Justia.com Opinion Summary: The primary issue presented in this case was whether former RCW 9.92.151 (2004) or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution requires a county jail to provide opportunities for an inmate who is yet to be sentenced to earn credit toward early release, also known as "good-time" credit. Petitioner, Teddy Talley argued that the Skamania County Jail and the Department of Corrections (Department) violated the former RCW 9.92.151(1) and the Constitution by not providing opportunities for him to earn good-time credit before his criminal conviction. Skamania County argued that the statutory issue was not properly before the Supreme Court and that its program for earning good-time credit is constitutional. The Department argued that it may rely on a county’s jail-time certification when determining the appropriate amount of good-time credit to apply toward early release. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the matter was properly before it, and that the former RCW 9.92.151 required a county jail to provide opportunities for a presentence inmate to earn good-time credit. The Court did not reach Defendant's constitutional argument. Because the Skamania County Jail policy conflicted with the former RCW 9.92.151, the Court calculated that Defendant should have received an earned early-release credit at the statutory maximum rate of 15 percent.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Personal
Restraint of
TEDDY GLEN TALLEY,
Petitioner.
No. 83284-6
En Banc
Filed September 15, 2011
J.M. JOHNSON, J.—The primary issue presented in this case is
whether former RCW 9.92.151 (2004) or the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution requires a county jail to provide opportunities for
an inmate who is yet to be sentenced to earn credit toward early release, also
known as “good-time” credit.
The petitioner, Teddy Glen Talley, argues that the Skamania County
Jail and the Department of Corrections (Department) violated former RCW
9.92.151(1) and the Constitution by not providing opportunities for him to
earn good-time credit before his criminal conviction. He further contends that
In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
these violations entitle him to good-time credit at the statutory maximum rate
of 15 percent.
Skamania County argues that the statutory issue is not
properly before this court and that its program for earning good-time credit is
constitutional. The Department argues that it may rely on a county’s jail-time
certification when determining the appropriate amount of good-time credit to
apply toward early release.
We hold that the statutory issue is properly before us. We also hold
that former RCW 9.92.151 requires a county jail to provide opportunities for
a presentence inmate to earn good-time credit. We do not reach Talley’s
constitutional issue. Because the Skamania County Jail policy conflicts with
former RCW 9.92.151, Talley should receive earned early-release credit at
the statutory maximum rate of 15 percent.
Facts and Procedural History
Though the procedural history is somewhat complex, the underlying
facts surrounding Talley’s incarceration are not in dispute. On October 27,
2005, Talley committed murder in the second degree. On March 29, 2007,
Talley pleaded guilty to this offense. The Skamania County Superior Court
imposed a sentence of 123 months of confinement.
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Following Talley’s
In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
conviction, the Skamania County Jail transferred Talley to the custody of the
Department. As part of the transfer, the Skamania County Jail issued a jailtime certification to the Department, crediting Talley with 516 days of
presentence credit for time served and zero days of earned early-release
credit, also known as “good-time” credit.
The Skamania County Jail policy did not allow Talley to earn goodtime credit. Under the county policy, only eligible inmates who work on the
in-custody work crew program, who attend educational or treatment programs
or who perform other work inside the facility can earn good-time credit.
Presentence inmates cannot participate in these programs. Skamania County
does not award good-time credit outside of these specified programs.
Further, the county allows inmates only classified as “medium” or “low risk”
to participate in its programs. Talley was not a medium or low risk inmate,
and he served his confinement at the county jail before receiving his sentence.
For these reasons, he could not participate in the specified programs to earn
good-time credit.
Talley, acting pro se, filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) in this
court, which the commissioner transferred to Division Two of the Court of
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In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
Appeals.
Talley’s pro se PRP argued that the Skamania County Jail
miscalculated his presentence credit in two ways. First, he contended that the
failure to provide him with presentence opportunities to earn good-time credit
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second,
he argued that because he was confined from October 28, 2005, to March 29,
2007, the jail needed to certify 518 days of time already served rather than
the 516 days that appeared in its jail-time certification to the Department.
The Court of Appeals issued an order granting his petition in part and
denying it in part. The Court of Appeals rejected Talley’s constitutional
argument and denied his request for relief on that basis. However, the Court
of Appeals determined that Talley correctly calculated his time already served
and ordered that, absent evidence to the contrary, the Department should
credit him with 518 days for time already served.
On remand, the
Department credited Talley with 518 days for time served.1
Talley sought discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ order. In
response, in two separate rulings, the commissioner requested substantive
briefing from the Department and Skamania County regarding the legality of
Talley received one day of credit for his confinement in the Clark County Jail and 517
days of credit for his confinement in the Skamania County Jail.
