited. 232 C. 455, 459. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.
Cited. 17 CA 490, 492. Cited. 19 CA 571, 572. Cited. 29 CA 274, 276. Cited. 37 CA 672, 674. Cited. Id., 733, 735.
Cited. 39 CA 82, 86. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 131. Jury improperly found defendant to be a persistent dangerous felony
offender because his conviction of attempted assault in the first degree is not one of the qualifying felonies enumerated in
subsection. 51 CA 171.
Cited. 43 CS 77, 82.
Subsec. (b):
Presentence report used to prove that defendant was not persistent felony offender under this subsection. 169 C. 263-
266. Cited. 182 C. 176, 177. Failure to allege imprisonment under provisions of the statute not considered reversible error
where proof of imprisonment was established during trial and defendant failed to request complete statement of facts. 184
C. 215, 216. Cited. Id., 369, 370. Cited. 187 C. 264, 265, 278. Cited. 195 C. 326, 331. Cited. 198 C. 158, 160, 161, 166,
167. Cited. 224 C. 397, 398, 400, 418, 419. Cited. 227 C. 711, 714. Cited. Id., 751, 753. Cited. 232 C. 455, 459. Cited.
234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.
Cited. 9 CA 133, 135. Cited. 10 CA 279, 280. Cited. 12 CA 1, 3, 29, 30. Cited. Id., 375, 376. Cited. 13 CA 438, 440.
Cited. 20 CA 586, 587. Cited. 31 CA 140, 141. Cited. Id., 178, 180. Cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Cited. 35 CA 405, 407. Cited. 37
CA 733, 735. Cited. 39 CA 82, 86. Cited. Id., 789, 791. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 202 C. 369, 371. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.
"By pleading nolo contendere to the charge of being a persistent larceny offender, defendant waived her right to appeal
this issue." 4 CA 676, 677, 682. Cited. 14 CA 88, 90, 97, 100. Cited. 21 CA 331, 332. Cited. 37 CA 228, 229, 232.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 195 C. 326, 329-333. Cited. 198 C. 158, 167. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Language of section and its legislative
purpose require sequence of offense, conviction and punishment for each prior felony before enhanced penalty as a persistent
offender attaches. 240 C. 317. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Cited. 41 CA 391, 393, 404-406.
Subsec. (e):
Cited. 176 C. 270, 271. Cited. 194 C. 573, 587. Cited. 195 C. 326, 328, 329, 331. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Subsec. (f):
Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. 187 C. 264, 278. Cited. 200 C. 453, 458. Cited. 207 C. 276, 285. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338,
339. Purpose is to allow sentencing court to impose a more severe sentence than would be allowed for the substantive
offense. Subsection requires sentencing court to consider defendant's history and character and the nature and circumstances
of his criminal conduct and whether extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest.
There is no requirement that sentences imposed be strictly proportional to the nature of substantive offense or offenses of
which defendant was convicted. Nature of substantive offense is only one factor to be considered by sentencing court. 254
C. 613.
Cited. 19 CA 571, 572, 574.
Subsec. (g):
Cited. 224 C. 397, 400. Cited. 227 C. 751, 754. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Cited. 12 CA 1, 29, 32. Cited. 37 CA 733, 735. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Subsec. (h):
Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Cited. 21 CA 331-335, 338. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231, 232.
Subsec. (i):
Cited. 184 C. 215, 217. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Sec. 53a-40a. Persistent offenders of crimes involving bigotry or bias. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of crimes involving bigotry or bias is a person
who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k
or 53a-181l, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted
of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l or section 53a-181b in effect prior to October 1, 2000.
(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving
bigotry or bias, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character
and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that an
increased penalty will best serve the public interest, the court shall: (1) In lieu of imposing
the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a if the crime is a felony,
impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious
degree of felony, or (2) in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under
section 53a-36 if the crime is a misdemeanor, impose the sentence of imprisonment
authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor, except that
if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall impose the sentence of imprisonment
for a class D felony as authorized by section 53a-35a.
(P.A. 90-137, S. 2; P.A. 00-72, S. 10.)
History: P.A. 00-72 amended Subsec. (a) to replace reference in Subdiv. (1) to "subsection (a) or (c) of section 53a-181b" with reference to Sec. "53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l" and to replace reference in Subdiv. (2) to "subsection (a)
or (c) of section 53a-181b" with reference to "section 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l or section 53a-181b in effect prior
to October 1, 2000" and amended Subsec. (b) to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality.
