2006 Ohio Revised Code - 1301.02. (UCC 1-102) Purposes; rules of construction; variation by agreement.

§ 1301.02. (UCC 1-102) Purposes; rules of construction; variation by agreement.
 

(A)  Chapters 1301., 1302., 1303., 1304, 1305., 1307., 1308., 1309., and 1310. of the Revised Code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote their underlying purposes and policies. 

(B)  Underlying purposes and policies of those chapters are the following: 

(1) To simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; 

(2) To permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; 

(3) To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 

(C)  The effect of the provisions of Chapters 1301., 1302., 1303., 1304., 1305., 1307., 1308., 1309., and 1310. of the Revised Code may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in those chapters and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by those chapters may not be disclaimed by agreement, but the parties by agreement may determine the standards by which the performance of those obligations is to be measured if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable. 

(D)  The presence in certain provisions of those chapters of the words "unless otherwise agreed" or words of similar import does not imply that the effect of other provisions may not be varied by agreement under division (C) of this section. 
 

HISTORY: 129 v S 5 (Eff 7-1-62); 144 v H 693 (Eff 11-6-92); 146 v S 155. Eff 8-15-96.
 

Not analogous to former RC § 1301.02 (RS § 3178b; 95 v 196; GC § 8297; Bureau of Code Revision, 10-1-53), repealed 129 v S 5, § 2, eff 7-1-62; but see former RC §§ 1315.75, 1323.58, 1339.12, 1323.04, 4965.03, 4965.41.

 

Official Comment

1. Subsections (1) and (2) are intended to make it clear that: 

This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices. However, the proper construction of the Act requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its reason. 

Courts have been careful to keep broad acts from being hampered in their effects by later acts of limited scope. Pacific Wool Growers v Draper & Co., 158 Or. 1, 73 P.2d 1391 (1937), and compare Section 1-104.They have recognized the policies embodied in an act as applicable in reason to subject-matter which was not expressly included in the language of the act, Commercial Nat. Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520, 36 S.Ct. 194, 60 L.Ed. 417 (1916) (bona fide purchase policy of Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act extended to case not covered but of equivalent nature). They have done the same where reason and policy so required, even where the subject-matter had been intentionally excluded from the act in general. Agar v. Ordo, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934) (Uniform Sales Act change in seller's remedies applied to contract for sale of choses in action even though the general coverage of that Act was intentionally limited to goods "other than things in action.") They have implemented a statutory policy with liberal and useful remedies not provided in the statutory text. They have disregarded a statutory limitation of remedy where the reason of the limitation did not apply. Fiterman v. J. N. Johnson & Co., 156 Minn. 201, 194 N.W. 399 (1923) (requirement of return of the goods as a condition to rescission for breach of warranty; also, partial rescission allowed). Nothing in this Act stands in the way of the continuance of such action by the courts. 

The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved. 

2. Subsection (3) states affirmatively at the outset that freedom of contract is a principle of the Code: "the effect" of its provisions may be varied by "agreement." The meaning of the statute itself must be found in its text, including its definitions, and in appropriate extrinsic aids; it cannot be varied by agreement. But the Code seeks to avoid the type of interference with evolutionary growth found in Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926). Thus private parties cannot make an instrument negotiable within the meaning of Article [Chapter] 3 except as provided in Section 3-104; nor can they change the meaning of such terms as "bona fide purchaser," "holder in due course," or "due negotiation," as used in this Act. But an agreement can change the legal consequences which would otherwise flow from the provisions of the Act. "Agreement" here includes the effect given to course of dealings, usage of trade and course of performance by Sections 1-201, 1-205 and 2-208; the effect of an agreement on the rights of third parties is left to specific provisions of this Act and to supplementary principles applicable under the next section. The rights of third parties under Section 9-301 when a security interest is unperfected, for example, cannot be destroyed by a clause in the security agreement. 

This principle of freedom of contract is subject to specific exceptions found elsewhere in the Act and to the general exception stated here. The specific exceptions vary in explicitness: the statute of frauds found in Section 2-201, for example, does not explicitly preclude oral waiver of the requirement of a writing, but a fair reading denies enforcement to such a waiver as part of the "contract" made unenforceable; Section 9-501(3), on the other hand, is quite explicit. Under the exception for "the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act," provisions of the Act prescribing such obligations are not to be disclaimed. However, the section also recognizes the prevailing practice of having agreements set forth standards by which due diligence is measured and explicitly provides that, in the absence of a showing that the standards manifestly are unreasonable, the agreement controls. In this connection, Section 1-205 incorporating into the agreement prior course of dealing and usages of trade is of particular importance. 

3. Subsection (4) is intended to make it clear that, as a matter of drafting, words such as "unless otherwise agreed" have been used to avoid controversy as to whether the subject matter of a particular section does or does not fall within the exceptions to subsection (3), but absence of such words contains no negative implication since under subsection (3) the general and residual rule is that the effect of all provisions of the Act may be varied by agreement. 

4. Subsection (5) is modelled on 1 U.S.C. Section 1 and New York General Construction Law Sections 22 and 35.