State of WV v. McGhee
Annotate this Case
January 1995 Term
_____________
No. 22475
_____________
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee
v.
PERSONNE E. MCGHEE,
Defendant Below, Appellant
___________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ohio County
Honorable Fred Risovich II, Judge
Criminal Case No. 92-F-74
AFFIRMED
___________________________________________________________
Submitted: January 11, 1995
Filed: February 17, 1995
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Esq.
Attorney General
Dawn E. Warfield, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Appellee
James J. A. Mulhall, Esq.
First Judicial Circuit Public Defender Corp.
Wheeling, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellant
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
JUSTICE BROTHERTON did not participate.
JUDGE FOX sitting by temporary assignment.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. W.Va.R.Evid. 404(b)." Syllabus Point 1, State v. Edward
Charles L., 183 W. Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990).
2. "Other criminal act evidence admissible as part of
the res gestae or same transaction introduced for the purpose of
explaining the crime charged must be confined to that which is
reasonably necessary to accomplish such purpose." Syllabus Point
1, State v. Spicer, 162 W. Va. 127, 245 S.E.2d 922 (1978).
3. "When offering evidence under Rule 404(b) of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the prosecution is required to
identify the specific purpose for which the evidence is being
offered and the jury must be instructed to limit its consideration
of the evidence to only that purpose. It is not sufficient for the
prosecution or the trial court merely to cite or mention the litany
of possible uses listed in Rule 404(b). The specific and precise
purpose for which the evidence is offered must clearly be shown
from the record and that purpose alone must be told to the jury in the trial court's instruction." Syllabus Point 1, State v.
McGinnis, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, (No. 22031, Dec. 8,
1994).
4. "Where an offer of evidence is made under Rule
404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the trial court,
pursuant to Rule 104(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, is
to determine its admissibility. Before admitting the evidence, the
trial court should conduct an in camera hearing as stated in State
v. Dolin, 176 W. Va. 688, 347 S.E.2d 208 (1986). After hearing the
evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court must be
satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts or
conduct occurred and that the defendant committed the acts. If the
trial court does not find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the acts or conduct was committed or that the defendant was the
actor, the evidence should be excluded under Rule 404(b). If a
sufficient showing has been made, the trial court must then
determine the relevancy of the evidence under Rules 401 and 402 of
the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and conduct the balancing
required under Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. If
the trial court is then satisfied that the Rule 404(b) evidence is
admissible, it should instruct the jury on the limited purpose for
which such evidence has been admitted. A limiting instruction
should be given at the time the evidence is offered, and we
recommend that it be repeated in the trial court's general charge to the jury at the conclusion of the evidence." Syllabus Point 2,
State v. McGinnis, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, (No. 22031,
Dec. 8, 1994).
Per Curiam:
Personne E. McGhee appeals his conviction of carrying a
concealed deadly weapon, a misdemeanor offense. On appeal, Mr.
McGhee alleges that the prosecution's repeated references to
another alleged crime, namely, brandishing a weapon, denied him a
fair trial and that the jury was improperly instructed on the
elements of the crime. Because Mr. McGhee's allegations are
without merit, we affirm his conviction.
On December 8, 1991, in response to a radio report
alleging that Mr. McGhee had been seen near a Wheeling tavern
pointing a 9 Millimeter pistol at Julius Wallace, Officer Gessler
of the Wheeling Police Department went to the tavern where he saw
Mr. McGhee getting into the passenger seat of Rodney Carter's car.
The police followed Mr. Carter's car which had a dark interior and
tinted windows. When the police stopped the car, Mr. McGhee
spontaneously lowered his window and placed his hands on the car's
roof. Mr. McGhee was searched outside the car but no weapon was
found. However, the search of the inside of Mr. Carter's car
revealed a 9 MM pistol with its butt protruding from under the
car's passenger seat.See footnote 1 Mr. McGhee was arrested. It is undisputed
that Mr. McGhee does not have a license to carry a weapon.
Mr. McGhee was charged with one count of second offense
carrying a concealed weaponSee footnote 2 and one count brandishing a firearm.
The charges were severed and on April 7, 1993, a jury found Mr.
McGhee not guilty of brandishing a firearm.See footnote 3
On May 13, 1993, Mr. McGhee was tried by a jury on the
charge of carrying a concealed weapon, a violation of W. Va. Code
61-7-3 [1989].See footnote 4 During his opening statement, the prosecutor said
that the police stopped Mr. McGhee because of a report that he was
brandishing a weapon.See footnote 5 The defense's objection was overruled. The three officers who were involved in Mr. McGhee's arrest testified
that the radio message triggered their involvement.See footnote 6 Mr. McGhee
denied he "pulled a gun or something there at the bar."