Sec. 53a-40b. Additional term of imprisonment authorized for offense committed while on release. A person convicted of an offense committed while released
pursuant to sections 54-63a to 54-63g, inclusive, or sections 54-64a to 54-64c, inclusive,
other than a violation of section 53a-222, may be sentenced, in addition to the sentence
prescribed for the offense to (1) a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years if
the offense is a felony, or (2) a term of imprisonment of not more than one year if the
offense is a misdemeanor.
(P.A. 90-213, S. 54; P.A. 98-90, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 98-90 excepted convictions under Sec. 53a-222 from provisions of section.
Jury hearing not constitutionally required for enhanced sentence based on prior conviction; enhanced penalty provisions
do apply to defendant who committed second crime while released on written promise to appear. 62 CA 34.
Sec. 53a-40c. Psychological counseling required for person convicted of sexual
assault of a minor. Any person convicted of a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a,
53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a where the victim of the sexual assault was a person
ten years of age or under shall, in addition to any fine or term of imprisonment imposed,
be sentenced to undergo psychological counseling.
(P.A. 93-340, S. 15.)
Sec. 53a-40d. Persistent offenders of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order or criminal
violation of a restraining order. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of
crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation
of a protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order is a person who (1) stands
convicted of assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening
under section 53a-62, harassment under section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223, criminal violation of a restraining order under section
53a-223b or criminal trespass under section 53a-107 or 53a-108, and (2) has, within the
five years preceding the commission of the present crime, been convicted of a capital
felony, a class A felony, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86 or
53a-122, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a-153, or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a-72b,
53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216, assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening under section 53a-62, harassment under
section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223, criminal
violation of a restraining order under section 53a-223b, or criminal trespass under section
53a-107 or 53a-108 or has been released from incarceration with respect to such conviction, whichever is later.
(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving
assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective
order or criminal violation of a restraining order, and the court is of the opinion that
such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's
criminal conduct indicate that an increased penalty will best serve the public interest,
the court shall, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section
53a-36 or section 53a-35a, as applicable, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section 53a-36 or section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of
misdemeanor or felony, except that if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall
impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony, as authorized by section
53a-35a.
(P.A. 95-193, S. 2; P.A. 02-127, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 02-127 applied the provisions to criminal violation of a restraining order under Sec. 53a-223b and in
Subsec. (b) added references to Sec. 53a-35a, specified "felony" in the provision concerning the imposition of the sentence
of imprisonment authorized for the next more serious crime and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality.
Sec. 53a-40e. Standing criminal restraining order. (a) If any person is convicted
of a violation of section 53a-59, 53a-59a, 53a-60, 53a-60a, 53a-60b, 53a-60c, 53a-70,
53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-181c, 53a-181d or 53a-181e, or of
attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a, against a family
or household member as defined in subdivision (2) of section 46b-38a, the court may,
in addition to imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a, if
the court is of the opinion that the history and character and the nature and circumstances
of the criminal conduct of such offender indicate that a standing criminal restraining
order will best serve the interest of the victim and the public, issue a standing criminal
restraining order which shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court for
good cause shown.
(b) Such standing criminal restraining order may include but is not limited to enjoining the offender from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the
victim; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking
the victim; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the victim.
(c) Every standing criminal restraining order of the court made in accordance with
this section shall contain the following language: "This order shall remain in effect until
modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown. In accordance with section 53a-223a, violation of a standing criminal restraining order issued by the court pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less
than one year nor more than five years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or
both."
(P.A. 96-228, S. 1; P.A. 98-15; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 41, 121; P.A. 99-186, S. 13.)
History: (Revisor's note: In Subsec. (c) the reference in public act 96-228 to "section 1 of this act" was deemed by the
Revisors to be a reference to section 2 of that act and therefore codified as "section 53a-110c"); P.A. 98-15 amended
Subsec. (a) to add references to Secs. 53a-181c, 53a-181d and 53a-181e; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change
in Subsec. (c), effective June 24, 1998; P.A. 99-186 amended Subsec.(a) to make provisions applicable to any person
convicted "of attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a".
See Sec. 51-5c re automated registry of protective orders.
Imposition of a standing criminal restraining order after defendant began serving his sentence did not constitute punishment or affect defendant's sentence and therefore, trial court had jurisdiction to impose it. 269 C. 107.
Order precluding defendant from having contact with his minor children is within scope of the statute. 81 CA 84.
Sec. 53a-40f. Persistent operating while under the influence felony offender.
Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent operating while under the influence felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d and (2) has, prior to the commission of the present crime and within the preceding
ten years, been convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection (a)
of section 14-227a or been convicted in any other state of an offense the essential elements of which are substantially the same as section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection
(a) of section 14-227a.
(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent operating while under the
influence felony offender, and the court is of the opinion that his history and character and
the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration
will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized
by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may
impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious
degree of felony.
(P.A. 97-291, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-41. Fines for felonies. A fine for the conviction of a felony shall be fixed
by the court as follows: (1) For a class A felony, an amount not to exceed twenty thousand
dollars; (2) for a class B felony, an amount not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars; (3)
for a class C felony, an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars; (4) for a class D
felony, an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars; (5) for an unclassified felony,
an amount in accordance with the fine specified in the section of the general statutes
that defines the crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 41; P.A. 92-256, S. 1; 92-260, S. 19; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70.)
History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A felony from ten to twenty thousand dollars, for a class
B felony from ten to fifteen thousand dollars, and for a class C felony from five to ten thousand dollars; P.A. 92-260
amended Subdiv. (3) to replace "law" with "section of the general statutes"; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective
date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section.
See Sec. 53a-35a re terms of imprisonment for felonies.
See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.
Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Failure of trial court to inform defendant of amount of fine not plain error. 65 CA 234.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 728.
Sec. 53a-42. Fines for misdemeanors. A fine for the conviction of a misdemeanor
shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, an amount not to
exceed two thousand dollars; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed
one thousand dollars; (3) for a class C misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed five
hundred dollars; (4) for an unclassified misdemeanor, an amount in accordance with
the fine specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 42; P.A. 92-256, S. 2; 92-260, S. 20; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70.)
History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A misdemeanor from one to two thousand dollars; P.A.
92-260 replaced "law" with "section of the general statutes"; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section.
See Sec. 53a-36 re terms of imprisonment for misdemeanors.
See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.
Cited. 178 C. 145, 153; 180 C. 557, 561. Cited. 217 C. 73, 90.
Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 32 CA 656, 660; judgment reversed in part, see 232
C. 345 et seq.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 722, 727.
Sec. 53a-43. Fines for violations. A fine for a violation shall be fixed by the court
in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars. In the case of a violation defined in
any other section of the general statutes, if the amount of the fine is expressly specified
in the section that defines the offense, the amount of the fine shall be fixed in accordance
with such section.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 43.)
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.
Sec. 53a-44. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain. If a person has gained
money or property through the commission of any felony, misdemeanor or violation,
upon conviction thereof the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense
under section 53a-41, 53a-42 or 53a-43, may sentence the defendant to pay an amount,
fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain from the
commission of the offense. In such case the court shall make a finding as to the amount
of the defendant's gain from the offense and, if the record does not contain sufficient
evidence to support such a finding, the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For
purposes of this section, the term "gain" means the amount of money or the value of
property derived.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 44; P.A. 92-260, S. 21.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in punctuation.
Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.
Sec. 53a-45. Murder: Penalty; waiver of jury trial; finding of lesser degree.
(a) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section
53a-35a unless it is a capital felony or murder under section 53a-54d.
(b) If a person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing
conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a waives his right to a jury
trial and elects to be tried by a court, the court shall be composed of three judges designated by the Chief Court Administrator or his designee, who shall name one such judge
to preside over the trial. Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide
all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly.
(c) The court or jury before which any person indicted for murder or held to answer
for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a is tried may find such person guilty of homicide in a lesser degree than that charged.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 45; P.A. 73-137, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 13, 28; P.A. 82-298, S. 4; P.A. 83-210, S. 2, 5; P.A. 92-260,
S. 22.)
History: P.A. 73-137 added reference to capital felonies in Subsec. (a) and substituted reference to Sec. 53a-46a for
reference to Sec. 53a-46, deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed person indicted for murder to plead guilty with
consent of court and state's attorney in which case court would sentence him as for a Class A felony, relettering former
Subsecs. (c) and (d) accordingly; P.A. 80-442 specified punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a and deleted reference
to death sentenced under Sec. 53a-46a in Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 82-298 amended Subsec. (b) to provide
that court shall be composed of three judges designated by chief court administrator, who shall also name one such judge
to preside, where previously one judge was the judge presiding at the session and the other two were designated by the
chief justice of the supreme court; P.A. 83-210 amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) by inserting "or held to answer for murder
after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a"; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add
exception for "murder under section 53a-54d", amended Subsec. (b) to replace provision that such judges or a majority of
them "shall determine the question of guilt or innocence and shall, as provided in said section 53a-46a, render judgment
and impose sentence" with "shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render
judgment accordingly", and amended Subsec. (c) to replace "him" with "such person".
