2005 Connecticut Code - Sec. 53a-126b. Criminal trover in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-126b. Criminal trover in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of criminal trover in the second degree when, knowing that he is
not licensed or privileged to do so, he uses the personal property of another without the
consent of such owner, and such use results in damage to or diminishes the value of
such property or subjects such owner to economic loss, fine or other penalty.
(b) Criminal trover in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 94-114, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-127. Diversion from state of benefit of labor of employees: Class A
misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of diversion from the state of benefit of labor of
employees when he fraudulently procures for himself or another, from any employee
of the state or any department thereof, the benefit of any labor which the state or any
department thereof is entitled to receive from such employee during his hours of employment or fraudulently aids or assists in procuring or attempting to procure the benefit of
any such labor.
(b) Diversion from the state of benefit of labor of employees is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 129; P.A. 92-260, S. 53.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 194 C. 223.
Sec. 53a-127a. Unlawful entry into coin machine; possession of key to enter:
Class A misdemeanor. (a) No person shall, with intent to commit larceny: (1) Enter,
or force an entrance into, alter or insert any part of an instrument into any coin machine,
as defined in section 53a-143; or (2) knowingly possess a key or device, or a drawing,
print or mold thereof, adapted and designed to open or break into any such coin machine.
(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
(1971, P.A. 753; P.A. 84-546, S. 126, 173; P.A. 92-260, S. 54.)
History: P.A. 84-546 made technical grammar change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a).
Sec. 53a-127b. Fraudulent use of an automated teller machine: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of fraudulent use of an automated teller machine when,
with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or herself
or a third person, such person knowingly uses in a fraudulent manner an automated
teller machine for the purpose of obtaining property. For the purposes of this section,
"automated teller machine" means an unmanned device at which banking transactions
including, without limitation, deposits, withdrawals, advances, payments and transfers
may be conducted, and includes, without limitation, a satellite device and point of sale
terminal as defined in section 36a-2.
(b) In any prosecution under this section, the crime shall be deemed to have been
committed in the town in which the automated teller machine was located.
(c) Fraudulent use of an automated teller machine is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 83-417, S. 2; P.A. 84-301, S. 2; P.A. 03-278, S. 106.)
History: P.A. 84-301 replaced "automatic" with "automated" and added definition of "automated teller machine"; P.A.
03-278 made technical changes in Subsec. (a), effective July 9, 2003.
See Sec. 54-1d(b) re consolidation of offenses.
Sec. 53a-127c. Theft of electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or
economic gain: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of theft of electric, gas, water,
steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or economic gain when he: (1) Engages in the business for profit
or economic gain of tampering or making connection with the equipment of a supplier
of an electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications
or community antenna television service which is not metered or otherwise measured,
in whole or in part, without the consent of such supplier, for the purpose of supplying
such service on one or more occasions to two or more households, or (2) engages in the
business for profit or economic gain of offering for sale to any person other than the
supplier of an electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service which is not metered or otherwise
measured, in whole or in part, any decoder, descrambler or other device, the principal
function of which defeats the electronic signal encryption jamming or individually addressed switching imposed by such supplier for the purpose of restricting the delivery
of such service to persons who pay for such service, or (3) without the consent of the
supplier of such service and with intent to defraud such supplier, engages in the business
for profit or economic gain of connecting or disconnecting the meters, pipes, cables,
conduits, conductors or attachments of such supplier or in any other manner tampers or
connects with such meters, pipes, cables, conduits, conductors or attachments. There
shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is engaged in the business for profit or
economic gain of offering for sale a decoder, descrambler or other device, equipment
or component in violation of subdivision (2) of this subsection if such person has five
or more decoders, descramblers or other devices in his possession or under his control.
(b) Theft of electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or economic gain is a class
D felony.
(P.A. 84-496; P.A. 89-281, S. 2; P.A. 94-215, S. 1; P.A. 95-246, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 89-281 added theft of cable service and made provisions applicable to one engaging in business for
economic gain in Subsecs. (a) and (b); P.A. 94-215 substituted "electric, gas, water, steam" for "utility" where appearing
and amended Subsec. (a) to add "or other device" in Subdiv. (2), add Subdiv. (3) re connecting, disconnecting or tampering
with the meters, pipes, cables, conduits, conductors or attachments of a supplier without the consent of such supplier and
with intent to defraud such supplier, and add provision making it a rebuttable presumption that a person is engaged in the
business for profit or economic gain of offering for sale a decoder, descrambler or other device if he has five or more
decoders, descramblers or other devices in his possession or under his control; P.A. 95-246 included theft of "telecommunications" and "wireless radio communications" service and added "equipment or component" in provision re a rebuttable
presumption.
See Sec. 52-570f re civil action and relief authorized for theft of service.
Sec. 53a-127d. Cheating: Class D felony or class B misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of cheating when, in the course of playing or conducting any lawful gambling
game, he: (1) Knowingly uses an altered or counterfeit chip, token, tile, pull tab, wagering slip or check or knowingly marks, loads or tampers with any cards or dice or substitutes for cards or dice provided by the operator of a lawfully operated game of chance
any cards or dice that have been marked, loaded or tampered with; or (2) knowingly
uses any device, instrument, article or substance with intent to cheat or defraud or to
alter or affect the otherwise random results of any lawfully operated game of chance;
or (3) intentionally places, increases or attempts to increase a winning wager or decreases
or attempts to decrease a losing wager after that period of time during which the rules
of a lawfully operated game of chance permit a wager to be placed or after the results
of the game in which the wager has been placed become known.
(b) Cheating is a class D felony, except that a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 98-193, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-127e. Possession of a cheating device: Class D felony. (a) A person is
guilty of possession of a cheating device when, while on premises where lawful gambling is to be conducted, such person knowingly possesses or has under such person's
control: (1) Any altered or counterfeit chip, token, tile, pull tab, wagering slip or check
or any cards or dice that have been marked, loaded or tampered with; or (2) any device,
instrument or other thing adapted, designed or commonly used to facilitate the alteration
of the normal play or operation of a piece of gaming equipment or to facilitate the
unauthorized removal of any money or other contents from any gaming equipment; or
(3) any other device, instrument or thing which, under the circumstances in which it is
used or possessed, manifests an intent that it be used by the actor or another person to
alter the normal play or operation of a lawfully operated game of chance or to commit
cheating as provided in section 53a-127d or larceny as provided in section 53a-119.
(b) Possession of a cheating device is a class D felony.
(P.A. 98-193, S. 2; P.A. 01-84, S. 7, 26.)
History: P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality and replace in
Subdiv. (2) "adopted" with "adapted", effective July 1, 2001.
Sec. 53a-127f. Possession of a shoplifting device: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A
person is guilty of possession of a shoplifting device when such person has in such
person's possession any device, instrument or other thing specifically designed or
adapted to advance or facilitate the offense of larceny by shoplifting, as defined in
subdivision (9) of section 53a-119, by defeating any antitheft or inventory control device, under circumstances manifesting an intent to use the same in the commission of
larceny by shoplifting.
(b) Possession of a shoplifting device is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 00-9.)
Sec. 53a-128. Issuing a bad check. Penalties. (a) A person is guilty of issuing a
bad check when: (1) As a drawer or representative drawer, he issues a check knowing
that he or his principal, as the case may be, does not then have sufficient funds with the
drawee to cover it, and (A) he intends or believes at the time of issuance that payment
will be refused by the drawee upon presentation, and (B) payment is refused by the
drawee upon presentation; or (2) he passes a check knowing that the drawer thereof
does not then have sufficient funds with the drawee to cover it, and (A) he intends or
believes at the time the check is passed that payment will be refused by the drawee upon
presentation, and (B) payment is refused by the drawee upon presentation.
(b) For the purposes of this section, an issuer is presumed to know that the check
or order, other than a postdated check or order, would not be paid, if: (1) The issuer had
no account with the drawee at the time the check or order was issued; or (2) payment
was refused by the drawee for insufficient funds upon presentation within thirty days
after issue and the issuer failed to make good within eight days after receiving notice
of such refusal. For the purposes of this subsection, an issuer is presumed to have received notice of such refusal if the drawee or payee provides proof of mailing such
notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the issuer at his last known address.
(c) Issuing a bad check is: (1) A class D felony if the amount of the check was more
than one thousand dollars; (2) a class A misdemeanor if the amount of the check was
more than five hundred dollars but not more than one thousand dollars; (3) a class B
misdemeanor if the amount of the check was more than two hundred fifty dollars but
not more than five hundred dollars; or (4) a class C misdemeanor if the amount of the
check was two hundred fifty dollars or less.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 130; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 28; P.A. 80-109; P.A. 81-225; P.A. 83-137.)
History: 1971 act removed former Subsec. (a) containing applicable definitions, but see Sec. 53a-118(a); P.A. 80-109
amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re presumption that issuer has received notice of drawee's refusal to pay; P.A. 81-225 included proof of mailing by payee as acceptable in presuming that issuer has received notice; P.A. 83-137 amended
Subsec. (c) to reclassify the offense from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony or a class A, B or C misdemeanor
depending upon the amount of the check.
Cited. 202 C. 443, 444.
Cited. 20 CA 811.
Cited. 34 CS 584. Ability of court to order personal restitution in amount of bad corporate check when there is no
finding as to the ability of the defendant to pay or as to the extent of his gain. Restitution properly ordered against individual
defendant issuer of bad corporate check. 35 CS 536-538, 540.
Sec. 53a-128a. Credit card crimes. Definitions. As used in this section and sections 53a-128b to 53a-128i, inclusive:
(a) "Cardholder" or "holder of a card" means the person named on the face of a
credit card to whom or for whose benefit the credit card is issued by an issuer;
(b) "Credit card" means any instrument or device, whether known as a credit card,
as a credit plate, or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for the
use of the cardholder in obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value on
credit;
(c) "Expired credit card" means a credit card which is no longer valid because the
term shown on it has elapsed;
(d) "Issuer" means the person which issues a credit card, or its agent duly authorized
for that purpose;
(e) "Participating party" means any person or any duly authorized agent of such
person, which is obligated by contract to acquire from another person providing money,
goods, services or anything else of value, a sales slip, sales draft or instrument for the
payment of money, evidencing a credit card transaction, and from whom, directly or
indirectly, the issuer is obligated by contract to acquire such sales slip, sales draft, instrument for the payment of money and the like;
(f) "Receives" or "receiving" means acquiring possession, custody or control;
(g) "Revoked credit card" means a credit card which is no longer valid because
permission to use it has been suspended or terminated by the issuer.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 29; P.A. 92-260, S. 55.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change.
See Sec. 54-1d(b) re consolidation of offenses.
Subsec. (b):
A merchant account identification card and a telephone card are within meaning of "credit card". 246 C. 402.
Sec. 53a-128b. False statement to procure issuance of credit card. Any person
who makes or causes to be made, either directly or indirectly, any false statement in
writing, knowing it to be false and with intent that it be relied on, respecting his identity
or that of any other person or his financial condition or that of any other person, for the
purpose of procuring the issuance of a credit card, violates this section and is subject
to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 30.)
Sec. 53a-128c. Credit card theft. Illegal transfer. Fraud. Forgery. (a) Any person who takes a credit card from the person, possession, custody or control of another
without the consent of the cardholder or of the issuer or who, with knowledge that it
has been so taken, receives the credit card with intent to use it or to sell it, or to transfer
it to any person other than the issuer or the cardholder is guilty of credit card theft and
is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i. Taking a credit
card without consent includes obtaining it by conduct defined or known as statutory
larceny, common law larceny by trespassory taking, common law larceny by trick, embezzlement, or obtaining property by false pretense, false promise or extortion.
(b) Any person who receives a credit card that he knows to have been lost, mislaid,
or delivered under a mistake as to the identity or address of the cardholder, and who
retains possession, custody or control thereof with intent to use it or to sell it or to transfer
it to any person other than the issuer or the cardholder, is guilty of credit card theft and
is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(c) Any person other than the issuer who sells a credit card or any person who buys
a credit card from a person other than the issuer violates this subsection and is subject
to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(d) Any person who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, or a
person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person,
obtains control over a credit card as security for debt violates this subsection and is
subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(e) Any person, other than the issuer, who, during any twelve-month period, receives credit cards issued in the names of two or more persons which he has reason to
know were taken or retained under circumstances which constitute credit card theft or
a violation of section 53a-128b or subsection (c) or (d) of this section violates this
subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i.
(f) Any person who, with intent to defraud a purported issuer, a participating party,
or a person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other
person, falsely makes or falsely embosses a purported credit card or utters such a credit
card is guilty of credit card forgery and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection
(b) of section 53a-128i. A person "falsely makes" a credit card when he makes or draws,
in whole or in part, a device or instrument which purports to be the credit card of a
named issuer but which is not such a credit card because the issuer did not authorize
the making or drawing, or when such person so alters a credit card which was validly
issued. A person "falsely embosses" a credit card when, without the authorization of
the named issuer, he completes a credit card by adding any of the matter, other than the
signature of the cardholder, which an issuer requires to appear on the credit card before
it can be used by a cardholder.
(g) Any person other than the cardholder or any person authorized by him who,
with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, or a person providing money,
goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, signs a credit card, violates
this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section
53a-128i.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 31.)
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 37 CS 527, 528.
Sec. 53a-128d. Illegal use of credit card. Presumption of knowledge of revocation. Any person who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, or a person
providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, (1)
uses for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value a
credit card obtained or retained in violation of section 53a-128b or a credit card which
he knows is forged, expired or revoked, or (2) obtains money, goods, services or anything
else of value by representing without the consent of the cardholder that he is the holder
of a specified card or by representing that he is the holder of a card and such card has
not in fact been issued, or (3) uses a credit card obtained or retained in violation of
section 53a-128c or a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or revoked, as
authority or identification to cash or to attempt to cash or otherwise to negotiate or
transfer or to attempt to negotiate or transfer any check or other order for the payment
of money, whether or not negotiable, if such negotiation or transfer or attempt to negotiate or transfer would constitute a violation of section 53a-128 violates this subsection
and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i, if the value
of all money, goods, services and other things of value obtained in violation of this
subsection does not exceed five hundred dollars in any six-month period; and is subject
to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i, if such value does exceed
five hundred dollars in any such six-month period. Knowledge of revocation shall be
presumed to have been received by a cardholder four days after it has been mailed to
him, at the address set forth on the credit card or at his last-known address, by registered
or certified mail, return receipt requested, and, if, the address is more than five hundred
miles from the place of mailing, by air mail. If the address is located outside the United
States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone or Canada, notice shall be presumed to have been received ten days after mailing by registered or certified mail.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 32.)
Cited. 204 C. 441, 444.
Review of legislative history of credit card crimes reveals no purpose or intent that enactment of the more specific
crime of illegal credit card use precludes state from charging defendant with the more general crime of larceny. 75 CA 756.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 37 CS 527, 528.
Sec. 53a-128e. Illegal furnishing of money, goods or services on credit card.
(a) Any person who is authorized by an issuer or a participating party to furnish money,
goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by the cardholder, or any agent or employee of such person, who, with intent to defraud the issuer,
or participating party, the cardholder, or any other person furnishes money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card obtained or retained
in violation of section 53a-128c or a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or
revoked, violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection
(a) of section 53a-128i, if the value of all money, goods, services and other things of
value furnished in violation of this subsection does not exceed five hundred dollars in
any six-month period; and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section
53a-128i if such value does exceed five hundred dollars in any such six-month period.
(b) Any person who is authorized by an issuer or a participating party to furnish
money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by
the cardholder, or any agent or employee of such person, who, with intent to defraud
the issuer, a participating party, the cardholder, or any other person fails to furnish
money, goods, services or anything else of value which he represents in writing to the
issuer or participating party that he has furnished violates this subsection and is subject
to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i, if the difference between
the value of all money, goods, services and anything else of value actually furnished
and the value represented to the issuer or participating party to have been furnished does
not exceed five hundred dollars in any six-month period; and is subject to the penalties
set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i if such difference does exceed five hundred
dollars in any such six-month period.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 33.)
Sec. 53a-128f. Unlawful completion or reproduction of credit card. Any person, other than the cardholder, having under his possession, custody or control two or
more incomplete credit cards, or possessing a purported distinctive element of a credit
card, with intent to complete such incomplete credit cards or to utilize such purported
distinctive element in the production or reproduction of any credit card, without the
consent of the issuer, or a person having under his possession, custody or control, with
knowledge of its character, a distinctive element of any credit card or any machinery,
plates or any contrivance designed to produce or reproduce instruments purporting to
be the credit cards of an issuer, or of any issuer in a group of issuers utilizing a common
distinctive element or elements in credit cards issued by all members of such group,
who has not consented to the production or reproduction of such cards, violates this
section and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i. A
credit card is "incomplete" if part of the matter other than the signature of the cardholder,
which an issuer, or any issuer in a group of issuers utilizing a common distinctive element
or elements in credit cards issued by all members of such group, requires to appear on
the credit card, before it can be used by a cardholder, has not yet been stamped, embossed,
imprinted or written on it. A "distinctive element" of a credit card is any material or
component used in the fabrication of credit cards, which, by virtue of such element's
chemical or physical composition, color or design, is unique to the credit cards issued
by a particular issuer or group of issuers utilizing a common distinctive element or
elements in credit cards issued by all members of such group.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 34; P.A. 92-260, S. 56.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change.
Sec. 53a-128g. Receipt of money, goods or services obtained by illegal use of
credit card. Any person who receives money, goods, services or anything else of value
obtained in violation of section 53a-128d, knowing or believing the same to have been
so obtained, violates this section and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection
(a) of section 53a-128i. Any person who obtains at a discount price a ticket issued by
an airline, railroad, steamship or other transportation company which was acquired in
violation of section 53a-128d without reasonable inquiry to ascertain that the person
from whom it was obtained had a legal right to possess it shall be presumed to know
that such ticket was acquired under circumstances constituting a violation of said section.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 35.)
Sec. 53a-128h. Certain defenses denied. In any prosecution for violation of sections 53a-128a to 53a-128i, inclusive, the state is not required to establish and it is no
defense: (1) That a person other than the defendant who violated said sections has not
been convicted, apprehended or identified; or (2) that some of the acts constituting the
violation did not occur in this state or were not a violation or elements of a violation
where they did occur.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 36.)
Sec. 53a-128i. Penalties for credit card crimes. (a) Any person who is subject
to the penalties of this subsection shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) Any person who is subject to the penalties of this subsection shall be guilty of
a class D felony.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 37.)
Sec. 53a-129. Misapplication of property: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of misapplication of property when, knowingly possessing personal property
of another pursuant to an agreement that the same will be returned to the owner at a
future time, he loans, leases, pledges, pawns or otherwise encumbers such property
without the consent of the owner thereof in such manner as to create a risk that the owner
will not be able to recover it or will suffer pecuniary loss.
(b) In any prosecution under this section, it shall be a defense that, at the time the
prosecution was commenced, (1) the defendant had recovered possession of the property, unencumbered as a result of the unlawful disposition, and (2) the owner had suffered
no material economic loss as a result of the unlawful disposition.
(c) Misapplication of property is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 131.)
Cited. 180 C. 662, 679. Cited. 194 C. 223.
Sec. 53a-129a. Identity theft defined. (a) A person commits identity theft when
such person intentionally obtains personal identifying information of another person
without the authorization of such other person and uses that information to obtain or
attempt to obtain, money, credit, goods, services, property or medical information in
the name of such other person without the consent of such other person.
(b) As used in this section, "personal identifying information" means any name,
number or other information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other
information, to identify a specific individual including, but not limited to, such individual's name, date of birth, mother's maiden name, motor vehicle operator's license number, Social Security number, employee identification number, employer or taxpayer
identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, health
insurance identification number, demand deposit account number, savings account number, credit card number, debit card number or unique biometric data such as fingerprint,
voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation.
(P.A. 99-99; P.A. 03-156, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 03-156 revised section to replace offense of identity theft with definition of identity theft by amending
Subsec. (a) to replace "A person is guilty of identity theft when" with "A person commits identity theft when", delete
requirement that the use of such information be "for any unlawful purpose" and include "money" and "property" among
items the person obtains or attempts to obtain, by designating definition of "personal identifying information" as new
Subsec. (b) and amending said definition to add provision that such information means "any name, number or other
information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual", include
such individual's name, date of birth, employer or taxpayer identification number, alien registration number, government
passport number, health insurance identification number, debit card number or unique biometric data such as fingerprint,
voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation and replace "demand deposit number" with "demand
deposit account number" and by deleting former Subsec. (b) classifying identity theft as a class D felony.
Sec. 53a-129b. Identity theft in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is
guilty of identity theft in the first degree when such person commits identity theft, as
defined in section 53a-129a, and the value of the money, credit, goods, services or
property obtained exceeds ten thousand dollars.
(b) Identity theft in the first degree is a class B felony.
(P.A. 03-156, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-129c. Identity theft in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person
is guilty of identity theft in the second degree when such person commits identity theft,
as defined in section 53a-129a, and the value of the money, credit, goods, services or
property obtained exceeds five thousand dollars.
(b) Identity theft in the second degree is a class C felony.
(P.A. 03-156, S. 3.)
Sec. 53a-129d. Identity theft in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person
is guilty of identity theft in the third degree when such person commits identity theft,
as defined in section 53a-129a.
(b) Identity theft in the third degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 03-156, S. 4.)
Sec. 53a-129e. Trafficking in personal identifying information: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of trafficking in personal identifying information when such
person sells, gives or otherwise transfers personal identifying information, as defined
in section 53a-129a, of another person to a third person knowing that such information
has been obtained without the authorization of such other person and that such third
person intends to use such information for an unlawful purpose.
(b) Trafficking in personal identifying information is a class D felony.
(P.A. 03-156, S. 5.)
Sec. 53a-130. Criminal impersonation: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is
guilty of criminal impersonation when he: (1) Impersonates another and does an act in
such assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another;
or (2) pretends to be a representative of some person or organization and does an act in
such pretended capacity with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another;
or (3) pretends to be a public servant other than a sworn member of an organized local
police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety,
or wears or displays without authority any uniform, badge or shield by which such
public servant is lawfully distinguished, with intent to induce another to submit to such
pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense.
(b) Criminal impersonation is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 132; P.A. 97-123, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 97-123 amended Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a) to exclude from the offense a person pretending to be "a sworn
member of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety"
and include the wearing or display of a "shield".
Cited. 194 C. 213-215. Cited. Id., 233, 234. Cited. 207 C. 109, 110. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. 225 C. 650, 652.
Held not to be unconstitutionally vague. 2 CA 204, 209. Cited. 18 CA 694, 695. Cited. 32 CA 724, 726, 727. Cited. 40
CA 643, 667, 671. Does not require use of an official or real badge because statute's goal is to prohibit criminal impersonation
with intent of inducing another to submit to authority that he or she does not possess. 66 CA 819.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 194 C. 213, 220. Subdiv. (1): Statute as written does not prohibit giving a false name. Id., 213, 221, 222. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 233, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 146, 148. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 431,
433; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 502, 504.
Cited. 2 CA 204, 205, 209. Cited. 32 CA 724, 728. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 339, 340; judgment reversed in part, see
232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq.
Cited. 37 CA 589, 594. Subdiv. (3) cited. 40 CA 643, 645, 665, 669-671. Subdiv. (3) cited. 45 CA 303. Statute prohibits
impersonating another, not merely giving a false name. 60 CA 534.
Sec. 53a-130a. Impersonation of a police officer: Class D felony. (a) A person
is guilty of impersonation of a police officer when he pretends to be a sworn member
of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety, or wears or displays without authority any uniform, badge or
shield by which such police officer is lawfully distinguished, with intent to induce another person to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance
upon that pretense.
(b) Impersonation of a police officer is a class D felony.
(P.A. 97-123, S. 2.)
Sec. 53a-131. Unlawfully concealing a will: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of unlawfully concealing a will when, with intent to defraud, he conceals,
secrets, suppresses, mutilates or destroys a will, codicil or other testamentary instrument.
(b) Unlawfully concealing a will is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 133.)
Sec. 53a-132. False entry by an officer or agent of a public community: Class
A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of false entry by an officer or agent of a public
community when (1) as an officer or agent of a public community, he makes any intentionally false entry on the books of the public community or (2) he intentionally attests
or certifies by placing his signature upon process that he has personally served the same,
when he has not done so.
(b) False entry by an officer or agent of a public community is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 134; P.A. 84-108, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 57.)
History: P.A. 84-108 inserted new Subsec. (b) providing that person who intentionally attests or certifies by signature
upon process that he has personally served process when he has not done so is guilty of false entry, relettering former
Subsec. (b) as (c); P.A. 92-260 combined former Subsecs. (a) and (b) and rephrased language, relettering former Subsec.
(c) as Subsec. (b), and amended relettered Subsec. (b) to make technical changes in the name of the offense.
Annotations to former section 53-364:
State has been held to be a "public community" and an employee has been held to be an "agent" within the meaning
of the statute. 159 C. 544, 577.
Sec. 53a-133. Robbery defined. A person commits robbery when, in the course
of committing a larceny, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon
another person for the purpose of: (1) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking
of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking; or (2) compelling
the owner of such property or another person to deliver up the property or to engage in
other conduct which aids in the commission of the larceny.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 135.)
See Sec. 53a-119 for definition of "larceny".
Annotation to former section 53-28:
Violation of this statute necessarily involves an attempt to perpetrate a robbery. 146 C. 227.
Annotations to former section 53-67:
Cited. 154 C. 37, 38; 157 C. 466.
Sentence of not less than seven nor more than twelve years for bank robber who was second offender was reasonable.
27 CS 119-121.
Annotations to present section:
Defendant's ability to carry out threat of immediate physical force is not essential element of robbery. 175 C. 569, 573.
Cited. 176 C. 239, 243. Cited. 178 C. 689, 694. Cited. 179 C. 576, 587. Cited. 180 C. 599, 601. Cited. 181 C. 388, 396.
