US Laws, Codes, Statutes & Cases

      Sec. 53a-31. Calculation of periods of probation and conditional discharge. (a) A period of probation or conditional discharge commences on the day it is imposed, except that, where it is preceded by a sentence of imprisonment with execution suspended after a period of imprisonment set by the court, it commences on the day the defendant is released from such imprisonment. Multiple periods, whether imposed at the same or different times, shall run concurrently.

      (b) Issuance of a warrant or notice to appear for violation pursuant to section 53a-32 shall interrupt the period of the sentence as of the date of such issuance until a final determination as to the violation has been made by the court. During the interrupted period, the court may impose any of the conditions of release set forth in section 54-64a. In the absence of a warrant or notice to appear for violation pursuant to section 53a-32, if the defendant has failed to comply with any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, such failure shall not relieve the Court Support Services Division from the responsibility of supervising the defendant.

      (c) In any case where a person who is under a sentence of probation or of conditional discharge is also under an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, or a sentence authorized under section 18-65a or 18-73, imposed for some other offense by a court of this state, the service of the sentence of imprisonment shall satisfy the sentence of probation or of conditional discharge unless the sentence of probation or of conditional discharge is revoked prior to parole or satisfaction of the sentence of imprisonment.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 31; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 11; P.A. 87-282, S. 20; P.A. 92-260, S. 13; P.A. 97-151, S. 1; P.A. 02-132, S. 32; P.A. 03-278, S. 103.)

      History: 1971 act substituted sentences "authorized under section 18-73 or 18-75" for "reformatory" sentences in Subsec. (c); P.A. 87-282 amended Subsec. (c) to delete obsolete reference to repealed Sec. 18-75; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) to add reference to Sec. 18-65a; P.A. 97-151 amended Subsec. (b) to authorize the court to impose any of the conditions of release set forth in Sec. 54-64a during the interrupted period and provide that, in the absence of a warrant or notice to appear for violation, the failure of the defendant to comply with any conditions of probation or conditional discharge does not relieve the Office of Adult Probation from the responsibility of supervising the defendant; P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing "Office of Adult Probation" with "Court Support Services Division"; P.A. 03-278 made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective July 9, 2003.

      Cited. 170 C. 128. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Held: Term "release" as used in section includes physical release from custody whether by mistake or not and probation commences by operation of law on date of actual release from imprisonment. 36 CA 440, 441, 443, 444, 446, 448.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 24 CA 575, 578. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Cited. 36 CA 440, 441, 445, 446. Cited. 39 CA 722, 728. Although probation may continue during a period of incarceration, it does not commence pursuant to this section unless defendant is released from imprisonment. 60 CA 515.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 9 CA 59, 73. Cited. 37 CA 72, 83. Cited. 39 CA 722, 730, 731. Defendant is not excused from complying with conditions of probation simply because a probation officer informs him that he is in violation of that probation. 75 CA 643.

      Sec. 53a-32. Violation of probation or conditional discharge. Arrest. Hearing. Disposition. (a) At any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, the court or any judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, or may issue a notice to appear to answer to a charge of such violation, which notice shall be personally served upon the defendant. Any such warrant shall authorize all officers named therein to return the defendant to the custody of the court or to any suitable detention facility designated by the court. Whenever a defendant has, in the judgment of such defendant's probation officer, violated the conditions of such defendant's probation, the probation officer may, in lieu of having such defendant returned to court for proceedings in accordance with this section, place such defendant in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program established pursuant to section 53a-39d. Whenever a sexual offender, as defined in section 54-260, has violated the conditions of such person's probation by failing to notify such person's probation officer of any change of such person's residence address, as required by said section, such probation officer may notify any police officer that such person has, in such officer's judgment, violated the conditions of such person's probation and such notice shall be sufficient warrant for the police officer to arrest such person and return such person to the custody of the court or to any suitable detention facility designated by the court. Any probation officer may arrest any defendant on probation without a warrant or may deputize any other officer with power to arrest to do so by giving such other officer a written statement setting forth that the defendant has, in the judgment of the probation officer, violated the conditions of the defendant's probation. Such written statement, delivered with the defendant by the arresting officer to the official in charge of any correctional center or other place of detention, shall be sufficient warrant for the detention of the defendant. After making such an arrest, such probation officer shall present to the detaining authorities a similar statement of the circumstances of violation. Provisions regarding release on bail of persons charged with a crime shall be applicable to any defendant arrested under the provisions of this section. Upon such arrest and detention, the probation officer shall immediately so notify the court or any judge thereof. Thereupon, or upon an arrest by warrant as herein provided, the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it without unnecessary delay for a hearing on the violation charges. At such hearing the defendant shall be informed of the manner in which such defendant is alleged to have violated the conditions of such defendant's probation or conditional discharge, shall be advised by the court that such defendant has the right to retain counsel and, if indigent, shall be entitled to the services of the public defender, and shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence in such defendant's own behalf.

      (b) If such violation is established, the court may: (1) Continue the sentence of probation or conditional discharge; (2) modify or enlarge the conditions of probation or conditional discharge; (3) extend the period of probation or conditional discharge, provided the original period with any extensions shall not exceed the periods authorized by section 53a-29; or (4) revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge. If such sentence is revoked, the court shall require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence. Any such lesser sentence may include a term of imprisonment, all or a portion of which may be suspended entirely or after a period set by the court, followed by a period of probation with such conditions as the court may establish. No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such violation is established by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 32; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 12; P.A. 86-403, S. 89, 132; P.A. 95-142, S. 7; P.A. 98-130; P.A. 99-187, S. 4.)

      History: 1971 act clarified Subsec. (b) to specify that lesser sentence may be imposed when a sentence is revoked; P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (b), substituting "conditional discharge" for "conditional release"; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision re the arrest and return of a sexual offender who has violated the conditions of his probation by failing to notify his probation officer of a change of address and amended Subsec. (b) to rephrase provisions, insert Subdiv. indicators, add Subdiv. (3) authorizing an extension of the period of probation or conditional discharge and prohibit revocation of probation or conditional discharge unless a violation is established "by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence" rather than by "reliable and probative evidence"; P.A. 98-130 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision that any lesser sentence imposed upon revocation may include a term of imprisonment followed by a period of probation; P.A. 99-187 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision authorizing a probation officer to place a defendant who, in such officer's judgment, has violated the conditions of such defendant's probation in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program in lieu of returning such defendant to court for violation of probation proceedings and to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality.

      Cited. 165 C. 73. Defendant's right to counsel hereunder is of "constitutional dimension", and tests of competency are met. 167 C. 639. Order of probation revocation was upheld where defendant moved from receiving state of Maine to Massachusetts without reporting to Connecticut parole authorities and was convicted of possession of drugs in Massachusetts. Id. Cited. 169 C. 223, 227-229. Cited. 170 C. 118, 128. In determining issue of "unnecessary delay" principles applicable to sixth amendment "speedy trial" determinations may be considered. 192 C. 321-323, 326. Cited. 193 C. 35, 45. Cited. 195 C. 461, 463. Cited. 204 C. 52, 57. Cited. 207 C. 152, 156, 157. Cited. Id., 565, 567. Cited. 219 C. 629, 631. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306. Cited. 226 C. 191, 193, 195. Cited. 228 C. 487, 489. "Fair preponderance of the evidence" standard for determining whether probation has been violated. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Davis, 29 CA 801, 813, reversed. 229 C. 285-290, 293, 295, 298. Cited. 235 C. 469, 470. Cited. 240 C. 639. Cited. 242 C. 648. Willfulness not an element of a probation violation; state need only establish that probationer knew of the condition and engaged in conduct that violated the condition. 256 C. 412.