See annotations to part IV.
Cited. 187 C. 6, 28.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 201 C. 435, 438.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 180 C. 382, 404. Cited. 190 C. 639, 640. Cited. 198 C. 77, 90. Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 381.
Subsec. (c):
Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find a defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree
where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382, 399, 400, 402,
403, 407. Cited. 181 C. 187, 200; id., 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66, 71, 72. Cited. 187 C. 6, 28. Cited. 188 C. 542, 546. Cited.
190 C. 639, 652. Cited. 193 C. 695, 732. Cited. 195 C. 232, 243. Manslaughter is not lesser included offense of felony
murder. 196 C. 421, 422, 427. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. Id., 368, 372. Cited. 206 C. 346, 359. Cited. 210 C. 78, 105.
Cited. 212 C. 593, 607. Cited. 214 C. 57, 63. Cited. 225 C. 55, 65. Cited. 226 C. 237, 250. Cited. 231 C. 115, 140. Cited.
240 C. 727.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 187. Cited. 17 CA 502, 521; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. 40 CA 151, 164.
Cited. 42 CS 426, 429.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 206 C. 346, 359.
Sec. 53a-46. Sentencing proceedings; appeal. Section 53a-46 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 46; 1972, P.A. 56, S. 1; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)
Sec. 53a-46a. Imposition of sentence for capital felony. Hearing. Special verdict. Mitigating and aggravating factors. Factors barring death sentence. (a) A
person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for a capital felony only if a hearing is
held in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b) For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is
convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony, the judge or judges who presided at the
trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate hearing to
determine the existence of any mitigating factor concerning the defendant's character,
background and history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, and any aggravating factor set forth in subsection (i). Such hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates
that none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists or
that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists. Such hearing shall be conducted (1)
before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled
for the purpose of such hearing if (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty;
(B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before three judges as provided in subsection
(b) of section 53a-45; or (C) if the jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been
discharged by the court for good cause, or (3) before the court, on motion of the defendant
and with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.
(c) In such hearing the court shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel all material
contained in any presentence report which may have been prepared. No presentence
information withheld from the defendant shall be considered in determining the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. Any information relevant to any mitigating
factor may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility
under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the
admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials.
The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the
hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of
the information to establish the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. The
burden of establishing any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be
on the state. The burden of establishing any mitigating factor shall be on the defendant.
(d) In determining whether a mitigating factor exists concerning the defendant's
character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, pursuant
to subsection (b) of this section, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall first
determine whether a particular factor concerning the defendant's character, background
or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, has been established by the
evidence, and shall determine further whether that factor is mitigating in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Mitigating factors are such as do not
constitute a defense or excuse for the capital felony of which the defendant has been
convicted, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as tending either to
extenuate or reduce the degree of his culpability or blame for the offense or to otherwise
constitute a basis for a sentence less than death.
(e) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting
forth its findings as to the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the existence
of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant
to subsection (d).
(f) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) none of the factors set
forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in
subsection (i) exist and (3) (A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating
factors exist but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i), the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
(g) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) any of the factors set
forth in subsection (h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection
(i) exists, or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist
and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set
forth in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors, the court shall
impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
(h) The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury or,
if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as provided in subsection (e), that
at the time of the offense (1) the defendant was under the age of eighteen years, or (2)
the defendant was a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, or (3)
the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant's ability to
conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired
but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (4) the
defendant was criminally liable under sections 53a-8, 53a-9 and 53a-10 for the offense,
which was committed by another, but the defendant's participation in such offense was
relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (5)
the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the defendant's conduct in the
course of commission of the offense of which the defendant was convicted would cause,
or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.
(i) The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following: (1)
The defendant committed the offense during the commission or attempted commission
of, or during the immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of, a
felony and the defendant had previously been convicted of the same felony; or (2) the
defendant committed the offense after having been convicted of two or more state offenses or two or more federal offenses or of one or more state offenses and one or more
federal offenses for each of which a penalty of more than one year imprisonment may
be imposed, which offenses were committed on different occasions and which involved
the infliction of serious bodily injury upon another person; or (3) the defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of death to
another person in addition to the victim of the offense; or (4) the defendant committed
the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; or (5) the defendant
procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything
of pecuniary value; or (6) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the
receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; or (7) the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a; or
(8) the defendant committed the offense set forth in subdivision (1) of section 53a-54b
to avoid arrest for a criminal act or prevent detection of a criminal act or to hamper or
prevent the victim from carrying out any act within the scope of the victim's official
duties or to retaliate against the victim for the performance of the victim's official duties.