Cited. 182 C. 430, 435; id., 449, 460. Cited (1975 revision). 183 C. 299, 303, 311. Cited. 185 C. 402, 410. Cited. 186 C.
555. 566, 571 (Diss. Op.). Cited. 189 C. 114, 115. Cited. 190 C. 822, 831. Cited. 195 C. 567, 573. Cited. 196 C. 122, 130.
Cited. Id., 395, 400. Cited. 199 C. 207, 223. Cited. 201 C. 289, 294, 295, 297-300. Cited. Id., 489, 493, 494. Cited. 202
C. 349, 353, 357, 361, 364. Cited. 206 C. 621, 622. Cited. Id., 657, 658, 667. Cited. 209 C. 564, 575. Cited. 210 C. 652,
687, 688. Cited. 211 C. 398, 400. Cited. 212 C. 31, 45. Cited. 216 C. 367, 388, 389. Cited. 219 C. 489, 498-500. Cited.
223 C. 243, 250. Cited. Id., 595, 596, 603. Cited. 225 C. 270, 277. Cited. Id., 347, 352. Cited. 230 C. 183, 262. Cited. 232
C. 455, 457. Cited. 233 C. 44, 52. Cited. 235 C. 748, 750. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. 242 C. 523. Cited. Id., 666. Use of
force considered to be in course of robbery or attempted robbery within meaning of statute if it occurs during continuous
sequence of events surrounding the taking or attempted taking, even though some time immediately before or after. 248
C. 472.
Cited. 1 CA 642, 645. Cited. 8 CA 545, 555. Cited. Id., 620, 625, 627. Cited. 9 CA 373, 377. Cited. 10 CA 330, 331.
Cited. Id., 474. Cited. 12 CA 163, 171. Cited. 13 CA 420, 421. Cited. 19 CA 111, 137; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538
et seq. Cited. Id., 554, 555, 559, 560, 563. Cited. Id., 695, 696, 702, 704, 705. Cited. 20 CA 513, 516-518. Cited. 21 CA
299, 308. Cited. 24 CA 27, 28, 34, 35; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 646, 648. Cited. 27 CA
601, 604. Cited. 28 CA 161, 165, 166. Cited. Id., 612, 616. Cited. Id., 721, 732. Cited. 31 CA 47, 48, 54, 56, 57. Cited. 32
CA 193, 194. Cited. 33 CA 184, 186; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Cited. Id., 311, 313. Cited. 34 CA 223,
231. Cited. 35 CA 699, 711, 712. Cited. Id., 839, 841, 844. Cited. 36 CA 401, 409. Cited. 38 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 581,
582, 586. Cited. 39 CA 63, 64. Cited. Id., 478, 479. Cited. Id., 579, 595. Cited. Id., 617, 618. Cited. 41 CA 147, 148. Cited.
Id., 255, 257. Cited. Id., 584, 585. Cited. 43 CA 801. Cited. 44 CA 307. Cited. 45 CA 6. Cited. 46 CA 616. Cited. Id., 691.
Cited. Id., 778. Term "purpose" is synonymous with the terms "object" and "intent". 51 CA 541. Completion of crime not
required for conviction under section. Id. Knife with a six-inch blade displayed by defendant during a robbery was capable
of causing death or serious physical injury and constituted a "dangerous instrument" and that defendant by his actions,
demands for the money and manner of carrying the knife, used or threatened to use it during the robbery. 82 CA 823.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 181 C. 388, 394. Cited. 202 C. 349, 356, 358, 362, 364. Cited. 210 C. 652, 688.
Cited. 8 CA 620, 622, 624-626. Cited. 19 CA 111, 112, 135, 136; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id.,
423, 424. Cited. Id., 695, 696, 704, 705. Cited. 20 CA 513, 516, 518. Cited. 24 CA 27, 34, 35; judgment reversed, see 220
C. 652 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 104, 111, 112. Cited. 27 CA 601, 604, 605. Cited. 28 CA 612, 616.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 202 C. 349, 361, 362, 364. Cited. 210 C. 652, 688. Cited. 216 C. 367, 368, 388, 389.
Cited. 8 CA 620, 624, 625. Cited. 19 CA 111, 112, 134-137; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 695,
696, 702-705. Cited. 20 CA 27, 30. Cited. Id., 513, 516, 518, 519. Cited. 24 CA 27, 34, 25; judgment reversed, see 220
C. 652 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106, 111, 112. Cited. 27 CA 601, 605.
Cited. 41 CS 525, 533.
Sec. 53a-134. Robbery in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty
of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the commission of the crime of
robbery as defined in section 53a-133 or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another
participant in the crime: (1) Causes serious physical injury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime; or (2) is armed with a deadly weapon; or (3) uses or threatens
the use of a dangerous instrument; or (4) displays or threatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or
other firearm, except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative
defense that such pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not
a weapon from which a shot could be discharged. Nothing contained in this subdivision
shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, robbery in
the second degree, robbery in the third degree or any other crime.
(b) Robbery in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty
under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 136; P.A. 75-411, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 22, 28; P.A. 92-260, S. 58.)
History: P.A. 75-411 removed reference to dangerous instruments in Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) and added Subdivs. (3)
and (4); P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (b) specifying that five years of sentence imposed may not be suspended
or reduced, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to specify that "the crime" is "the crime of robbery
as defined in section 53a-133".
See also annotations to Part V.
Cited. 172 C. 74, 75. Cited. 175 C. 569, 571, 573. Cited. 182 C. 511, 513. Cited. 185 C. 473, 474. Cited. 186 C. 179,
180; id., 555, 571 (Diss. Op.). Cited. 190 C. 822, 831. Cited. 196 C. 305, 306. Cited. Id., 309, 311. Cited. Id., 430, 431.
Cited. 199 C. 47, 50. Cited. Id., 207, 223. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. Id., 377, 378. Cited. Id., 591, 593. Cited. 200 C. 310,
311, 314. Cited. Id., 465, 466. Cited. 201 C. 34, 38. Cited. 202 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 86, 91. Cited. 203 C. 494, 495. Cited.
204 C. 52. Cited. Id., 240, 241, 258. Cited. 212 C. 31, 45. Cited. 214 C. 454, 457. Cited. 218 C. 479, 481. Cited. 230 C.
109, 112. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Cited. 241 C. 413. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 648.
Cited. 8 CA 545, 547. Cited. 9 CA 373, 377. Cited. 10 CA 659, 665. Cited. 11 CA 699, 700. Cited. Id., 709, 710. Cited.
12 CA 268, 269. Cited. Id., 655, 656. Cited. 13 CA 133, 134. Cited. Id., 708. Cited. 14 CA 472, 474. Cited. 15 CA 34, 35.
Cited. 15 CA 197, 198. Cited. 19 CA 423, 426. Cited. 20 CA 521, 522. Cited. 22 CA 216, 219, 227. Cited. 28 CA 581,
589; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 32 CA 38, 40. Cited. 35 CA 201. Cited. Id., 839, 843. Cited. 36 CA
59, 60. Cited. Id., 448, 453; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. Id.,
868, 869. Cited. 39 CA 45. Cited. 40 CA 250, 260. Cited. 41 CA 147, 148. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 801. Cited. 45 CA
32. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 691. Court cannot properly instruct jury of elements of section without first instructing
jury of elements of Sec. 53a-133. 51 CA 541. Sufficiency of evidence to convict defendant as a principal in robbery. Id.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2): "Miranda" warning not a ritualistic formula and words which convey its substance are sufficient. 167 C.
309. Cited. 169 C. 242, 243. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 683-685. Subdiv. (2) cited. 170 C. 332, 333. Subdiv. (2): Participation
of two persons not necessary, so Wharton's rule is inapplicable. 171 C. 105. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 395, 397. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 610, 611. Subdiv. (2) cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Subdiv.(2) cited. Id., 586. Subdiv. (1) cited. 174 C. 16, 18. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 129, 130. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 142-144. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 452, 459. Subdiv. (2) cited. 175 C. 250, 251.
Subdiv. (2): Requirement of weapon's operability is imposed by section 53a-3(6). Id., 569, 572. Subdiv. (4): Essential
element of subsection is defendant's representation of having a firearm, not the firearm's operability. Affirmative defense
of inoperability does not violate due process. 175 C. 569-576. Subdiv. (4) cited. 176 C. 239, 240, 242; id., 367, 368. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 177 C. 335, 336; id., 370, 371; id., 379, 380; id., 637, 639. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 116, 118. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 287, 288, 293. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 427, 429. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 564, 565; id., 634; id., 689, 690, 694; 179 C. 46,
47; id., 576-578, 586; 180 C. 557, 560. Subdiv. (1): A lesser included offense of felony murder. Id., 599, 601. Subdiv. (2)
cited. 181 C. 237, 238; id., 388, 390, 397, 399. Subdiv. (4) cited. 181 C. 237-239, 243. Cited. 181 C. 426, 428. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 182 C. 262, 263, 269, 270; id., 366, 367, 382. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 430-432, 435. Cited. Id., 430, 436. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 449, 451, 460, 467. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 533, 534, 543. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 595, 596, 598, 599, 602; 183
C. 280, 281; 185 C. 163, 164. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.; id., 260, 261, 267; id., 402, 404. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 473, 476. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 607. Subdiv. (1) cited. 186 C. 1, 2, 7. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 222, 224. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 261, 262; id.,
426, 427; id., 555, 566. Subdiv. (3) cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 406,
407, 414. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 432, 470; id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (3) cited. 189 C. 114, 115; id., 183, 184. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 268, 269, 271, 274; id., 337-339; id., 429, 430. Subdiv. (2) cited. 190 C. 822, 823, 831, 832. Subdiv. (4) cited. 191 C.
564, 565; id., 670, 671; 192 C. 618, 619, 625, 630. Subdiv. (3) cited. 193 C. 48, 51. Subdiv. (4) cited. 193 C. 238, 239.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 457, 459. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 526-528. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 602, 603. Subdiv. (3) cited. 194 C.
89, 90. Subdiv. (4) cited. 195 C. 183, 185. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 326, 327. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 444, 445, 449. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 552, 553. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 567, 568, 573, 575. Subdiv. (2) cited. 196 C. 36-38. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
115, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. 122, 123. Subdiv. (2) cited. 157, 158. Subdiv. (4): Essential element is the representation by
a defendant that he has a firearm, not the specific identifying characteristic of the weapon alleged in the information. Id.,
395, 396, 398-401. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 567, 568. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 685, 686, 688. Subdiv. (2) cited. 197 C. 106,
107. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 115, 117. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 413, 415. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 629, 630. Subdiv. (4) cited. 198
C. 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 203. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 314, 315. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 328, 329.
Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 490, 491. Subdiv. (3) cited. 198 C. 592, 593. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 680, 681. Subdiv. (4) cited. 199
C. 5, 6. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 47, 48. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 62, 63. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 146, 147. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.,
207, 208. Cited. Id., 207, 223. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 255, 257. Cited. Id., 473, 481. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 473, 474, 480.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 44, 45. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 310, 311, 314. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
310, 316. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 350, 351, 357, 359. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 523, 524. Subdiv. (3) cited. 201 C. 289, 290,
295, 299. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 333, 334. Subdiv. (4) cited. 202 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 259, 260. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 349, 350, 353, 354. Cited. 203 C. 81, 82. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 159, 160. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.,
445, 446. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 506, 508, 514, 517, 518. Subdiv. (2) cited. 204 C. 240, 241, 257. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.,
330, 331. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 377, 383. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205 C. 673, 674. Subdiv. (4) cited. 206 C. 40, 43. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 621, 622. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 657, 658. Subdiv. (2) cited. 207 C. 152, 154. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 323, 324.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 619, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. 208 C. 38-41. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 202, 203. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 365,
366. Subdiv. (3) cited. 209 C. 416-418. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 458, 459. Subdiv. (3) cited. 210 C. 199, 200. Subdiv. (3)
cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 398, 399. Subdiv. (4) cited. 212 C. 6, 8. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 31, 33, 45. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 387, 389, 390. Subdiv. (3) cited. 213 C. 422, 424, 432. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (4): Judgment
of appellate court in State v. Horne, 19 CA 111, reversed. 215 C. 538, 540, 542. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 698. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 216 C. 282, 284. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 801; 217 C. 419, 420. Subdiv. (1) cited.
218 C. 85, 87. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 151, 152. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 432-435. Subdiv. (4) cited. 219 C. 93, 95. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 269, 271. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.; Id., 489, 490, 496, 500, 510. Subdiv. (2) cited. 220 C. 385, 388; Id., 652,
653. Subdiv. (4) cited. 221 C. 447-449. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 643, 645. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Subdiv. (4)
cited. 223 C. 243, 245. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 243, 250. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 243, 258, 261. Subdiv. (2) cited. 299, 301.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 595, 596, 609. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 635, 637, 638. Subdiv. (4) cited. 224 C. 711, 713. Subdiv. (2)
cited. 225 C. 270, 271, 277. Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 601, 609. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 601, 609. Subdiv. (4) cited. 227 C.
363, 365. Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 234, 235. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 384-386. Subdiv. (2) cited. 230 C. 351, 353. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 686, 687. Subdiv. (4) cited. 232 C. 455, 457. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 691, 693. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 707, 709.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 44, 52. Subdiv. (4) cited. 235 C. 67, 68, 72, 77, 79. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 402, 403. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 748, 750. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 802, 804. Subdiv. (3) cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 342, 349.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 238 C. 784. Subdiv. (2) cited. 239 C. 235. Subdiv. (3) cited. 240 C. 317. Subdiv. (2) cited. 241 C. 1.
Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 165. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 242 C. 93. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 125. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 296. Subdiv. (2) cited. 247 C. 662.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 1 CA 584, 585. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 642, 643, 644, 646. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 697, 698. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 2 CA 127, 128. Subdiv. (2) cited. 6 CA 247, 248, 250, 251. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 697, 698.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Subdiv. (3). cited. Id., 27, 28. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 95, 96. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 149, 150.
Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 217, 218. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445, 446, 452. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 445, 446, 452, 455. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 503, 504. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 528. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 715, 716. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 726, 727, 730, 733.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 8 CA 119, 120, 123. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 399, 400. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 454-456. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 467. Cited. Id., 491, 493. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 545, 546, 553, 555. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 545, 553. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 566, 567. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 667, 672, 672A, 672B, 672C, 672D. Subdiv. (2) cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 275. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 313, 314. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 373, 374. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 548, 549. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 587, 588. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 648, 649. Subdiv. (3) cited. 10 CA 50, 51. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 103, 104. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id., 330, 331, 336, 344. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 404, 405. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 474. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 624, 625.
Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 643, 650. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 659, 660, 666, 667. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 659-661, 664, 666. Cited.
Id., 659, 664. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 397-403. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
699-701. Subdiv. (2) cited. 12 CA 163, 164. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 217. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 662, 663. Subdiv. (2) cited.
13 CA 76, 83, 86. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 554-556. Subdiv. (2) cited. 14 CA 67, 68. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 108, 109. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 463, 464. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 472, 474, 476. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 493, 494, 497. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.,
657, 658. Subdiv. (4) cited. 15 CA 161, 163. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 416, 417. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 502. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 539, 540. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 586. Subdiv. (2) cited. 16 CA 38, 39. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206,
207. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 284, 285; Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 390, 391. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 403. Subdiv. (2) cited. 17
CA 50, 51. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 359. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 490, 491. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 648, 650. Subdiv. (4) cited.
19 CA 111, 113, 116, 140; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 53 et seq. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 179, 180, 186. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 423, 424. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 554, 555, 558, 562-564. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 695, 696. Subdiv. (2) cited. 20 CA 27-
29. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 27, 29. Cited. Id., 212. Cited. Id., 467, 469. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 513, 514. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 643-645. Cited. Id., 643, 646. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 665, 666. Subdiv. (3) cited. 21 CA 48, 49. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.,
244, 245. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 299-301, 305-307, 309, 311, 313. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 299, 307. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 22 CA 98, 99; Id., 216 227. Cited. Id., 329, 330. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 27, 28; judgment reversed, see
220 C. 652 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 152, 153. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 316-318, 320, 321, 324, 325. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 316-318, 320, 321, 325. Cited. Id., 316, 326. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 518, 519; Id., 729-731. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA
104, 106. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 255; Id., 565, 567; Id., 646-648; 26 CA 114, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242, 244. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 27 CA 601, 602. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 654, 655, 665. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 64, 66. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 161, 162, 165, 168, 169. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 402, 404, 405. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 444, 445. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 474, 475. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 581, 588; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.,
judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 612-615, 617. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 645, 646. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 721, 722. Subdiv. (4) cited. 29 CA 207, 211. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 274, 276. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 421, 422.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 679-681. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited. 31 CA 614, 615, 617, 618. Cited. Id.,
614, 617. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 660, 661. Subdiv. (4) cited. 32 CA 21, 23. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 193, 194. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 476, 477. Subdiv. (3) cited. 33 CA 143, 144, 147. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 184, 185. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 288,
289. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 311, 313. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 457, 458. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 468, 470, 476, 477, 481-483.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 468, 482. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 849, 850. Subdiv. (2) cited. 34 CA 223, 224, 226. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id., 261, 262. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 610, 611. Subdiv. (3) cited. 35 CA 279, 280. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 699, 700. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 740 742, 743. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 781, 782. Subdiv. (3): Robbery in the second degree pursuant to Sec.
53a-135(a)(1) is not a lesser included offense of robbery in the first degree pursuant to this section. Id., 839, 841, 843-
846, 849. Subdiv. (4) cited. 36 CA 401, 405. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 556-558, 570. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 718, 720. Cited.
Id., 831, 832. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 37 CA 35, 36. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 219. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 482-
484, 486, 489, 491. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 482, 490. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 589, 594. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 619, 621. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id., 672, 674, 689, 690. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 733, 735, 739. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 581,
582. Subdiv. (3) cited. 39 CA 45, 46, 53. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 45, 54. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 63, 64, 79, 81. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 82, 84, 86, 92, 93. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 82, 86, 92, 93. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 384, 386, 400-402. Subdiv. (3)
cited. Id., 384, 400. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 478, 479. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 502, 503, 513, 514. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 579,
580, 595. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 617, 618. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 840, 841. Subdiv. (4) cited. 40 CA 21, 22. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 250, 252. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 328, 329. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 526, 527. Subdiv. (4) cited. 41 CA 47-49. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 391, 392. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 517. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 695, 696. Subdiv. (2) cited. 42 CA 472.
Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 669. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 810. Subdiv. (4) cited. 43 CA 142. Cited. Id., 801. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 44 CA 26. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 280. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 476. Subdiv. (4) cited.
Id., 561. Subdiv. (3) cited. 45 CA 6. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 270. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 390. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 658. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 684. A showing that victim had
custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient to support a charge of larceny. 49 CA 486. Testimony of sole
witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Id. Subdiv. (3) requires that evidence show either actual use
of a dangerous instrument or its threatened use, demonstrated by either an actual display or words combined with an overt
display of the threatened instrument. 71 CA 585. Court's failure to instruct jury on the affirmative defense of inoperability
of gun involved in the incident at issue, as provided for in text of the statute relative to charge of robbery in the first
degree, constituted plain error and violated defendant's constitutional right to fair trial. Id., 865. Subdiv. (3) requires use
or threatened use of a dangerous instrument. 81 CA 367. Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under Subdiv.
(4). 83 CA 489.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 595, 599. Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Sec. 53a-135. Robbery in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is
guilty of robbery in the second degree when he commits robbery as defined in section
53a-133 and (1) he is aided by another person actually present; or (2) in the course of
the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom he or another participant
in the crime displays or threatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct
to be a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.
(b) Robbery in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 137; P.A. 75-411, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 59.)
History: P.A. 75-411 clarified Subsec. (a)(2), including references to display of weapon and to actions in course of
commission of crime or in course of immediate flight from commission of crime; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add
"as defined in section 53a-133".
Cited. 171 C. 47, 48. Cited. Id., 105, 118. Cited. 174 C. 142, 143. Cited. 176 C. 270. Cited. 178 C. 287, 293. Cited. 179
c. 576, 587. Cited. 182 C. 207, 208. Cited. 183 C. 156, 157, 162. Cited. 185 C. 260, 264. Cited. 191 C. 506, 507. Cited.
197 C. 309. Cited. 198 C. 158, 165, 166. Cited. 201 C. 125, 132, 133. Cited. Id., 489, 490, 494, 501. Cited. 202 C. 224,
226. Cited. 203 C. 506, 518. Cited. 204 C. 630, 631. Cited. 210 C. 435, 436, 438. Cited. 224 C. 445, 447, 451, 452. Cited.
235 C. 469, 470.
Cited. 2 CA 11, 12. Cited. 12 CA 375, 376. Cited. 13 CA 420, 431. Cited. 14 CA 159, 160. Cited. Id., 205-207. Cited.
36 CA 401, 403, 409. Cited. 37 CA 35, 38. Cited. 39 CA 384, 401. Cited. 43 CA 801.
Subsec. (a):
(2): Cited. 169 C. 161. (2): Cited. 173 C. 545. (2): Cited. 174 C. 142, 143, 145. (1): Cited. Id., 142, 143, 145, 146. (2):
Cited. 176 C. 227, 228; id., 367, 368. (1): Cited. 179 C. 98. (2): Cited. Id., 381, 382. (1): Cited. 182 C. 476, 477. (2): Cited.
Id., 533, 543, 544; 183 C. 156, 162; 184 C. 366; 187 C. 602, 603. Cited. 190 C. 327, 329. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 241,
242. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 297, 298. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 677, 678. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 158, 160, 163-166.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 158, 164. Cited. Id., 158, 165. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 557, 558. Subdiv. (2) cited. 200 C. 350, 351,
358, 359. Subdiv. (1) cited. 201 C. 125, 126, 129-132. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 489, 494. Subdiv. (2) cited. 203 C. 506, 518.
Cited. 209 C. 143-145. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 178, 179. Subdiv. (1) cited. 230 C. 608,
610. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 686, 688. Subdiv. (2) cited. 235 C. 67, 72, 77-79. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 145, 147. Cited. Id.,
502, 517.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 6 CA 247, 248, 250, 251. Subdiv. (1) cited. 9 CA 656, 657. Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 330, 336. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 239, 240. Subdiv. (1) cited. 16 CA 264, 265. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 455, 456. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 17 CA 247, 248. Subdiv. (1) cited. 25 CA 428-430; 26 CA 779, 780. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 47, 48, 54, 56-
58. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 143, 144, 147. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 184, 188, 195. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 468, 470, 477, 480-
483. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 468, 482. Subdiv. (1): Robbery in second degree pursuant to this section is not a lesser included
offense of robbery in the first degree pursuant to Sec. 53a-134(a)(3). 35 CA 839, 841, 843-846, 848, 849. Subdiv. (1)
cited. 36 CA 774, 775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 35, 36, 38. Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CA 384, 401, 402. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41
CA 817, 818. Subdiv. (2) cited. 43 CA 801. Court's failure to instruct jury on the lesser included offense of robbery in the
second degree in violation of the statute where there was uncontroverted evidence from two state's witnesses that the gun
was inoperable constituted plain error and violated defendant's constitutional right to fair trial. 71 CA 865.
Sec. 53a-136. Robbery in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of robbery in the third degree when he commits robbery as defined in section 53a-133.
(b) Robbery in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 138; P.A. 92-260, S. 60.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add "as defined in section 53a-133".
Cited. 169 C. 247, 249. Cited. 171 C. 105, 118. Cited. 181 C. 388, 396-399. Cited. 185 C. 260, 264. Cited. 188 C. 591,
592. Cited. 190 C. 428, 429. Cited. 192 C. 618, 629. Cited. 197 C. 314. Cited. 198 C. 285, 287. Cited. 199 C. 557, 558.
Cited. 202 C. 224. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. 210 C. 435, 439. Cited. 218 C. 432, 434, 435. Cited.
219 C. 160, 161. Cited. 239 C. 235. Rational basis exists for legislature to classify larceny from the person as a more serious
offense than simple robbery and therefore the classification did not violate defendant's right to equal protection of the
laws. 246 C. 132.
Cited. 5 CA 500, 501. Cited. 7 CA 27, 28, 31. Cited. 8 CA 454, 455. Cited. Id., 620, 621. Cited. 13 CA 420, 421, 431.
Cited. Id., 596, 597, 601, 603. Cited. 14 CA 205, 207. Cited. 16 CA 318, 319. Cited. Id., 433, 435. Cited. 17 CA 226, 231.
Cited. 19 CA 423, 426. Cited. 20 CA 513, 514. Cited. Id., 643, 650. Cited. 21 CA 248, 249. Cited. Id., 291, 292. Cited. 22
CA 216, 217. Cited. 24 CA 316, 323. Cited. Id., 518, 524. Cited. 26 CA 114, 116. Cited. 27 CA 780, 781. Cited. 35 CA
839, 842, 848. Cited. 39 CA 579, 580, 600. Cited. Id., 810, 811. Cited. 40 CA 250, 260. Cited. 44 CA 307. Cited. 46 CA
616. Cited. Id., 778.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 185 C. 402, 404. Cited. 192 C. 618, 626. Cited. 201 C. 125, 133. Cited. Id., 559, 560. Cited. 211 C. 101, 103.
Cited. 220 C. 487, 489. Cited. 242 C. 523.
Cited. 8 CA 35, 36. Cited. 10 CA 330, 336. Cited. 13 CA 596, 601. Cited. 14 CA 493, 503. Cited. 35 CA 201. Cited.
38 CA 531, 532. Cited. 41 CA 255, 257. Cited. Id., 584, 585. Cited. 44 CA 307.
Cited. 33 CS 599. Cited. 37 CS 520, 521.
Sec. 53a-136a. Robbery involving occupied motor vehicle. Penalty. Any person
who commits robbery by taking a motor vehicle from the person of another knowing
that such motor vehicle is occupied by such other person shall be imprisoned for a term
of three years which shall not be suspended and shall be in addition and consecutive to
any term of imprisonment imposed for such offense.
(P.A. 93-204.)
Cited. 46 CA 691.