      Cited. 3 CA 410, 411. Cited. 6 CA 394. Cited. 7 CA 131-134. Cited. 9 CA 59, 71-73. Cited. Id., 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 11 CA 251, 252. Cited. 12 CA 679, 680. Cited. 13 CA 638, 639. Cited. 15 CA 34, 57. Cited. 16 CA 264, 265. Cited. 18 CA 368-370. Cited. 19 CA 304, 318. Cited. 20 CA 572, 573. Cited. 22 CA 303, 304. Cited. 23 CA 642, 643, 645, 647; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 629 et seq. Cited. 27 CA 225, 227-229. Cited. Id., 780, 781. Standard of proof needed to find a violation of probation discussed. 29 CA 801, 803, 807; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 346, 351, 354, 355. Cited. 31 CA 278, 310; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 385 et seq.; see also 37 CA 801 et seq. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 33 CA 162, 163, 165, 166, see also 35 CA 520 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 1, 2, 7. Cited. Id., 46, 47. Cited. Id., 537-539. Cited. 35 CA 107, 108. Proper standard of proof in revocation of probation proceeding is that of a fair preponderance of the evidence; previous consideration of case, 33 CA 162, remanded for reconsideration, 229 C. 916; original judgment reversed and case remanded for new probation revocation hearing. Id., 520, 521, 523, 524. Sec. 53a-31 et seq. cited. 36 CA 440, 446. Cited. 37 CA 72, 74. Cited. 38 CA 762-764, 766. Cited. 39 CA 175, 177. Cited. Id., 267, 277. Cited. Id., 722-724, 730, 731. Cited. 40 CA 395, 396, 400. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 45 CA 566. Reaffirmed prior holding that proper standard of proof for revocation of probation hearing proceeding is a fair preponderance of evidence and that revocation is on consideration of the whole record. 52 CA 557. A probation revocation hearing has two distinct components. 56 CA 125. In determining whether defendant's probationary status should be revoked court has broad discretion and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of court's ruling. 57 CA 743. State may amend the factual basis for an alleged probation violation prior to a hearing under section. 60 CA 515. If a specific condition of probation does not explicitly proscribe certain noncriminal conduct and can not be reasonably interpreted to proscribe such conduct, defendant must receive actual notice that continuation of the conduct could result in a charge of violation of a condition of probation. Id., 716. Willfulness is not element of the offense of violation of probation. Court's findings that defendant violated probation were not clearly erroneous. 68 CA 367. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's probation and reinstating prison sentence after defendant's urine tested positive for opiate. Id., 437. Court is vested with broad discretion in determining, on basis of the entire record, whether sentence of probation should continue or be revoked, and court may require defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose a lesser sentence. 81 CA 710.

      Cited. 42 CS 574, 586.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 219 C. 629, 635. Cited. 229 C. 285, 290, 295.

      Cited. 10 CA 395, 402. Cited. 18 CA 368, 372. Cited. 19 CA 304, 310, 312, 317. Cited. 25 CA 421, 427; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 299 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 1, 8, 9. Cited. Id., 537, 539. Cited. 38 CA 762, 766. Cited. 42 CA 768. Trial court reasonably could have found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant violated his probation by engaging in breach of the peace and criminal mischief and thus violated criminal laws of the state. 57 CA 64. State satisfied notice requirements when it recited the charges constituting defendant's violation of probation during both defendant's arraignment and probation revocation hearing. 80 CA 75.

      Cited. 42 CS 574, 590.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 169 C. 223, 233. Cited. 178 C. 145, 153. Cited. 219 C. 629, 635. Cited. 225 C. 46, 50. Cited. 228 C. 487, 495. Cited. 229 C. 285, 290, 293. Court's discretion to provide right of allocution to defendant during probation revocation proceeding is identical to discretion provided at time of original sentencing. 243 C. 339.

      Cited. 1 CA 70, 71. Cited. 3 CA 410, 414. Cited. 10 CA 395, 402. Cited. 11 CA 251, 258. Cited. 18 CA 368, 376. Cited. 20 CA 572, 576, 578. Cited. 22 CA 303, 309. Cited. 23 CA 642, 653; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 629 et seq. Cited. 27 CA 225, 226, 247. Cited. 29 CA 801, 807; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 346, 350. Cited. 31 CA 660, 663. Cited. 33 CA 162, 168, see also 35 CA 520 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 1, 8. Cited. Id., 46, 55. Cited. Id., 537, 539. Cited. 36 CA 440, 444. Cited. 37 CA 72, 83. Cited. 38 CA 762, 767, 771. Cited. 39 CA 722, 728, 729. Cited. 40 CA 395, 396, 403. Cited. 42 CA 768. Trial court has broad discretion in continuing or revoking sentence of probation. 50 CA 46. Provides that once a probation violation is established, court may extend period of probation if original period with any extension does not exceed periods authorized by Sec. 53a-29. 72 CA 33. Subsec. requires that violation of probation be "established by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence." This requirement is not satisfied when, as in this case, the substance that defendant possessed was readily available for laboratory analysis to determine whether it in fact contained cocaine, a narcotic, but was never subjected to such testing. 81 CA 409.

      Sec. 53a-32a. Violation of probation by certain sexual offenders. If a defendant who entered a plea of nolo contendere or a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine to a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000, subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, and was ordered to undergo sexual offender treatment as a condition of probation, becomes ineligible for such treatment because of such defendant's refusal to acknowledge that such defendant committed the act or acts charged, such defendant shall be deemed to be in violation of the conditions of such defendant's probation and be returned to court for proceedings in accordance with section 53a-32.

      (P.A. 97-151, S. 2; P.A. 01-84, S. 16, 26.)

      History: P.A. 01-84 replaced reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000," included a violation of "subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21" and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.

      Trial court not required to notify defendant, upon entering guilty plea under Alford doctrine, that failure to acknowledge his guilt could result in violation of condition of his probation requiring sex offender treatment. 268 C. 174.

      Statute can be applied only prospectively. 69 CA 421. Trial court improperly considered defendant's refusal to admit to guilt during sexual offender treatment as a violation of probation. Id. (judgment reversed, see 268 C. 174).

      Sec. 53a-33. Termination of probation or conditional discharge. The court or sentencing judge may at any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, after hearing and for good cause shown, terminate a sentence of probation or conditional discharge before the completion thereof, except a sentence of probation imposed for conviction of a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000, subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 33; P.A. 92-260, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 11; P.A. 01-84, S. 17, 26.)

      History: P.A. 92-260 added "a sentence of"; P.A. 95-142 specified that a sentence of probation or conditional discharge may be terminated "before the completion thereof" and precluded termination of a sentence of probation imposed for conviction of a violation of Subdiv. (2) of Sec. 53-21 or Sec. 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b; P.A. 01-84 replaced reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000," and included a violation of "subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21", effective July 1, 2001.

      Cited. 165 C. 73. Cited. 170 C. 128. Cited. 219 C. 752, 762. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306. Cited. 225 C. 46, 50.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Sec. 53a-31 et seq. cited. 36 CA 440, 446.

      Sec. 53a-34. Unconditional discharge: Criteria; effect. (a) The court may impose a sentence of unconditional discharge in any case where it is authorized to impose a sentence of conditional discharge under section 53a-29, if the court is of the opinion that no proper purpose would be served by imposing any condition upon the defendant's release.

      (b) When the court imposes a sentence of unconditional discharge, the defendant shall be released with respect to the conviction for which the sentence is imposed without imprisonment, probation supervision or conditions. A sentence of unconditional discharge is for all purposes a final judgment of conviction.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 34.)

      Cited. 170 C. 128. Cited. 180 C. 557, 561. Cited. 188 C. 557, 559. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 32, 46. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Sec. 53a-31 et seq. cited. 36 CA 440, 446.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 182 C. 595, 603.

      Sec. 53a-35. Imprisonment for any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981: Indeterminate sentences; maximum and minimum terms. (a) For any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be an indeterminate sentence, except as provided in subsection (d). When such a sentence is imposed the court shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) and the minimum term shall be as provided in subsection (c) or (d).

      (b) The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a class A felony, life imprisonment; (2) for a class B felony, a term not to exceed twenty years; (3) for a class C felony, a term not to exceed ten years; (4) for a class D felony, a term not to exceed five years; (5) for an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime; and (6) for a capital felony, life imprisonment unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a.

      (c) Except as provided in subsection (d) the minimum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a class A felony, the minimum term shall not be less than ten nor more than twenty-five years; (2) for a class B, C or D felony the court may fix a minimum term of not less than one year nor more than one-half of the maximum term imposed, except that (A) where the maximum is less than three years the minimum term may be more than one-half the maximum term imposed or (B) when a person is found guilty under section 53a-59(a)(1), section 53a-59a, 53a-101(a)(1) or 53a-134(a)(2), the minimum term shall be not less than five years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced, or when a person is found guilty under section 53a-60c, the minimum term shall be not less than three years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced, or when a person is found guilty under section 53a-60b,the minimum term shall be not less than two years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced; (3) for an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.