1
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In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
the county jail’s failure to provide opportunities to earn good-time credit in
light of former RCW 9.92.151(1).2
Both the Department and Skamania County filed responses. Skamania
County argued that the statutory issue was not properly before this court. The
Department argued that it could lawfully rely on the county’s jail-time
certification.
We granted review of Talley’s motion for discretionary review. In re
Pers. Restraint of Talley, 170 Wn.2d 1002, 245 P.3d 226 (2010).
Subsequently, we granted his motion to appoint counsel. With the assistance
of counsel, Talley filed a supplemental brief addressing the issues raised in
his PRP.
Analysis
The statutory issue is properly before us.
Former RCW 9.92.151
requires a county jail to provide opportunities for a presentence inmate to
earn good-time credit. We do not reach Talley’s constitutional issues. In
light of the conflict between former RCW 9.92.151 and the Skamania County
The 2009 amendments to RCW 9.94A.151 do not affect the statutory provisions relevant
to this case. See Laws of 2009, ch. 28, § 3 (amending RCW 9.94A.151).
2
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In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
Jail policy, Talley should receive good-time credit at the statutory maximum
rate of 15 percent.
A.
“Good-Time” Credit in Washington
Before addressing the issues presented in this case it is instructive to
consider the nature of good-time credit. Our prior case law distinguishes
between “straight-time” and “good-time” credit. “Straight-time” credit refers
to credit a prisoner receives for time actually served before receiving his
sentence. See State v. Phelan, 100 Wn.2d 508, 510, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983).
“Good-time” credit refers to credit a prisoner receives for good behavior or
good performance while incarcerated. See id. “Good-time” credit is the
familiar name for what the legislature refers to as “‘earned early release
time.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 121 Wn.2d 655, 658, 853 P.2d 444
(1993).
Washington’s current statutory scheme allows both county jails and the
Department to award good-time credit. A county jail may award good-time
credit for “good behavior and good performance” as determined by the
county authorities. RCW 9.92.151(1). For inmates convicted of a serious
violent offense or a sex offense that is a class A felony, good-time credit
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In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
cannot exceed 15 percent of the sentence imposed. Id. No inmate can
receive good-time credit that exceeds one-third of the imposed sentence. Id.
Offenders confined for violations of RCW 9.94A.670(5)(a) are not eligible
for good-time credit. RCW 9.92.151(2). The legislature placed similar,
though not identical, guidelines for earning good-time credit in the
Department’s facilities. See RCW 9.94A.728-.729.
There are two types of good-time credit available in the Department’s
system: good-conduct time and earned time. See Dep’t of Corrections Policy
Directive 350.100 (Apr. 29, 2011) (DOC Directive). A prisoner convicted of
a “serious violent offense” on or after July 1, 2003 may earn good-time credit
up to 10 percent of his or her sentence. DOC Directive 350.100(I)(B). The
Skamania County Superior Court convicted Talley of murder in the second
degree, which is a serious violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(44)(a)(iii).
A prisoner held by the Department earns “good conduct time” for good
behavior on a pro rata basis for every 30 days served, as allowed by crime
category. DOC Directive 350.100(II)(C). Thus, a prisoner subject to the 10percent rule may earn “good conduct time” for good behavior at a rate of 3
days per 30 days served. A prisoner held by the Department may also accrue
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In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
“earned time” for participation in approved programs.
DOC Directive
350.100(III)(A). A program participant subject to the 10-percent rule earns
credit at a rate of 1.11 days per calendar month.
DOC Directive
350.100(III)(A)(1).
“A prisoner denied or unable to pay bail will spend presentence
detention in a county jail and then transfer to a [Department] facility upon
sentencing.” In re Pers. Restraint of Fogle, 128 Wn.2d 56, 60, 904 P.2d 722
(1995). Upon transfer, the Department reduces the prisoner’s sentence for
both day-for-day (straight-time) credit and good-time credit earned at the
county jail before sentencing. Id.
The Skamania County Jail policy contrasts with the Department’s
system. An inmate at the Skamania County Jail can receive good-time credit
only if he participates in a specified work program. To use the nomenclature
of the Department, the Skamania County Jail policy only offers “earned time”
and not “good conduct time.”
Presentence inmates cannot participate in the county’s work programs
nor can inmates who are not classified as “medium” or “low risk” detainees.
Skamania County awards a program participant serving a sentence of 30 days
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In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
or less 1 day of good-time credit per 7 days served. A program participant
serving a sentence of more than 30 days receives 5 days of good-time credit
per 30 days served.