PART X*
FORGERY AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-346:
Writing must be introduced before any other evidence can be admitted. 1 R. 534. But it may be shown that accused
destroyed it or acknowledged the forgery. 2 R. 93. An order for groceries subject of forgery. 5 D. 254. Meaning of "utter";
venue where forged check is uttered in one county but drawn on a bank in another. 96 C. 432. Cited. 114 C. 178; 158 C. 266.
Cited. 22 CS 173; 25 CS 354; 27 CS 283. In civil action court construed term "falsely" to imply that paper is false, not
genuine, regardless of the truth or falsehood of statement it contains. 24 CS 498. An agent may commit forgery by making
or signing an instrument in disobedience of his instructions or by exceeding his authority. Id. Cited. 28 CS 15.
Annotations to former section 53-348:
Proof of passing counterfeit money inadmissible until money is produced. 1 R. 152; but see 2 R. 88. Prosecution for
counterfeiting when barred by statute of limitations. 1 R. 171. Possession at one time of several forged notes with intent
to pass them a single offense. 7 C. 414. Possession of unsigned bank note inadmissible to show knowledge in prosecution
for passing counterfeit coin. 9 C. 344. What evidence held admissible to show guilty knowledge. 19 C. 237. Legislative
history of section. 149 C. 37. Clear legislative intent to make counterfeiting of federal money or uttering of counterfeit
federal money a crime against the state and punishable in state courts. Id., 39. U. S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8, does not keep
matter solely within federal jurisdiction; both federal and state governments may deal with the matter, the former to protect
its currency, the latter to protect its citizens against fraud. Id., 41.
Annotations to present part X of chapter 952:
Secs. 53a-137 through 53a-145 cited. 11 CA 161, 162. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Sec. 53a-137. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this part:
(1) "Written instrument" means any instrument or article containing written or
printed matter or the equivalent thereof, used for the purpose of reciting, embodying,
conveying or recording information or constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right,
privilege or identification, which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person.
(2) "Complete written instrument" means one which purports to be a genuine written instrument fully drawn with respect to every essential feature thereof. An endorsement, attestation, acknowledgment or other similar signature or statement is deemed
both a complete written instrument in itself and a part of the main instrument in which
it is contained or to which it attaches.
(3) "Incomplete written instrument" means one which contains some matter by way
of content or authentication but which requires additional matter in order to render it a
complete written instrument.
(4) A person "falsely makes" a written instrument when he makes or draws a complete written instrument in its entirety, or an incomplete written instrument, which purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible maker or drawer, but which is not such
either because the ostensible maker or drawer is fictitious or because, if real, he did not
authorize the making or drawing thereof.
(5) A person "falsely completes" a written instrument when, by adding, inserting
or changing matter, he transforms an incomplete written instrument into a complete
one, without the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, so that such complete instrument
appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized by
its ostensible maker or drawer.
(6) A person "falsely alters" a written instrument when, without the authority of
anyone entitled to grant it, he changes a written instrument, whether it be in complete
or incomplete form, by means of erasure, obliteration, deletion, insertion of new matter,
transposition of matter, or in any other manner, so that such instrument in its thus altered
form appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized
by its ostensible maker or drawer.
(7) "Forged instrument" means a written instrument which has been falsely made,
completed or altered.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 139.)
Cited. 235 C. 502, 504.
Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 165. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 610.
Subsec. (1):
Cited. 37 CA 72, 79.
Subsec. (2):
Cited. 207 C. 555, 561, 563.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 611.
Subsec. (3):
Cited. 207 C. 555, 561.
Subsec. (4):
Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166, 167.
Subsec. (5):
Cited. 207 C. 555, 561. Cited. 235 C. 502, 512.
Subsec. (7):
Cited. 34 CS 606, 611.
Sec. 53a-138. Forgery in the first degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty
of forgery in the first degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he
falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument or issues or possesses any written
instrument which he knows to be forged, which is or purports to be, or which is calculated
to become or represent if completed: (1) Part of an issue of money, stamps, securities
or other valuable instruments issued by a government or governmental instrumentality;
or (2) part of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments representing interests in or
claims against a corporate or other organization or its property.
(b) Forgery in the first degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 140; P.A. 76-292, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 76-292 made first degree forgery a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony.
Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166. Cited. 37 CA 72, 80.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 610. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. cited. 47 CA 1.
Sec. 53a-139. Forgery in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is
guilty of forgery in the second degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure
another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument or issues or possesses
any written instrument which he knows to be forged, which is or purports to be, or which
is calculated to become or represent if completed: (1) A deed, will, codicil, contract,
assignment, commercial instrument or other instrument which does or may evidence,
create, transfer, terminate or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation or status;
or (2) a public record or an instrument filed or required or authorized by law to be filed
in or with a public office or public servant; or (3) a written instrument officially issued
or created by a public office, public servant or governmental instrumentality; or (4) a
prescription of a duly licensed physician or other person authorized to issue the same
for any drug or any instrument or device used in the taking or administering of drugs
for which a prescription is required by law.
(b) "Drugs" as used in this section includes all drugs except controlled drugs as
defined in section 21a-240.
(c) Forgery in the second degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 141; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 38; P.A. 76-292, S. 2.)
History: 1971 act removed exception re narcotic drugs in Subsec. (b); P.A. 76-292 made second degree forgery a Class
D felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor.
Cited. 201 C. 125, 126. Cited. 207 C. 555, 560. Defendant may be found guilty of forgery in the second degree if the
state establishes that defendant, with intent to deceive another, falsely made, possessed or altered a written instrument that
he or she knew to be forged. 252 C. 229.
Cited. 8 CA 342, 343. Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166. Cited. 28 CA 521, 523, 530, 532. Cited. 37 CA 72, 80. Cited. 42
CA 790. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 610.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1). Cited. 169 C. 581. Subdiv. (2) cited. 195 C. 421, 423. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id., 158, 160. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 146, 148. Cited. 201 C. 125, 149, 151, 153. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 125, 149, 150.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 207 C. 555, 556, 559. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 469, 470.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 5 CA 473, 474. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 1, 2. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 493, 494. Subdiv. (3) cited.
Id. Cited. 28 CA 521, 523. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 72, 78. Subdiv. (1) cited. 42 CA 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 47 CA 1.
Sec. 53a-140. Forgery in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of forgery in the third degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure
another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument, or issues or possesses
any written instrument which he knows to be forged.
(b) Forgery in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 142; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 39.)
History: 1971 act referred to issuance of instrument which person knows to be forged rather than to alteration of such
an instrument.
Cited. 194 C. 233, 234. Cited. 204 C. 441, 444. Cited. 207 C. 109, 110. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433, 437; judgment superseded
by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 235 C. 469, 470.
Cited. 8 CA 342, 343. Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166. Cited. 33 CA 339, 349; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431
et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 37 CA
72, 73, 78-80. Cited. Id., 437, 442. Cited. 42 CA 790. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. cited. 47 CA 1.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 194 C. 233, 238. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et
seq. Cited. 235 C. 502, 504, 509, 512.
Cited. 33 CA 339, 340, 349; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency
of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 437, 442. Cited. 42 CA 790.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 610. Cited. Id., 656, 660.
Sec. 53a-141. Criminal simulation: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty
of criminal simulation when: (1) With intent to defraud, he makes or alters any object
in such manner that it appears to have an antiquity, rarity, source or authorship which
it does not in fact possess; or (2) with knowledge of its true character and with intent
to defraud, he issues or possesses an object so simulated.
(b) Criminal simulation is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 143.)
Cited. 11 CA 161, 166. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. cited. 47 CA 1.
Sec. 53a-142. Forgery of symbols: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty
of forgery of symbols of value when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another,
he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument or issues or possesses any
written instrument which he knows to be forged, which is or purports to be, or which
is calculated to become or represent if completed part of an issue of tokens, public
transportation transfers, certificates or other articles manufactured and designed for use
as symbols of value usable in place of money for the purchase of property or services.
(b) Forgery of symbols of value is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 144.)
Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. cited. 47 CA 1.
Sec. 53a-143. Unlawfully using slugs: Definitions. The following definitions are
applicable to sections 53a-144 and 53a-145:
(1) "Coin machine" means a coin box, turnstile, vending machine or other mechanical or electronic device or receptacle designed (A) to receive a coin or bill or token made
for the purpose, and (B) in return for the insertion or deposit thereof, automatically to
offer, to provide, to assist in providing or to permit the acquisition of some property or
some service.
(2) "Slug" means an object or article which, by virtue of its size, shape or any other
quality, is capable of being inserted or deposited in a coin machine as an improper
substitute for a genuine coin, bill or token.
(3) "Value" of a slug means the value of the coin, bill or token for which it is capable
of being substituted.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 145.)
Cited. 11 CA 161, 166.
Sec. 53a-144. Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree: Class B misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of unlawfully using slugs in the first degree when he makes,
possesses or disposes of slugs with intent to enable a person to insert or deposit them
in a coin machine, and the value of such slugs exceeds one hundred dollars.
(b) Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 146.)
Cited. 11 CA 161, 166.
Sec. 53a-145. Unlawfully using slugs in the second degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of unlawfully using slugs in the second degree when:
(1) With intent to defraud the owner of a coin machine, he inserts or deposits a slug in
such machine; or (2) he makes, possesses or disposes of a slug with intent to enable a
person to insert or deposit it in a coin machine.
(b) Unlawfully using slugs in the second degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 147.)
Cited. 11 CA 161, 166. Cited. 12 CA 74, 78.
PART XI*
BRIBERY, OFFENSES AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE AND OTHER RELATED OFFENSES
*Perjury:
Annotations to former section 53-143:
Swearing falsely before church tribunal may constitute perjury. 2 C. 40. Falsely and corruptly taking poor debtor's oath
constitutes perjury. 11 C. 415. Evidence in original trial admissible to show materiality of testimony. 77 C. 201; 93 C. 6.
Materiality of testimony is a question of law. 92 C. 661. What testimony is material. Id., 662. Testimony of one witness
may be sufficient to convict. 93 C. 7, 12. Character evidence for accused is limited to specific trait involved; i.e., character
for truth and veracity. Id., 10. History of this section. 127 C. 720. Felonious intent is essential element of crime. 139 C.
690. Judgment that defendant was guilty of perjury was set aside where court had no jurisdiction of his person because of
defective bench warrant. 159 C. 96.
Cited. 23 CS 298. Applicable to perjured witness at coroner's hearing. 29 CS 305.
Bribery:
Annotation to former section 53-147:
Where defendants were tried and convicted on information that they conspired to offer money to police officers, crime
charged was conspiracy as set forth in Sec. 54-197, not bribery. 157 C. 330.
Annotations to former section 53-148:
Unnecessary that thing offered or given be to induce witness to testify falsely. 122 C. 635. Disbarment proceeding is
a "civil proceeding" within the statute. Id. Testimony of what complainant heard said to defendant was admissible as verbal
act to show relationship of persons is a criminal conspiracy. 157 C. 392.
Intent of section. Proceeding involving right to practice law is civil. 4 CS 161. Cited. Id., 306. Cited. 29 CS 305.
Annotation to former section 53-149:
Cited. 142 C. 285.
Annotation to former section 53-150:
Cited. 142 C. 285.
Annotation to former section 53-261:
Section cannot be enlarged to cover employee who had no authority to, nor did in fact, procure or contract for anything
in behalf of state. 25 CS 269.
Annotations to former section 53-262:
A member of a board of education accepting a gratuity, not within the statute. 121 C. 160. Conspiracy by an agent of
the state to receive share of real estate commissions. 126 C. 60. Cited. 129 C. 250.
Intent of statute is to prohibit person who has authority to make contracts or transact business on behalf of public or
private corporation from accepting any payment, commission, compensation or gratuity of any kind from person with
whom he makes contract or transacts business. It cannot be extended to include employee who has no authority or control
or, in fact, exercised no authority or control over the contract. 25 CS 268.
Annotations to former section 53-266:
Cited. 16 CS 410; 25 CS 259, 260, 271.
Annotation to former section 53-267:
Cited. 22 CS 252.
Annotations to present part XI of chapter 952:
Cited. 47 CA 1.
Sec. 53a-146. Definitions. For purposes of this part:
(1) An "official proceeding" is any proceeding held or which may be held before
any legislative, judicial, administrative or other agency or official authorized to take
evidence under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner or notary
or other person taking evidence in connection with any proceeding.
(2) "Benefit" means monetary advantage, or anything regarded by the beneficiary
as a monetary advantage, including benefit to any person or entity in whose welfare the
beneficiary is interested.
(3) "Public servant" is an officer or employee of government, elected or appointed,
and any person participating as advisor, consultant or otherwise, paid or unpaid, in
performing a governmental function.
(4) "Government" includes any branch, subdivision or agency of the state or any
locality within it.
(5) "Labor official" means any duly appointed or elected representative of a labor
organization or any duly appointed or elected trustee or representative of an employee
welfare trust fund.
(6) "Witness" is any person summoned, or who may be summoned, to give testimony in an official proceeding.
(7) "Juror" is any person who has been drawn or summoned to serve or act as a
juror in any court.
(8) "Physical evidence" means any article, object, document, record or other thing
of physical substance which is or is about to be produced or used as evidence in an
official proceeding.
(9) "Person selected to be a public servant" means any person who has been nominated or appointed to be a public servant.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 148; P.A. 80-479, S. 1; P.A. 99-240, S. 12.)
History: P.A. 80-479 substituted "monetary advantage" for "gain or advantage" in Subdiv. (2), specified "paid or
unpaid" advisors or consultants in Subdiv. (3) and added Subdiv. (9) defining "person selected to be a public servant";
P.A. 99-240 made definitions applicable to new Sec. 53a-151a but specific reference not added since said Sec. already
included in existing reference to "this part" and made a technical change in Subdiv. (2) for purposes of gender neutrality.
Cited. 200 C. 664, 668.
Cited. 2 CA 204, 209.
Subsec. (3):
Cited. 172 C. 458, 468. Cited. 201 C. 379, 385.
Cited. 22 CA 449, 456. Cited. 40 CA 643, 669.
Sec. 53a-147. Bribery: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of bribery if he
promises, offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a public servant or a person selected
to be a public servant, any benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision, opinion,
recommendation or vote as a public servant or a person selected to be a public servant.
(b) Bribery is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 149; P.A. 80-479, S. 2; P.A. 03-259, S. 46.)
History: P.A. 80-479 included bribery of persons selected to be public servants in provisions and bribery consisting of
promises of benefits for recipient's decision, opinion, recommendation of vote, deleting reference to "other exercise of
discretion"; P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change bribery from a class D felony to a class C felony.
Offense of offering gratuity requires element of proof, specific intent, which is not needed to prove greater offense of
bribery. 172 C. 458, 467. It is no defense for crime of bribery that police officer had no authority to take action desired by
bribe given. Id., 458, 468. Covers crime of bribery in broad terms and is not limited to administration of justice and attempts
to influence legislation. Id. Cited., 458, 460, 465-469. Sec. 29-9 is not lesser included offense to this charge, and acceptance
of guilty plea to said section was nullity. Id., 608.
Cited. 1 CA 524. Cited. 5 CA 125, 129. Cited. 9 CA 15, 16. Cited. 14 CA 322, 329. Cited. 21 CA 386, 387.
Sec. 53a-148. Bribe receiving: Class C felony. (a) A public servant or a person
selected to be a public servant is guilty of bribe receiving if he solicits, accepts or agrees
to accept from another person any benefit for, because of, or as consideration for his
decision, opinion, recommendation or vote.
(b) Bribe receiving is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 150; P.A. 80-479, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 61; P.A. 03-259, S. 47.)
History: P.A. 80-479 applied provisions to persons selected to be public servants and reworded Subsec. (a); P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "another" with "another person"; P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change bribe
receiving from a class D felony to a class C felony.
Offense under Sec. 29-9 is not a lesser included offense. 201 C. 379, 381-385. Cited. 208 C. 411, 413. Cited. 214 C.
657, 658, 668. Cited. 229 C. 716, 719.
Cited. 5 CA 125-129. Cited. 14 CA 322, 323. Cited. 17 CA 486, 487. Cited. 22 CA 449, 450, 456.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 14 CA 322, 323, 330. Cited. 20 CA 386, 392. Cited. 22 CA 449, 455.
Sec. 53a-149. Bribery of a witness: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of
bribery of a witness if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a witness any benefit
to influence the testimony or conduct of such witness in, or in relation to, an official
proceeding.
(b) Bribery of a witness is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 151; P.A. 03-259, S. 48.)
History: P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change bribery of a witness from a class D felony to a class C felony.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 192 C. 98, 99.
Cited as 53a-149a [sic]. 12 CA 74, 75, 83.
Sec. 53a-150. Bribe receiving by a witness: Class C felony. (a) A witness is guilty
of bribe receiving by a witness if he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit
from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence
his testimony or conduct in, or in relation to, any official proceeding.
(b) Bribe receiving by a witness is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 152; P.A. 03-259, S. 51.)
History: P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change bribe receiving by a witness from a class D felony to a class C felony.
Sec. 53a-151. Tampering with a witness: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty
of tampering with a witness if, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about
to be instituted, he induces or attempts to induce a witness to testify falsely, withhold
testimony, elude legal process summoning him to testify or absent himself from any
official proceeding.
(b) Tampering with a witness is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 153; P.A. 03-259, S. 52.)
History: P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change tampering with a witness from a class D felony to a class C felony.
Cited. 193 C. 526, 531. Cited. 196 C. 242, 251. Cited. 197 C. 369, 370. Cited. 200 C. 664-672. Cited. 204 C. 330, 331.
Cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Cited. Id., 918. Cited. 230 C. 686, 688, 690, 694. Cited. Id., 698, 723.
Cited. 1 CA 647. Cited. 12 CA 74, 75, 82. Cited. 26 CA 758, 759. Cited. 30 CA 95, 96; judgment reversed, see 228 C.
147 et seq. Cited. 33 CA 143, 144, 149. Cited. 46 CA 741. Defendant's claim that statute is so vague and indefinite that
it violates the due process clause of article first, Sec. 8 of the state constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution because it did not clearly define his conduct-telephoning victim despite police warnings not to contact her
and instructing her to tell police that "nothing ever happened"-is without merit; language of statute plainly warns potential
perpetrators that statute applies to any conduct that is intended to prompt witness to testify falsely or to refrain from
testifying in an official proceeding that the perpetrator believes to be pending or imminent; legislature's unqualified use
of word "induce" clearly informs persons of ordinary intelligence that any conduct, physical or verbal, can potentially give
rise to criminal liability. 74 CA 473. Supreme Court made clear that liability under section hinges on mental state of the
perpetrator in engaging in the conduct at issue, not on whether he must overcome by coercive means the will of a witness
reluctant to do so. 83 CA 672. As interpreted in our case law, section provides fair warning of the conduct that it prohibits. Id.
Cited. 39 CS 428, 429. Cited. 41 CS 525, 529, 530. Cited. 43 CS 46, 54.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 230 C. 686, 688.
Cited. 33 CA 143, 144. Cited. 41 CA 584, 585.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 200 C. 664, 674.
Sec. 53a-151a. Intimidating a witness: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of
intimidating a witness when, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about
to be instituted, such person uses, attempts to use or threatens the use of physical force
against a witness or another person with intent to (1) influence, delay or prevent the
testimony of the witness in the official proceeding, or (2) induce the witness to testify
falsely, withhold testimony, elude legal process summoning the witness to testify or
absent himself or herself from the official proceeding.
(b) Intimidating a witness is a class C felony.
(P.A. 99-240, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-152. Bribery of a juror: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of bribery
of a juror if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a juror any benefit as consideration
for the juror's decision or vote.
(b) Bribery of a juror is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 154; P.A. 73-639, S. 10.)
History: P.A. 73-639 made bribery of a juror a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony.
Sec. 53a-153. Bribe receiving by a juror: Class C felony. (a) A juror is guilty of
bribe receiving by a juror if he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another person
any benefit as consideration for his decision or vote.
(b) Bribe receiving by a juror is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 155; P.A. 73-639, S. 11; P.A. 92-260, S. 62.)
History: P.A. 73-639 made bribe receiving by a juror a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony; P.A. 92-260 amended
Subsec. (a) to replace "another" with "another person".
Sec. 53a-154. Tampering with a juror: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of
tampering with a juror if he influences any juror in relation to any official proceeding
to or for which such juror has been drawn, summoned or sworn.
(b) Tampering with a juror is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 156.)
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2). Cited. 170 C. 601, 602.
Cited. 38 CS 464, 465.
Sec. 53a-155. Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence if, believing that an official proceeding is pending, or about to be instituted, he: (1) Alters,
destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its
verity or availability in such proceeding; or (2) makes, presents or uses any record,
document or thing knowing it to be false and with purpose to mislead a public servant
who is or may be engaged in such official proceeding.
(b) Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 157.)
Cited. 1 CA 540, 542, 543. Cited. 6 CA 394. Cited. 25 CA 624, 625.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 540, 541, 547, 549, 551. Cited. Id., 540, 547-549, 551. Subdiv. (1) cited. 236 C. 514, 516.
Cited. 237 C. 339, 341.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 1 CA 540, 541, 548.
Sec. 53a-156. Perjury: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of perjury if, in any
official proceeding, he intentionally, under oath, makes a false statement, swears, affirms
or testifies falsely, to a material statement which he does not believe to be true.
(b) Perjury is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 158.)
Cited. 175 C. 279. 291. Cited. 189 C. 92, 93. Cited. 200 C. 243, 251. One-witness-plus-corroboration rule discussed.
204 C. 472, 479, 480.
Cited. 4 CA 359, 360. Cited. 5 CA 552. Cited. 17 CA 395, 396.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 193 C. 474, 497. Cited. 204 C. 472, 473.
Cited. 5 CA 552. Cited. 10 CA 605, 606.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 728.
Sec. 53a-157. Transferred to Sec. 53a-157b.
Sec. 53a-157a. False statement in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person
is guilty of false statement in the first degree when he intentionally makes a false written
statement on a certified payroll submitted pursuant to section 31-53 which he does not
believe to be true and which statement is intended to mislead a contracting authority or
the labor commissioner in the exercise of his authority or the fulfillment of his duties
under chapter 557.
(b) False statement in the first degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 93-392, S. 7.)
Sec. 53a-157b. (Formerly Sec. 53a-157). False statement in the second degree:
Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of false statement in the second degree
when he intentionally makes a false written statement under oath or pursuant to a form
bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are
punishable, which he does not believe to be true and which statement is intended to
mislead a public servant in the performance of his official function.
(b) False statement in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 159; P.A. 93-392, S. 6.)
History: P.A. 93-392 amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) to classify the intentional making of a false written statement other
than on a certified payroll as false statement "in the second degree"; Sec. 53a-157 transferred to Sec. 53a-157b in 1995.
Annotations to former section 53a-157:
Cited. 186 C. 265, 269. Cited (Diss. Op.). 187 C. 544, 569. Cited. 200 C. 310, 312. Cited. Id., 743, 755. Cited. 221 C.
93, 101. Cited. 227 C. 1, 23. Cited. 238 C. 588.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 728. Cited. 28 CA 733, 737. Cited. 34 CA 694, 702. Cited. 35 CA 714, 716. Cited. 36 CA 556, 563, 564.
Cited. 38 CS 340, 341. Cited. 40 CS 145, 148.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 233 C. 527, 529.
Cited. 6 CA 143, 146. Cited. 34 CA 694, 695.
Cited. 38 CS 695-697, 700.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 727.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 233 C. 527, 529. Cited. 235 C. 679, 682.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 233 C. 527, 529.
Sec. 53a-158. Bribery of a labor official: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of bribery of a labor official if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a labor official
any benefit with intent to influence him in respect to any of his acts, decisions or duties
as such labor official.
(b) Bribery of a labor official is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 160.)
Sec. 53a-159. Bribe receiving by a labor official: Class D felony. (a) A labor
official is guilty of bribe receiving by a labor official if he solicits, accepts or agrees to
accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such
benefit will influence him in respect to any of his acts, decisions or duties as such labor
official.
(b) Bribe receiving by a labor official is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 161.)
Cited. 229 C. 479, 283.
Sec. 53a-160. Commercial bribery: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of
commercial bribery when he confers, or agrees to confer, any benefit upon any employee, agent or fiduciary without the consent of the latter's employer or principal, with
intent to influence his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs.
(b) Commercial bribery is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 162; P.A. 03-259, S. 44.)
History: P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change commercial bribery from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony.
Cited. 14 CA 236, 241.
Sec. 53a-161. Receiving a commercial bribe: Class D felony. (a) An employee,
agent or fiduciary is guilty of receiving a commercial bribe when, without consent of
his employer or principal, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another
person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his conduct
in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs.
(b) Receiving a commercial bribe is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 163; P.A. 03-259, S. 45.)
History: P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change receiving a commercial bribe from a class A misdemeanor to a
class D felony.
Cited. 229 C. 479, 483.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (5) cited. 37 CA 500, 501, 509; judgment reversed in part, see 237 C. 633 et seq.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 20 CA 386, 392.
Sec. 53a-161a. Bid rigging: Class D felony. No person, firm, corporation, association or partnership who bids, or intends to bid, for any contract to be awarded by any
commission, agency or department of the state or any political subdivision of the state
shall induce or attempt to induce any other person, firm, corporation, association or
partnership to submit or not to submit a bid or proposal for the purpose of restricting
competition. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of
a class D felony.
(P.A. 80-454, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-161b. Disclosure of bid or proposal: Class A misdemeanor. Unless
otherwise required by law, the prices quoted in a bid or proposal for any contract to be
awarded by any commission, agency or department of the state or any political subdivision of the state shall not be disclosed by the bidder or offeror prior to the opening, in
the case of a bid, or prior to the award, in the case of a proposal, directly or indirectly
to any other bidder or offeror or to any competitor. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 80-454, S. 2.)
Cited. 14 CA 322, 328, 330.
