2005 Idaho Code - 19-2515 — SENTENCE IN CAPITAL CASES -- SPECIAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING -- STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES -- SPECIAL VERDICT OR WRITTEN FINDINGS

                                  TITLE  19
                              CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
                                  CHAPTER 25
                                   JUDGMENT
    19-2515.  SENTENCE IN CAPITAL CASES -- SPECIAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING --
STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES -- SPECIAL VERDICT OR WRITTEN FINDINGS.
(1) Except as provided in section 19-2515A, Idaho Code, a person convicted of
murder in the first degree shall be liable for the imposition of the penalty
of death if such person killed, intended a killing, or acted with reckless
indifference to human life, irrespective of whether such person directly
committed the acts that caused death.
    (2)  Where a person is sentenced to serve a term in the penitentiary,
after conviction of a crime which falls within the provisions of section
20-223, Idaho Code, except in cases where the court retains jurisdiction, the
comments and arguments of the counsel for the state and the defendant relative
to the sentencing and the comments of the judge relative to the sentencing
shall be recorded. If the comments are recorded electronically, they need not
be transcribed. Otherwise, they shall be transcribed by the court reporter.
    (3)  Where a person is convicted of an offense which may be punishable by
death, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless:
    (a)  A notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed and served as
    provided in section 18-4004A, Idaho Code; and
    (b)  The jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds beyond a reasonable
    doubt at least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance. Where a
    statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant shall be
    sentenced to death unless mitigating circumstances which may be presented
    are found to be sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be
    unjust. The jury shall not direct imposition of a sentence of death unless
    it unanimously finds at least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance
    and unanimously determines that the penalty of death should be imposed.
    (4)  Notwithstanding any court rule to the contrary, when a defendant is
adjudicated guilty of murder in the first degree, whether by acceptance of a
plea of guilty, by verdict of a jury, or by decision of the trial court
sitting without a jury, no presentence investigation shall be conducted;
provided however, that if a special sentencing proceeding is not held or if a
special sentencing proceeding is held but no statutory aggravating
circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the court may order
that a presentence investigation be conducted.
    (5)  (a) If a person is adjudicated guilty of murder in the first degree,
    whether by acceptance of a plea of guilty, by verdict of a jury, or by
    decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, and a notice of intent
    to seek the death penalty was filed and served as provided in section
    18-4004A, Idaho Code, a special sentencing proceeding shall be held
    promptly for the purpose of hearing all relevant evidence and arguments of
    counsel in aggravation and mitigation of the offense. Information
    concerning the victim  and the impact that the death of the victim has had
    on the victim's family is relevant and admissible. Such information shall
    be designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human
    being and the resultant loss to the community by the victim's death.
    Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant and the
    appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as part of any victim impact
    information. The special sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a
    jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant with the consent of the
    prosecuting attorney.
    (b)  If the defendant's guilt was determined by a jury verdict, the same
    jury shall hear the special sentencing proceeding; provided however, that
    if it is impracticable to reconvene the same jury to hear the special
    sentencing proceeding due to an insufficient number of jurors, the trial
    court may dismiss that jury and convene a new jury of twelve (12) persons,
    plus alternate jurors as the trial court deems necessary pursuant to
    section 19-1904, Idaho Code.
    (c)  If the defendant's guilt was determined by a plea of guilty or by a
    decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, or if a retrial of the
    special sentencing proceeding is necessary for any reason including, but
    not limited to, a mistrial in a previous special sentencing proceeding or
    as a consequence of a remand from an appellate court, the trial court
    shall impanel a jury of twelve (12) persons, plus alternate jurors as the
    trial court deems necessary pursuant to section 19-1904, Idaho Code,
    unless such jury is waived.
    (d)  If a special sentencing proceeding is conducted before a newly
    impaneled jury pursuant to the provisions of subsection (5)(b) or (5)(c)
    of this section, the state and the defense may present evidence to inform
    the jury of the nature and circumstances of the murder for which the
    defendant was convicted. The newly impaneled jury shall be instructed that
    the defendant has previously been found guilty of first-degree murder and
    that the jury's purpose is limited to making findings relevant for
    sentencing.
    (6)  At the special sentencing proceeding, the state and the defendant
shall be entitled to present all relevant evidence in aggravation and
mitigation. Disclosure of evidence to be relied on in the sentencing
proceeding shall be made in accordance with Idaho criminal rule 16. Evidence
admitted at trial shall be considered and need not be repeated at the
sentencing hearing.
    (7)  The jury shall be informed as follows:
    (a)  If the jury finds that a statutory aggravating circumstance exists
    and no mitigating circumstances exist which would make the imposition of
    the death penalty unjust, the defendant will be sentenced to death by the
    court.
    (b)  If the jury finds the existence of a statutory aggravating
    circumstance but finds that the existence of mitigating circumstances
    makes the imposition of the death penalty unjust or the jury cannot
    unanimously agree on whether the existence of mitigating circumstances
    makes the imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant will be
    sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of
    parole; and
    (c)  If the jury does not find the existence of a statutory aggravating
    circumstance or if the jury cannot unanimously agree on the existence of a
    statutory aggravating circumstance, the defendant will be sentenced by the
    court to a term of life imprisonment with a fixed term of not less than
    ten (10) years.
    (8)  Upon the conclusion of the evidence and arguments in mitigation and
aggravation:
    (a)  With regard to each statutory aggravating circumstance alleged by the
    state, the jury shall return a special verdict stating:
         (i)   Whether the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven
         beyond a reasonable doubt; and
         (ii)  If the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven
         beyond a reasonable doubt, whether all mitigating circumstances, when
         weighed against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently
         compelling that the death penalty would be unjust.
    (b)  If a jury has been waived, the court shall:
         (i)   Make written findings setting forth any statutory aggravating
         circumstance found beyond a reasonable doubt;
         (ii)  Set forth in writing any mitigating circumstances considered;
         and
         (iii) Upon weighing all mitigating circumstances against each
         statutory aggravating circumstance separately, determine whether
         mitigating circumstances are found to be sufficiently compelling that
         the death penalty would be unjust and detail in writing its reasons
         for so finding.
    (9)  The following are statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one
(1) of which must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a
sentence of death can be imposed:
    (a)  The defendant was previously convicted of another murder.
    (b)  At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed
    another murder.
    (c)  The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many
    persons.
    (d)  The murder was committed for remuneration or the promise of
    remuneration or the defendant employed another to commit the murder for
    remuneration or the promise of remuneration.
    (e)  The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting
    exceptional depravity.
    (f)  By the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the
    defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life.
    (g)  The murder was committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
    perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or mayhem and the
    defendant killed, intended a killing, or acted with reckless indifference
    to human life.
    (h)  The murder was committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
    perpetrate, an infamous crime against nature, lewd and lascivious conduct
    with a minor, sexual abuse of a child under sixteen (16) years of age,
    ritualized abuse of a child, sexual exploitation of a child, sexual
    battery of a minor child sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age, or
    forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object, and the defendant
    killed, intended a killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human
    life.
    (i)  The defendant, by his conduct, whether such conduct was before,
    during or after the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a
    propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing
    threat to society.
    (j)  The murder was committed against a former or present peace officer,
    executive officer, officer of the court, judicial officer or prosecuting
    attorney because of the exercise of official duty or because of the
    victim's former or present official status.
    (k)  The murder was committed against a witness or potential witness in a
    criminal or civil legal proceeding because of such proceeding.