      (d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c), except as provided in subdivision (2) of said subsection (c), when a person is sentenced for a class C or D felony or for an unclassified felony, the maximum sentence for which does not exceed ten years, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less; except when a person is found guilty under sections 53a-55a, 53a-56a, 53a-60a, 53a-70a, 53a-72b, 53a-92a, 53a-94a, 53a-102a and 53a-103a, the court shall not fix a term of less than one year.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 35; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 13; P.A. 73-137, S. 8; P.A. 74-186, S. 9, 12; P.A. 75-380, S. 14; 75-411, S. 3; P.A. 76-435, S. 2, 82; P.A. 77-422, S. 5; P.A. 80-442, S. 9, 28; P.A. 83-587, S. 76, 96.)

      History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to minimum sentence terms in Subsec. (d), required that sentence be specified in the sentence in Subsec. (b), amended Subsec. (c) to add exception re Subsec. (d), to raise minimum term for Class A felony from one to ten years and maximum term from ten to twenty-five years, to clarify exception re maximum term of three years by specifying minimum terms and to add Subdiv. (3) re unclassified felonies and amended Subsec. (d) to add exception re Subsec. (c)(2) and to include applicability re unclassified felonies; P.A. 73-137 removed reference to death sentence imposed for class A felony in accordance with Sec. 53a-46 in Subsec. (b)(1) and added Subdiv. (6) re capital felonies; P.A. 74-186 removed reference to guilt under Subdivs. (2) or (4) of Sec. 53a-60(a) in Subsec. (c)(2)(B); P.A. 75-380 added exception in Subsec. (d) re required one-year term; P.A. 75-411 deleted reference to guilt under Sec. 53a-135(a)(2) in Subsec. (c)(2)(B); P.A. 76-435 added exception in Subsec. (d) as amended by P.A. 75-380; P.A. 77-422 expanded exception in Subsec. (c)(2)(B) re required three-year and two-year minimum terms and added reference to guilt under Sec. 53-59a; P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (a) to limit applicability to felonies committed prior to July 1, 1981, effective on that date; P.A. 83-587 substituted "53a-59a" for "53-59a" in Subsec. (c).

      Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. 176 C. 270, 271. Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 182 C. 595, 597-599, 602. Cited. 190 C. 327, 335; Id., 639, 642. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759.

      Cited. 1 CA 724, 734. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 403-406. Cited. 19 CA 440, 443, 444. Cited. Id., 571, 574, 575. Cited. Id., 631, 635. Cited. 24 CA 612, 617. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231, 232.

      Courts may impose a definite sentence for a felony of one year or less. 31 CS 350. Cited. 33 CS 705.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 171 C. 278. Cited. 189 C. 114, 116. Cited. 196 C. 655, 658.

      Cited. 12 CA 403, 405. Cited. 19 CA 571, 575.

      Subsec. (b):

      Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 114, 116, 117. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151. Subdiv. (1) cited. 195 C. 326, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited. 195 C. 326, 328. Subdiv. (4) cited. 199 C. 121, 124. Cited. 211 C. 591, 612. Subdiv. (4) cited. 231 C. 545, 556. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 545, 557.

      Cited. 19 CA 571, 575. Subdiv. (1) cited. 24 CA 612, 615, 623. Cited. Id., 612, 618, 619. Cited. 46 CA 450.

      Subsec. (c):

      Subdiv. (2)(B): Rational relationship exists between the protection of public health and safety and the imposition of nonsuspendable sentence for violent crime of second degree robbery, an essential element of which is threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. 171 C. 677, 681. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 595, 599; 189 C. 114, 117. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 182 C. 595, 601, 603. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 144, 153. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 195 C. 326, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 197 C. 413, 427. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 485, 488, 502, 503. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 121, 124. Subdiv. (2) cited. 202 C. 343, 345. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 591, 612.

      Subdiv. (3) cited. 12 CA 403, 405, 406. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 403, 406. Cited. 24 CA 612, 618.

      Sec. 53a-35a. Imprisonment for any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981: Definite sentences; terms authorized. For any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be a definite sentence and the term shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a capital felony, a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a; (2) for the class A felony of murder, a term not less than twenty-five years nor more than life; (3) for a class A felony other than murder, a term not less than ten years nor more than twenty-five years; (4) for the class B felony of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a, a term not less than five years nor more than forty years; (5) for a class B felony other than manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a, a term not less than one year nor more than twenty years, except that for a conviction under section 53a-59(a)(1), 53a-59a, 53a-70a, 53a-94a, 53a-101(a)(1) or 53a-134(a)(2), the term shall be not less than five years nor more than twenty years; (6) for a class C felony, a term not less than one year nor more than ten years, except that for a conviction under section 53a-56a, the term shall be not less than three years nor more than ten years; (7) for a class D felony, a term not less than one year nor more than five years, except that for a conviction under section 53a-60b or 53a-217, the term shall be not less than two years nor more than five years, for a conviction under section 53a-60c, the term shall be not less than three years nor more than five years, and for a conviction under section 53a-216, the term shall be five years; (8) for an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.

      (P.A. 80-442, S. 10, 28; P.A. 86-220; P.A. 92-260, S. 15; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 2.)

      History: P.A. 80-442 effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 86-220 amended Subdiv. (1) to add "imprisonment without the possibility of release" to reflect revision made by P.A. 85-366; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (6) to add reference to "Sec. 53a-217" and provision that "for a conviction under section 53a-216, the term shall be five years", to reflect existing minimum mandatory sentences prescribed in said sections; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 added a new Subdiv. (4) to provide a term of not less than five years nor more than forty years for the class B felony of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under Sec. 53a-55a, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and amended Subdiv. (5) to provide that the specified sentence is for a class B felony "other than manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a" and delete a reference to Sec. 53a-55a, reflecting the separate sentencing provisions established for Sec. 53a-55a in Subdiv. (4).

      See Sec. 53a-41 re fines for felonies.

      Cited. 196 C. 655, 659. Cited. 197 C. 337, 353, 355, 357. Cited. 198 C. 92, 94. Cited. 200 C. 268, 279. Cited. Id., 664, 674. Cited. 201 C. 598, 600. Cited. 210 C. 519, 525. Cited. 211 C. 258, 282-285. Cited. 212 C. 31, 47. Definite sentencing scheme for any felony under this section implicitly repealed indeterminate sentencing aspect of Sec. 21a-278(a). 214 C. 378, 382-384, 386-388. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. 225 C. 559, 562. Cited. 230 C. 109, 114, 115, 118. Cited. 234 C. 139, 143, 166. Cited. Id., 735, 748. Cited. 235 C. 502, 517. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 240 C. 743.

      Cited. 6 CA 680, 681. Cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720, 731. Cited. 10 CA 659, 665. Cited. 12 CA 403-407. Cited. 19 CA 571, 573-575. Cited. 23 CA 201, 205. Cited. 32 CA 759, 764. Cited. 35 CA 714, 720. Cited. 42 CA 348.

      Subdiv. (1):

      Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 392, 393. Cited. 235 C. 206, 227. Cited. 238 C. 389.

      Subdiv. (2):

      Cited. 216 C. 282, 285, 294, 295. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759.

      Cited. 34 CA 58, 93; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq.

      Subdiv. (3):

      Cited. 198 C. 671, 674. Cited. 235 C. 679, 681.

      Cited. 8 CA 177, 178.

      Subdiv. (4):

      Cited. 202 C. 93, 99. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759.

      Cited. 15 CA 416, 444.

      Subdiv. (5):

      Cited. 6 CA 680, 681.

      Subdiv. (6):

      Cited. 218 C. 273, 275.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 728. Cited. 10 CA 486, 493.

      Subdiv. (7):

      Cited. 211 C. 258, 284. Cited. 214 C. 378, 385.

      Sec. 53a-35b. "Life imprisonment" defined. A sentence of imprisonment for life shall mean a definite sentence of sixty years, unless the sentence is life imprisonment without the possibility of release, imposed pursuant to subsection (g) of section 53a-46a, in which case the sentence shall be imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's natural life.

      (P.A. 80-442, S. 11, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 3; P.A. 95-19, S. 2.)

      History: P.A. 80-442 effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added provision re life imprisonment without the possibility of release; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change.

      See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.