Sec. 53a-161c. Receiving kickbacks: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of
receiving kickbacks when he: (1) By force, intimidation or threat of procuring dismissal
from employment induces any person who is employed in the construction, completion
or repair of any public building, public work, or building or work financed in whole or
in part by loans or grants from the state, or who has a contract with the state, to give up
any part of the compensation to which he is entitled; (2) knowingly solicits, accepts or
agrees to accept any benefit, in cash or in kind, from another person upon an agreement
or understanding that such benefit will influence such person's conduct in relation to
referring an individual or arranging for the referral of an individual for the furnishing
of any goods, facilities or services to such other person under contract to provide goods,
facilities or services to a local, state or federal agency; or (3) by force, intimidation or
threat, such person induces another person who has a contract with the state to give up
any part of the compensation to which such other person is entitled. For the purposes
of this section and section 53a-161d, "refer" means to send, direct or recommend and
"referral" means the act of sending, directing or recommending. For purposes of this
subsection, "benefit" shall not include forms of remuneration listed in 42 CFR Section
1001.952.
(b) Receiving kickbacks is a class D felony.
(P.A. 80-290; P.A. 96-169, S. 11.)
History: P.A. 96-169 substituted "when he: (1) By" for "whenever he by", added Subdivs. (2) and (3) and added
definitions of "refer", "referral" and "benefit".
Cited. 229 C. 479, 482, 483.
Sec. 53a-161d. Paying a kickback: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of paying a kickback when he knowingly offers or pays any benefit, in cash or kind, to any
person with intent to influence such person: (1) To refer an individual, or to arrange for
the referral of an individual, for the furnishing of any goods, facilities or services for
which a claim for benefits or reimbursement has been filed with a local, state or federal
agency; or (2) to purchase, lease, order or arrange for or recommend the purchasing,
leasing or ordering of any goods, facilities or services for which a claim of benefits or
reimbursement has been filed with a local, state or federal agency.
(b) Paying a kickback is a class D felony.
(P.A. 96-169, S. 12; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 38, 121.)
History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective June 24, 1998.
Sec. 53a-162. Rigging: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of rigging if, with
intent to prevent a publicly exhibited sporting or other contest from being conducted in
accordance with the rules and usages purporting to govern it, he: (1) Confers or offers
or agrees to confer any benefit upon, or threatens any injury to, a participant, official
or other person associated with the contest or exhibition; or (2) tampers with any person,
animal or thing.
(b) Rigging is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 164.)
Sec. 53a-163. Soliciting or accepting benefit for rigging: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of soliciting or accepting benefit for rigging if he knowingly solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit the giving of which would be
criminal under section 53a-162.
(b) Soliciting or accepting benefit for rigging is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 165.)
Sec. 53a-164. Participation in a rigged contest: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A
person is guilty of participation in a rigged contest if he knowingly engages in, sponsors,
produces, judges or otherwise participates in a publicly exhibited sporting or other contest knowing that the contest is not being conducted in compliance with the rules and
usages purporting to govern it, by reason of conduct which would be criminal under
section 53a-162.
(b) Participation in a rigged contest is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 166; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 40.)
History: 1971 act substituted "section 53a-162" for "this section" in Subsec. (a).
Sec. 53a-165. Hindering prosecution defined. As used in sections 53a-165aa,
53a-166 and 53a-167, a person "renders criminal assistance" when, with intent to prevent, hinder or delay the discovery or apprehension of, or the lodging of a criminal
charge against, another person whom such person knows or believes has committed a
felony or is being sought by law enforcement officials for the commission of a felony,
or with intent to assist another person in profiting or benefiting from the commission
of a felony, such person: (1) Harbors or conceals such other person; or (2) warns such
other person of impending discovery or apprehension; or (3) provides such other person
with money, transportation, weapon, disguise or other means of avoiding discovery or
apprehension; or (4) prevents or obstructs, by means of force, intimidation or deception,
any person from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or apprehension
of such other person or in the lodging of a criminal charge against such other person; or
(5) suppresses, by an act of concealment, alteration or destruction, any physical evidence
which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such other person or in the lodging
of a criminal charge against such other person; or (6) aids such other person to protect
or expeditiously profit from an advantage derived from such crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 167; P.A. 02-97, S. 6.)
History: P.A. 02-97 made definition applicable to Sec. 53a-165aa and made technical changes, including changes for
purposes of gender neutrality.
Cited. 223 C. 595, 604.
Subdiv. (4):
Cited. 205 C. 17, 18.
Subdiv. (5):
Cited. 7 CA 470, 471, 476.
Secs. 53a-165a to 53a-165z. Reserved for future use.
Sec. 53a-165aa. Hindering prosecution in the first degree: Class C felony. (a)
A person is guilty of hindering prosecution in the first degree when such person renders
criminal assistance to another person who has committed a class A or B felony or an
unclassified felony for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for more than ten
years and such other person committed such felony with intent to intimidate or coerce
the civilian population or a unit of government.
(b) Hindering prosecution in the first degree is a class C felony and any person
found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which
five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 02-97, S. 3.)
Sec. 53a-166. Hindering prosecution in the second degree: Class C felony. (a)
A person is guilty of hindering prosecution in the second degree when such person
renders criminal assistance to another person who has committed a class A or class B
felony or an unclassified felony for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for
more than ten years.
(b) Hindering prosecution in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 168; P.A. 78-37, S. 1; P.A. 02-97, S. 4; P.A. 03-259, S. 49.)
History: P.A. 78-37 classified rendering assistance to person who committed an unclassified offense punishable by
maximum imprisonment of more than ten years as hindering prosecution in the first degree; P.A. 02-97 changed the name
of the offense from "hindering prosecution in the first degree" to "hindering prosecution in the second degree" and made
technical changes, including a change for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change
hindering prosecution in the second degree from a class D felony to a class C felony.
Cited. 200 C. 310, 316. Cited. 223 C. 595, 604.
Cited. 7 CA 470, 471, 473, 474, 476. Cited. 22 CA 601, 602, 606.
Cited. 38 CS 521, 523.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 28 CA 721, 722, 733.
Sec. 53a-167. Hindering prosecution in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A
person is guilty of hindering prosecution in the third degree when such person renders
criminal assistance to another person who has committed a class C or class D felony or
an unclassified felony for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for ten years
or less but more than one year.
(b) Hindering prosecution in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 169; P.A. 78-37, S. 2; P.A. 02-97, S. 5; P.A. 03-259, S. 50.)
History: P.A. 78-37 classified assisting person who committed an unclassified offense punishable by maximum imprisonment of one to ten years as hindering prosecution in the second degree; P.A. 02-97 changed the name of the offense
from "hindering prosecution in the second degree" to "hindering prosecution in the third degree" and made technical
changes, including a change for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change hindering
prosecution in the third degree from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony.
Cited. 205 C. 17, 18.
Cited. 1 CA 540, 543. Cited. 30 CA 712, 713.
Sec. 53a-167a. Interfering with an officer: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of interfering with an officer when such person obstructs, resists, hinders or
endangers any peace officer or firefighter in the performance of such peace officer's or
firefighter's duties.
(b) Interfering with an officer is a class A misdemeanor.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 50; P.A. 76-225; P.A. 01-84, S. 11, 26.)
History: P.A. 76-225 reworded Subsec. (a) to eliminate redundant reference to interference with peace officer or fireman
and made interference with an officer a Class A misdemeanor rather than a Class D felony; P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec.
(a) to replace "fireman" with "firefighter" and make other technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective
July 1, 2001.
Annotation to former section 53-165:
Cited. 168 C. 395.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 182 C. 242, 244. Cited. 189 C. 1. Cited. 191 C. 433, 435. Cited. 194 C. 347, 350. Cited. 195 C. 668, 676. Cited.
198 C. 43, 44. Cited. 205 C. 456, 457, 459, 467-469, 471-474. Cited. 211 C. 389, 391. Cited. 220 C. 38, 40. Cited. 230
C. 400, 402. Cited. 234 C. 78, 80, 81. Cited. 236 C. 214, 215.
Cited. 1 CA 540, 543. Cited. 1 CA 709, 718. Cited. 5 CA 616, 618-622. Statute meets requirement of fair notice to
defendant. 6 CA 407, 408, 411, 415, 416. Cited. 7 CA 257, 258. Cited. 8 CA 153, 154, 157. Cited. 10 CA 486, 494. Cited.
Id., 532, 534. Cited. 12 CA 364, 365. Cited. 14 CA 10, 12, 20, 29. Cited. 15 CA 58, 59. Cited. Id., 161, 182. Cited. 18 CA
104, 106. Cited. 21 CA 326. Cited. 22 CA 10, 11. Cited. Id., 683, 685. Cited. 23 CA 83, 84. Cited. Id., 447-449. Cited.
Id., 479, 480, 483. Cited. 24 CA 473, 474; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788 et seq. Cited. Id., 598, 599, 606-608.
Cited. 27 CA 49, 50, 55, 56. Cited. Id., 103, 104, 108, 113. Cited. 28 CA 369, 370. Cited. 30 CA 45, 46. Cited. 31 CA 178,
180. Cited. 36 CA 106, 108; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 276, 277, 296-298. Cited. 38 CA 56,
58. Cited. 40 CA 601, 602, 609, 613. Cited. 42 CA 507. Cited. 43 CA 76. Cited. 45 CA 369. Cited. 46 CA 118. Broad
intent is to prohibit conduct that hampers activities of police in performance of their duties, including physical resistance
as well as defendant's conduct in this case, in which, after officer saw defendant in window and ordered him at gunpoint
to get down and show his hands, defendant reentered building and fled through another window. 66 CA 357.
Cited. 33 CS 4. Construed. 33 CS 515. Intention to interfere is necessary element of offense; charge to jury also required
knowledge of officer's duty; unlawful entry by officer would not be "in the performance of his duties", so proof of lawfulness
is essential element of state's case and section 53a-23 is applicable. 34 CS 531. Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction.
Id., 549, 550. Cited. 36 CS 89. Cited. 37 CS 767, 774. Cited. 38 CS 364, 365; id., 400; id., 665, 666. Cited. 39 CS 347,
348. Cited. 43 CS 46, 74.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 205 C. 456, 459. Cited. 221 C. 788, 790. In order to sustain a conviction under statute, there must be a finding
that police officers had been acting in the performance of their duties. 261 C. 553.
Defendant acted with the intent to interfere with the performance of the officers' duties; defendant's act does not have
to be successful. 1 CA 669, 670, 679. Cited. Id., 709, 710, 714-720, 722. Cited. 5 CA 496, 497. Cited. Id., 616, 619, 620.
Cited. 6 CA 407, 416. Cited. 9 CA 255. Cited. 14 CA 10, 18. Cited. 17 CA 104-106. Cited. 21 CA 260, 261. Cited. 23
CA 123, 125. Cited. 24 CA 195, 196. Cited. Id., 473, 474; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788 et seq. Cited. Id., 489.
Cited. 25 CA 3, 5. Cited. 31 CA 178, 180. Cited. 32 CA 224, 238. Cited. 33 CA 509, 510. Cited. 37 CA 276, 277, 295.
Cited. 40 CA 601, 602, 610. Cited. 41 CA 584, 585. Cited. 45 CA 369. Cited. 46 CA 791.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 354.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 13 CA 667, 668.
Sec. 53a-167b. Failure to assist a peace officer or firefighter: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of failure to assist a peace officer or firefighter when,
commanded by a peace officer or firefighter authorized to command assistance, such
person refuses to assist such peace officer or firefighter in the execution of such peace
officer's or firefighter's duties.
(b) Failure to assist a peace officer or firefighter is a class A misdemeanor.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 51; P.A. 01-84, S. 12, 26.)
History: P.A. 01-84 replaced "fireman" with "firefighter" and made other technical changes for purposes of gender
neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.
Cited. 216 C. 820. Section not facially unconstitutional under fourth or fourteenth amendments. 217 C. 73-75, 77-79,
81, 83, 87-90, 92, 94. Cited. 218 C. 483-486.
Cited. 22 CA 683, 684, 686. Cited. 31 CA 443, 447.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 22 CA 683, 684.
Sec. 53a-167c. Assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel. (a) A
person is guilty of assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel when, with
intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable peace officer, firefighter or employee of an
emergency medical service organization, as defined in section 53a-3, emergency room
physician or nurse, employee of the Department of Correction, member of the Board
of Pardons and Paroles, probation officer, employee of the judicial branch assigned to
provide pretrial secure detention and programming services to juveniles accused of the
commission of a delinquent act, employee of the Department of Children and Families
assigned to provide direct services to children and youth in the care or custody of the
department, employee of a municipal police department assigned to provide security at
the police department's lockup and holding facility or active individual member of a
volunteer canine search and rescue team, as defined in section 5-249, from performing
his or her duties, and while such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse,
member, probation officer or active individual member is acting in the performance of
his or her duties, (1) such person causes physical injury to such peace officer, firefighter,
employee, physician, nurse, member, probation officer or active individual member, or
(2) such person throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled, any rock, bottle, can
or other article, object or missile of any kind capable of causing physical harm, damage or
injury, at such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, probation
officer or active individual member, or (3) such person uses or causes to be used any
mace, tear gas or any like or similar deleterious agent against such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, probation officer or active individual
member, or (4) such person throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled, any paint,
dye or other like or similar staining, discoloring or coloring agent or any type of offensive
or noxious liquid, agent or substance at such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, probation officer or active individual member, or (5) such person
throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled, any bodily fluid including, but not
limited to, urine, feces, blood or saliva at such peace officer, firefighter, employee,
physician, nurse, member, probation officer or active individual member.
(b) Assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel is a class C felony. If
any person who is confined in an institution or facility of the Department of Correction
is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for assault of an employee of the Department
of Correction under this section, such term shall run consecutively to the term for which
the person was serving at the time of the assault.
(P.A. 73-639, S. 19; P.A. 90-157, S. 2; 90-250, S. 2; P.A. 93-246, S. 1; P.A. 94-62; P.A. 98-41; P.A. 99-26, S. 28; 99-204; P.A. 01-84, S. 13, 26; P.A. 03-6, S. 1; 03-19, S. 126; P.A. 04-234, S. 2; 04-241, S. 3; 04-257, S. 120.)
History: P.A. 90-157 applied provisions to assaults of employees of an emergency medical service organization; P.A.
90-250 applied provisions to employees of the department of correction, specified that assault must occur while peace
officer, fireman or correction department employee is acting in performance of his duties and added provision re consecutive
sentences for persons sentenced for assault of correction department employees; P.A. 93-246 applied provisions to assault
of an employee or member of the board of parole or probation officer; P.A. 94-62 applied the provisions to emergency
room physicians and emergency room nurses; P.A. 98-41 applied provisions to an assault of an employee of the Judicial
Branch assigned to provide pretrial secure detention and programming services to juveniles accused of the commission
of a delinquent act or an assault of an employee of the Department of Children and Families performing duties at Long
Lane School; P.A. 99-26 revised the category of employees of the Department of Children and Families to which provisions
apply by replacing an employee "performing duties at Long Lane School" with an employee "assigned to provide direct
services to children and youth in the care or custody of the department"; P.A. 99-204 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv.
(5) re throwing or hurling any bodily fluid at specified personnel and changed the name of the offense to "assault of public
safety or emergency medical personnel" where appearing; P.A. 01-84 replaced "fireman" with "firefighter" in Subsec. (a),
effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 03-6 amended Subsec. (a) to apply provisions to assault of an employee of a municipal police
department assigned to provide security at the police department's lockup and holding facility and make a technical change
for the purpose of gender neutrality; P.A. 03-19 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective May 12, 2003; P.A. 04-234 replaced Board of Parole with Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective July 1, 2004; P.A. 04-241 applied provisions
to assaults of active individual members of volunteer canine search and rescue teams; P.A. 04-257 amended Subsec. (a)
to delete reference to an employee of the Board of Parole, effective June 14, 2004.
See Sec. 53a-59b re assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree.
Cited. 214 C. 195, 196. Cited. 231 C. 545-547, 555, 557-559, 562, 563. Cited. 234 C. 78, 80. Cited. 236 C. 31, 33, 36.
Cited. 237 C. 454, 455. Cited. Id., 633.
Cited. 3 CA 353, 354. Cited. 10 CA 486, 494. Cited. 12 CA 364, 365. Cited. 14 CA 10, 12, 29, 36-38. Cited. 27 CA
103, 105. 32 CA 224, 239, 240. Cited. 37 CA 338, 339, 342. Cited. 40 CA 601, 602, 604, 606, 613. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited.
Id., 76. Cited. 46 CA 118. Under Sec. 53a-23, the illegality of an arrest is not a defense to charges under this section which
was intended to require an arrestee to submit to an arrest, even though he believes, and may ultimately establish, that the
arrest was without probable cause or was otherwise unlawful. It was not intended to require an arrestee to submit to
egregiously unlawful conduct - such as an unprovoked assault - by the police in the course of an arrest, whether the arrest
was legal or illegal. 79 CA 667.
Cited. 33 CS 4. Cited. 39 CS 347, 348.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 201 C. 605, 606, 628, 630. Subdiv. (1) cited. 205 C. 370, 371. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 910. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 231 C. 545, 547-549, 551-556, 558, 560-563. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 502, 504, 513. Judgment of appellate
court in State v. Wolff, 37 CA 500 reversed in part to affirm judgment of trial court with respect to charges under this
section. 237 C. 633. Trial court improperly prevented defendant from offering evidence re first element of the crime,
namely, whether the officer was performing his assigned duties when defendant struck him. 255 C. 581. In order to sustain
conviction under the statute, there must be a finding that police officers had been acting in the performance of their duties.
261 C. 553.
Cited. 1 CA 709, 710. Subdiv. (1) cited. 9 CA 169, 171; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14
CA 10, 11, 16, 18, 21, 36, 38. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 10, 11, 16, 18, 21, 36, 38, 39. Cited. Id., 10, 27. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23
CA 160, 161, 172; Id., 315, 316. Cited. Id., 447, 449. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.; Id., 663, 664. Cited erroneously as Sec. 53-167c(a)(1). 28 CA 469. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 606, 607, 610. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 178, 179. Cited. 32 CA 224, 225.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 224, 226, 237-243. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 224, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 509, 510. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 743, 744, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35 CA 431, 432, 434. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 699, 700. Cited. 37 CA 338, 339, 346-348. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 338, 347, 348. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 500, 501.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 635, 636. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 306, 307. Cited. Id., 306, 315. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 333, 335.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 657, 659. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 789, 790. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 480. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 578.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 44 CA 264. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 118. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CS 347, 353.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 231 C. 545, 557.
Cited. 32 CA 224, 239. Legislature intended to deter all prisoners being held in Connecticut facilities, whether there
temporarily or for duration of a sentence, from assaulting employees of those facilities and therefore trial court lacked
discretion to impose a sentence concurrent to defendant's federal sentence. 63 CA 386.
Sec. 53a-167d. Assault of a prosecutor: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty
of assault of a prosecutor when such person, with intent to intimidate or harass, or to
retaliate against, another person on account of the performance by such other person of
such other person's duties as a prosecutor employed by the Division of Criminal Justice,
causes physical injury to such other person.
(b) Assault of a prosecutor is a class C felony.
(P.A. 01-25.)
PART XII*
ESCAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-154:
Cited. 25 CS 451; 27 CS 283.
Annotations to former section 53-155:
Cited. 302 U. S. 54.
One fleeing from state in breach of his parole is guilty of escape. 68 C. 450. On the record, held that escape from prison
farm was in fact one from prison. 130 C. 111. Cited. 165 C. 371. Cited. 166 C. 178.
Cited. 25 CS 252; 28 CS 16.
Annotations to former section 53-157:
Escape from jail a crime at common law. 7 C. 387. Escape from jail of person imprisoned on void warrant no crime.
7 C. 456. Jailer's license no defense to escape. 16 C. 51. Cited. 302 U. S. 54.
Cited. 27 CS 275.
Annotations to former section 53-158:
As used in this section, "correctional institution" refers to what was formerly known as a jail and is now a community
correctional center. 166 C. 178.
Cited. 4 CS 215. Failure to sentence under, error, when. 30 CS 144.
Annotations to former section 53-159:
Cited. 4 CS 215; 24 CS 310.
Annotations to former section 53-162:
The essential elements of the common law and Sec. 53-162 crime of escape from custody are identical and the former
is not a lesser offense included in the law. 165 C. 522, 530.
Cited. 23 CS 16, 17.
Annotations to former section 53-162a:
Defendant guilty of offense even where officer in charge gave him permission. 151 C. 159. Authorization by guard not
equivalent to being "authorized by law". Id.
Annotations to former section 53-165:
Offense within this statute to obstruct indifferent person lawfully deputed to serve process. 39 C. 249. Refusal to turn
over property to attaching officer who has lost possession of it after attachment no offense under this statute. 74 C. 64.
Cited. 132 C. 228; 145 C. 141; 153 C. 149. No one has a right, unless under the most exceptional circumstances, to obstruct
an officer who is armed with process lawful upon its face and who is in the performance of his duty. 147 C. 76.
Cited. 13 CS 113. There must be actual opposition or resistance, making necessary, under the circumstances, the use
of force. 24 CS 7.
Failure to allege officer "was concerned in administration of justice while executing his duties" was not fatal. 2 Conn.
Cir. Ct. 156. For violation, personal abuse must hinder officer in performing his duties. Id., 169. Cited. Id., 200. Even
though defendant who was arrested as a result of speedy information resisted arrest because he mistakenly believed a
warrant was necessary, he was guilty under this section since the intent requisite to the crime of resisting arrest is the intent
to resist or obstruct an officer while he is making a lawful arrest, not the intent to violate the criminal law. Id., 467, 468.
Defendant who volunteered to accompany officer to confront complaining witness but then ran away and, in course of
tussle with officers to apprehend him, was placed under arrest on speedy information found guilty under statute. 4 Conn.
Cir. Ct. 530, 534. Purpose of statute is to enforce orderly behavior in important mission of preserving the peace and any
act intended to thwart that purpose is a violation. Id., 534, 540. Physical strength need not be involved nor need act be
wholly or partially successful or such as to defeat or delay officer's performance of duty. Id. Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 311,
355. Statute was violated by defendants who, after being placed under arrest, refused to leave police cruiser and enter
police wagon, necessitating their being carried bodily to wagon. Id., 583. State failed to prove defendant committed offense
beyond reasonable doubt where there was no battery by defendant, who was five foot, eighty-five pound female, against
police officer, who was over six feet and weighed one hundred eighty-three pounds. Id., 587. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 431.
Sec. 53a-168. Escape: Definitions. For purposes of sections 53a-169 to 53a-171,
inclusive:
(1) "Correctional institution" means the facilities defined in section 1-1 and any
other correctional facility established by the Commissioner of Correction.
(2) "Custody" means restraint by a public servant pursuant to an arrest or court
order other than a Probate Court order directed against a person who is not in the custody
of the Commissioner of Correction when such order is issued.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 170; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 41; P.A. 80-216, S. 1.)
History: 1971 act replaced reference to Sec. 53a-170 with reference to Sec. 53a-171; P.A. 80-216 clarified meaning of
custody as it applies to probate court orders.
Cited. 240 C. 97.
Cited. 37 CA 276, 284.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 37 CA 276, 281. Cited. Id., 733, 735, 744.
Sec. 53a-169. Escape in the first degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty
of escape in the first degree (1) if he escapes from a correctional institution or (2) if he
escapes from any public or private, nonprofit halfway house, group home or mental
health facility or community residence to which he was transferred pursuant to subsection (e) of section 18-100 or section 18-100c and he is in the custody of the Commissioner
of Correction or is required to be returned to the custody of said commissioner upon his
release from such facility or (3) if he escapes from a work detail or school on the premises
of the correctional institution or (4) if he fails to return from a furlough authorized under
section 18-101a or (5) if he fails to return from work release or education release as
authorized under sections 18-90a and 18-100 or (6) if he escapes from a hospital for
mental illness in which he has been confined under the provisions of section 17a-582,
17a-584, 17a-593, 17a-594 or 17a-596 or (7) if, while under the jurisdiction of the
Psychiatric Security Review Board, but not confined to a hospital for mental illness, he
leaves the state without authorization of the board.
(b) Escape in the first degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 171; P.A. 73-639, S. 12; P.A. 74-338, S. 47, 94; P.A. 78-92, S. 2; P.A. 80-216, S. 2; P.A. 82-12;
P.A. 84-236, S. 1; P.A. 85-506, S. 25, 32; P.A. 89-383, S. 2, 16; P.A. 98-39.)
History: P.A. 73-639 replaced offense of escape from a correctional institution with offense of escape in the first degree
which includes escapes from correctional institutions and escapes from work details or schools on institution premises;
P.A. 74-338 specified failure to return from furlough as first degree escape; P.A 78-92 specified escapes from halfway
house, group home or mental health facility and failure to return from work-release or education release as first degree
escape; P.A. 80-216 specified escape from halfway house, group home or mental health facility is first degree escape if
escapee is in correction commissioner's custody or is to be returned to his custody upon release from the facility; P.A. 82-12 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (6) concerning a person who escapes from a state hospital or treatment facility;
P.A. 84-236 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) to include escapes from community residences; P.A. 85-506 amended
Subdiv. (6) of Subsec. (a) to replace "state hospital or other treatment facility" with "hospital for mental illness" and replace
reference to repealed Sec. 53a-47 with "section 17-257c, 17-257e, 17-257n, 17-257o or 17-257q", and added Subdiv. (7)
concerning a person under the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board who leaves the state; P.A. 89-383
amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) to include a person who escapes from his abode to which he was released pursuant to
Subsec. (f) of Sec. 18-100, effective July 5, 1989, to July 1, 1994 (Revisor's note: The amendment to this section contained
in P.A. 89-393 was deleted by the Revisors following its expiration on July 1, 1994); P.A. 98-39 amended Subdiv. (2) of
Subsec. (a) to add reference to Sec. 18-100c.
See Sec. 18-101a re consideration of prisoner's failure to return from furlough as crime of escape.