During the closing statements for both sides, the
brandishing incident was mentioned. According to the prosecutor,
Mr. McGhee said:
[H]e never saw a gun or had a gun. And, this
report he pulled out a gun that the police
perceived [sic] was totally false. It didn't
happen. Yet, Mr. McGhee goes out and gets in
the passenger side of a car and doesn't get
more than 100 feet from Market Street and the
police car pulls up behind him. . . .
The defense during their closing statement pointed out that Julius
Wallace had not testified; in fact, no one testified that "they saw
Personne McGhee with any gun." Finally, in the rebuttal statement,
the prosecutor said:
I don't know whether Mr. McGhee brandished a
gun at Julius Wallace or not. But, that's not
the charge we are here on. He's charged with
carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Obviously
somebody saw him with a gun that night or
there wouldn't be a police report. . . .
After the jury convicted Mr. McGhee of violating W. Va.
Code 61-7-3 [1989] and he was sentenced to one year in the Ohio
County Jail and fined $1,000, Mr. McGhee appealed to this Court.
Three of Mr. McGhee's assignments of error concern the State's use
of the brandishing incident. Mr. McGhee also alleges that the jury
was improperly instructed.
I.
A.
Mr. McGhee maintains that the repeated references and
evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts denied him a fair trial.
Mr. McGhee argues that the prosecutor devoted excessive trial time to the alleged brandishing, a part of the background material and,
thus, shifted his trial's focus from the concealed weapon charge to
the brandishing incident.See footnote 7 The State maintains that the
brandishing incident was merely offered to explain why the police
officers stopped Mr. McGhee.
Rule 404(b) [1985] of the W.V.R.Evid. states:
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
-- Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.See footnote 8
Although providing background of an incident is not listed in Rule
404(b) as an admissible purpose, "W.Va.R.Evid. 404(b) is an
'inclusive rule' in which all relevant evidence involving other
crimes or acts is admitted at trial unless the sole purpose for the
admission is to show criminal disposition. (Citation omitted.)" State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. Va. 641, 647, 398 S.E.2d 123,
129 (1990). In State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. Va. at 648, 398 S.E.2d at 130, quoting, U.S. v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir.
1980), we noted:
[O]ne of the accepted bases for the
admissibility of evidence of other crimes
arises when such evidence, "furnishes part of
the context of the crime" or is necessary to a
"full presentation" of the case, or is so
intimately connected with and explanatory of
the crime charged against the defendant and is
so much a part of the setting of the case and
its "environment" that its proof is
appropriate in order "to complete the story of
the crime on trial by proving its immediate
context. . . ."
Based on this reasoning we permit evidence of other crimes in order
"to complete the story" or to show "the context of the crime." See
State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. Va. at 649, 398 S.E.2d at 131
(other sexual acts performed in presence of child victims held
admissible); State v. Nelson, 189 W. Va. 778, 784, 434 S.E.2d 697,
703 (1993) (full presentation of the case required admission of
defendant's involvement in drug transaction and agreement to check
into outstanding warrants); State v. Gilbert, 184 W. Va. 140, 146-
47, 399 S.E.2d 851, 858 (1990) (per curiam) (permitting evidence
that defendant engaged in an act of bestiality during one of his
sexual assaults on the victim); State v. Spicer, 162 W. Va. 127,
245 S.E.2d 922 (1978)(excessive evidence about the rapes of the
victim during an armed robbery prosecution was not admissible as
part of the same transaction exception).
In Syl. pt.1, State v. Edward Charles L., supra, we
stated:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident. W.Va.R.Evid. 404(b).
See also Syl. pt. 12, State v. Thomas, 157 W. Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974). Recently, in State v. McGinnis, ___ W. Va. ___, ___,
___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (Slip. op. at 8) (No. 22031, Dec. 8, 1994), we
noted that "evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts [are]
potentially admissible, subject to other limitations such as Rule
403 where they may be offered for any relevant purpose that does
not compel an inference from character to conduct. [Citations
omitted.]" See TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
187 W. Va. 457, 419 S.E.2d 870 (1992), aff'd ___ U.S.___, 113 S. Ct. 2711, 125 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1993). In his book, Handbook of Evidence
for West Virginia Lawyers, Justice Cleckley noted that the complete
story principle, "though not mentioned in Rule 404(b), continues to
be a viable 'other purpose' for admitting evidence of other wrongs
as long as the conduct is truly illustrative of the context of the
offense and has independent relevance to a material issue in the
lawsuit." Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West
Virginia Lawyers § 4-5(B)(4)(i), Vol I at 357 (3d ed. 1994).