      Cited. 198 C. 92, 94. Cited. 201 C. 276, 277. Cited. 207 C. 374, 386. Cited. 215 C. 231, 232. Cited. 216 C. 282, 285. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 234 C. 139, 144, 166.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 24 CA 612, 618, 622.

      Sec. 53a-35c. Availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release shall not be available as a sentence for an offense committed prior to October 1, 1985.

      (P.A. 85-366, S. 4.)

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.

      Sec. 53a-36. Imprisonment for misdemeanor: Maximum and minimum sentences. A sentence of imprisonment for a misdemeanor shall be a definite sentence and the term shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, a term not to exceed one year except that when a person is found guilty under section 53a-61(a)(3) or 53a-61a, the term shall be one year and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, a term not to exceed six months; (3) for a class C misdemeanor, a term not to exceed three months; (4) for an unclassified misdemeanor, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 36; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 14; P.A. 77-422, S. 6; P.A. 92-260, S. 16.)

      History: 1971 act added exception re guilt under Sec. 53a-61(a)(3) in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 77-422 expanded exception to include guilt under Sec. 53a-61a; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (1) to consolidate statutory references and delete redundant language.

      See Sec. 53a-42 re fines for misdemeanors.

      Cited. 169 C. 223. Cited. 178 C. 145, 153. Court in sentencing of defendant found guilty under Sec. 53a-61a must impose a mandatory nonsuspendable term of imprisonment and does not have option of imposing a fine or a sentence of unconditional discharge. 180 C. 557, 559-561, 564. Cited. 194 C. 198, 209. Cited. 217 C. 73, 90. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 223 C. 635, 666.

      Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720, 731. Cited. 19 CA 631, 635. Cited. 32 CA 656, 660; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231.

      Subdiv. (1):

      Cited. 189 C. 114, 117.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 727.

      Subdiv. (2):

      Cited. 184 C. 434, 438.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 722.

      Subdiv. (3):

      Cited. 194 C. 198, 199.

      Cited. 12 CA 481, 494.

      Sec. 53a-37. Multiple sentences: Concurrent or consecutive, minimum term. When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time, or when a person who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time by a court of this state is sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment, the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall run either concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other and to the undischarged term or terms in such manner as the court directs at the time of sentence. The court shall state whether the respective maxima and minima shall run concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other, and shall state in conclusion the effective sentence imposed. When a person is sentenced for two or more counts each constituting a separate offense, the court may order that the term of imprisonment for the second and subsequent counts be for a fixed number of years each. The court in such cases shall not set any minimum term of imprisonment except under the first count, and the fixed number of years imposed for the second and subsequent counts shall be added to the maximum term imposed by the court on the first count.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 37; P.A. 73-639, S. 4.)

      History: P.A. 73-639 added provisions clarifying court's sentencing powers in cases where person is to be sentenced for two or more counts each of which constitutes a separate offense.

      Cited. 178 C. 427, 432, 436. Statute provides for three sentencing options where multiple sentences are imposed at same time. Id., 634-639. Section authorizes multiple sentences with consecutive minimum and maximum terms. 179 C. 381-384. Cited. Id., 384-387. Cited. 184 C. 366, 367; Id., 434, 439. Cited. 185 C. 473, 478. Cited. 190 C. 327, 335. Cited. 192 C. 471, 477. Cited. 197 C. 413, 427, 428. Cited. Id., 485, 503. Cited. 206 C. 40, 55. Cited. Id., 685, 701-703. Cited. 207 C. 270, 276. Cited. Id., 276. Cited. 208 C. 420, 422. Cited. 217 C. 568, 577. Does not impose limits on trial court's common law inherent sentencing power to stay execution of a criminal sentence. 225 C. 46, 52-54. Cited. 228 C. 384, 389. Court was not prohibited from imposing a term of incarceration consecutive to a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release. 249 C. 645.

      Cited. 7 CA 131, 135. Cited. Id., 367, 377. Cited. 9 CA 365-367. Cited. Id., 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 17 CA 307, 311. Cited. 20 CA 572, 575, 576. Cited. 26 CA 10, 12. Cited. 34 CA 503, 507. Application of section is limited to "offenses" and since criminal contempt is not a criminal offense it is not a matter within the section's scope; however, legislature did not intend to change existing common law in enacting this section and therefore trial court had inherent authority to impose criminal sentence that ran concurrently with previous sentence for criminal contempt. 59 CA 145.

      Cited. 30 CS 71. Cited. 36 CS 168, 169.

      Sec. 53a-38. Calculation of terms of imprisonment. (a) An indeterminate sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody or institution to which he was sentenced.

      (b) A definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody to which he was sentenced. Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run; (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.

      (c) When a sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on a person is vacated and a new sentence is imposed on such person for the same offense or for an offense based on the same act, the new sentence shall be calculated as if it had commenced at the time the vacated sentence commenced, and all time served under or credited against the vacated sentence shall be credited against the new sentence.

      (d) When a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment escapes, the escape shall interrupt the sentence and such interruption shall continue until the return of such person to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 38; P.A. 92-260, S. 17.)

      History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (c).

      Calculations of terms of imprisonment discussed. 185 C. 124-129. Cited. 230 C. 17, 18.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 45 CA 566.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 185 C. 124, 131; Id., 124, 126-129, 131.

      Cited. 33 CA 205, 213.

      Cited. 40 CS 354, 356.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 209 C. 23-26, 28, 32-34. Subdiv. (2) cited. 217 C. 568, 577. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 384, 388, 390. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 384, 390.

      Cited. 34 CA 503, 508. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 503, 508, 509. Cited. 45 CA 566.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 202 C. 343, 347-349. Cited. 215 C. 695, 697, 699. Cited. 216 C. 220, 224. Fundamental purpose is to afford inmate credit toward current sentence for time that he was confined as direct result of his initial trial on same charges and therefore petitioner entitled to credit toward his prison sentence for time that he was confined in mental health facility. 258 C. 394.

      Cited. 30 CA 190, 195, 196. Cited. 39 CA 455, 461, 463, 464.

      Sec. 53a-39. Reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant by sentencing court or judge. Statement by victim. (a) At any time during the period of a definite sentence of three years or less, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced.

      (b) At any time during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years, upon agreement of the defendant and the state's attorney to seek review of the sentence, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced.

      (c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any portion of a sentence imposed that is a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense which may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

      (d) At a hearing held by the sentencing court or judge under this section, such court or judge shall permit any victim of the crime to appear before the court or judge for the purpose of making a statement for the record concerning whether or not the sentence of the defendant should be reduced, the defendant discharged or the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section. In lieu of such appearance, the victim may submit a written statement to the court or judge and the court or judge shall make such statement a part of the record at the hearing. For the purposes of this subsection, "victim" means the victim, the legal representative of the victim or a member of the deceased victim's immediate family.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 39; P.A. 82-428, S. 1, 4; P.A. 84-505, S. 3, 6; P.A. 85-354, S. 1, 3; P.A. 87-538, S. 1, 3, 5; P.A. 90-261, S. 7, 19; P.A. 94-119; P.A. 95-175, S. 3.)

      History: P.A. 82-428 specified applicability to definite sentences "of three years or less"; P.A. 84-505 authorized the sentencing court or judge to order certain defendants discharged on intensive probation, effective June 13, 1984, to July 1, 1987; P.A. 85-354 added provisions to require applications for the intensive probation program to be referred to the office of adult probation for assessment and recommendations, to specify that the period of intensive probation shall not exceed the unexpired portion of the sentence, to authorize the court or judge to place on regular probation a defendant who successfully completes intensive probation, to specify the period of such regular probation, and to require a defendant discharged on intensive probation to comply with the probation conditions ordered by the court or required by the office of adult probation; P.A. 87-538 prohibited the discharge on intensive probation of a defendant sentenced for a class A felony, authorized the placement in the intensive probation program of a defendant with a definite sentence which includes suspension of incarceration after a period of at least two years but not more than five years, followed by a period of probation, if he has served at least one-half of the unsuspended portion of his sentence prior to release, and reenacted and continued in effect on and after July 1, 1987, the provisions of this section previously effective from June 13, 1984, until July 1, 1987; P.A. 90-261 deleted all provisions re the discharge of a defendant on intensive probation; P.A. 94-119 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a), added Subsec. (b) authorizing the sentencing court or judge at any time during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years to reduce the sentence or order the defendant discharged and added Subsec. (c) making the section inapplicable to any sentence imposed for an offense carrying a mandatory minimum sentence; P.A. 95-175 added Subsec. (d) re statement by victim re reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant.