(P.A. 73-137, S. 4; P.A. 80-332, S. 1; 80-442, S. 14, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 1; P.A. 93-306, S. 12; P.A. 95-19, S. 1; P.A.
01-151, S. 1, 2, 5.)
History: P.A. 80-332 restated provisions and referred to mitigating or aggravating factors throughout, replacing references to factors set forth in Subsecs. (f) and (g); P.A. 80-442 referred to imposition of sentence in accordance with Sec.
53a-35a(1) rather than to sentence for a Class A felony in Subsec. (e), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added a new
Subsec. (d) to specify the procedure for the determination by a jury or court of the existence of a mitigating factor and to
add a definition of mitigating factors, relettered the remaining Subsecs. and amended Subsec. (f) to replace "a sentence in
accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(1)" with "a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release"; P.A. 93-306
amended Subsec. (h) to add as an aggravating factor that the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon;
P.A. 95-19 revised section to permit the jury or court to make findings as to whether any aggravating factor or factors
outweigh any mitigating factor or factors and require the court to sentence the defendant accordingly, while retaining
provision that the existence of certain factors concerning the defendant will operate to automatically bar the imposition of
the death sentence, and, more specifically, amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the separate hearing shall not be held if
the state stipulates "that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists" rather than "that one or more mitigating factors exist"
and make technical changes, amended Subsec. (c) to make technical changes, amended Subsec. (e) to require the jury or
court to return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to "the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the
existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors
outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d)" rather than "the existence of any
aggravating or mitigating factor", amended Subsec. (f) to revise the circumstances that must be found for the court to
impose the death sentence by requiring the court to sentence the defendant to death if the jury or court finds "that (1) none
of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist
and (3)(A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist but are outweighed by one or more
aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i)" rather than "that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist
and that no mitigating factor exists", designated provisions of Subsec. (f) re the circumstances that must be found for the
court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release as new Subsec. (g) and amended said
Subsec. to require the court to impose said sentence if the jury or court finds "that (1) any of the factors set forth in subsection
(h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exists or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors
set forth in subsection (i) exist and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set forth
in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors" rather than "that none of the factors set forth in
subsection (h) exists or that one or more mitigating factors exist", redesignated former Subsec. (g) as new Subsec. (h) and
amended said Subsec. to replace the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if the jury or court finds
that "any mitigating factor exists" and that "the mitigating factors to be considered concerning the defendant shall include,
but are not limited to" the five enumerated factors with the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if
the jury or court finds any of the enumerated factors and deleted former Subdiv. (3) as a factor that would in and of itself
bar the imposition of the death sentence the circumstance that at the time of the offense the defendant "was under unusual
and substantial duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution", renumbering Subdivs. (4) and
(5) as Subdivs. (3) and (4), respectively, redesignated former Subsec. (h) re aggravating factors as new Subsec. (i) and
amended said Subsec. to replace the provision requiring the court to impose the death sentence if no mitigating factor is
present and the jury or court finds one of the enumerated factors with "The aggravating factors to be considered shall be
limited to the following:"; P.A. 01-151 amended Subsec. (h) to add new Subdiv. (2) barring the imposition of the death
sentence on a defendant who was a person with mental retardation, as defined in Sec. 1-1g, redesignate existing Subdivs.
(2), (3) and (4) as Subdivs. (3), (4) and (5), and make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality and amended
Subsec. (i) to add Subdiv. (8) establishing as an aggravating factor the commission of the offense set forth in Sec. 53a-54b(1) to avoid arrest for a criminal act, prevent detection of a criminal act, hamper or prevent the victim carrying out the
victim's official duties or retaliate against the victim for performance of the victim's official duties and make a technical
change for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.
See Sec. 53a-35b re definition of "life imprisonment".
See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.