B.
Standard of Review
The standard of review is de novo. The facts of Talley’s case are not
in dispute.
This case involves the proper interpretation of court rules,
statutes, and the Constitution. Interpretation of court rules, statutes, and the
Constitution are issues of law, subject to de novo review. See State v.
Osman, 168 Wn.2d 632, 637, 229 P.3d 729 (2010) (“This court reviews the
interpretation of court rules de novo.”); State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 346,
68 P.3d 282 (2003) (“Construction of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo . . . .”); City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 668, 91
P.3d 875 (2004) (“Constitutional challenges are questions of law and are also
reviewed de novo.”).
C.
The Statutory Issue Is Properly Before This Court
“[T]he Supreme Court will review only the questions raised in the
motion for discretionary review . . . unless the Supreme Court orders
otherwise upon the granting of the motion . . . .” RAP 13.7(b) (emphasis
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In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
added); see also State v. Korum, 157 Wn.2d 614, 624, 141 P.3d 13 (2006);
Denaxas v. Sandstone Court of Bellevue, LLC, 148 Wn.2d 654, 671, 63 P.3d
125 (2003).
The statutory issue in this case is whether former RCW 9.92.151
requires a county jail to provide opportunities for a presentence inmate to
earn good-time credit.
Talley did not raise this issue in his motion for
discretionary review. However, the commissioner ordered briefing from the
Department and Skamania County on this issue and authorized Talley to file
reply briefs in response. With full knowledge of the commissioner’s rulings,
we granted Talley’s motion for discretionary review. See Talley, 170 Wn.2d
at 1002.
When acting in accordance with his delegated authority, the
commissioner acts with the authority of this court. See SAR 15. Further, by
granting review, we ratified the commissioner’s rulings and effectively
ordered review of the statutory issue. With the commissioner’s rulings and
our subsequent grant of review, the statutory issue is properly before us.
D.
Former RCW 9.92.151 Requires County Jails To Provide
Opportunities for Presentence Inmates To Earn “Good-Time” Credit
Former RCW 9.92.151 establishes the standards for “earned early
release credit” for inmates held in county facilities.3 See In re Pers. Restraint
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In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
of Erickson, 146 Wn. App. 576, 583 n.23, 191 P.3d 917 (2008). “Earned
early release” credit is also known as “good time.” Williams, 121 Wn.2d at
658. The statute provides, “The earned early release time shall be for good
behavior and good performance as determined by the correctional agency
having jurisdiction.” Former RCW 9.92.151(1). “Any program established
pursuant to this section shall allow an offender to earn early-release credits
for presentence incarceration.” Id. (emphasis added).
As applied to Talley, Skamania County’s program for earned earlyrelease credit does not comply with former RCW 9.92.151(1). Under the
county’s program, Talley could not earn any type of good-time credit. He
could not earn credit for good conduct and could not participate in specified
programs to accrue earned time. However, the statute requires that “[a]ny
program . . . shall allow an offender to earn early release credits for
presentence incarceration.” Id. Because Skamania County’s program did not
allow Talley to earn good-time credit, it failed to comply with former RCW
9.92.151. See In re Pers. Restraint of King, 146 Wn.2d 658, 663, 49 P.3d
854 (2002).4
RCW 9.94A.728-.729 establishes the standards for good-time credit for inmates held in
the Department’s facilities.
4
Our decision in King is instructive. King held that, for purposes of good-time credit,
3
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In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
In their briefs, neither Skamania County nor the Department argues that
the county’s program complied with the statutory requirements.
The
Department argues that it could justifiably rely on the county’s jail-time
certification. The Department may presumptively rely on a county’s jail-time
certification absent a manifest error of law. Williams, 121 Wn.2d at 664.
However, while the Department’s assertion is correct, it is also irrelevant.
Whether the Department could presumptively rely on the county’s jail-time
former RCW 9.94A.150 (1996) (recodified as amended at RCW 9.94A.728) requires the
Department to apply presentence time against standard sentence, not enhancement
sentence time. 146 Wn.2d at 664-65.
In 1995, the people of the State of Washington enacted Initiative 159, the “Hard
Time for Armed Crime Act” (Hard Time Act). Laws of 1995, ch. 129. King involved the
proper interpretation and implementation of these statutory changes. 146 Wn.2d at 660.