      See Sec. 51-195 re sentence review by review division.

      Cited. 184 C. 366, 368. Cited. 187 C. 109, 124. Cited. 200 C. 664, 674. Cited. 208 C. 420, 429, 430. Cited. 210 C. 519, 526, 527. Cited. 214 C. 717, 718, 722-725. Does not confer continuing jurisdiction on trial court to entertain a motion for judgment of acquittal. 230 C. 427, 432-434. Cited. 240 C. 708.

      Cited. 3 CA 497-502. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 32, 45. Term "sentence" refers to the aggregate or total effective sentence. 19 CA 631-639. Cited. 20 CA 467-469. Cited. 21 CA 557, 565. Cited. 22 CA 601, 605. Cited. 23 CA 201, 203, 205, 206. Nothing in this section or any other statute confers on trial court jurisdiction to entertain a motion for acquittal after service of a sentence has commenced. 32 CA 1, 3-5. Section does not violate separation of powers doctrine. 39 CA 632-635. A definite sentence includes both its executed and suspended portions. 54 CA 387.

      When the original sentence was defective, commitment for violation of probation is illegal. 31 CS 350. Cited. 40 CS 238, 241, 242. Cited. 41 CS 229, 251.

      Sec. 53a-39a. Alternate incarceration program. (a) In all cases where a defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony, other than a capital felony, a class A felony or a violation of section 21a-278, 21a-278a, 53a-55, 53a-56, 53a-56b, 53a-57, 53a-58 or 53a-70b or any other offense for which there is a mandatory minimum sentence which may not be suspended or reduced by the court, after trial or by a plea of guilty without trial, and a term of imprisonment is part of a stated plea agreement or the statutory penalty provides for a term of imprisonment, the court may, in its discretion, order an assessment for placement in an alternate incarceration program under contract with the Judicial Department. If the Court Support Services Division recommends placement in an alternate incarceration program, it shall also submit to the court a proposed alternate incarceration plan. Upon completion of the assessment, the court shall determine whether such defendant shall be ordered to participate in such program as an alternative to incarceration. If the court determines that the defendant shall participate in such program, the court shall suspend any sentence of imprisonment and shall make participation in the alternate incarceration program a condition of probation as provided in section 53a-30.

      (b) An alternate incarceration program includes, but shall not be limited to, an intensive probation program, any community service program approved by the Chief Court Administrator and any residential or nonresidential program approved by the Chief Court Administrator which provides care, supervision and supportive services such as employment, psychiatric and psychological evaluation and counseling, and drug and alcohol dependency treatment. Any defendant placed in an alternate incarceration program shall comply with any other conditions of probation ordered by the court or required by the Court Support Services Division, as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of section 53a-30.

      (P.A. 89-383, S. 3, 16; P.A. 94-128, S. 1, 3; P.A. 02-132, S. 33.)

      History: P.A. 89-383, S. 3 effective July 5, 1989, to July 1, 1994; P.A. 94-128 negated effect of P.A. 89-383, reenacting and continuing existence of section, effective July 1, 1994; P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing "program to be conducted by the Office of Adult Probation" with "program under contract with the Judicial Department" and replacing "Office of Adult Probation" with "Court Support Services Division" and amended Subsec. (b) by replacing "Office of Adult Probation" with "Court Support Services Division".

      Sec. 53a-39b. Special alternative incarceration program for young male defendants. Section 53a-39b is repealed, effective October 1, 2003.

      (P.A. 89-390, S. 18, 37; P.A. 90-230, S. 75, 101; 90-261, S. 10, 19; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-9, S. 5, 10; P.A. 03-48, S. 2.)

      Sec. 53a-39c. Community service labor program. (a) There is established, within available appropriations, a community service labor program for persons charged with a violation of section 21a-267 or 21a-279 who have not previously been convicted of a violation of section 21a-267, 21a-277, 21a-278 or 21a-279. Upon application by any such person for participation in such program the court may grant such application and (1) if such person has not previously been placed in the community service labor program, the court may either suspend prosecution and place such person in such program or, upon a plea of guilty without trial where a term of imprisonment is part of a stated plea agreement, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with section 53a-30; or (2) if such person has previously been placed in such program, the court may, upon a plea of guilty without trial where a term of imprisonment is part of a stated plea agreement, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with said section 53a-30. No person may be placed in such program who has twice previously been placed in such program.

      (b) Any person who enters such program shall pay to the court a participation fee of two hundred five dollars, except that no person may be excluded from such program for inability to pay such fee, provided (1) such person files with the court an affidavit of indigency or inability to pay, (2) such indigency is confirmed by the Court Support Services Division, and (3) the court enters a finding thereof. All program fees collected shall be deposited into the alternative incarceration program account.

      (c) Any person for whom prosecution is suspended and who is placed in the community service labor program pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall agree to the tolling of the statute of limitations with respect to such crime and to a waiver of such person's right to a speedy trial. A pretrial community service labor program established under this section for persons for whom prosecution is suspended shall include a drug education component. If such person satisfactorily completes the program of community service labor to which such person was assigned, such person may apply for dismissal of the charges against such person and the court, on reviewing the record of such person's participation in such program and on finding such satisfactory completion, shall dismiss the charges. If the program provider certifies to the court that such person did not successfully complete the program of community service labor to which such person was assigned or is no longer amenable to participation in such program, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty for such person and immediately place the case on the trial list.

      (d) The period of participation in a community service labor program shall be a minimum of fourteen days for a first violation and thirty days for a second violation involving a plea of guilty and conviction.

      (P.A. 90-213, S. 3, 56; P.A. 97-248, S. 11, 12; P.A. 99-148, S. 2, 4; P.A. 03-2, S. 50.)

      History: P.A. 97-248 amended Subsec. (a) to make ineligible for the program persons who have previously participated in the drug education program established under Sec. 54-56i, and amended Subsec. (b) to require a pretrial community service labor program established for persons for whom prosecution is suspended to include a drug education component, effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 99-148 amended Subsec. (a) to make eligible for the program persons charged with a violation of Sec. 21a-267, to make ineligible for the program persons who have previously been convicted of a violation of Sec. 21a-267 and to delete the provision that made persons who previously participated in the drug education program established under Sec. 54-56i ineligible for the program, amended Subsec. (c) to replace provisions that specified differing periods of participation in the program depending upon whether the violation was of subsection (a), (b) or (c) of Sec. 21a-279 with provisions requiring a period of participation consisting of a minimum of fourteen days for a first violation and thirty days for a second violation involving a plea of guilty and conviction, and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 1999; P.A. 03-2 added new Subsec. (b) to establish a participation fee of two hundred five dollars, prohibit the exclusion of a person from the program for inability to pay such fee and require that all program fees collected be deposited into the alternative incarceration program account and redesignated existing Subsecs. (b) and (c) as new Subsecs. (c) and (d), respectively, effective February 28, 2003.

      Program intended to avoid unnecessary trials and expenditures of resources, so defendant's application for program when trial nearly complete is justification for denying application. 51 CA 126.

      Sec. 53a-39d. Pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program. (a) Not later than October 1, 1998, the Chief Court Administrator shall establish a pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program. Eligibility for participation in the program shall be limited to (1) individuals who are eligible to be sentenced by the court to a period of probation, pursuant to section 53a-29, and have been ordered by the court, as a condition of such probation, to participate in the program, (2) individuals who are eligible to be released on bail under section 54-63d or 54-64a and have been required by the bail commissioner or the court, as a condition of release, to participate in the program, (3) individuals who have been sentenced to a period of probation and, in the judgment of their probation officers, have violated the conditions of such probation and been referred to the program by their probation officers pursuant to subsection (a) of section 53a-32, and (4) individuals who have been ordered by the court, as a condition of probation, to participate in the program pursuant to subsection (d) of section 54-56e or subsection (b) of section 54-76j and shall be based upon criteria, including a limit on the maximum number of eligible participants, established by the Chief Court Administrator.

      (b) Any person entering such program shall, as a condition of participating in such program, agree to: (1) Submit to periodic urinalysis drug tests, (2) detention in a halfway house facility for a period of two days each time such test produces a positive result, (3) comply with all rules established by the halfway house if detained in such facility, and (4) waive the right to a hearing.