Former Sec. 53-10 unconstitutional. 164 C. 162. Cited. 197 C. 436, 440. Cited. 207 C. 374, 375, 382, 383, 390, 392,
393, 399. Cited. 209 C. 225, 227. Cited. 212 C. 258, 260, 264. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 225 C. 559, 562. Does not
violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183, 185, 189, 193, 229,
235, 236, 245, 252-254, 257-259, 268, 286. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 234 C. 735,
748. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209, 211, 214, 236, 247, 252, 257, 260. Cited. 237 C. 332, 334, 335, 338. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital
sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 409. Court upheld previous
holding that statute does not require a capital sentencer to give mitigating force to any particular proven factor solely
because that factor establishes something good about the defendant. Instead, statute leaves the decision as to whether a
proven factor is mitigating in nature to sentencer's reasoned moral judgment. 264 C. 1. Once sentencer has found an
aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no requirement that it go further and make an additional
determination that the presence of that factor justifies imposition of the death penalty. Id.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720. Cited. 32 CA 296, 308. Cited. 36 CA 364, 366.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 240, 278. Cited. 237 C. 332, 337. Cited. 238 C. 389. Term "judges" in
the first sentence does not entitle defendant who elected to have a jury determine his sentence at the penalty phase hearing
to have all three members of the panel before whom the guilt phase was conducted preside at such hearing. 264 C. 1.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 383-385, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 238, 266-271, 273. Cited. 235 C. 206, 257, 259. Cited. 237
C. 332, 334. Cited. 241 C. 57. The state may present evidence to rebut mitigation at the penalty phase that would not be
admissible under normal rules of evidence. Under the statute, the state like the defendant only has to meet the relevancy
standard for evidence to be allowed. 251 C. 579.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 383, 386, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 240, 281-284. Cited. 235 C. 206, 207, 218, 229, 234, 251,
255. Cited. 238 C. 389. Mercy is a legitimate consideration only insofar as it is related to mitigating evidence. 264 C. 1.
Requirement for capital sentencer to consider "all the facts and circumstances of the case" is not unconstitutionally vague.
Id. Lack of remorse is not listed as a statutory aggravating factor, and so may not be relied upon as an aggravating factor,
but because mitigating factors call upon jury to elect whether to exercise mercy, defendant's lack of remorse will be relevant
generally to rebut defendant's claimed mitigating factors. 266 C. 171. Jury must make its determination of whether the
proposed mitigating evidence is mitigating in nature considering all facts and circumstances of the case, but statute does
not require that mitigating evidence have some nexus to the offense. Id.
Subsec. (e):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 166. Imposition of death penalty premised on two unanimous findings by trier of fact that (1) existence
of aggravating factor proved beyond a reasonable doubt by state; (2) existence of a mitigating factor not proved by defendant
by a preponderance of the evidence. 207 C. 374, 382, 383, 386-388, 390, 392-394. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 239, 240, 243,
244. Cited. 235 C. 206, 215, 236, 247.
Subsec. (f):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 391. Cited. 208 C. 125, 128. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 230 C. 183,
237-240, 258, 285. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 235 C. 206, 219, 238, 245-247. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Statute requires that jury determine that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors by any amount or degree. 266 C.
171. In light of the unique nature of death penalty, of the need for reliability and consistency and the nature of rendering
a verdict requiring death penalty, jury must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh
mitigating factors and therefore it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death sentence should be imposed. Id.
Subsec. (g):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 166. Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 384. Cited. 212 C. 258, 262. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 183, 272, 284. Cited. 235 C. 206, 207, 247, 251. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206, 229. Cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 828. Although trial court should generally use language of Subdiv. (2) in instructing jury on the
statutory mitigating factor, it is not possible that court's minor misstatement, involving such a tenuous semantic distinction,
could have misled jury. 269 C. 213. General thrust of statute as a whole persuades us that legislature intended to recognize
as mitigating, per se, only those factors that tend to reduce defendant's moral culpability for the offense and make it unlikely
that threat of execution would serve as effective deterrent. Id. "Mental capacity" as used in Subdiv. (2) is not open-ended
term referring to any and all types of mental function, but refers specifically to defendant's ability, at time of the offense,
to understand the wrongful nature and consequences of his conductLlegislature's intent in enactingsubsec. was to specify
factual circumstances under which defendant's moral culpability for committing the offense is reduced. Id. In order to
establish either prong of the mitigating factor of Subdiv. (2), defendant must show that his mental impairment had a causal
nexus with the offense, thereby reducing his moral culpability. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 364, 366.
Subsec. (h):
Subdiv. (4) cited. 209 C. 225, 229. Subdiv. (4): Meaning of "especially cruel" must include intentional infliction of
extreme pain or torture above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing. 212 C. 258, 259, 265,
266, 270, 271. Cited. Id., 258, 262. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 258, 265. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Subdiv. (6)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 230 C. 183, 185, 190, 193, 242, 252, 25