Illegal confinement is no defense to escape from correctional institution. 169 C. 438, 441. Cited. 184 C. 157, 166. Held
constitutional as to both due process and equal protection clauses of fourteenth amendment to U.S. constitution. Id., 222-
225. Defendant's acts did not constitute violation of statute as it was amended as of date of acts as he was not then under
jurisdiction of commissioner of correction. 185 C. 517, 519, 522, 523, 525, 526. Cited. 216 C. 402, 405, 406, 408, 409,
411. Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited. 234 C. 301, 309.
Cited. 36 CA 440, 445. Cited. 39 CA 333, 336. Cited. Id., 407, 410. Cited. Id., 789, 790.
Cited. 35 CS 544, 547.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 184 C. 222, 223, 226. Subdiv. (2) cited. 213 C. 38, 48. Subdiv. (2): Proof of single failure to report
insufficient to prove guilt of "escape". 216 C. 402-411. Subdiv. (6) cited. Id., 402, 408. Subdiv. (7) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4)
cited. Id., 402, 409. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2): Decision of appellate court in State v. Jemison, 35 CA 1, 2-5,
overruled to the extent that it permits conviction for escape to rest solely on jury's finding that defendant repeatedly did
not report to supervising officer as scheduled. 234 C. 301, 302, 306, 308-311. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 748, 751. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 236 C. 209, 210. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 266, 267. Subdiv. (1) cited. 241 C. 322.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 817, 818. Subdiv. (4) cited. 35 CA 1, 8; see also 234 C. 301 et seq. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id.; see
also 234 C. 301 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 680, 681. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 333, 336. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 789,
790. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 407, 408, 411. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 813, 815.
Subdiv. (3): Equating failure to return from parole with escape held not violative of constitutional right to due process
and equal protection. 36 CS 71, 72.
Sec. 53a-170. Escape in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of escape in the second degree if he escapes from any correctional institution while
employed at work outside such correctional institution.
(b) Escape in the second degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 173; P.A. 73-639, S. 14; P.A. 92-260, S. 63.)
History: P.A. 73-639 substituted "escape in the second degree" for "escape while at work"; P.A. 92-260 made technical
changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language.
Sec. 53a-171. Escape from custody: Class C felony or class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of escape from custody if such person (1) escapes from custody,
or (2) has been convicted as delinquent, has been committed to the Department of Children and Families, and (A) fails to return from a leave authorized under section 17a-8a,
or (B) escapes from a state or private facility or institution in which such person has
been assigned or placed by the Commissioner of Children and Families.
(b) If a person has been arrested for, charged with or convicted of a felony, escape
from such custody is a class C felony, otherwise, escape from custody is a class A
misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 172; 1971, P.A. 16; P.A. 00-209, S. 2.)
History: 1971 act changed escape from custody after arrest or charge for, or conviction of, a felony from a Class D to
a Class C felony; P.A. 00-209 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) re a person who has been convicted as delinquent
and fails to return from an authorized leave or escapes from a facility or institution in which such person was assigned or
placed and to make technical changes.
Cited. 173 C. 35, 39, 41, 45. Cited. 188 C. 406, 407. Cited. 196 C. 309-311. Cited. 197 C. 588, 589. Cited. 207 C. 270,
272. Cited. 211 C. 398, 400. Cited. 220 C. 270, 272.
Cited. 23 CA 160, 161. Cited. Id., 615, 616, 621. Cited. 24 CA 287, 288. Cited. 36 CA 691-694. Cited. 37 CA 276,
278, 280-282, 284. Cited. Id., 733, 735.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 3 CA 684, 685. Cited. 12 CA 604, 605. Cited. 23 CA 160, 161. Cited. 36 CA 691, 692. Cited. 37 CA 276, 278,
282. Cited. Id., 733, 735, 744.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 173 C. 35, 36, 49.
Cited. 37 CA 276, 285, 286.
Sec. 53a-171a. Aiding escape from hospital or sanatorium: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of aiding escape from a hospital or sanatorium when he
aids the escape from a hospital or sanatorium of any person committed thereto as mentally ill or as drug dependent.
(b) Aiding escape from a hospital or sanatorium is a class A misdemeanor.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 42; P.A. 76-336, S. 11.)
History: P.A. 76-336 reworded Subsec. (a) for clarity and grammatical sense inserting "when he aids the escape from
a hospital or sanatorium".
Sec. 53a-172. Failure to appear in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person
is guilty of failure to appear in the first degree when (1) while charged with the commission of a felony and while out on bail or released under other procedure of law, he
wilfully fails to appear when legally called according to the terms of his bail bond or
promise to appear, or (2) while on probation for conviction of a felony, he wilfully fails
to appear when legally called for a violation of probation hearing.
(b) Failure to appear in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 174; P.A. 92-260, S. 64; P.A. 98-26, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language; P.A. 98-26
amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) re failure to appear for a violation of probation hearing.
Cited. 176 C. 421, 422, 425-427. Cited. 221 C. 407, 408. Cited. 222 C. 556, 558, 559, 583. Cited. 227 C. 829-831,
845-847. Cited. 229 C. 285, 287. Cited. Id., 529, 543. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114, 135. Cited. 242 C. 296.
Cited. 4 CA 154-157. Cited. 6 CA 402, 403. Cited. 12 CA 621, 622. Cited. 17 CA 556, 558. Cited. 20 CA 205, 207.
Cited. 27 CA 279, 281. Cited. 29 CA 801, 802; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 190, 192. Cited.
34 CA 191, 193-195, 197, 199. Cited. 36 CA 691, 692. Cited. 37 CA 437, 438. Cited. 39 CA 816, 819. Cited. 43 CA 142.
Cited. Id., 552.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 223 C. 283, 285. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Cited. 242 C. 296.
Cited. 13 CA 413, 414. Cited. 24 CA 316, 318. Cited. 25 CA 575, 576. Cited. 30 CA 9, 10. Cited. 34 CA 191, 192,
195. Cited. 37 CA 437, 438, 449. Cited. 39 CA 816, 817. Cited. 41 CA 47-49. Cited. 43 CA 142.
Sec. 53a-173. Failure to appear in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of failure to appear in the second degree when (1) while charged
with the commission of a misdemeanor or a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence
to a term of imprisonment may be imposed and while out on bail or released under other
procedure of law, he wilfully fails to appear when legally called according to the terms
of his bail bond or promise to appear, or (2) while on probation for conviction of a
misdemeanor or motor vehicle violation, he wilfully fails to appear when legally called
for a violation of probation hearing.
(b) Failure to appear in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 175; P.A. 87-343, S. 2, 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 65; P.A. 98-26, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 87-343 included persons charged with a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language; P.A.
98-26 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) re failure to appear for a violation of probation hearing.
Cited. 227 C. 829-831, 845-847. Cited. 234 C. 301, 303.
Cited. 6 CA 247, 250. Cited. 8 CA 542, 543. Cited. 11 CA 644, 645. Cited. 13 CA 638, 639. Cited. 17 CA 226, 231.
Cited. 20 CA 811. Cited. 38 CA 85, 86. Cited. 43 CA 142. Cited. 45 CA 722. Pursuant to section, to support a conviction
for failure to appear, state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that defendant received and deliberately ignored
a notice to appear or that he intentionally embarked on a course of conduct designed to prevent him from receiving such
notice. 61 CA 118.
Cited. 35 CS 587, 588, 596, 597.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 38 CA 85, 86.
Sec. 53a-174. Unauthorized conveyance of items into correctional or humane
institution or to inmate: Class D felony. Unauthorized conveyance of letter into or
from, or use of false name to enter, correctional institution: Class A misdemeanor.
(a) Any person not authorized by law who conveys or passes, or causes to be conveyed
or passed, into any correctional or humane institution or the grounds or buildings thereof,
or to any inmate of such an institution who is outside the premises thereof and known
to the person so conveying or passing or causing such conveying or passing to be such
an inmate, any controlled drug, as defined in section 21a-240, any intoxicating liquors,
any firearm, weapon, dangerous instrument or explosive of any kind, any United States
currency, or any rope, ladder or other instrument or device for use in making, attempting
or aiding an escape, shall be guilty of a class D felony. The unauthorized conveying,
passing or possession of any rope or ladder or other instrument or device, adapted for
use in making or aiding an escape, into any such institution or the grounds or buildings
thereof, shall be presumptive evidence that it was so conveyed, passed or possessed for
such use.
(b) Any person not authorized by law who conveys into any such institution any
letter or other missive which is intended for any person confined therein, or who conveys
from within the enclosure to the outside of such institution any letter or other missive
written or given by any person confined therein, shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person or visitor who enters or attempts to enter a correctional institution
or facility by using a misleading or false name or title shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 176; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 43; 1972, P.A. 12; P.A. 73-639, S. 16.)
History: 1971 act applied provisions to humane institutions and replaced reference to "narcotic or hypnotic" drugs with
reference to "controlled" drugs in Subsec. (a) and added Subsec. (c) re use of false or misleading name in entrance in or
attempt to enter a correctional facility; 1972 act specified conveyance of U.S. currency into correctional or humane institution or to one of its inmates as Class D felony; P.A. 73-639 prohibited conveyance of any "dangerous instrument".
Cited. 42 CA 264.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 42 CA 264.
Sec. 53a-174a. Possession of weapon or dangerous instrument in correctional
institution: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution when, being an inmate of such institution,
he knowingly makes, conveys from place to place or has in his possession or under his
control any firearm, weapon, dangerous instrument, explosive, or any other substance
or thing designed to kill, injure or disable.
(b) Possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution is
a class B felony.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 55; P.A. 73-639, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 73-639 applied provisions with respect to possession of dangerous instruments.
Cited. 169 C. 428, 431. Cited. 195 C. 1, 2, 9. Cited. 227 C. 711, 714. Cited. Id., 751, 753. Cited. 230 C. 591, 593. Cited.
240 C. 97.
Cited. 39 CA 789, 790.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 230 C. 591, 593. Cited. 235 C. 748, 749. Cited. 240 C. 97.
Cited. 32 CA 448, 449. Cited. 36 CA 41, 42. Cited. 39 CA 789, 790. Cited. 44 CA 499.
PART XIII*
RIOT AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-167a:
Cited. 164 C. 69. Specific intent not required. Id.
Cited. 23 CS 231. Claim of prisoner convicted under this statute of brutal treatment may not be considered in habeas
corpus proceeding. 25 CS 519.
Annotations to former section 53-168:
This section applies to responses to questions put by police as well as to report by person who himself goes to police
for some action. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 193.
Annotations to former section 53-169:
Justice cannot order person engaged in riot bound over without complaint and warrant. 4 C. 112.
Sec. 53a-175. Riot in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is
guilty of riot in the first degree when simultaneously with six or more other persons he
engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes
or creates a grave risk of causing public alarm, and in the course of and as a result of
such conduct, a person other than one of the participants suffers physical injury or
substantial property damage occurs.
(b) Riot in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 177.)
Cited. 32 CA 224, 246.
Sec. 53a-176. Riot in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is
guilty of riot in the second degree when, simultaneously with two or more other persons,
he engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly
causes or creates a grave risk of causing public alarm.
(b) Riot in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 178.)
Cited. 32 CA 224, 246.
Sec. 53a-177. Unlawful assembly: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty
of unlawful assembly when he assembles with two or more other persons for the purpose
of engaging in conduct constituting the crime of riot, or when, being present at an assembly which either has or develops such a purpose, he remains there with intent to advance
that purpose.
(b) Unlawful assembly is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 179.)
Cited. 32 CA 224, 246.
Sec. 53a-178. Inciting to riot: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of
inciting to riot when he advocates, urges or organizes six or more persons to engage in
tumultuous and violent conduct of a kind likely to cause public alarm.
(b) Inciting to riot is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 180; P.A. 92-260, S. 66.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "create" with "cause".
Sec. 53a-179. Criminal advocacy: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal advocacy when (1) he advocates the overthrow of the existing form of government
of this state or any subdivision thereof by imminent dangerous action, or (2) with knowledge of its contents, he publishes, sells or distributes any document which advocates
such imminent dangerous action.
(b) Criminal advocacy is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 181.)
Annotation to former section 53-1:
Cited. 325 U.S. 10.
Annotation to former section 53-5:
Construed, applied and upheld. 96 C. 607.
Annotation to former section 53-6:
Cited. 96 C. 607.
Annotation to present section:
Cited. 197 C. 436, 443.
Sec. 53a-179a. Inciting injury to persons or property: Class C felony. (a) A
person is guilty of inciting injury to persons or property when, in public or private,
orally, in writing, in printing or in any other manner, he advocates, encourages, justifies,
praises, incites or solicits the unlawful burning, injury to or destruction of any public
or private property or advocates, encourages, justifies, praises, incites or solicits any
assault upon any organization of the armed forces of the United States, as defined by
section 27-103, or of this state, as defined by section 27-2, or the police force of this or
any other state or upon any officer or member thereof or the organized police or fire
departments of any municipality or any officer or member thereof, or the killing or
injuring of any class or body of persons, or of any individual.
(b) Inciting injury to persons or property is a class C felony.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 52.)
Annotations to former section 53-44:
Cited. 166 C. 81, 83, 88.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 234 C. 78, 80.
Cited. 36 CA 821, 822. Section not void for vagueness and overbreadth. 48 CA 148. Provisions codified common law
distinction between solicitation an attempt and solicitation not an attempt under Sec. 53a-49(a)(1). 65 CA 145.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 36 CA 821, 822.
Statute not unconstitutionally void for vagueness and overbreadth; requirement of intent that must be read into statute
preserves it from constitutional demise under first amendment. 41 CS 525, 526, 528, 530, 531, 537. Cited. 43 CS 46, 54, 74.
Sec. 53a-179b. Rioting at correctional institution: Class B felony. (a) A person
is guilty of rioting at a correctional institution when he incites, instigates, organizes,
connives at, causes, aids, abets, assists or takes part in any disorder, disturbance, strike,
riot or other organized disobedience to the rules and regulations of such institution.
(b) Rioting at a correctional institution is a class B felony.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 53.)
Cited. 190 C. 143-151. Cited. 227 C. 711-713, 742. Cited. 227 C. 751, 753. Cited. 237 C. 454, 455, 469-471, 474.
Cited. 240 C. 97.
Statute not constitutionally vague or overbroad. 30 CA 224, 227, 229, 230. Cited. 32 CA 224-226, 245-250. Cited. 44
CA 264.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 237 C. 454, 471-474.
Cited. 30 CA 224, 225, 227. Cited. 32 CA 224, 226. Cited. 39 CA 333, 336.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 74.
Sec. 53a-179c. Inciting to riot at correctional institution: Class C felony. (a) A
person is guilty of inciting to riot at a correctional institution when he incites, instigates,
organizes, connives at, causes, aids, abets or takes part in any meeting of inmates of a
correctional institution, the purpose of which is to foment unrest, disorder, disturbance,
strike, riot or other organized disobedience to the rules and regulations of the institution.
(b) Inciting to riot at a correctional institution is a class C felony.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 54.)
Cited. 32 CA 224, 249.
Sec. 53a-180. Falsely reporting an incident in the first degree: Class D felony.
(a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the first degree when, knowing
the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, such person:
(1) Initiates or circulates a false report or warning of an alleged occurrence or impending
occurrence of a fire, explosion, catastrophe or emergency under circumstances in which
it is likely that public alarm or inconvenience will result; or (2) reports, by word or
action, to any official or quasi-official agency or organization having the function of
dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property, an alleged occurrence
or impending occurrence of a fire, explosion or other catastrophe or emergency which
did not in fact occur or does not in fact exist.
(b) Falsely reporting an incident in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 182; P.A. 81-353, S. 1; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 1, 9.)
History: P.A. 81-353 increased the penalty from a class B to a class A misdemeanor; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2
renamed offense by replacing "falsely reporting an incident" with "falsely reporting an incident in the first degree" where
appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, delete in Subdiv. (1) a false
report or warning re a "crime" and delete former Subdiv. (3) re a gratuitous report to a law enforcement officer or agency
re an offense or incident, said provision being reenacted as Sec. 53a-180c by same act, and amended Subsec. (b) to increase
penalty from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony, effective January 1, 2002.
Cited. 188 C. 161, 175. Cited. 200 C. 743, 755. Cited. 216 C. 301, 314. Cited. 219 C. 529, 551. Cited. Id., 557, 564.
Cited. 221 C. 93, 101. Cited. 223 C. 635, 666. Cited. 224 C. 627, 644. Cited. 227 C. 1, 23. Cited. 238 C. 588.
Cited. 14 CA 548, 549. Cited. 19 CA 396, 397. Cited. 29 CA 843, 852. Cited. 36 CA 556, 563, 564.
Cited. 34 CS 666, 669.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 186 C. 265, 268.
Evidence was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict under section. 55 CA 475.
Sec. 53a-180a. Falsely reporting an incident resulting in serious physical injury or death: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident
resulting in serious physical injury or death when such person commits the crime of
falsely reporting an incident in the first degree as provided in section 53a-180 or falsely
reporting an incident in the second degree as provided in section 53a-180c, and such
false report results in the serious physical injury or death of another person.
(b) Falsely reporting an incident resulting in serious physical injury or death is a
class C felony.
(P.A. 81-353, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 67; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 3, 9.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make technical changes in the name of the offense; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess.
P.A. 01-2 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, replace reference to the crime
of "falsely reporting an incident as provided in section 53a-180" with "falsely reporting an incident in the first degree as
provided in section 53a-180" and add reference to the crime of "falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as
provided in section 53a-180c" and amended Subsec. (b) to increase the penalty from a class D to a class C felony, effective
January 1, 2002.
Sec. 53a-180b. Falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident
concerning serious physical injury or death when such person commits the crime of
falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as provided in section 53a-180c and
such false report is of the alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of the serious
physical injury or death of another person.
(b) Falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death is a
class D felony.
(P.A. 97-147, S. 2; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 4, 9.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "the crime of falsely reporting an incident as
provided in section 53a-180" with "the crime of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as provided in section
53a-180c" and make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, effective January 1, 2002.
Sec. 53a-180c. Falsely reporting an incident in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree
when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless,
such person gratuitously reports to a law enforcement officer or agency (1) the alleged
occurrence of an offense or incident which did not in fact occur, (2) an allegedly impending occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not about to occur, or (3)
false information relating to an actual offense or incident or to the alleged implication
of some person therein.
(b) Falsely reporting an incident in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 2, 9.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 effective January 1, 2002.
Secs. 53a-180d to 53a-180z. Reserved for future use.
PART XIV*
BREACH OF THE PEACE, HARASSMENT
AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-174:
An assault with "intent to drown and suffocate" not within this statute. 5 C. 330. A breach of the peace under this section
may be committed without assault or battery. 29 C. 72. Assailing party with scurrilous and abusive language is a "mocking"
under this section. 34 C. 279. Effect of provision concerning libelous publications. 90 C. 98. Elements necessary where
offense is tumultuous behavior. 75 C. 205. Interrupting a school under former statute. 26 C. 607; 28 C. 232; 82 C. 321.
Does not define breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it; it may be committed in other ways.
126 C. 5. Not necessary that information contain an allegation that publications were maliciously made if there is no
mention of privilege. 148 C. 208. Not necessary to prove a breach of the peace to support a conviction of libel. Id. Cited.
97 C. 138; 124 C. 557; 145 C. 124; 147 C. 704; 148 C. 77; 153 C. 208; 157 C. 226. Cited. 162 C. 383. Cited. 165 C. 288,
291, 294.
Annotations to former statute prohibiting acts calculated to intimidate: to threaten and use means to intimidate a company
against its will to abstain from keeping in its employ workmen of its own choice is within the prohibition of the statute.
55 C. 70, 71; 92 C. 168. Statute as applied to strike. 77 C. 237; 79 C. 13; id., 416. Necessary allegations of information;
intimidation need not result. 80 C. 614; 81 C. 696. Notice by bricklayers' union to contractors and employers that members
would not work if nonunion men were employed held no violation of this statute on particular facts. 92 C. 168. Does not
require proof of assault and battery. No specific intent is essential. It is sufficient that the acts intentionally committed
cause serious disquietude on the part of those in the vicinity. 140 C. 586. Cited. 142 C. 605.
Cited. 5 CS 507; 22 CS 361; 23 CS 294; id., 344; id., 455; 24 CS 354; 25 CS 483; 27 CS 128. "Peace" defined; it is
not the law that there is no breach of the peace unless public repose is disturbed. Numerous abusive and indecent telephone
calls held breach of the peace. (Now see Sec. 53a-183.) Where minor defendant was committed to reformatory for violation
of this section, there should have been presentence investigation and report as defendant could have been detained therein
for as much as two years. 26 CS 504, 505. Petitioner by habeas corpus petition challenged her commitment for indefinite
term for breach of peace, when Sec. 17-360 provides maximum sentence of one year for this misdemeanor and sentence
ordered modified. 28 CS 9.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 200; id., 611; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 224, 227; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 68; id., 90; id., 413, 416; id., 476, 477;
id., 538. Abusive and threatening language uttered over telephone constituted violation. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 288. (Now see
Sec. 53-174a.) Defendant's contention that conduct involving one or two persons and occurring in an isolated place could
not constitute breach of the peace was without merit. Id., 648. Time is not an essential element of crime of breach of peace
unless date is material to the defense. Id., 649. Mere presence of defendant as inactive companion would not make him an
accessory to breach of peace. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 138. Breach of peace may be found if alleged offensive act is of such a
character that it naturally tends to cause serious disquietude on part of those in vicinity where act is likely to exercise its
malignity. Id., 423. "Provokes contention" does not require that blows be struck. Id., 550, 552. Statute provides its own
definition of "mocking". Id. Although defendant did not take part in assault, he is guilty under statute because everyone
is party to an offense who directly or indirectly counsels or procures any person to commit the offense or do any act forming
a part thereof. Id., 610, 613. Defendant properly charged with breach of peace when he violated curfew imposed by mayor
of New Haven when riotous conditions existed in the city. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22. Right to constitutional procedural safeguards
applicable to charges of misdemeanor. Id., 178. Evidence of defendant magazine salesman's forcible amorous assault on
complainant housewife in her home warranted his conviction of crime of breach of peace by assault. Id., 186. Statute does
not define crime of breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it and defendant garage owner's
threatened assault on complaining witness in his shop warranted his conviction under it. Id., 298. Constitutionality of this
statute properly raised by demurrer upon ground it is unconstitutionally vague. Demurrer overruled as language used in
statute is plain and unambiguous and legislative intent clearly expressed. Id., 384. Cited. Id., 311; 517. Section does not
define crime of breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it. It may be committed in ways other
than those specified. Offensive acts must be of such character that they tend naturally to cause serious disquietude on part
of those in vicinity. Id., 583. Evidence of prior altercation between defendant and victim's son which led immediately to
attack on father, admissible on question of motive. Id., 607. There was sufficient evidence on which trial court found
defendant had committed assault and battery and appeal court cannot retry case. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 14. Defendant in resisting
unlawful arrest was not guilty of breach of peace. Id., 42. Cited. Id., 90, 402, 403, 404, 405, 431.
Annotations to former section 53-175:
Disorderly conduct arrest proper where defendant refused to answer police officer's questions and gathered a crowd
by his shouting. 157 C. 485.
Conduct to be disorderly under this section must take place in a public place. 23 CS 430. Constitutionality upheld;
disorderly conduct involves annoyance to or interference with someone in a public place by conduct which is offensive
or disorderly. 24 CS 7. What constitutes disorderly conduct; sit-in demonstrations in waiting rooms of business office,
although nonabusive, nonviolent and nonboisterous, held to be disorderly conduct. Id., 337.
Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 57; id., 533. Defendant was correctly charged with disorderly conduct when he violated curfew
order of mayor of New Haven imposed to prevent continuance of riots in that city. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22. Waiving Viet Cong
flag is expression of ideas and not incitement to violence under statute. Lower court will not rule unconstitutional laws of
long regarded social importance and a public policy of wide general support. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 402 et seq.
Annotations to former section 53-183:
"Permit" covers not only a voluntary turning loose, but also failure to use reasonable care to restrain. 104 C. 499. Need
not be confined by halter. 136 C. 440. To establish a violation it must be shown that the animals were at large on the
highway without a keeper either by the voluntary act of the defendant or by reason of his negligent failure to restrain them.
146 C. 470.
Owner of horse not required to respond in damages where horse was at large on the highway because the barnyard gate
had been cut by a person unknown to the owner. 10 CS 384.
Annotations to former section 53-186:
Cited. 104 C. 499.
Sec. 53a-180aa. Breach of the peace in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A
person is guilty of breach of the peace in the first degree when, with intent to cause
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person
places a nonfunctional imitation of an explosive or incendiary device or an imitation of
a hazardous substance in a public place or in a place or manner likely to be discovered
by another person.
(b) For the purposes of this section: (1) "Hazardous substance" means any physical,
chemical, biological or radiological substance or matter which, because of its quantity,
concentration or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics, may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or
incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to
human health, and (2) "public place" means any area that is used or held out for use by
the public whether owned or operated by public or private interests.
(c) Breach of the peace in the first degree is a class D felony.
(Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 5, 9.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 effective January 1, 2002.
Sec. 53a-181. Breach of the peace in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree when, with intent to
cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such
person: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior in a
public place; or (2) assaults or strikes another; or (3) threatens to commit any crime
against another person or such other person's property; or (4) publicly exhibits, distributes, posts up or advertises any offensive, indecent or abusive matter concerning any
person; or (5) in a public place, uses abusive or obscene language or makes an obscene
gesture; or (6) creates a public and hazardous or physically offensive condition by any
act which such person is not licensed or privileged to do. For purposes of this section,
"public place" means any area that is used or held out for use by the public whether
owned or operated by public or private interests.