In State v. Spicer, we noted that evidence of other
criminal acts is confined to what is necessary to accomplish its
legitimate purpose. Syl. pt. 1, State v. Spicer, states:
Other criminal act evidence admissible as
part of the res gestae or same transaction
introduced for the purpose of explaining the
crime charged must be confined to that which
is reasonably necessary to accomplish such
purpose.
In Syl. pt. 1, State v. McGinnis, supra, we stated:
When offering evidence under Rule 404(b) of
the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the
prosecution is required to identify the
specific purpose for which the evidence is
being offered and the jury must be instructed
to limit its consideration of the evidence to
only that purpose. It is not sufficient for
the prosecution or the trial court merely to
cite or mention the litany of possible uses
listed in Rule 404(b). The specific and
precise purpose for which the evidence is
offered must clearly be shown from the record
and that purpose alone must be told to the
jury in the trial court's instruction.
In this case, the evidence of Mr. McGhee's alleged
brandishing of a weapon was offered to explain why the defendant
was stopped. In offering evidence of the alleged brandishing
incident, the prosecution identified the specific purpose, namely
as background. Although the brandishing incident was mentioned
several times, it was in the context of providing "background."
Evidence of the alleged brandishing incident was limited and no
additional information was provided. Even the prosecutor in his
rebuttal argument noted that the brandishing incident was not the
issue or part of the current charge.
We have long held that "[r]ulings on the admissibility of
evidence are largely within a trial court's sound discretion and
should not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of
discretion." State v. Louk, 171 W. Va. 639, 643, 301 S.E.2d 596,
599 (1983), overruled on other grounds, State v. Jenkins, 191
W. Va. 87, ___, 443 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1994); Syl. pt. 2, State v.
Peyatt, 173 W.Va. 317, 315 S.E.2d 574 (1983); Syl. pt. 9, TXO
Production, supra; State v. McGinnis, ___ W. Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d
at ___, Slip op. at 23; Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Allen v. Bedell,
___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 22359, Dec. 9, 1994); Syl. pt.
1, Capper v. Gates, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 21996, Dec.
8, 1994). After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court
did not abuse his discretion by allowing limited use of the alleged
incident to complete the story.
B.
Mr. McGhee also argues that the State should have
disclosed its intention use the brandishing incident. Mr. McGhee
filed a pre-trial discovery motion requesting notice of the State's
intention to use evidence of other crimes. The record contains no
evidence of any response from the State. However, no motion to
compel was filed and there was no court-ordered discovery.See footnote 9 Mr.
McGhee maintains that he was surprised when the brandishing incident was mentioned in the prosecutor's opening statement and
that preparation of his case was hampered.
The State maintains that Mr. McGhee knew that the police
radio message triggered the stopping of Mr. McGhee and that the
radio message would be introduced in the trial. The State notes
that although Mr. McGhee objected to the evidence, he did not
request a continuance, recess or any other remedial measures that
would have allowed preparation time. The State argues that the
record fails to substantiate Mr. McGhee's claim that he was
prejudiced.
In Syl. pt. 2, State v. Grimm, 165 W. Va. 547, 270 S.E.2d 173 (1980), we stated:
When a trial court grants a pre-trial
discovery motion requiring the prosecution to
disclose evidence in its possession, non-
disclosure by the prosecution is fatal to its
case where such non-disclosure is prejudicial.
The non-disclosure is prejudicial where the
defense is surprised on a material issue and
where the failure to make the disclosure
hampers the preparation and presentation of
the defendant's case.
In State v. Miller, 178 W. Va. 618, 624, 363 S.E.2d 504, 510
(1987), we outlined the two prong inquiry of State v. Grimm, supra:
(1) [D]id the non-disclosure surprise the
defendant on a material fact, and (2) did it
hamper the preparation and presentation of the
defendant's case.
See also Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Kusen v. Hill, ___ W. Va. ___,
___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 22441, Dec. 21, 1994). State v. Miller noted
that Rule 16(d)(2) [1985] of W.Va.R.Cr.P. "enables a trial court to
impose sanctions that may have the effect of curing a late
discovery problem. [Footnote omitted.]" 178 W. Va. at 625, 343 S.E.2d at 511. Although technically, Rule 16 does not apply in
this case because the discovery was not court ordered, the remedial
measures outlined in Rule 16, including the granting of a
continuance, were available, but not requested.