      (c) Participants in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program shall submit to periodic urinalysis drug tests. If the test produces a positive result, the participant shall be detained in a halfway house facility for a period of two days.

      (d) Any person who has submitted to a urinalysis drug test pursuant to subsection (c) of this section that produced a positive result may request that a second urinalysis drug test be administered, at such person's expense, to confirm the results of the first test, except that if the participant is determined to be indigent, based upon financial affidavits, the Judicial Department shall pay the cost of the test. The second drug test shall be a urinalysis drug test, separate and independent of the initial test. The participant shall be detained in a halfway house pending the results of the second test. If such second test does not produce a positive result, the participant, if detained in a halfway house, shall be released and the fee, if paid by the participant, shall be refunded to the participant.

      (e) A participant enrolled in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program as a condition of probation may be charged with a violation of probation, if the participant's probation officer determines that the participant has violated the conditions of probation or the conditions of the program. A participant enrolled in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program as a condition of release may be charged with a violation of the conditions of such person's release, if a bail commissioner determines that the participant has violated the conditions of such person's release or the conditions of the program.

      (P.A. 98-145, S. 3, 4; P.A. 99-187, S. 3; P.A. 02-89, S. 83.)

      History: P.A. 99-187 amended Subsec. (a) to expand eligibility for the program by adding Subdiv. (2) to include individuals eligible to be released on bail who have been required as a condition of release to participate in the program, adding Subdiv. (3) to include individuals sentenced to a period of probation who have violated the conditions of probation and been referred to the program by their probation officers, and adding Subdiv. (4) to include individuals ordered by the court to participate in the program as a condition of probation under the accelerated rehabilitation or youthful offender programs, and amended Subsec. (e) to make existing provisions applicable to a participant enrolled in the program "as a condition of probation" and add provision that a participant enrolled in the program as a condition of release may be charged with violation of the conditions of such person's release if a bail commissioner determines there has been a violation of the conditions of release or conditions of the program; P.A. 02-89 deleted as obsolete Subsec. (f) requiring the chairman of the Board of Parole, the Commissioner of Correction and the Chief Court Administrator to submit a report on the program to the committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to criminal justice not later than January 1, 2000.

      See Secs. 18-100e and 54-125f re pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program established by Commissioner of Correction and chairman of Board of Pardons and Paroles, respectively.

      Sec. 53a-40. Persistent offenders: Definitions; defense; authorized sentences. (a) A persistent dangerous felony offender is a person who:

      (1) (A) Stands convicted of manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first or second degree, or assault in the first degree, and (B) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for any of the following crimes: (i) The crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii) murder, sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iii) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117, or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9, 53-10, 53-11, 53-12 to 53-16, inclusive, 53-19, 53-21, 53-69, 53-78 to 53-80, inclusive, 53-82, 53-83, 53-86, 53-238 and 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iv) in any other state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph; or

      (2) (A) Stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and (B) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for any of the following crimes: (i) Murder, manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first or second degree or assault in the first degree, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii) prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117, or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9, 53-10, 53-11, 53-12 to 53-16, inclusive, 53-19, 53-21, 53-69, 53-78 to 53-80, inclusive, 53-82, 53-83 and 53-86 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iii) in any other state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph.

      (b) A persistent dangerous sexual offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for (A) any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection, or (B) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53-238 or 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes, or (C) in any other state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection or this subdivision.

      (c) A persistent serious felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a felony, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present felony, convicted of and imprisoned under an imposed term of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for a crime. This subsection shall not apply where the present conviction is for a crime enumerated in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the prior conviction was for a crime other than those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section.

      (d) A persistent serious sexual offender is a person, other than a person who qualifies as a persistent dangerous sexual offender under subsection (b) of this section, who qualifies as a persistent serious felony offender under subsection (c) of this section and the felony of which such person presently stands convicted is a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21, or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b and the prior conviction is for a violation of section 53-21 of the general statutes, revised to January 1, 1995, involving sexual contact, committed prior to October 1, 1995, a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes, committed on or after October 1, 1995, and prior to October 1, 2000, a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.

      (e) A persistent larceny offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of larceny in the third degree in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October 1, 1982, or larceny in the fourth, fifth or sixth degree, and (2) has been, at separate times prior to the commission of the present larceny, twice convicted of the crime of larceny.

      (f) A persistent felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a felony other than a class D felony, and (2) has been, at separate times prior to the commission of the present felony, twice convicted of a felony other than a class D felony.

      (g) It shall be an affirmative defense to the charge of being a persistent offender under this section that (1) as to any prior conviction on which the state is relying the defendant was pardoned on the ground of innocence, and (2) without such conviction, the defendant was not two or more times convicted and imprisoned as required by this section.

      (h) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981, shall sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than forty years and, if such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section, sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than life.

      (i) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous sexual offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, shall sentence such person to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of imprisonment for life, as defined in section 53a-35b.

      (j) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious felony offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best serve the public interest, the court in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony.

      (k) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious sexual offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose a sentence of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute the maximum sentence specified by section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of felony.

      (l) When any person has been found to be a persistent larceny offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-36 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony authorized by section 53a-35, if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed prior to July 1, 1981, or authorized by section 53a-35a, if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981.

      (m) When any person has been found to be a persistent felony offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony; provided the sentence imposed may not be less than three years, and provided further three years of the sentence so imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 40; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 15; P.A. 73-616, S. 40; P.A. 76-336, S. 20; P.A. 80-442, S. 12, 28; P.A. 83-4, S. 1, 2; P.A. 85-603; P.A. 92-260, S. 18; P.A. 94-37, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 48; P.A. 01-84, S. 18, 26.)

      History: 1971 act removed requirements that offenders under Subsecs. (a) and (b) have been previously convicted and imprisoned "two or more times" and "at separate times" and redefined persistent larceny offender as one who stands convicted of larceny in "the third or fourth degree" rather than in "the second or a lesser degree" in Subsec. (c); P.A. 73-616 corrected section reference re assault with intent to kill, substituting Sec. 54-117 for Sec. 53-117 in Subsec. (a); P.A. 76-336 substituted sexual assault in first or third degree or sexual assault in first or third degree with a firearm for "rape" in Subsec. (a) and specified applicability of conviction for crimes enumerated in Secs. 53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 prior to October 1, 1975; P.A. 80-442 specified applicability of Subsec. (b) to persistent "serious" felony offenders, inserted new Subsec. (d) re persistent felony offenders, relettering as necessary, amended Subsecs. (f) to (h), formerly (e) to (g), re crimes committed on or after July 1, 1981, and added Subsec. (i) re extended incarceration effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 83-4 amended Subsec. (c) to reflect the establishment of six degrees of larceny pursuant to P.A. 82-271 by including persons convicted of larceny in the third degree "in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October 1, 1982" and larceny in the "fifth or sixth" degree; P.A. 85-603 made a technical change to Subsec. (h) and rewrote some of the language of said Subsec. to reflect said change; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace an obsolete reference to the offense of "sexual assault in the first degree with a firearm" with its revised name of "aggravated sexual assault in the first degree", and made other minor technical changes in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (d); P.A. 94-37 amended Subsec. (f) to revise the penalty for a person found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender by replacing the provision that permitted the court to impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized for a class A felony with the provision requiring the court to sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than forty years and by adding the provision requiring the court to sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than life if such person has been twice convicted and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in Subsec. (a)(2); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (a) to delete from category of a persistent dangerous felony offender a person who stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm and has been previously convicted and imprisoned for more than one year for any of said crimes or any predecessor statutes, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes, to revise and restructure Subsec. to reflect such deletion and to revise Subdiv. and Subpara. indicators accordingly, added new Subsec. (b) re persistent dangerous sexual offender, new Subsec. (d) re persistent serious sexual offender, new Subsec. (i) re penalty for persistent dangerous sexual offender and new Subsec. (k) re penalty for persistent serious sexual offender, relettering intervening and remaining Subsecs. accordingly, and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (d) to replace in provision re the offense for which the person presently stands convicted the reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21", to replace in provision re offenses for which the person was previously convicted the reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes, committed on or after October 1, 1995, and prior to October 1, 2000," and to add reference to a prior conviction for "a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21", effective July 1, 2001.