(b) Breach of the peace in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 183; P.A. 92-260, S. 68; P.A. 98-55; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 6, 9.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace in Subdiv. (6) "public, hazardous or physically offensive condition"
with "public and hazardous or physically offensive condition" and amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change in the
name of the offense; P.A. 98-55 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (7) re placing a nonfunctional imitation of an explosive
or incendiary device in a public place and add definition of "public place" and amended Subsec. (b) to add exception
making a violation of Subdiv. (7) a class A misdemeanor; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 renamed offense by replacing
"breach of the peace" with "breach of the peace in the second degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to delete
Subdiv. (7) re placing of a nonfunctional imitation of an explosive or incendiary device in a public place, said provision
being reenacted as part of Sec. 53a-180aa by same act, and to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality
and amended Subsec. (b) to delete exception that made a violation of Subsec. (a)(7) a class A misdemeanor, effective
January 1, 2002.
Cited. 190 C. 371, 411. Cited. 191 C. 433, 436. Cited. 194 C. 347, 358, 360. Cited. 195 C. 668, 672, 676. Cited. 205
C. 456, 474. Cited. 217 C. 73, 76. Cited. 237 C. 613. Cited. Id., 633. Cited. 243 C. 115.
Cited. 3 CA 410, 411. Cited. 6 CA 334, 335. Cited. 6 CA 407, 408. Cited. 9 CA 255. Cited. 10 CA 499, 500. Cited. 12
CA 74, 75, 79. Cited. Id., 306, 308. Cited. Id., 481, 487. Cited. 13 CA 139, 149. Cited. 14 CA 6. Cited. Id., 10, 12, 16.
Cited. Id., 548, 549. Cited. 15 CA 641, 642. Cited. 17 CA 234, 236. Cited. Id., 339, 340. Cited. 26 CA 157, 162. Cited. 28
CA 344, 359. Cited. 29 CA 683, 684. Cited. 36 CA 135, 136. Statute found not to be unconstitutionally vague on its face
and not to be overbroad. 56 CA 264.
Cited. 33 CS 93. Cited. 34 CS 548, 549. Obscene gesture must be erotic in a significant way and must appeal to prurient
interest in sex or portray sex in patently offensive way. Id., 575. Not unconstitutionally vague or overly broad. 35 CS 587-
590. Cited. 36 CS 89; id., 609, 610. Whether defendant's vituperations addressed to the police officer constituted breach
of the peace under statute discussed. 38 CS 349, 352. Cited. 39 CS 359-361. Cited. 43 CS 46, 52, 65.
Notice of conduct to be precise. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 667. History prior to penal code. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 668. Cited. Id., 751, 752.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (5) cited. 194 C. 347, 358. Cited. 195 C. 668, 676. Cited. 198 C. 43, 44. Subdiv. (5) cited. 205 C. 456, 475,
476. Subdiv. (2) cited. 214 C. 378, 379. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 153, 155. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 903. Subdiv. (1):
Does not require proof of actual physical contact on part of defendant with a victim; when applied to speech, parameters
of the violent, threatening or tumultuous behavior prohibited by section are consistent with "fighting words"; judgment
of appellate court in State v. Szymkiewicz, 36 CA 625 et seq. reversed. 237 C. 613. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 613. Subdiv. (5)
cited. Id., 633. Subdiv. (3): To avoid invalidation on grounds of overbreadth, judicial gloss adopted that when a police
officer is the only person upon whose sensibilities the inflammatory language could have played, a conviction can be
supported only for extremely offensive behavior supporting an inference that the actor wished to provoke the policeman
to violence. 265 C. 145.
Cited. 1 CA 669, 670. Subdiv. (5): This part of the statute is confined to language which constitutes "fighting" words
and defendant's repeated vile, racist and threatening epithets were of such a nature. Id., 669, 678. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.,
709, 714. Statute meets requirements of fair notice to defendant. 6 CA 407, 408, 411, 415. Cited. Id., 407, 415. Cited. 10
CA 499, 500. Subdiv. (2) cited. 12 CA 74, 88, 89. Subdiv. (6) cited. Id., 74, 82, 88, 89. Cited. 13 CA 139, 149. Subdiv.
(6) cited. 14 CA 10, 16. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 440, 441. Subdiv. (6) cited. 27 CA 103, 105, 110, 113. Subdiv. (5) cited.
Id., 103, 110. Cited. 36 CA 625; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 613 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 625-629. Subdiv. (5)
cited. Id., 625, 629. Cited. 37 CA 500, 507, 509; judgment reversed in part, see 237 C. 633 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38
CA 306, 307. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 847, 848. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. The distinction that may be
drawn between the "fighting words" as contemplated under subdiv. (1) and those under subdiv. (5) can be found "under
the totality of the circumstances...which gives rise to the words. Subdiv. (1) proscribes fighting words uttered in a violent,
tumultuous or threatening manner, whereas subdiv. (5) proscribes fighting words that tend to induce immediate violence
by the person or persons to whom the words are uttered because of their raw effect. The core meaning of subdiv. (5)
remains intact-fighting words may arise in different contexts not confined to abusive or obscene language-and is not
unconstitutionally vague. 78 CA 98. 78 CA 98. There is no indication that legislature did not intend to create separate
crimes prohibited by this section and Sec. 53a-62(a)(2). 81 CA 248.
Subdiv. (5) cited. 38 CS 349, 353. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 581, 582. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Cited. 39 CS 504, 509.
Sec. 53a-181a. Creating a public disturbance: Infraction. (a) A person is guilty
of creating a public disturbance when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance
or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he (1) engages in fighting or in violent,
tumultuous or threatening behavior; or (2) annoys or interferes with another person by
offensive conduct; or (3) makes unreasonable noise.
(b) Creating a public disturbance is an infraction.
(P.A. 83-276, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 69.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change.
Cited. 228 C. 795, 798. Cited. 243 C. 115.
No right to jury trial. 9 CA 255-257. Cited. 12 CA 258, 263, 267. Cited. Id., 481, 482, 487, 493, 494, 498. Cited. 24
CA 195, 196. Cited. Id., 541, 542. Cited. 28 CA 344, 359. Cited. 32 CA 656, 665; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C.
345 et seq.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 228 C. 795, 811. Cited. 237 C. 613. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 12 CA 258, 263, 267. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 481, 483. Subdiv. (2): "Offensive conduct" defined. Id.,
481, 483, 486, 488. Subdiv. (1): Legislative intent to proscribe conduct which actually involves physical violence or
portends imminent physical violence. Id., 481, 483, 486, 488, 490, 491. Cited. Id., 481, 485. Cited. 36 CA 625, 629;
judgment reversed, see 237 C. 613 et seq.
Sec. 53a-181b. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias: Class D felony. Section
53a-181b is repealed, effective October 1, 2000.
(P.A. 90-137, S. 1, 3; P.A. 00-72, S. 11.)
Sec. 53a-181c. Stalking in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty
of stalking in the first degree when he commits stalking in the second degree as provided
in section 53a-181d and (1) he has previously been convicted of this section or section
53a-181d, or (2) such conduct violates a court order in effect at the time of the offense,
or (3) the other person is under sixteen years of age.
(b) Stalking in the first degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 92-237, S. 1.)
See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 47, 51.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 46 CA 661.
Sec. 53a-181d. Stalking in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when, with intent to cause another person
to fear for his physical safety, he wilfully and repeatedly follows or lies in wait for such
other person and causes such other person to reasonably fear for his physical safety.
(b) Stalking in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 92-237, S. 2.)
See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Cited. 44 CA 84. Held to be not unconstitutionally vague. 46 CA 661.
Constitutionality of statute under attack for vagueness or overbreadth discussed. 43 CS 46-48, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58,
60-64, 67, 69-71, 74-76.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 44 CA 84. Cited. 46 CA 661.
Sec. 53a-181e. Stalking in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of stalking in the third degree when he recklessly causes another person to
reasonably fear for his physical safety by wilfully and repeatedly following or lying in
wait for such other person.
(b) Stalking in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 95-214, S. 1.)
See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.
See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.
Secs. 53a-181f to 53a-181h. Reserved for future use.
Sec. 53a-181i. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias: Definitions. For the purposes of sections 53a-181j to 53a-181l, inclusive:
(1) "Disability" means physical disability, mental disability or mental retardation;
(2) "Gender identity or expression" means a person's gender-related identity, appearance or behavior, whether or not that gender-related identity, appearance or behavior
is different from that traditionally associated with the person's assigned sex at birth;
(3) "Mental disability" means one or more mental disorders, as defined in the most
recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association's "Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders";
(4) "Mental retardation" has the same meaning as provided in section 1-1g; and
(5) "Physical disability" means any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury, organic processes or changes
or from illness, including, but not limited to, blindness, epilepsy, deafness or hearing
impairment or reliance on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device.
(P.A. 04-135, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-181j. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the first degree: Class
C felony. (a) A person is guilty of intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the first
degree when such person maliciously, and with specific intent to intimidate or harass
another person because of the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability,
sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person, causes serious
physical injury to such other person or to a third person.
(b) Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the first degree is a class C felony.
(P.A. 00-72, S. 1; P.A. 04-135, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 04-135 amended Subsec. (a) to add "disability" and "gender identity or expression" as bases.
See Sec. 52-571c re action for damages and other relief for violation of this section.
Sec. 53a-181k. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree:
Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the
second degree when such person maliciously, and with specific intent to intimidate
or harass another person because of the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity,
disability, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person, does
any of the following: (1) Causes physical contact with such other person, (2) damages,
destroys or defaces any real or personal property of such other person, or (3) threatens,
by word or act, to do an act described in subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection, if there
is reasonable cause to believe that an act described in subdivision (1) or (2) of this
subsection will occur.
(b) Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 00-72, S. 2; P.A. 04-135, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 04-135 amended Subsec. (a) to add "disability" and "gender identity or expression" as bases.
See Sec. 52-571c re action for damages and other relief for violation of this section.
Sec. 53a-181l. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the third degree: Class
A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the
third degree when such person, with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person
or group of persons because of the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability,
sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person or persons: (1)
Damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property, or (2) threatens, by word
or act, to do an act described in subdivision (1) of this subsection or advocates or urges
another person to do an act described in subdivision (1) of this subsection, if there is
reasonable cause to believe that an act described in said subdivision will occur.
(b) Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 00-72, S. 3; P.A. 04-135, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 04-135 amended Subsec. (a) to add "disability" and "gender identity or expression" as bases.
See Sec. 52-571c re action for damages and other relief for violation of this section.
Sec. 53a-182. Disorderly conduct: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty
of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm,
or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent,
tumultuous or threatening behavior; or (2) by offensive or disorderly conduct, annoys
or interferes with another person; or (3) makes unreasonable noise; or (4) without lawful
authority, disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting of persons; or (5) obstructs vehicular
or pedestrian traffic; or (6) congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses
to comply with a reasonable official request or order to disperse; or (7) commits simple
trespass, as provided in section 53a-110a, and observes, in other than a casual or cursory
manner, another person (A) without the knowledge or consent of such other person, (B)
while such other person is inside a dwelling, as defined in section 53a-100, and not in
plain view, and (C) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
(b) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 184; P.A. 01-83, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 01-83 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality and add Subdiv.
(7) re a person who commits simple trespass and observes another person inside a dwelling under certain circumstances.
Annotation to former section 53-175:
However forceful and persuasive arguments may be compelling determination that Connecticut disorderly conduct
statute, section 53-175 is unconstitutional as containing no ascertainable standard of quiet, circuit court should leave such
decision to higher courts. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 73, 77.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 188 C. 557, 558. Cited. 194 C. 347, 356. Cited. 224 C. 914. Cited. 228 C. 795-798, 806, 809, 811. Cited. 234
C. 78, 80, 81. Cited. 237 C. 613. Cited. Id., 633.
Cited. 5 CA 616, 619. Cited. 9 CA 15, 16. Cited. Id., 255, 257. Cited. 11 CA 24, 25. Cited. 12 CA 258, 263. Cited. Id.,
306-308, 312, 313. Cited. Id., 364, 365. Cited. Id., 481, 493, 494. Cited. 17 CA 156. Cited. Id., 234, 236. Cited. Id., 339,
340. Cited. 22 CA 303, 304. Cited. 26 CA 157, 162. Cited. 28 CA 344, 359. Cited. 29 CA 283, 284, 287-289; judgment
reversed, see 228 C. 795 et seq. Cited. 36 CA 106, 108; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78 et seq.
Cited. 34 CS 612. Cited. 36 CS 129, 130. Cited. 37 CS 767, 768, 772, 776. Cited. 38 CS 472, 473. Cited. Id., 665-667.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 179 C. 328, 330. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 194 C. 347, 348, 350, 353, 354. Subdiv. (3): Under statute
disorderly conduct may occur in a place that is not public. Id., 347-351, 353-355. Cited. Id., 347, 349. Subdiv. (6) cited.
Id., 347, 358. Subdiv. (2) cited. 221 C. 788, 790. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 795-797, 800, 801, 811-
813, 815, 818-820. Subdiv. (2): Plain language of section unconstitutionally vague, court construed it to provide it with
constitutional content for the future. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Indrisano, 29 CA 283, 287, reversed. 228 C.
795-797, 800, 801, 815-819. Cited. Id., 795, 809-812, 819. Cited. 230 C. 183, 262. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 619. Cited.
Id., 633.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 153, 154. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 517, 521, 522. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 24, 25, 28, 30-33, 35.
Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 24, 25, 29-33. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 24, 32, 33, 35, 36. Subdiv. (3) cited. 12 CA 258, 267.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 481, 488, 494. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 481, 494. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Cited. 29 CA 283, 284, 288;
judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 625, 628, 629; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 613 et
seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 40 CA 643, 645. Cited. 46 CA 661. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2): Held unconstitutional on its
face where conduct occurred prior to judicial gloss placed on statute. Id. Subdiv. (2) should be read and applied as follows:
a person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with the predominant intent previously defined or with reckless disregard
for the risks of his or her conduct, the person, by conduct that is grossly offensive under contemporary community standards
to a person who actually overhears it or sees it, disturbs or impedes the lawful activity of another person. 83 CA 724.
Expression of political views found not to constitute disorderly conduct. 33 CS 93. Subdiv. (2): Failure of charge to
limit application of section to "fighting words" deprived defendant of freedom of speech constitutional guarantee. 34 CS
689-691, 694, 695, 698. Cited. 37 CS 767, 773. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 767, 773, 774. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 767, 773-775.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CS 665, 668, 669. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.
Sec. 53a-182a. Obstructing free passage: Class C misdemeanor. (a) Unless a
person is engaging in any activity which is expressive of rights guaranteed under the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of this state, a person is guilty of
obstructing free passage when, after being warned by a law enforcement officer not to
do so, he (1) stands, sits or lies in or upon any public street, curb, crosswalk, walkway
area, mall or the portion of private property utilized for public use, so as to obstruct
unreasonably the free passage of pedestrians thereon, or (2) obstructs unreasonably or
prevents free access to the entrance to any building open to the public.
(b) Obstructing free passage is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 83-221; P.A. 92-260, S. 70.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes.
Cited. 28 CA 344, 359.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 70.
Sec. 53a-182b. Harassment in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is
guilty of harassment in the first degree when, with the intent to harass, annoy, alarm or
terrorize another person, he threatens to kill or physically injure that person or any other
person, and communicates such threat by telephone, or by telegraph, mail, computer
network, as defined in section 53a-250, or any other form of written communication,
in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm and has been convicted of a capital
felony, a class A felony, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86 or
53a-122, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a-153, or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216. For the purposes of
this section, "convicted" means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
(b) For purposes of this section, such offense may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the telephone call was made or where it was received.
(c) The court may order any person convicted under this section to be examined by
one or more psychiatrists.
(d) Harassment in the first degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 90-282, S. 1; P.A. 95-143, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 95-143 amended Subsec. (a) to include communication of the threat by computer network.
Cited. 45 CA 408.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 52, 65.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 45 CA 408.
Sec. 53a-183. Harassment in the second degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A
person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when: (1) By telephone, he addresses
another in or uses indecent or obscene language; or (2) with intent to harass, annoy or
alarm another person, he communicates with a person by telegraph or mail, by electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network, by computer
network, as defined in section 53a-250, or by any other form of written communication,
in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; or (3) with intent to harass, annoy or
alarm another person, he makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues,
in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.
(b) For purposes of this section such offense may be deemed to have been committed
either at the place where the telephone call was made, or at the place where it was
received.
(c) The court may order any person convicted under this section to be examined by
one or more psychiatrists.
(d) Harassment in the second degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 185; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 44; P.A. 89-103, S. 2; P.A. 90-282, S. 2; P.A. 95-143, S. 2.)
History: 1971 act substituted "telegraph" for "telephone" in Subsec. (a) (2); P.A. 89-103 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to
include communicating by electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network; P.A. 90-282 changed name of offense to harassment in the second degree; P.A. 95-143 amended Subsec. (a) to include in Subdiv.
(2) communication by computer network.
Annotation to former section 53-183:
Conversation sought to be introduced to show bias of witness properly excluded as hearsay. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 60.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 204 C. 4, 6. Cited. 209 C. 52, 53.
Cited. 4 CA 520, 523. Cited. 5 CA 79, 80. Cited. 8 CA 598, 599. Cited. 43 CA 527. Cited. 44 CA 84.
Cited. 39 CS 428, 429. Cited. 43 CS 46, 52. Internet service provider has federal immunity from tort liability for damages
related to e-mail sent via provider's service. 46 CS 406.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 731, 733.
Subdiv. (3): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and this case harassment is not a lesser included
offense of threatening. 1 CA 647, 649. Subdiv. (2) cited. 4 CA 520, 525, 526. Subdiv. (3) cited. 5 CA 79, 83, 84. Subdiv.
(3) cited. 25 CA 503, 505. Subdiv. (2): Section does not require state to prove defendant engaged in a direct communication
with the person whom he intended to harass. 40 CA 544-546, 549-553. Subdiv. (3) cited. 41 CA 847, 848. Subdiv. (3)
cited. 43 CA 527. Subdiv. (3): Is not unconstitutionally vague either on its face or as applied to defendant's conduct. 46
CA 661. Subdiv. (2): Not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. 49 CA 617. Subdiv. (3): Statute is not unconstitutionally
overbroad; statute prohibits purposeful telephone harassment and does not involve first amendment concerns since it
proscribes conduct and not the content of calls. 55 CA 475. Subdiv. (3): Section is not unconstitutionally vague as applied
to defendant's conduct. Id. Criminal violation of a protective order pursuant to Sec. 53a-110b and harassment in the second
degree pursuant to Subdiv. (3) constitute separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 61 CA 118.
Subdiv. (3): Freedom of speech subject to reasonable regulation of place and manner of exercise. Not necessary to limit
application of statute to "fighting words". The prohibition is against purposeful harassment by means of device readily
susceptible of abuse; trespasser upon our privacy. 34 CS 689, 690, 695, 696, 698. Subdiv. (3) cited. 43 CS 46, 71. Cited.
Id., 46, 74.
Sec. 53a-183a. Obstructing or interfering with the lawful taking of wildlife:
Class C misdemeanor. (a) No person shall obstruct or interfere with the lawful taking
of wildlife by another person at the location where the activity is taking place with intent
to prevent such taking.
(b) A person violates this section when he intentionally or knowingly: (1) Drives
or disturbs wildlife for the purpose of disrupting the lawful taking of wildlife where
another person is engaged in the process of lawfully taking wildlife; (2) blocks, impedes
or otherwise harasses another person who is engaged in the process of lawfully taking
wildlife; (3) uses natural or artificial visual, aural, olfactory or physical stimuli to affect
wildlife behavior in order to hinder or prevent the lawful taking of wildlife; (4) erects
barriers with the intent to deny ingress or egress to areas where the lawful taking of
wildlife may occur; (5) interjects himself into the line of fire; (6) affects the condition
or placement of personal or public property intended for use in the lawful taking of
wildlife in order to impair its usefulness or prevent its use; or (7) enters or remains upon
private lands without the permission of the owner or his agent, with intent to violate
this section.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "taking" and "wildlife" shall be defined as in
section 26-1.
(d) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class
C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 85-351; P.A. 90-322.)
History: P.A. 90-322 amended Subsec. (a) to revise the elements of the offense by replacing "harass" with "obstruct",
adding provision that the obstruction or interference occur "at the location where the activity is taking place" and deleting
as an element interference or harassment of another person engaged in "acts in preparation" for the lawful taking of wildlife,
inserted new Subsec. (b) to enumerate specific intentional or knowing acts that constitute a violation, and Subsec. (c) to
define "taking" and "wildlife" and relettered former Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (d).
Cited. 226 C. 265, 266, 269-278. Section does not violate first amendment to U.S. Constitution. It is narrowly drawn
to serve significant state interests in public safety, raising revenue, wildlife management and protection of citizens' rights
to hunt, and leaves open ample alternative means of communication. 260 C. 275.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 54, 69.
Sec. 53a-183b. Interfering with an emergency call: Class A misdemeanor. (a)
A person is guilty of interfering with an emergency call when such person, with the
intent of preventing another person from making or completing a 9-1-1 telephone call
or a telephone call or radio communication to any law enforcement agency to request
police protection or report the commission of a crime, physically or verbally prevents
or hinders such other person from making or completing such telephone call or radio
communication.
(b) Interfering with an emergency call is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 03-43, S. 1.)
See Sec. 53-210 re refusal to relinguish party line when needed for emergency call.
PART XV
INTOXICATION
Secs. 53a-184 and 53a-184a. Intoxication by drug; definition, commitment,
treatment, penalty. Intoxication by alcohol or drug; definition, commitment, dismissal of criminal proceedings, unclassified misdemeanor. Sections 53a-184 and
53a-184a are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 186; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 45; P.A. 74-280, S. 22, 25; P.A. 75-479, S. 11, 12, 25; P.A. 76-300, S. 2,
3, 4; P.A. 86-371, S. 34, 45; P.A. 89-390, S. 36, 37.)
PART XVI
LOITERING IN OR ABOUT SCHOOL GROUNDS.
PUBLIC INDECENCY
Sec. 53a-185. Loitering on school grounds: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person
is guilty of loitering on school grounds when he loiters or remains in or about a school
building or grounds, not having any reason or relationship involving custody of or responsibility for a pupil or any other license or privilege to be there.
(b) Loitering on school grounds is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 187; P.A. 92-260, S. 71.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change in the name of the offense.
Sec. 53a-186. Public indecency: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of
public indecency when he performs any of the following acts in a public place: (1) An
act of sexual intercourse as defined in subdivision (2) of section 53a-65; or (2) a lewd
exposure of the body with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desire of the person;
or (3) a lewd fondling or caress of the body of another person. For the purposes of this
section, "public place" means any place where the conduct may reasonably be expected
to be viewed by others.
(b) Public indecency is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 188; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 46; P.A. 76-336, S. 22; P.A. 92-260, S. 72.)
History: 1971 act substituted "A person" for "Any person" for consistency with other statutes; P.A. 76-336 specified
sexual intercourse as defined in Sec. 53a-65 and deleted reference to acts of deviate sexual conduct in Subsec. (a) for
conformity with changes enacted re sex offenses; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and
rephrasing language.
Annotations to former section 53-220:
Cited. 37 CA 534, 535, 543, 544.
Cited. 7 CS 265; 23 CS 177.
Word "wantonly" implies turpitude, and that the act done was of wilful and wicked purpose. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 443.
Criminal intent is essential ingredient of offense. Id., 452. Offense is not against observer merely, but against the state. Id.
Cited. Id., 596; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 480. Review of cases concerned with crime of indecent exposure. Id., 657. Lewd and
offensive conduct not fairly within ambit of statute in absence of proof of actual exposure. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 530, 532, 533.
Offense does not depend upon number present at exposure. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 202.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 18 CA 482, 483. Cited. 29 CA 591, 597-599. Cited. 37 CA 534, 535, 543, 544.
Cited. 38 CS 661, 662.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 37 CA 534, 535. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 534, 537, 542, 544.
Cited. 38 CS 313, 315. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
PART XVII*
TAMPERING WITH PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS,
EAVESDROPPING AND VOYEURISM
*See chapter 959a re wiretapping and electronic surveillance.
Annotations to former section 53-140:
Admissibility of evidence obtained by officers in violation of this section in federal courts. 277 U. S. 438, 479; 302
U. S. 379; 308 U. S. 338.
Annotations to present part XVII of chapter 952:
Sec. 53a-187-53a-189 eavesdropping statutes cited. 238 C. 692.
Sec. 53a-187. Definitions. Applicability. (a) The following definitions are applicable to sections 53a-188 and 53a-189: (1) "Wiretapping" means the intentional overhearing or recording of a telephonic or telegraphic communication or a communication
made by cellular radio telephone by a person other than a sender or receiver thereof,
without the consent of either the sender or receiver, by means of any instrument, device
or equipment. The normal operation of a telephone or telegraph corporation and the
normal use of the services and facilities furnished by such corporation pursuant to its
tariffs shall not be deemed "wiretapping". (2) "Mechanical overhearing of a conversation" means the intentional overhearing or recording of a conversation or discussion,
without the consent of at least one party thereto, by a person not present thereat, by
means of any instrument, device or equipment. (3) "Unlawfully" means not specifically
authorized by law. For purposes of this section, "cellular radio telephone" means a
wireless telephone authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to operate
in the frequency bandwidth reserved for cellular radio telephones.
(b) This section and sections 53a-188 and 53a-189 shall not apply to wiretapping
by criminal law enforcement officials in the lawful performance of their duties and do
not affect the admissibility of evidence in any proceedings other than a prosecution for
eavesdropping or tampering with private communications.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 189; P.A. 86-403, S. 90, 132; P.A. 89-103, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (b); P.A. 89-103 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to
communications made by cellular radio telephone in the definition of wiretapping and to define "cellular radio telephone".
Cited. 171 C. 524, 544. Cited. 212 C. 195, 209, 210. Cited. 224 C. 593, 619. Cited. 238 C. 692.
Cordless telephone conversations are protected telephonic communications. 45 CS 497.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1). Cited. 171 C. 524, 544. Subdiv. (2). Cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 212 C. 195, 210. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Cited. 224 C. 593, 619, 620. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 692. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.