In this case, the alleged incident was offered as
background, and the record shows that the brandishing incident was
not discussed before the jury. At trial, Mr. McGhee did not seem
surprised because he failed to request any measures from the trial
court that would have allowed additional preparation time. Neither
does the record indicate that Mr. McGhee was prejudiced by the
police report.
C.
Mr. McGhee also argues that the in camera hearing held by
the trial court on his objection to the introduction of the alleged
incident was inadequate. During the State's opening statement,
defense objected to the prosecutor's statement. See supra note 5.
During the in camera hearing, the defense argued that Mr. Wallace's
statements were inadmissible because the statements were hearsay
and evidence of a collateral crime. The State maintained that this background information showed why the police stopped Mr. McGhee,
that Mr. Wallace would not testify and that no other information
about the alleged brandishing would be presented. The defense
continued to object "if he [the prosecutor] is not going to produce
Julius Wallace to testify." The defense also stated that the
admission was "fairly prejudicial," but provided no explanation.
Recently, we discussed the issue of collateral misconduct
in State v. McGinnis, supra. Syl. pt. 2, State v. McGinnis states:
Where an offer of evidence is made under
Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence, the trial court, pursuant to Rule
104(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence,
is to determine its admissibility. Before
admitting the evidence, the trial court should
conduct an in camera hearing as stated in
State v. Dolin, 176 W. Va. 688, 347 S.E.2d 208
(1986). After hearing the evidence and
arguments of counsel, the trial court must be
satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence
that the acts or conduct occurred and that the
defendant committed the acts. If the trial
court does not find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the acts or conduct was
committed or that the defendant was the actor,
the evidence should be excluded under Rule
404(b). If a sufficient showing has been
made, the trial court must then determine the
relevancy of the evidence under Rules 401 and
402 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and
conduct the balancing required under Rule 403
of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. If
the trial court is then satisfied that the
Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible, it should
instruct the jury on the limited purpose for
which such evidence has been admitted. A
limiting instruction should be given at the
time the evidence is offered, and we recommend
that it be repeated in the trial court's
general charge to the jury at the conclusion
of the evidence.
In this case, the trial court held an in camera hearing.
During the hearing the State noted that the alleged brandishing
was introduced only to explain the police radio report that lead to
stopping the defendant. The State did not allege that the
defendant committed the act but only that there was a report.
Although during the in camera hearing, the trial court did not
specifically refer to Rules 401, 402 and 403 of the W.Va.R.Evid.,
the trial court did consider the relevancy of the report and was
satisfied that the evidence could be admitted for the purpose of
providing background.See footnote 10
In this case, the trial court did not give the limiting
instructions recommended in Syl. pt. 2, State v. McGinnis.
However, unlike the defense in State v. McGinnis, which "made
timely objections to most of the prosecution's witnesses and
frequently asked for limiting instructions," Mr. McGhee's lawyer
made only the objection considered during the in camera hearingSee footnote 11 and did not request any limiting instructions. In State v.
McGinnis, we noted that "the trial court is under no obligation to
give a limiting instruction unless one is requested." State v.
McGinnis, ___ W. Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___, Slip Op. at 15.
See also, TXO Production, 187 W.Va. at 471, 419 S.E.2d at 884("TXO
did not request a limiting instruction regrading the other acts
testimony;" therefore, no error occurred); State v. Pancake, 170 W.
Va. 690, 694, 296 S.E.2d 37, 41 (1982)("[d]efendant would have been
entitled to a cautionary instruction, but did not ask for one").
In this case, we note that although no limiting
instruction was given, the jury was informed by the State in its
closing rebuttal that brandishing is "not the charge we are here
on." Although the in camera hearing should have been conducted
before the trial, the defense did not file a motion in limine to
exclude evidence of the alleged brandishing.See footnote 12
Finally, we note that the defense's argument that the in
camera hearing was inadequate as a matter of law, is mostly a
restatement of his argument to exclude evidence of the alleged
brandishing which we discussed and rejected earlier. See supra
Part I A.
II
Mr. McGhee alleges that the jury was not instructed on
all the elements of the concealed weapon charge, specifically "the
required mental state." However, without objection by the defense,
the jury received the following instruction concerning the "proof
of specific intent:"
The Court instructs the jury that the crimes
charged in this case are crimes which require
proof of specific intent before the defendant
can be convicted. Specific intent, as the
term applies, means more than the general
intent to commit the act. To establish
specific intent, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly
did an act which the law forbids, purposely
intending to violate the law. Such intent may
be determined from all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case.
The record shows that Mr. McGhee agreed to the
instructions and that all instructions requested by the defense
were given.