      Annotations to former section 53-67:

      Cited. 157 C. 466. Cited. 168 C. 395.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 176 C. 270, 272. Cited. 180 C. 660, 661. Cited. 184 C. 215, 216. Cited. 188 C. 27, 28. Cited. 191 C. 180, 182. Cited. 192 C. 471, 475. Cited. 194 C. 573. Cited. Id., 692, 699. Cited. 195 C. 326-330. Cited. 197 C. 280, 281. Cited. 198 C. 158, 159, 166-168. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. 203 C. 506, 519, 521, 523, 524. Cited. 207 C. 619, 620. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 226 C. 601, 611. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317. Cited. 242 C. 143.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 1, 30, 31. Cited. 31 CA 140, 148. Cited. 36 CA 401, 406. Cited. 45 CA 390. Admission of certified copy of judgment sufficient to prove persistent dangerous felony offender. 50 CA 521.

      Subsec. (a):

      Constitutionality of dangerous felony offender statutes has long been upheld. 173 C. 545, 548, 554, 557. Nothing in statute precludes state from offering probative evidence to clarify an official judgment of conviction in order to prove defendant a second offender. 194 C. 573, 574, 586-589. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 573, 586. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 692, 693, 695. No viable basis for challenge to statute on the grounds of vagueness. 195 C. 326, 329-333. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 326, 330. Cited. Id., 475, 476. Cited. 193 C. 273, 275, 282. Cited. 200 C. 350. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 453, 458. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdivs. (1) and (2)(B) cited. 202 C. 509, 511. Cited. 203 C. 81, 82. Cited. Id., 506, 509, 519-522. Cited. 206 C. 621, 622. Cited. 207 C. 276, 278. Cited. 210 C. 573, 579. Cited. 213 C. 97, 99. Cited. 216 C. 220, 221. Cited. 224 C. 445, 447. Cited. 232 C. 455, 459. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.

      Cited. 17 CA 490, 492. Cited. 19 CA 571, 572. Cited. 29 CA 274, 276. Cited. 37 CA 672, 674. Cited. Id., 733, 735. Cited. 39 CA 82, 86. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 131. Jury improperly found defendant to be a persistent dangerous felony offender because his conviction of attempted assault in the first degree is not one of the qualifying felonies enumerated in subsection. 51 CA 171.

      Cited. 43 CS 77, 82.

      Subsec. (b):

      Presentence report used to prove that defendant was not persistent felony offender under this subsection. 169 C. 263- 266. Cited. 182 C. 176, 177. Failure to allege imprisonment under provisions of the statute not considered reversible error where proof of imprisonment was established during trial and defendant failed to request complete statement of facts. 184 C. 215, 216. Cited. Id., 369, 370. Cited. 187 C. 264, 265, 278. Cited. 195 C. 326, 331. Cited. 198 C. 158, 160, 161, 166, 167. Cited. 224 C. 397, 398, 400, 418, 419. Cited. 227 C. 711, 714. Cited. Id., 751, 753. Cited. 232 C. 455, 459. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.

      Cited. 9 CA 133, 135. Cited. 10 CA 279, 280. Cited. 12 CA 1, 3, 29, 30. Cited. Id., 375, 376. Cited. 13 CA 438, 440. Cited. 20 CA 586, 587. Cited. 31 CA 140, 141. Cited. Id., 178, 180. Cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Cited. 35 CA 405, 407. Cited. 37 CA 733, 735. Cited. 39 CA 82, 86. Cited. Id., 789, 791. Cited. 45 CA 369.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 202 C. 369, 371. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.

      "By pleading nolo contendere to the charge of being a persistent larceny offender, defendant waived her right to appeal this issue." 4 CA 676, 677, 682. Cited. 14 CA 88, 90, 97, 100. Cited. 21 CA 331, 332. Cited. 37 CA 228, 229, 232.

      Subsec. (d):

      Cited. 195 C. 326, 329-333. Cited. 198 C. 158, 167. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Language of section and its legislative purpose require sequence of offense, conviction and punishment for each prior felony before enhanced penalty as a persistent offender attaches. 240 C. 317. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.

      Cited. 41 CA 391, 393, 404-406.

      Subsec. (e):

      Cited. 176 C. 270, 271. Cited. 194 C. 573, 587. Cited. 195 C. 326, 328, 329, 331. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.

      Subsec. (f):

      Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. 187 C. 264, 278. Cited. 200 C. 453, 458. Cited. 207 C. 276, 285. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Purpose is to allow sentencing court to impose a more severe sentence than would be allowed for the substantive offense. Subsection requires sentencing court to consider defendant's history and character and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct and whether extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest. There is no requirement that sentences imposed be strictly proportional to the nature of substantive offense or offenses of which defendant was convicted. Nature of substantive offense is only one factor to be considered by sentencing court. 254 C. 613.

      Cited. 19 CA 571, 572, 574.

      Subsec. (g):

      Cited. 224 C. 397, 400. Cited. 227 C. 751, 754. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.

      Cited. 12 CA 1, 29, 32. Cited. 37 CA 733, 735. Cited. 45 CA 369.

      Subsec. (h):

      Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.

      Cited. 21 CA 331-335, 338. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231, 232.

      Subsec. (i):

      Cited. 184 C. 215, 217. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.

      Sec. 53a-40a. Persistent offenders of crimes involving bigotry or bias. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of crimes involving bigotry or bias is a person who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l or section 53a-181b in effect prior to October 1, 2000.

      (b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving bigotry or bias, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that an increased penalty will best serve the public interest, the court shall: (1) In lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a if the crime is a felony, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony, or (2) in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-36 if the crime is a misdemeanor, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor, except that if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony as authorized by section 53a-35a.

      (P.A. 90-137, S. 2; P.A. 00-72, S. 10.)

      History: P.A. 00-72 amended Subsec. (a) to replace reference in Subdiv. (1) to "subsection (a) or (c) of section 53a-181b" with reference to Sec. "53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l" and to replace reference in Subdiv. (2) to "subsection (a) or (c) of section 53a-181b" with reference to "section 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l or section 53a-181b in effect prior to October 1, 2000" and amended Subsec. (b) to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality.

      Sec. 53a-40b. Additional term of imprisonment authorized for offense committed while on release. A person convicted of an offense committed while released pursuant to sections 54-63a to 54-63g, inclusive, or sections 54-64a to 54-64c, inclusive, other than a violation of section 53a-222, may be sentenced, in addition to the sentence prescribed for the offense to (1) a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years if the offense is a felony, or (2) a term of imprisonment of not more than one year if the offense is a misdemeanor.

      (P.A. 90-213, S. 54; P.A. 98-90, S. 2.)

      History: P.A. 98-90 excepted convictions under Sec. 53a-222 from provisions of section.

      Jury hearing not constitutionally required for enhanced sentence based on prior conviction; enhanced penalty provisions do apply to defendant who committed second crime while released on written promise to appear. 62 CA 34.

      Sec. 53a-40c. Psychological counseling required for person convicted of sexual assault of a minor. Any person convicted of a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a where the victim of the sexual assault was a person ten years of age or under shall, in addition to any fine or term of imprisonment imposed, be sentenced to undergo psychological counseling.

      (P.A. 93-340, S. 15.)

      Sec. 53a-40d. Persistent offenders of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order is a person who (1) stands convicted of assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening under section 53a-62, harassment under section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223, criminal violation of a restraining order under section 53a-223b or criminal trespass under section 53a-107 or 53a-108, and (2) has, within the five years preceding the commission of the present crime, been convicted of a capital felony, a class A felony, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86 or 53a-122, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a-153, or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216, assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening under section 53a-62, harassment under section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223, criminal violation of a restraining order under section 53a-223b, or criminal trespass under section 53a-107 or 53a-108 or has been released from incarceration with respect to such conviction, whichever is later.

      (b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that an increased penalty will best serve the public interest, the court shall, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-36 or section 53a-35a, as applicable, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section 53a-36 or section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor or felony, except that if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony, as authorized by section 53a-35a.

      (P.A. 95-193, S. 2; P.A. 02-127, S. 4.)

      History: P.A. 02-127 applied the provisions to criminal violation of a restraining order under Sec. 53a-223b and in Subsec. (b) added references to Sec. 53a-35a, specified "felony" in the provision concerning the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment authorized for the next more serious crime and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality.