Cited. 15 CA 529, 530.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 171 C. 524, 544. Cited. 212 C. 195, 210. Cited. 224 C. 593, 621. Cited. 238 C. 692.
Cited. 15 CA 529-531.
Sec. 53a-188. Tampering with private communications: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of tampering with private communications when: (1)
Knowing that he does not have the consent of the sender or receiver, he obtains from
an employee, officer or representative of a telephone or telegraph corporation, by connivance, deception, intimidation or in any other manner, information with respect to the
contents or nature of a telephonic or telegraphic communication; or (2) knowing that
he does not have the consent of the sender or receiver, and being an employee, officer
or representative of a telephone or telegraph corporation, he knowingly divulges to
another person the contents or nature of a telephonic or telegraphic communication.
(b) Tampering with private communications is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 190.)
Cited. 171 C. 524, 544. Cited. 212 C. 195, 210. Cited. 238 C. 692.
Sec. 53a-189. Eavesdropping: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of eavesdropping when he unlawfully engages in wiretapping or mechanical overhearing of a
conversation.
(b) Eavesdropping is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 191.)
See Sec. 52-570d re prohibition on recording private telephonic communications and civil remedies for violation thereof.
Cited. 171 C. 524, 544. Cited. 197 C. 326, 327. Cited. 212 C. 195, 210. Cited. 216 C. 541, 545, 553. Cited. 224 C. 593,
619, 620. Cited. 238 C. 692.
Cited. 8 CA 673, 689. Cited. 15 CA 529, 530.
Cordless telephone conversations are protected telephonic communications. 45 CS 497.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 171 C. 524, 544. Cited. 238 C. 692.
Sec. 53a-189a. Voyeurism: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of voyeurism
when, with malice or intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of such person or
any other person, such person knowingly photographs, films, videotapes or otherwise
records the image of another person (1) without the knowledge and consent of such
other person, (2) while such other person is not in plain view, and (3) under circumstances
where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
(b) Voyeurism is a class D felony.
(P.A. 99-143, S. 1; P.A. 03-114, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 03-114 increased the penalty from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony.
Sec. 53a-189b. Disseminating voyeuristic material: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of disseminating voyeuristic material when such person disseminates a
photograph, film, videotape or other recorded image of another person without the consent of such other person and knowing that such photograph, film, videotape or image
was taken, made or recorded in violation of section 53a-189a.
(b) Disseminating voyeuristic material is a class D felony.
(P.A. 99-143, S. 2.)
PART XVIII
BIGAMY AND INCEST
Sec. 53a-190. Bigamy: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of bigamy when he
marries or purports to marry another person in this state if either is lawfully married;
or so marries or purports to marry another person in any other state or country in violation
of the laws thereof, and knowingly cohabits and lives with such other person in this
state as husband and wife.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to the charge of bigamy that at the time of the
subsequent marriage or purported marriage: (1) The actor reasonably believed, based
on persuasive and reliable information, that the prior spouse was dead; or (2) a court
had entered a judgment purporting to terminate or annul any prior disqualifying marriage
and the actor did not know that such judgment was invalid; or (3) the single person did
not know that the other person was legally married.
(c) Bigamy is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 192; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 47; P.A. 92-260, S. 73.)
History: 1971 act substituted "A person" for "Any person" for conformity with other statutes; P.A. 92-260 made
technical changes.
Annotations to former section 53-221:
Former statute cited. 129 C. 572. Cited. 142 C. 178.
Cited. 22 CS 180. Omission, since 1875, of language declaring bigamous marriage to be null and void at most merely
left validity of such marriages to be determined by general principles of common law. 26 CS 259.
Sec. 53a-191. Incest: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of incest when he
marries a person whom he knows to be related to him within any of the degrees of
kindred specified in section 46b-21.
(b) Incest is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 193; P.A. 80-346, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 74.)
History: P.A. 80-346 substituted "such person" for "he" or "him", eliminating unnecessary distinctions based on sex
and removed reference to engaging in sexual intercourse with relative as incest; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in
Subsec. (a) by replacing "such person" with "he" or "him" as appropriate.
Annotations to former section 53-223:
In information for incest alleged to have been committed by accused with his legitimate daughter, actual marriage
between accused and his daughter's mother must be proved. 6 C. 446. Applies to half-brother and half-sister. 132 C. 165.
Relatively high penalty clearly reflects the strong public policy of this state. 148 C. 288. Does not apply to uncle-in-law
and niece-in-law. 158 C. 461.
Consent is not essential element in establishing crime of incest. 29 CS 95. Cited. Id., 186, 187.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 210 C. 244, 247. Relationship as half-uncle and half-niece is void. 213 C. 637-639, 641, 642, 645, 646, 656.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 189 C. 321, 322.
PART XIX
COERCION
Sec. 53a-192. Coercion: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony. (a) A person
is guilty of coercion when he compels or induces another person to engage in conduct
which such other person has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, or to abstain from
engaging in conduct in which such other person has a legal right to engage, by means
of instilling in such other person a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the
actor or another will: (1) Commit any criminal offense; or (2) accuse any person of a
criminal offense; or (3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair any person's credit or business repute; or (4) take or
withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution based on subdivision (2), (3)
or (4) of subsection (a) of this section that the actor believed the accusation or secret to
be true or the proposed official action justified and that his purpose was limited to
compelling the other person to behave in a way reasonably related to the circumstances
which were the subject of the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, as by
desisting from further misbehavior or making good a wrong done.
(c) Coercion is a class A misdemeanor except, if the threat is to commit a felony,
coercion is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 194; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 48; P.A. 92-260, S. 75.)
History: 1971 act referred simply to coercion rather than to "criminal" coercion in Subsec. (c); P.A. 92-260 made
technical changes.
Cited. 240 C. 766.
Cited. 8 CA 351, 352. Cited. 40 CA 1, 2, 16.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (4) cited. 18 CA 694, 695. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 1, 16.
PART XX*
OBSCENITY AND RELATED OFFENSES
*Annotations to former section 53-243:
Cited. 126 C. 418, 434; 150 C. 248; 152 C. 702. Defendant must have possession of films with specific intent to use
them for one of purposes prohibited. Intent cannot be established by mere fact of possession. 138 C. 485. Constitutionality
upheld. 146 C. 78. Proof of knowledge that the proscribed material is obscene or indecent is requisite to a conviction. Id.
Since this statute has been construed as including a scienter requirement by implication, the constitutionality of the statute
is not open to attack on the ground that it lacks such a requirement. The test of whether material can be adjudged obscene
is whether, to the average person applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. The question of suppressibility under constitutional standards is one of law.
Knowledge by a bookseller of the obscene character of magazines possessed by him can ordinarily be proved only by
circumstantial evidence. 150 C. 92.
No necessity for the existence of any specific intent or motive to constitute this crime. Test of obscenity stated. 6 CS
427. Conviction under this statute is caused for revocation of license to practice medicine and surgery. 13 CS 144.
Appellate court must make independent appraisal of whether dominant theme of material "appeals to prurient interests".
2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 144. Cumulative independent facts may prove scienter. Id. Elements constituting requisite scienter discussed. Id., 428. History discussed. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 355. Obscenity not protected by language of first amendment to federal
constitution or article first, section 5, of Connecticut constitution. Id., 441. Criteria for determining obscenity discussed.
Id. Not essential for state to show defendant had manual or physical possession of obscene films; sufficient if they were
in actual possession of person over whom defendant had control so they would be forthcoming if he ordered them. 4 Conn.
Cir. Ct. 506. Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 313. Intent "to sell, lend, give, offer or show" cannot be inferred from possession of
pornographic material by defendant or his disposal of it while in police custody. Id., 551.
Annotations to former section 53-244:
Cited. 150 C. 94.
Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 442.
Annotations to former section 53-244a:
Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 310 (fn. 3). History discussed. Id., 355, 356. Whether given work is obscene and therefore
beyond scope of constitutional protection is ultimately for court to determine as matter of law. Id., 360. This section must
be construed in light of free press guarantee and due process clause of federal constitution. Id., 362.
Annotations to former section 53-244b:
History discussed. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 355, 356.
Annotations to former section 53-245:
Movie held not obscene since, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal was not to the prurient interest of the
average person, applying contemporary community standards on a national basis. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 429. In cases involving
indecency and obscenity, appellate court is required to make its own independent constitutional judgment on evidence
introduced in trial court as to obscenity of motion picture in question. Id., 605, 606. Lascivious or indecent actions and
material are included in and are synonymous with obscenity so that rules and standards set forth under heading "obscenity"
and covering literature, motion pictures and all other arts provide basis and precedent for interpretation of this statute. Id.
Constitutional status of material may not be made to turn on a "weighing" of its social importance against its prurient
appeal, for a work cannot be proscribed unless it is "utterly" without social importance. Id.
Sec. 53a-193. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this section
and sections 53a-194 to 53a-210, inclusive:
(1) Any material or performance is "obscene" if, (A) taken as a whole, it predominantly appeals to the prurient interest, (B) it depicts or describes in a patently offensive
way a prohibited sexual act, and (C) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic,
educational, political or scientific value. Predominant appeal shall be judged with reference to ordinary adults unless it appears from the character of the material or performance
or the circumstances of its dissemination to be designed for some other specially susceptible audience. Whether a material or performance is obscene shall be judged by ordinary
adults applying contemporary community standards. In applying contemporary community standards, the state of Connecticut is deemed to be the community.
(2) Material or a performance is "obscene as to minors" if it depicts a prohibited
sexual act and, taken as a whole, it is harmful to minors. For purposes of this subdivision:
(A) "Minor" means any person less than seventeen years old as used in section 53a-196
and less than sixteen years old as used in sections 53a-196a and 53a-196b, and (B)
"harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever
form, of a prohibited sexual act, when (i) it predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, (ii) it is patently offensive to prevailing standards in
the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors,
and (iii) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or
scientific value for minors.
(3) "Prohibited sexual act" means erotic fondling, nude performance, sexual excitement, sado-masochistic abuse, masturbation or sexual intercourse.
(4) "Nude performance" means the showing of the human male or female genitals,
pubic area or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, or the showing of the
female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the
top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state
in any play, motion picture, dance or other exhibition performed before an audience.
(5) "Erotic fondling" means touching a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic
area, buttocks, or if such person is a female, breast.
(6) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of human male or female genitals
when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.
(7) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad
in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound
or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
(8) "Masturbation" means the real or simulated touching, rubbing or otherwise stimulating a person's own clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if the
person is female, breast, either by manual manipulation or with an artificial instrument.
(9) "Sexual intercourse" means intercourse, real or simulated, whether genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex or between a human and an animal, or with an artificial genital.
(10) "Material" means anything tangible which is capable of being used or adapted
to arouse prurient, shameful or morbid interest, whether through the medium of reading,
observation, sound or in any other manner. Undeveloped photographs, molds, printing
plates, and the like, may be deemed obscene notwithstanding that processing or other
acts may be required to make the obscenity patent or to disseminate it.
(11) "Performance" means any play, motion picture, dance or other exhibition performed before an audience.
(12) "Promote" means to manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver,
transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, advertise,
produce, direct or participate in.
(13) "Child pornography" means any visual depiction including any photograph,
film, videotape, picture or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where the
production of such visual depiction involves the use of a person under sixteen years of
age engaging in sexually explicit conduct, provided whether the subject of a visual
depiction was a person under sixteen years of age at the time the visual depiction was
created is a question to be decided by the trier of fact.
(14) "Sexually explicit conduct" means actual or simulated (A) sexual intercourse,
including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal physical contact,
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or with an artificial genital, (B)
bestiality, (C) masturbation, (D) sadistic or masochistic abuse, or (E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.
(15) "Visual depiction" includes undeveloped film and videotape and data, as defined in subdivision (8) of section 53a-250, that is capable of conversion into a visual
image and includes encrypted data.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 195; P.A. 74-124; P.A. 78-331, S. 21, 58; 78-345, S. 1, 4; P.A. 83-507; P.A. 85-496, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 76; P.A. 04-139, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 74-124 added provision re application of contemporary community standards in judgments concerning
obscenity; P.A. 78-331 extended applicability of definitions to encompass Sec. 53a-196a; P.A. 78-345 amended Subsec.
(b) to replace "nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement or sado-masochistic abuse" with reference to prohibited sexual
acts, to redefine "minor" re sixteen-year-olds, to replace definition of "nudity" with definition of "nude performance", to
delete definition of "sexual conduct", to define "prohibited sexual act", "erotic fondling", "masturbation", and "sexual
intercourse" and to redefine "harmful to minors" as description or representation which lacks serious literary, artistic,
educational, political or scientific value for minors rather than as something "utterly without redeeming social importance
for minors" and redefined "material" in Subsec. (c) to specify something used or adapted to arouse "prurient, shameful or
morbid" interest; P.A. 83-507 amended Subsec. (a) to redefine "obscene" by replacing (1) "its predominant appeal is to
prurient, shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, excretion, sadism or masochism" with "it predominantly appeals to
the prurient interest", (2) "it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such
matters" with "it depicts or describes in a patently offensive way a prohibited sexual act" and (3) "it is utterly without
redeeming social value" with "taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value",
and reordered and redesignated the other definitions; P.A. 85-496 included reference to section 53a-196c and added definition of "child pornography"; P.A. 92-260 made definitions applicable to "this section and sections 53a-194 to 53a-210,
inclusive" rather than to "sections 53a-193 to 53a-196a, inclusive and section 53a-196c", replaced alphabetic Subsec.
indicators with numeric indicators, amended Subsec. (1) to replace numeric Subdiv. indicators with alphabetic indicators
and add "or performance" in provisions re judging predominant appeal and applying community standards, and amended
Subsec. (2) to replace numeric Subdiv. indicators with alphabetic indicators and alphabetic Subpara. indicators with numeric
indicators; P.A. 04-139 applied definitions to Secs. 53a-196e to 53a-196g, inclusive, amended Subdiv. (2) to make a
technical change and to delete in Subpara. (A) applicability to Sec. 53a-196c of definition of a minor as a person less than
sixteen years old, redefined "child pornography" in Subdiv. (13) and added definitions of "sexually explicit conduct" and
"visual depiction" as Subdivs. (14) and (15), respectively.
Cited. 193 C. 612, 618.
The definition of obscenity is sufficiently explicit to inform a person of ordinary intelligence of what material would
be in violation of the law. 32 CS 639.
Former Subsec. (a):
Cited. 193 C. 612, 623.
Cited. 3 CA 80, 90. Cited. 28 CA 91, 103.
The definition of "obscene" contained in this section is presently immune from attack upon the grounds of vagueness
or over breadth at the federal level. 32 CS 639, 646.
Former Subsec. (b):
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 28 CA 91, 101, 103. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 91,
102. Cited. Id., 91, 103.
Former Subsec. (c):
Cited. 28 CA 91, 101.
Former Subsec. (d):
Cited. 28 CA 91, 101.
Cited. 38 CS 570, 574.
Former Subsec. (e):
Cited. 193 C. 612, 623.
Former Subsec. (h):
Cited. 29 CA 591, 595.
Former Subsec. (l):
Cited. 28 CA 91, 101.
Subdiv. (11):
Requirement in Sec. 53a-196d, through its incorporation of Sec. 53a-193(11) and (13), that the live performance depicted
in the materials be "performed before an audience" means that there must be some recording or viewing of, or listening
to, a live performance, or a reproduction of a live performance, by a person or persons other than the person or persons
simultaneously engaged in the performance; the number of such persons recording, viewing or listening to the performance
and whether they are actually present at the live performance 252 C. 579.
Sec. 53a-194. Obscenity: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of obscenity when, knowing its content and character, he promotes, or possesses with intent to
promote, any obscene material or performance.
(b) Obscenity is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 196.)
State has burden of presenting evidence of contemporary community standards in prosecution for obscenity, except
where performance is so offensive that no conceivable community standard would permit it. 174 C. 46. Cited. 193 C. 612,
614, 618, 623.
Cited. 28 CA 91, 102.
Connecticut's obscenity statute is not so vague or overly broad as to violate federal standards. This section is presently
immune from attack upon the grounds of vagueness or overbreadth at the federal level. 32 CS 639, 646. Cited. 33 CS 681.
Cited. 38 CS 570.
Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 656.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 193 C. 612, 616.
Cited. 38 CS 570, 572.
Sec. 53a-195. Defense. In any prosecution for obscenity it is a defense that the
persons to whom allegedly obscene material was disseminated, or the audience to an
allegedly obscene performance, consisted of persons or institutions having scientific,
educational or governmental justification for possessing or viewing the same.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 197; P.A. 92-260, S. 77.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change.
Cited. 200 C. 664, 675.
Sec. 53a-196. Obscenity as to minors: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of
obscenity as to minors when he knowingly promotes to a minor, for monetary consideration, any material or performance which is obscene as to minors.
(b) For purposes of this section, "knowingly" means having general knowledge of
or reason to know or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or
inquiry as to (1) the character and content of any material or performance which is
reasonably susceptible of examination by such person and (2) the age of the minor.
(c) In any prosecution for obscenity as to minors, it shall be an affirmative defense
that the defendant made (1) a reasonable mistake as to age, and (2) a reasonable bona
fide attempt to ascertain the true age of such minor, by examining a draft card, driver's
license, birth certificate or other official or apparently official document, exhibited by
such minor, purporting to establish that such minor was seventeen years of age or older.
(d) Obscenity as to minors is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 198; P.A. 85-496, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 78.)
History: P.A. 85-496 increased penalty from class A misdemeanor to class D felony; P.A. 92-260 made a technical
change in Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 36 CS 352, 357.
Sec. 53a-196a. Employing a minor in an obscene performance: Class A felony.
(a) A person is guilty of employing a minor in an obscene performance when (1) he
employs any minor, whether or not such minor receives any consideration, for the purpose of promoting any material or performance which is obscene as to minors, notwithstanding that such material or performance is intended for an adult audience, or (2)
he permits any such minor to be employed, whether or not such minor receives any
consideration, in the promotion of any material or performance which is obscene as
to minors, notwithstanding that such material or performance is intended for an adult
audience, and he is the parent or guardian of such minor or otherwise responsible for
the general supervision of such minor's welfare.
(b) Employing a minor in an obscene performance is a class A felony.
(P.A. 77-577, S. 2; P.A. 78-345, S. 2, 4; P.A. 85-496, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 79.)
History: P.A. 78-345 restated provisions for conformity with Sec. 53a-193 as amended; P.A. 85-496 increased penalty
from class B felony to class A felony; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
See Sec. 17a-47 re legal division within Department of Children and Families.
Cited. 227 C. 207, 209, 210.
Sec. 53a-196b. Promoting a minor in an obscene performance: Class B felony.
(a) A person is guilty of promoting a minor in an obscene performance when he knowingly promotes any material or performance in which a minor is employed, whether or
not such minor receives any consideration, and such material or performance is obscene
as to minors notwithstanding that such material or performance is intended for an adult
audience.
(b) For purposes of this section, "knowingly" means having general knowledge of
or reason to know or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or
inquiry as to (1) the character and content of any material or performance which is
reasonably susceptible of examination by such person and (2) the age of the minor
employed.
(c) Promoting a minor in an obscene performance is a class B felony.
(P.A. 78-345, S. 3, 4; P.A. 85-496, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 80.)
History: P.A. 85-496 increased penalty from class C felony to class B felony; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in
Subsec. (a).
Cited. 28 CA 91, 95-97, 100.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 28 CA 91, 92, 100.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 28 CA 91, 96.
Sec. 53a-196c. Importing child pornography: Class B felony. (a) A person is
guilty of importing child pornography when, with intent to promote child pornography,
such person knowingly imports or causes to be imported into the state three or more
visual depictions of child pornography of known content and character.
(b) Importing child pornography is a class B felony.
(P.A. 85-496, S. 5; P.A. 04-139, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 04-139 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "any child pornography" with "three or more visual depictions
of child pornography" and make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, deleted former Subsec. (b) providing
that importation of two or more copies of any publication containing child pornography shall be prima facie evidence that
such publications were imported with intent to promote child pornography, redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as new Subsec.
(b) and amended said Subsec. to increase penalty from a class C felony to a class B felony.
Sec. 53a-196d. Possessing child pornography in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of possessing child pornography in the first degree when
such person knowingly possesses fifty or more visual depictions of child pornography.
(b) Possessing child pornography in the first degree is a class B felony.
(P.A. 95-143, S. 3; P.A. 04-139, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 04-139 renamed offense by replacing "possessing child pornography" with "possessing child pornography
in the first degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to replace provision that offense occurs when a person "knowingly
possesses child pornography, as defined in subdivision (13) of section 53a-193" with "knowingly possesses fifty or more
visual depictions of child pornography" and delete provision that possession of a photographic or other visual reproduction
of a nude minor for a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental or judicial purpose is not
a violation of subsection, and amended Subsec. (b) to increase penalty from a class D felony to a class B felony.
Trial court properly rejected defendant's claim that statute is unconstitutionally vague; there is no first amendment
right to possess materials otherwise covered by the definition of child pornography specified in Sec. 53a-193(13) when
the person depicted is younger than eighteen, statute is not unconstitutional on its face and defendant having conceded
that statute clearly gives fair notice that pornographic materials depicting children under sixteen are prohibited and having
admitted that he possessed materials depicting children under sixteen, statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to
defendant. "Minor", for purposes of statute, means a person under sixteen years of age. 252 C. 579.
Sec. 53a-196e. Possessing child pornography in the second degree: Class C
felony. (a) A person is guilty of possessing child pornography in the second degree when
such person knowingly possesses twenty or more but fewer than fifty visual depictions of
child pornography.
(b) Possessing child pornography in the second degree is a class C felony.
(P.A. 04-139, S. 5.)
Sec. 53a-196f. Possessing child pornography in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of possessing child pornography in the third degree when such
person knowingly possesses fewer than twenty visual depictions of child pornography.
(b) Possessing child pornography in the third degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 04-139, S. 6.)
Sec. 53a-196g. Possesing child pornography: Affirmative defenses. In any
prosecution for a violation of section 53a-196d, 53a-196e or 53a-196f, it shall be an
affirmative defense that (1) the defendant (A) possessed fewer than three visual depictions of child pornography, (B) did not knowingly purchase, procure, solicit or request
such visual depictions or knowingly take any other action to cause such visual depictions
to come into the defendant's possession, and (C) promptly and in good faith, and without
retaining or allowing any person, other than a law enforcement agency, to access any
visual depiction or copy thereof, took reasonable steps to destroy each such visual depiction or reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and afforded that agency access
to each such visual depiction, or (2) the defendant possessed a visual depiction of a nude
person under sixteen years of age for a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational,
religious, governmental or judicial purpose.
(P.A. 04-139, S. 7.)
Secs. 53a-197 and 53a-198. Disseminating indecent comic books: Class A misdemeanor. Failing to identify a comic book publication: Violation. Sections 53a-197 and 53a-198 are repealed, effective October 1, 2004.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 199, 200; P.A. 92-260, S. 81; P.A. 04-139, S. 14.)
Sec. 53a-199. Injunction against promoting any obscene material or performance. An injunction may be granted against the promoting of any material or performance that is obscene or obscene as to minors or the possessing with intent to promote
any such material.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 201.)
Sec. 53a-200. Institution of action for adjudication of obscenity. Whenever any
state's attorney or assistant state's attorney has reasonable cause to believe that any
person is knowingly promoting any material or performance that is obscene or obscene
as to minors, he shall institute an action for an adjudication of the obscenity of such
material or performance. Such action shall commence with the filing of an application
for an injunction with a judge of the superior court for the judicial district wherein is
located such material or performance. The complaint shall: (1) Be directed against the
promoting of the material or performance; (2) designate as defendants and list the names
and addresses, if known, of its promoters, or any person possessing it with intent to
promote it; (3) allege its obscene nature; (4) seek an adjudication that it is obscene or
obscene as to minors and an injunction against any promoting or possessing with intent
to promote; (5) seek its surrender, seizure, destruction or termination.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 202; P.A. 74-183, S. 124, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 514, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 92-260, S. 82.)
History: P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas and "circuit" with "county or judicial district",
reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to court of common pleas in reorganization of judicial system, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced prosecuting attorneys with state's attorneys and assistant state's attorneys and court
of common pleas with superior court, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978;
P.A. 78-280 deleted reference to counties; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing alphabetic with numeric
Subdiv. indicators.
Sec. 53a-201. Presentation of material or evidence depicting performance.
Probable cause determination. Time for trial and decision. The prosecuting attorney,
at the time of presenting the complaint and application to the court, shall also present
the material or a witness or other evidence describing or depicting the performance. If,
after examination, the court finds no probable cause to believe such material or performance obscene or obscene as to minors, the court shall dismiss the action. If, after examination, the court finds probable cause to believe such material or performance obscene or
obscene as to minors, the court shall then proceed as in other applications for an injunction. The person sought to be enjoined shall be entitled to a trial of the issues, commencing within one day after the close of all pleadings, and any decision by the court shall
be rendered within two days of the conclusion of the trial.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 203; P.A. 92-260, S. 83.)
History: P.A. 92-260 added provisions requiring that the court "dismiss the action" if it fails to find probable cause and
that the court proceed as in other applications for an injunction "if, after examination, the court finds probable cause to
believe such material or performance obscene or obscene as to minors", provisions which were contained in former Sec.
53-244d which was repealed by 1969 P.A. 828, S. 214, the same act which enacted the penal code.
Sec. 53a-202. Third party may be made a party. On or before the date set for
trial, any person who promotes, or who possesses with intent to promote, the material
or performance complained of in the application for an injunction may file an appearance
and be made a party to the proceedings.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 204.)
Sec. 53a-203. Jury trial. Every person appearing shall be entitled, upon request,
to a trial by jury and the court may order a trial of any issue to the jury.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 205; P.A. 92-260, S. 84.)
History: P.A. 92-260 deleted an obsolete reference to "the criminal sessions of such court".
Cited. 17 CA 326, 327. Cited. 40 CA 515, 517.