In King, the petitioner, David King, earned 57 days of good-time credit during his
presentence confinement. Id. at 661. However, under statutory changes implemented by
the Hard Time Act, an offender could not earn good-time credit for the “portion of his or
her sentence that result[ed] from any deadly weapon enhancements.” Id. at 664 (quoting
former RCW 9.94A.150(1) (1996)). At the time, the Department’s policy required
running the offender’s enhancement time before running the standard sentence time. Id. at
661. Because the Department counted King’s presentence confinement as part of his
enhancement time, it did not credit him with his 57 days of good-time. Id. at 661-62.
We held that the Department’s policy conflicted with former RCW 9.94A.150(1).
Id. at 662. The Department argued that the statute ensured only that inmates otherwise
entitled to good-time credit were not deprived of good-time credit. Id. at 663. We
disagreed, holding that such an interpretation would render portions of the statute
meaningless, “specifically the portion that states, ‘[a]ny program established pursuant to
this section shall allow an offender to earn early release credits for presentence
incarceration.’” Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting former RCW
9.94A.150(1)). We further held that proper implementation of the statute required the
Department to apply the presentence time against the standard sentencing time. Id. at 66465.
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In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
certification does not resolve whether the county’s program complied with
former RCW 9.92.151(1).
Skamania County argues that the statutory issue is not properly before
us because Talley did not raise the statutory issue in his motion for
discretionary review. For the reasons discussed above, this argument fails.
See supra pp. 9-10. The statutory issue is properly before this court and, as
applied to Talley, the Skamania County program failed to comply with former
RCW 9.92.151(1). We hold that former RCW 9.92.151(1) requires a county
jail to provide opportunities for a presentence inmate to earn credit toward
early release.5
Our holding does not entail that every presentence inmate must
actually earn good-time credit in a county jail. An offender may forfeit the
opportunity to receive good-time credit by the offender’s own misbehavior or
poor performance.
However, former RCW 9.92.151(1) requires that the
offender first have this opportunity.
Whether to take advantage of this
Former RCW 9.92.151(2) (2004) expressly states that an offender serving a term of
confinement imposed under former RCW 9.94A.670(4)(a) (2004) is not eligible for earned
release credits. Our holding does not impact this express statutory exception. If the
legislature chooses to exclude certain offenders from the earned early release credit
program it may do so. Because Talley was not convicted of an offense under former
RCW 9.94A.670(4)(a), the statutory exception is inapplicable.
5
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In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
opportunity is up to the offender.
E.
Talley’s Remedy
Because resolution of the statutory issue resolves this case, we do not
adjudicate Talley’s constitutional claim. See Isla Verde Intern. Holdings,
Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 752, 49 P.3d 867 (2002). The only
remaining issue is the proper remedy for Talley.
In his brief and at oral argument, Talley contended that he should
receive good-time credit at the statutory maximum rate of 15 percent. At oral
argument, Skamania County conceded that, if a statutory violation occurred,
Talley should receive good-time credit at the statutory maximum rate of 15
percent. We remand Talley’s case to the Court of Appeals with instructions
to grant Talley good-time credit at the statutory maximum rate of 15 percent.6
Conclusion
We hold that the statutory issue is properly before us. We also hold
Technically, the statutory maximum does not mandate a specific rate at which an inmate
may earn good-time credit. Rather, the statutory maximum applies to the sentence
imposed against the offender credit. See Williams, 121 Wn.2d at 659. The statutory
maximum simply precludes an offender from earning good-time credit beyond 15 percent
of the sentence imposed. Here, however, because Skamania County failed to provide
Talley with any opportunity to earn good-time credit, we use the statutory maximum to
establish the rate at which he accrued good-time credit. See In re Pers. Restraint of Mota,
54 Wn. App. 252, 773 P.2d 129 (1989) aff’d by 114 Wn.2d 465, 788 P.2d 538 (1990).
6
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In re Pers. Restraint of Talley, No. 83284-6
that former RCW 9.92.151 requires a county jail to provide opportunities for
an inmate who is yet to be sentenced to earn credit toward early release. We
do not reach Talley’s constitutional issue.
Because a statutory violation
occurred, we hold that Talley is entitled to earned early-release credit at the
statutory maximum rate of 15 percent. We remand Talley’s case to the Court
of Appeals with instructions to grant Talley good-time credit at the statutory
maximum rate of 15 percent for the time he served in the Skamania County
Jail before being sentenced.
AUTHOR:
Justice James M. Johnson
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice Barbara A.
Justice Mary E. Fairhurst
Justice Charles W. Johnson
Justice Gerry L. Alexander
Justice Debra L. Stephens
Justice Tom Chambers
Justice Charles K. Wiggins
Justice Susan Owens
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