      Sec. 53a-40e. Standing criminal restraining order. (a) If any person is convicted of a violation of section 53a-59, 53a-59a, 53a-60, 53a-60a, 53a-60b, 53a-60c, 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-181c, 53a-181d or 53a-181e, or of attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a, against a family or household member as defined in subdivision (2) of section 46b-38a, the court may, in addition to imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a, if the court is of the opinion that the history and character and the nature and circumstances of the criminal conduct of such offender indicate that a standing criminal restraining order will best serve the interest of the victim and the public, issue a standing criminal restraining order which shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown.

      (b) Such standing criminal restraining order may include but is not limited to enjoining the offender from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the victim; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking the victim; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the victim.

      (c) Every standing criminal restraining order of the court made in accordance with this section shall contain the following language: "This order shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown. In accordance with section 53a-223a, violation of a standing criminal restraining order issued by the court pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or both."

      (P.A. 96-228, S. 1; P.A. 98-15; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 41, 121; P.A. 99-186, S. 13.)

      History: (Revisor's note: In Subsec. (c) the reference in public act 96-228 to "section 1 of this act" was deemed by the Revisors to be a reference to section 2 of that act and therefore codified as "section 53a-110c"); P.A. 98-15 amended Subsec. (a) to add references to Secs. 53a-181c, 53a-181d and 53a-181e; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change in Subsec. (c), effective June 24, 1998; P.A. 99-186 amended Subsec.(a) to make provisions applicable to any person convicted "of attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a".

      See Sec. 51-5c re automated registry of protective orders.

      Imposition of a standing criminal restraining order after defendant began serving his sentence did not constitute punishment or affect defendant's sentence and therefore, trial court had jurisdiction to impose it. 269 C. 107.

      Order precluding defendant from having contact with his minor children is within scope of the statute. 81 CA 84.

      Sec. 53a-40f. Persistent operating while under the influence felony offender. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent operating while under the influence felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d and (2) has, prior to the commission of the present crime and within the preceding ten years, been convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection (a) of section 14-227a or been convicted in any other state of an offense the essential elements of which are substantially the same as section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection (a) of section 14-227a.

      (b) When any person has been found to be a persistent operating while under the influence felony offender, and the court is of the opinion that his history and character and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony.

      (P.A. 97-291, S. 1.)

      Sec. 53a-41. Fines for felonies. A fine for the conviction of a felony shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A felony, an amount not to exceed twenty thousand dollars; (2) for a class B felony, an amount not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars; (3) for a class C felony, an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars; (4) for a class D felony, an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars; (5) for an unclassified felony, an amount in accordance with the fine specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 41; P.A. 92-256, S. 1; 92-260, S. 19; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70.)

      History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A felony from ten to twenty thousand dollars, for a class B felony from ten to fifteen thousand dollars, and for a class C felony from five to ten thousand dollars; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (3) to replace "law" with "section of the general statutes"; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section.

      See Sec. 53a-35a re terms of imprisonment for felonies.

      See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.

      Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Failure of trial court to inform defendant of amount of fine not plain error. 65 CA 234.

      Subdiv. (2):

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 728.

      Sec. 53a-42. Fines for misdemeanors. A fine for the conviction of a misdemeanor shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars; (3) for a class C misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars; (4) for an unclassified misdemeanor, an amount in accordance with the fine specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 42; P.A. 92-256, S. 2; 92-260, S. 20; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70.)

      History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A misdemeanor from one to two thousand dollars; P.A. 92-260 replaced "law" with "section of the general statutes"; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section.

      See Sec. 53a-36 re terms of imprisonment for misdemeanors.

      See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.

      Cited. 178 C. 145, 153; 180 C. 557, 561. Cited. 217 C. 73, 90.

      Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 32 CA 656, 660; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345 et seq.

      Subdiv. (1):

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 722, 727.

      Sec. 53a-43. Fines for violations. A fine for a violation shall be fixed by the court in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars. In the case of a violation defined in any other section of the general statutes, if the amount of the fine is expressly specified in the section that defines the offense, the amount of the fine shall be fixed in accordance with such section.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 43.)

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.

      Sec. 53a-44. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain. If a person has gained money or property through the commission of any felony, misdemeanor or violation, upon conviction thereof the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense under section 53a-41, 53a-42 or 53a-43, may sentence the defendant to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of the offense. In such case the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the defendant's gain from the offense and, if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a finding, the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For purposes of this section, the term "gain" means the amount of money or the value of property derived.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 44; P.A. 92-260, S. 21.)

      History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in punctuation.

      Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.

      Sec. 53a-45. Murder: Penalty; waiver of jury trial; finding of lesser degree. (a) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 53a-35a unless it is a capital felony or murder under section 53a-54d.

      (b) If a person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a waives his right to a jury trial and elects to be tried by a court, the court shall be composed of three judges designated by the Chief Court Administrator or his designee, who shall name one such judge to preside over the trial. Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly.

      (c) The court or jury before which any person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a is tried may find such person guilty of homicide in a lesser degree than that charged.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 45; P.A. 73-137, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 13, 28; P.A. 82-298, S. 4; P.A. 83-210, S. 2, 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 22.)

      History: P.A. 73-137 added reference to capital felonies in Subsec. (a) and substituted reference to Sec. 53a-46a for reference to Sec. 53a-46, deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed person indicted for murder to plead guilty with consent of court and state's attorney in which case court would sentence him as for a Class A felony, relettering former Subsecs. (c) and (d) accordingly; P.A. 80-442 specified punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a and deleted reference to death sentenced under Sec. 53a-46a in Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 82-298 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that court shall be composed of three judges designated by chief court administrator, who shall also name one such judge to preside, where previously one judge was the judge presiding at the session and the other two were designated by the chief justice of the supreme court; P.A. 83-210 amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) by inserting "or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a"; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add exception for "murder under section 53a-54d", amended Subsec. (b) to replace provision that such judges or a majority of them "shall determine the question of guilt or innocence and shall, as provided in said section 53a-46a, render judgment and impose sentence" with "shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly", and amended Subsec. (c) to replace "him" with "such person".

      See annotations to part IV.

      Cited. 187 C. 6, 28.

      Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 201 C. 435, 438.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 180 C. 382, 404. Cited. 190 C. 639, 640. Cited. 198 C. 77, 90. Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 381.

      Subsec. (c):

      Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find a defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382, 399, 400, 402, 403, 407. Cited. 181 C. 187, 200; id., 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66, 71, 72. Cited. 187 C. 6, 28. Cited. 188 C. 542, 546. Cited. 190 C. 639, 652. Cited. 193 C. 695, 732. Cited. 195 C. 232, 243. Manslaughter is not lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421, 422, 427. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. Id., 368, 372. Cited. 206 C. 346, 359. Cited. 210 C. 78, 105. Cited. 212 C. 593, 607. Cited. 214 C. 57, 63. Cited. 225 C. 55, 65. Cited. 226 C. 237, 250. Cited. 231 C. 115, 140. Cited. 240 C. 727.

      Cited. 7 CA 180, 187. Cited. 17 CA 502, 521; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. 40 CA 151, 164.

      Cited. 42 CS 426, 429.

      Subsec. (d):

      Cited. 206 C. 346, 359.

      Sec. 53a-46. Sentencing proceedings; appeal. Section 53a-46 is repealed.

      (1969, P.A. 828, S. 46; 1972, P.A. 56, S. 1; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)

      Sec. 53a-46a. Imposition of sentence for capital felony. Hearing. Special verdict. Mitigating and aggravating factors. Factors barring death sentence. (a) A person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for a capital felony only if a hearing is held in accordance with the provisions of this section.

      (b) For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony, the judge or judges who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate hearing to determine the existence of any mitigating factor concerning the defendant's character, background and history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, and any aggravating factor set forth in subsection (i). Such hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates that none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists or that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists. Such hearing shall be conducted (1) before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled for the purpose of such hearing if (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; (B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before three judges as provided in subsection (b) of section 53a-45; or (C) if the jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged by the court for good cause, or (3) before the court, on motion of the defendant and with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.

      (c) In such hearing the court shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel all material contained in any presentence report which may have been prepared. No presentence information withheld from the defendant shall be considered in determining the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. Any information relevant to any mitigating factor may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials. The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. The burden of establishing any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be on the state. The burden of establishing any mitigating factor shall be on the defendant.

      (d) In determining whether a mitigating factor exists concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall first determine whether a particular factor concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and c