Sec. 53a-204. Evidence. At the trial, all parties shall be permitted to submit evidence, including the testimony of experts, pertaining but not limited to the following:
(1) The elements or standards specified in the definitions of obscene and obscene as to
minors; (2) the artistic, literary, scientific, educational or governmental merits of the
material or performance; (3) the intent and knowledge of any defendant.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 206; P.A. 92-260, S. 85.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing alphabetic with numeric Subdiv. indicators.
Sec. 53a-205. Judgment. If the court or jury, as the case may be, finds the material
or performance not to be obscene or obscene as to minors, the court shall enter judgment
accordingly. If the court or jury, as the case may be, finds the material or performance
to be obscene or obscene as to minors, the court shall enter judgment to such effect and
may, in such judgment or in subsequent orders of enforcement thereof: (1) Enter an
injunction against any defendant prohibiting him from promoting or possessing such
material or performance, under such conditions and within such time as the court may
order; (2) direct any resident defendant to dispose of all such material in his possession
or under his control under such conditions and within such time as the court may order;
or (3) if any defendant fails fully to comply with the judgment or order of the court,
direct the state police or any organized local police department to seize and destroy all
such material in the possession or under the control of such defendant wherever the
same may be found within their jurisdiction.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 207; P.A. 77-614, S. 486, 587, 610; P.A. 78-303, S. 85, 136.)
History: P.A. 77-614 made state police department a division within the department of public safety, effective January
1, 1979, but under authority of P.A. 78-303 existing reference to state police was retained.
Sec. 53a-206. Injunction and restraining order. Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance and shall
describe in reasonable detail the obscene material or performance and the promoting or
possessing sought to be restrained, and is binding only upon the defendants to the action
and their officers, agents, servants and employees and upon those persons in active
concert or participating by contract or arrangement with them, who receive actual notice
of the order by personal service or otherwise.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 208; P.A. 92-260, S. 86.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change.
Cited. 16 CA 601, 602.
Sec. 53a-207. Service of process on nonresidents. Every nonresident person,
whether acting personally or by an agent, salesman, employee, officer or another, who
promotes any material or performance that is obscene or obscene as to minors in this
state shall be deemed to have appointed the Secretary of the State as his attorney and
to have agreed that any process in any action arising under sections 53a-199 to 53a-206, inclusive, brought against or naming such nonresident as a defendant, may be
served upon said secretary and shall have the same validity as if served upon such
nonresident personally. Such process shall be served by the officer to whom the same
is directed upon said secretary by leaving with or at the office of said secretary a true
and attested copy thereof and by sending to the defendant, by registered or certified
mail, postage prepaid, a like true and attested copy with an endorsement thereon of the
service upon said secretary addressed to such defendant at his last-known address. The
Secretary of the State shall keep a record of each such process and the day and hour of
service.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 209; P.A. 92-260, S. 87.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
Sec. 53a-208. Extradition. In all cases in which a court has entered its judgment
pursuant to section 53a-205 that the material or performance in question is obscene or
obscene as to minors, and a charge of a violation of the injunction or restraining order
is thereafter brought against a person who, being a defendant to such judgment, cannot
be found in this state, the Governor, or anyone performing the functions of Governor
by authority of a law of this state, shall, unless such person has appealed from such
judgment and such appeal is not finally determined, demand his extradition from the
executive authority of the state in which such person may be found, pursuant to the laws
of this state.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 210; P.A. 92-260, S. 88.)
History: P.A. 92-260 replaced reference to "sections 53a-199 to 53a-206, inclusive," with "section 53a-205".
Sec. 53a-209. Penalties. Any defendant, or any officer, agent, servant or employee
of such defendant, or any person in active concert or participation by contract or arrangement with such defendant, who receives actual notice, by personal service or otherwise,
of any injunction or restraining order entered pursuant to section 53a-205 and who
disobeys any of the provisions thereof shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars
or imprisoned not more than two years or both.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 211; P.A. 92-260, S. 89.)
History: P.A. 92-260 replaced reference to "sections 53a-199 to 53a-206, inclusive," with "section 53a-205".
Sec. 53a-210. Levy of fine against property. Any fine against any person under
section 53a-209 may be levied against any of his real property, personal property, tangible or intangible, choses in action or property of any kind or nature, including debts
owing to him, which may be situated or found in this state.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 212; P.A. 92-260, S. 90.)
History: P.A. 92-260 replaced reference to "any of sections 53a-199 to 53a-206, inclusive," with "section 53a-209".
PART XXI
MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES
Sec. 53a-211. Possession of a sawed-off shotgun or silencer: Class D felony. (a)
A person is guilty of possession of a sawed-off shotgun or a silencer when he owns,
controls or possesses any sawed-off shotgun that has a barrel of less than eighteen inches
or an overall length of less than twenty-six inches or when he owns, controls or possesses
any silencer designed to muffle the noise of a firearm during discharge.
(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply to persons, firms, corporations or
museums licensed or otherwise permitted by federal or state law to possess, control or
own sawed-off shotguns or silencers.
(c) Possession of a sawed-off shotgun or a silencer is a class D felony.
(P.A. 76-45; P.A. 80-244.)
History: P.A. 80-244 deleted phrase "of any caliber" following reference to sawed-off shot guns in Subsec. (a).
See Secs. 29-35 to 29-38a, inclusive, and 53-202 to 53-206d, inclusive, re regulation of firearms and penalties imposed
for firearms violations.
Cited. 190 C. 715, 717. Cited. 207 C. 323, 324. Cited. 233 C. 215, 218.
Cited. 1 CA 697, 698. Cited. 7 CA 550. Cited. 11 CA 397, 398, 402. Cited. 14 CA 67, 68, 75. Cited. 15 CA 539, 540.
Cited. 17 CA 490, 491, 498, 500. Cited. 30 CA 9, 10.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 190 C. 715, 719, 722, 723. Cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Cited. 201 C. 505, 506, 513, 514. Cited. 224 C. 163, 164.
Cited. 11 CA 397, 402. Cited. 13 CA 76, 77, 86. Cited. 26 CA 698, 699. Cited. 28 CA 474, 475.
Sec. 53a-212. Stealing a firearm: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of stealing
a firearm when, with intent to deprive another of his firearm or to appropriate the same
to himself or a third party, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds a firearm, as defined
in subdivision (l9) of section 53a-3.
(b) Stealing a firearm is a class D felony.
(P.A. 77-217.)
Cited. 189 C. 461, 462. Cited. 190 C. 715, 716. Cited. 197 C. 201, 203. Cited. 199 C. 591, 593. Cited. 241 C. 702.
Cited. 9 CA 349, 350. Cited. 19 CA 48, 51, 52, 59, 64. Cited. 20 CA 521, 522. Cited. 34 CA 751, 753, 766, 770, 771;
judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 481, 483. Cited. Id., 750, 752.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 190 C. 715, 720, 721. Cited. 196 C. 157, 158. Cited. 198 C. 405, 406.
Cited. 7 CA 367, 370. Cited. 8 CA 631, 632. Cited. Id., 667. Cited. 34 CA 751, 753, 769; judgment reversed, see 233
C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 740, 743. Cited. 38 CA 481, 483. Cited. Id., 643, 645, 653.
Sec. 53a-213. Drinking while operating motor vehicle: Class C misdemeanor.
(a) A person is guilty of drinking while operating a motor vehicle when he drinks any
alcoholic liquor while operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this state or
upon any road of any specially chartered municipal association or of any district organized under the provisions of chapter 105, a purpose of which is the construction and
maintenance of roads and sidewalks, or in any parking area for ten cars or more, or upon
any private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance with the
provisions of section 14-218a or upon any school property. As used in this section,
"alcoholic liquor" shall have the same meaning as in section 30-1.
(b) Drinking while operating a motor vehicle is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 79-368.)
Sec. 53a-214. Criminal lockout: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A landlord of a
dwelling unit subject to the provisions of chapter 830, an owner of such a unit, or the
agent of such landlord or owner is guilty of criminal lockout when, without benefit of
a court order, he deprives a tenant, as defined in subsection (l) of section 47a-1, of access
to his dwelling unit or his personal possessions.
(b) Criminal lockout is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 81-24.)
Sec. 53a-215. Insurance fraud: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of insurance
fraud when the person, with the intent to injure, defraud or deceive any insurance company: (1) Presents or causes to be presented to any insurance company, any written or
oral statement including computer-generated documents as part of, or in support of, any
application for any policy of insurance or a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant
to such policy of insurance, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete,
or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such application or
claim; or (2) assists, abets, solicits, or conspires with another to prepare or make any
written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to any insurance company in
connection with, or in support of, any application for any policy of insurance or any
claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to such policy of insurance, knowing that
such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning
any fact or thing material to such application or claim for the purposes of defrauding
such insurance company.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "statement" includes, but is not limited to, any
notice, statement, invoice, account, estimate of property damages, bill for services, test
result, or other evidence of loss, injury, or expense.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "insurance company" means "insurance company" as defined in section 38a-1.
(d) Insurance fraud is a class D felony.
(P.A. 81-113; P.A. 00-211, S. 6.)
History: P.A. 00-211 amended Subsec. (a) to delete "providing coverage for loss or damage to real or personal property
caused by fire" re insurance policies and to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality and amended Subsec.
(c) to redefine "insurance company".
See Secs. 53-440 to 53-443, inclusive, re health insurance fraud and abuse.
Cited. 28 CA 9, 28, 30, 31.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 1, 3.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 9, 11. Subdiv. (1) cited. 44 CA 294. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Sec. 53a-216. Criminal use of firearm or electronic defense weapon: Class D
felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal use of a firearm or electronic defense weapon
when he commits any class A, B or C or unclassified felony as defined in section 53a-25 and in the commission of such felony he uses or threatens the use of a pistol, revolver,
machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm or electronic defense weapon. No person
shall be convicted of criminal use of a firearm or electronic defense weapon and the
underlying felony upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Criminal use of a firearm or electronic defense weapon is a class D felony for
which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 81-342, S. 1; P.A. 86-287, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 86-287 added reference to electronic defense weapons.
Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Cited. 24 CA 330, 331.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 195 C. 651, 652.
Sec. 53a-217. Criminal possession of a firearm or electronic defense weapon:
Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm or electronic
defense weapon when such person possesses a firearm or electronic defense weapon
and (1) has been convicted of a felony, (2) has been convicted as delinquent for the
commission of a serious juvenile offense, as defined in section 46b-120, (3) knows that
such person is subject to a restraining or protective order of a court of this state or to a
foreign order of protection, as defined in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against
such person, after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such
person, in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force
against another person, or (4) knows that such person is subject to a firearms seizure
order issued pursuant to subsection (d) of section 29-38c after notice and an opportunity
to be heard has been provided to such person. For the purposes of this section, "convicted" means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(b) Criminal possession of a firearm or electronic defense weapon is a class D felony, for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by
the court.
(P.A. 82-464, S. 1; P.A. 86-287, S. 5; P.A. 91-212; P.A. 98-129, S. 12; P.A. 99-212, S. 1; P.A. 01-130, S. 15; P.A. 03-98, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 86-287 added reference to electronic defense weapons; P.A. 91-212 replaced "pistol, revolver" with
"firearm" and made technical changes; P.A. 98-129 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) prohibiting possession by a
person who has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense; P.A. 99-212 made provisions
applicable to a person convicted of any felony rather than only of a capital felony and specified class A, B, C and D felonies;
P.A. 01-130 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (3) re possession by a person who knows he or she is subject to a restraining
or protective order issued after notice and an opportunity to be heard in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened
use of physical force against another person and add Subdiv. (4) re possession by a person who knows he or she is subject
to a firearms seizure order issued pursuant to Sec. 29-38c after notice and an opportunity to be heard; P.A. 03-98 amended
Subsec. (a)(3) by replacing "protective order issued by a court" with "protective order of a court of this state" and adding
provisions re foreign order of protection and re order that has been issued against such person.
Cited. 200 C. 453, 458. Cited. 221 C. 915. Cited. 227 C. 363, 365, 368. Cited. 229 C. 164, 166. Cited. Id., 385, 388,
390, 395. Cited. 231 C. 235, 250-252. Cited. 234 C. 324, 330, 335, 338, 339. Cited. Id., 455, 464. Cited. 235 C. 274, 276.
Cited. Id., 402-404. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 242 C. 143. Cited. Id., 648. Cited. 247 C. 318.
Cited. 6 CA 189, 190. Cited. 11 CA 11, 12, 15. Cited. 15 CA 161, 166, 173, 174, 180, 181, 184, 185. Cited. Id., 342-
344, 355. Cited. 19 CA 48, 51, 59. Cited. 26 CA 367, 368, 375, 377. Cited. 29 CA 207, 209, 212. Cited. 30 CA 249, 250,
259. Cited. Id., 340, 341, 343. Cited. 33 CA 521-523. Cited. 34 CA 236, 238. Cited. 35 CA 781-783. Cited. 36 CA 805,
821. Cited. 37 CA 276, 277, 287, 290. Cited. 39 CA 82, 90. Cited. 40 CA 151, 153. Cited. 45 CA 584. Weapons possessed
by convicted murderer are contraband and cannot be given away by the convicted murderer. 65 CA 360.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 228 C. 384, 385. Cited. 229 C. 164, 166. Cited. 231 C. 235, 237. Cited. 241 C. 413.
Cited. 15 CA 161, 163. Cited. Id., 330, 331. Cited. Id., 749-751. Cited. 19 CA 48, 61. Cited. Id., 576, 577. Cited. 20
CA 137, 138. Cited. 24 CA 685, 686. Cited. 30 CA 26, 28. Cited. 33 CA 521, 522. Cited. 39 CA 82, 84. Cited. 40 CA 151,
153. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 45 CA 390. Court upheld prior rulings that convictions under both Sec. 29-35(a) and Subdiv.
(1) do not constitute double jeopardy. 83 CA 377.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 19 CA 48, 51. Cited. 33 CA 521, 531, 532.
Sec. 53a-217a. Criminally negligent storage of a firearm: Class D felony. (a)
A person is guilty of criminally negligent storage of a firearm when he violates the
provisions of section 29-37i and a minor obtains the firearm and causes the injury or
death of himself or any other person. For the purposes of this section, "minor" means
any person under the age of sixteen years.
(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply if the minor obtains the firearm
as a result of an unlawful entry to any premises by any person.
(c) Criminally negligent storage of a firearm is a class D felony.
(P.A. 90-144, S. 2.)
History: (Revisor's note: In codifying public act 90-144 the internal reference in Subsec. (a) to "section 29-37c" was
changed editorially by the Revisors to "section 29-37i" for accuracy).
Section not vague as applied to defendant's conduct; he cannot mount a facial challenge to the statute. 242 C. 211.
Sec. 53a-217b. Possession of a weapon on school grounds: Class D felony. (a)
A person is guilty of possession of a weapon on school grounds when, knowing that
such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person possesses a firearm or
deadly weapon, as defined in section 53a-3, (1) in or on the real property comprising a
public or private elementary or secondary school, or (2) at a school-sponsored activity
as defined in subsection (h) of section 10-233a.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the otherwise
lawful possession of a firearm (1) by a person for use in a program approved by school
officials in or on such school property or at such school-sponsored activity, (2) by a
person in accordance with an agreement entered into between school officials and such
person or such person's employer, (3) by a peace officer, as defined in subdivision (9)
of section 53a-3, while engaged in the performance of such peace officer's official
duties, or (4) by a person while traversing such school property for the purpose of gaining
access to public or private lands open to hunting or for other lawful purposes, provided
such firearm is not loaded and the entry on such school property is permitted by the
local or regional board of education.
(c) Possession of a weapon on school grounds is a class D felony.
(June Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-1, S. 1; P.A. 93-416, S. 7; P.A. 94-221, S. 1; P.A. 98-129, S. 15; P.A. 01-84, S. 8, 26.)
History: P.A. 93-416 amended Subsecs. (a) and (c) to replace reference to offense of "possession of a firearm on school
grounds" with revised name of "possession of a weapon on school grounds" due to inclusion of deadly weapon in offense
in Subsec. (a); P.A. 94-221 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) re school-sponsored activities and amended Subdiv.
(5) of Subsec. (b) to substitute "permitted by" the board of education for "not prohibited by school officials" and, notwithstanding the provisions of Subsec. (b), provided for the prohibition by boards of education of the possession of firearms
by students in or on school property or at a school-sponsored activity; P.A. 98-129 amended Subsec. (a) to add element
that the person know that he is not licensed or privileged to possess a weapon on school grounds and amended Subsec. (b)
to delete former Subdiv. (1) that had made provisions of Subsec. (a) inapplicable to the lawful possession of a firearm by
a person holding a valid state or local permit to carry such firearm, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and
deleted provision that had authorized boards of education and supervisory agents of private schools to prohibit the possession
of firearms by students in or on school property or at a school-sponsored activity; P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (b) to
exempt in Subdiv. (1) possession of a firearm for use in an approved program "at such school-sponsored activity" and
made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality in Subsecs. (a) and (b), effective July 1, 2001.
Sec. 53a-217c. Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver: Class D felony. (a)
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver when such person possesses a pistol or revolver, as defined in section 29-27, and (1) has been convicted of a
felony or of a violation of subsection (c) of section 21a-279 or section 53a-58, 53a-61,
53a-61a, 53a-62, 53a-63, 53a-96, 53a-175, 53a-176, 53a-178 or 53a-181d, (2) has been
convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, as defined in
section 46b-120, (3) has been discharged from custody within the preceding twenty
years after having been found not guilty of a crime by reason of mental disease or
defect pursuant to section 53a-13, (4) has been confined in a hospital for persons with
psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding twelve
months by order of a probate court, (5) knows that such person is subject to a restraining
or protective order of a court of this state or to a foreign order of protection, as defined
in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against such person, after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, in a case involving the use, attempted
use or threatened use of physical force against another person, (6) knows that such
person is subject to a firearms seizure order issued pursuant to subsection (d) of section
29-38c after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person,
or (7) is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States. For the purposes of this
section, "convicted" means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(b) Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver is a class D felony.
(July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-1, S. 3; P.A. 98-129, S. 13; P.A. 99-212, S. 21; P.A. 03-98, S. 5.)
History: P.A. 98-129 amended Subsec. (a) to add new Subdiv. (2) prohibiting the possession of a pistol or revolver by
a person who has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, renumbering the remaining
Subdivs. accordingly, and replaced in Subdiv. (4) "hospital for mental illness" with "hospital for persons with psychiatric
disabilities"; P.A. 99-212 amended Subsec. (a) to add new Subdiv. (6) prohibiting the possession of a pistol or revolver
by a person who knows that such person is subject to a firearms seizure order issued pursuant to Sec. 29-38c(d) after notice
and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, renumbering the remaining Subdiv. accordingly, and
made provisions gender neutral; P.A. 03-98 amended Subsec. (a) by making a technical change in Subdiv. (1) and replacing
"protective order issued by a court" with "protective order of a court of this state" and adding provisions re foreign order
of protection and re order that has been issued against such person in Subdiv. (5).
Operability of the pistol or revolver is not essential element of the offense. 59 CA 112. Where prior felony conviction
formed basis of a charge under this section, violation of section could not be established without presenting proof of such
conviction. 64 CA 384.
Sec. 53a-217d. Criminal possession of body armor: Class A misdemeanor. (a)
A person is guilty of criminal possession of body armor when he possesses body armor
and has been (1) convicted of a capital felony, a class A felony, except a conviction
under section 53a-196a, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86, 53a-122 or 53a-196b, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152
or 53a-153 or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a,
53a-72b, 53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216, or (2) convicted
as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, as defined in section
46b-120.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "body armor" means any material designed to
be worn on the body and to provide bullet penetration resistance and "convicted" means
having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(c) Criminal possession of body armor is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 98-127, S. 1.)
See Sec. 53-341b re restriction on sale or delivery of body armor.
Sec. 53a-217e. Negligent hunting. Penalties. Fines deposited in the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Fund and the Conservation Fund. Suspension of hunting
license. Forfeiture of hunting weapon. Prima facie evidence of hunting. (a) As used
in this section:
(1) "Criminal negligence" shall have the same meaning as "criminal negligence",
as defined in section 53a-3;
(2) "Hunting" shall have the same meaning as "hunting", as defined in section 26-1;
(3) "Loaded hunting implement" means (A) a rifle or shotgun with a live round in
the chamber or in a magazine which is attached to such rifle or shotgun, a muzzle-loaded
firearm with the percussion cap in place, or a flintlock firearm with powder in the pan,
(B) a bow and arrow with an arrow notched on the bow, (C) a drawn crossbow with a
bolt in place, or (D) a high velocity air gun that is charged with a projectile in the chamber
or in a magazine that is attached to such air gun; and
(4) "Serious physical injury" shall have the same meaning as "serious physical
injury, as defined in section 53a-3.
(b) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the first degree when, with criminal
negligence while hunting, such person discharges a loaded hunting implement and
thereby causes the death of another person.
(2) Negligent hunting in the first degree is a class D felony.
(c) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the second degree when, with
criminal negligence while hunting, such person violates any provision of section 26-85
or discharges a loaded hunting implement and thereby causes the serious physical injury
of another person.
(2) Negligent hunting in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person
found guilty under subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be fined not less than four
hundred dollars.
(d) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the third degree when such person,
while hunting, (A) discharges a firearm at a time of day when hunting is not permitted,
(B) discharges a firearm from a vehicle, (C) hunts while the person's license to hunt is
suspended, (D) hunts out of season or on a Sunday, or (E) discharges a firearm so as to
cause the projectile to strike or enter into any building occupied by people or domestic
animals or used for storage of flammable or combustible materials.
(2) Negligent hunting in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor and any person
found guilty under subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be fined not less than two
hundred dollars.
(e) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the fourth degree when such person, while hunting, (A) hunts without purchasing a license, permit or stamp or other
permission required by law, (B) is in possession of a loaded hunting implement at a
time of day when hunting is not allowed, (C) hunts with or discharges a firearm less
than two hundred fifty feet from any building occupied by people or domestic animals
or used for storage of flammable or combustible materials, or less than one hundred
twenty-five feet from any such building while hunting in tidal water areas, unless written
permission of the owner of such building has been obtained, or (D) hunts from or discharges a hunting implement from or across a public highway.
(2) Negligent hunting in the fourth degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(f) Any person who is convicted of a violation of any provision of subsection (b),
(c) or (d) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d within five years of a
previous conviction for violation of this section shall be considered a persistent negligent
hunter. Upon such second conviction within five years, a persistent negligent hunter
shall be fined an amount that is not less than twice the minimum fine provided for the
second violation and shall be subject to penalties provided for the next more serious
degree of negligent hunting under subsection (b), (c) or (d) of this section or subsection
(b) of section 53-206d.
(g) Any fine imposed for a conviction under subsection (b) or (c) of this section or
subsection (b) of section 53-206d shall be deposited in the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund established pursuant to section 54-215. Any fine imposed for a conviction
under subsection (d) or (e) of this section shall be deposited in the Conservation Fund
established under section 22a-27h for land management or acquisition of hunting easements.
(h) (1) The Commissioner of Environmental Protection may suspend the hunting
license of any person convicted under subsection (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this section or
subsection (b) of section 53-206d for: (A) Indefinitely upon conviction of negligent
hunting in the first degree or upon conviction of any violation of subsection (b) of section
53-206d; (B) up to ten years upon conviction of negligent hunting in the second degree;
(C) up to five years upon conviction of negligent hunting in the third degree; and (D)
up to three years upon conviction of negligent hunting in the fourth degree.
(2) Any person arrested for a violation of subsection (b), (c) or (d) of this section
or subsection (b) of section 53-206d, except as provided in section 26-85 shall surrender
any firearm, bow, crossbow, bolt or high velocity air gun in the person's possession
while hunting at the time of the alleged violation. Such property shall be confiscated at
the time of arrest by a police officer or conservation officer. Upon nolle or dismissal of
charges or acquittal of such person of such violation, such property shall be returned to
the person within five business days and in the same condition as when the firearm,
bow, crossbow or high velocity air gun was surrendered. Notwithstanding the provisions
of sections 54-33g and 54-36a, the property shall be turned over to the Commissioner
of Environmental Protection upon conviction of such person for such violation. Said
commissioner shall (A) retain the property for use by personnel of the Department of
Environmental Protection, (B) convey the property to the Commissioner of Administrative Services for sale at public auction, the proceeds of which shall be credited to the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund established pursuant to section 54-215, or (C)
destroy the property.
(i) Possession by any person of a loaded hunting implement while at or entering or
leaving an area where a reasonable person would believe the objective was to take
wildlife shall be prima facie evidence of hunting, except that a person may, one hour
before sunrise during the regulated deer and turkey firearms hunting seasons, be in
possession of a loaded rifle or shotgun, as defined in subdivision (3) of subsection (a)
of this section, provided a live round is not in the chamber of the rifle or shotgun.
(P.A. 00-142, S. 1.)
Sec. 53a-218. Interference with a cemetery or burial ground: Class C felony.
(a) A person is guilty of interference with a cemetery or burial ground when he, without
authorization of the owner of the burial lot, or a lineal descendant of the deceased, or
of the municipality, cemetery association or person or authority responsible for the
control or management of the cemetery or burial ground: (1) Intentionally destroys,
mutilates, defaces, injures or removes any tomb, monument, gravestone or other structure placed or designed for a memorial of the dead, or any portion or fragment thereof,
or any fence, railing, curb or other enclosure for the burial of the dead, in or from any
cemetery or burial ground; or (2) wantonly or maliciously disturbs the contents of any
tomb or grave in any cemetery or burial ground.
(b) Interference with a cemetery or burial ground is a class C felony and any person
found guilty under this section shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars.
(P.A. 84-280, S. 4; P.A. 89-109; P.A. 96-209, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 89-109 established a minimum fine of five hundred dollars; P.A. 96-209 amended Subsec. (b) by changing
penalty from class D to class C felony.
Disclaimer: These codes may not be the most recent version. Connecticut may have more current or accurate information. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or the information linked to on the state site. Please check official sources.