Rule 30 [1985] of the W.Va.R.Cr.P. states, in pertinent
part:
No party may assign as error the giving or the
refusal to give an instruction or to the
giving of any portion of the charge unless he
objects thereto before the arguments to the
jury are begun, stating distinctly the matter
to which he objects and the grounds of his
objection; but the court or any appellate
court may, in the interest of justice, notice
plain error in the giving or refusal to give
an instruction, whether or not it has been
made the subject of objection.
On appeal, Mr. McGhee maintains that his case is similar
to State v. Choat, 178 W. Va. 607, 617, 363 S.E.2d 493, 503 (1987)
in which the jury was not instructed to determine if the concealed
lock-blade knife with an approximately five-and-one-half inch blade
carried by the defendant was "in fact, a 'dangerous or deadly
weapon' pursuant to W.Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975]." Unlike the knife
in State v. Choat, this case's weapon, a pistol, is per se a deadly
weapon under W. Va. Code, 61-7-2 [1989]. Finally the jury was
instructed to consider the defendant's specific intent.
Because the jury instructions, when taken as a whole,
properly instructed the jury on all the necessary elements of the
crime, we find Mr. McGhee's final assignment of error to be without
merit.
For the above stated reasons, we affirm the decision of
the Circuit Court of Ohio County.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1
At trial, Mr. McGhee testified that the 9 MM pistol belonged
to Andrew Black whom he knew.Footnote: 2
Because the underlying first offense was overturned, Mr.
McGhee was tried on the lessor included first offense charge of
carrying a concealed weapon.Footnote: 3
The jury in this case was not informed of the severed
brandishing case or Mr. McGhee's acquittal.Footnote: 4
W. Va. Code 61-7-3 (a) [1989] provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who carries a concealed
deadly weapon, without a state license or
other lawful authorization established under
the provisions of this code, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not less than one
hundred dollars nor more than one thousand
dollars and may be imprisoned in the county
jail for not more than twelve months for the
first offense. . . .Footnote: 5
The prosecutor said in pertinent part:
On December 8, 1991, shortly after midnight a
man, by the name of Julius Wallace, came into
the Wheeling Police Department down to the
front desk and reported that the defendant--
After a bench conference, in which the defense's objection was
overruled, the prosecutor continued:
As I was saying, the police dispatch received
a report on Rico McGhee (the appellant). The
incident involved a handgun being brandished
by Mr. McGhee. The dispatch sent out over the
radio that there had been an incident
involving Mr. McGhee.Footnote: 6
Officer Gessler testified:
I heard them give a call out for an individual
that allegedly had a gun.
Officer Mackey of the Wheeling Police Department testified;
[There] was a radio transmission given out
with Rico's (the defendant) name in it. . . .
A radio transmission was given out from
Headquarters was that Rico McGhee had pointed
a 9 MM black pistol at one Julius Wallace, and
it was in the area of 11th and Market Streets.
Officer Flannigan of the Wheeling Police Department testified:
We were made aware of it (the incident)
through radio transmission. I believe from
headquarters that they said that Mr. McGhee
had pointed a pistol, a 9 MM pistol at on
Julius Wallace. In the area of what is known
as the Breeze or Johnny Cools now.Footnote: 7
Mr. McGhee did object when the alleged brandishing incident
was first mentioned because the person involved in the incident was
not going to testify. His objection was not renewed and Mr. McGhee
did not request a limiting instruction.Footnote: 8
Rule 404(b) was amended in 1994 by adding the following
provision to the end of the second sentence:
. . . [P]rovided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of
trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial.Footnote: 9
Rule 404(b) [1994] of W.Va.R.Evid. now requires the
prosecution to provide, upon defendant's request, notice of the
general nature of any collateral crimes to be introduced at trial.
See supra p.5 and note 8 for Rule 404(b).Footnote: 10
Although the defense in the in camera hearing said, "It's
[the police report] fairly prejudicial," no further explanation or
argument was provided by the defense.Footnote: 11
In Syl. pt. 1, Wimer v. Hinkle, 180 W. Va. 660, 379 S.E.2d 383 (1989), we stated:
An objection to an adverse ruling on a motion in limine to bar evidence at trial will preserve the point, even though no objection was made at the time the evidence was offered, unless there has been a significant change in the basis for admitting the evidence.Footnote: 12 Mr. McGhee did file a motion in limine to exclude evidence that Mr. McGhee stole the 9 MM pistol. Although the trial court's ruling is not in the record, no evidence was presented concerning the alleged theft.
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