In re MacIntyre Fuels, Inc.
In re MacIntyre Fuels, Inc. (2002-272); 175 Vt. 613; 833 A.2d 829
2003 VT 59
[Filed 30-Jun-2003]
ENTRY ORDER
2003 VT 59
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-272
APRIL TERM, 2003
In re MacIntyre Fuels, Inc. } APPEALED FROM:
Vermont Agency of Transportation }
}
} Environmental Board
}
}
} DOCKET NO. D.R. Request #402
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
¶ 1. MacIntyre Fuels, Inc., a Vermont corporation engaged in the
business of transporting and selling petroleum products, appeals from the
Environmental Board's assumption of Act 250 jurisdiction over the company's
proposed project to construct an intermodal fuel transfer facility on a
spur line adjacent to the main railway line in Montpelier. We conclude
that the Board erred in determining that the project is subject to Act 250
jurisdiction under the 1994 rail siding amendment to 10 V.S.A. § 6001(3).
We concur, however, with the Board's determination that MacIntyre's project
requires an amendment to an existing permit for part of the land upon which
the project is located. Accordingly, the matter is remanded for further
consideration consistent with this opinion.
¶ 2. In October 2001, MacIntyre obtained site plan approval from
the City of Montpelier to construct a facility that would allow the
transfer of petroleum products from railroad cars to trucks for local
delivery. At the time, MacIntyre operated a network of similar facilities
in Vermont and New Hampshire. The proposed project required the relocation
of existing track, the laying of a spur line adjacent to the main track,
and the installation of a system of fuel tanks, pipes, and pumping
equipment. The project also called for the construction of a 30' x 36'
canopy and the upgrading of an existing gravel driveway leading into the
railroad yard. MacIntyre was to construct the project on land that it
leased from the railroad. Most of that property, in turn, had been leased
by the railroad from the State of Vermont. A small strip of land (40' x
100') on which the project was to be located, however, had been leased by
the railroad from a neighboring property owner, Patrick Malone, under a
reciprocal lease agreement. Apparently, that strip of land was needed to
accommodate the canopy and a turnaround area. In its entirety, the project
would physically alter approximately 58,000 square feet, or less than two
acres of land.
¶ 3. In the fall of 2001, MacIntyre sought a declaratory ruling
from the district 5 environmental coordinator that an Act 250 land-use
permit was not needed for the project. State officials with the Agency of
Transportation supported MacIntyre's position that the project was outside
of Act 250 jurisdiction. That position was based on a 1994 amendment to 10
V.S.A. § 6001(3) that resulted from an earlier decision by another district
coordinator requiring an Act 250 permit for a similar railroad project.
The district coordinator in the earlier case determined that an Act 250
permit was needed because, although the project itself would physically
alter only a few acres, the railroad line serving the proposed facility
comprised more than ten acres. The ruling was based on § 6001(3), which
defines "Development," in relevant part, as the "construction of
improvements on a tract or tracts of land, owned or controlled by a person,
involving more than 10 acres of land within a radius of five miles of any
point on any involved land, for commercial or industrial purposes." In
response to this ruling, the Railroad Association of Vermont took its case
to the Legislature, which then amended § 6001(3) by adding the following
sentences:
In the case of a project undertaken by a railroad, no portion of a
railroad line or railroad right-of-way that will not be physically
altered as part of the project shall be included in computing the
amount of land involved. In the case of a project undertaken by a
person to construct a rail line or rail siding to connect to a
railroad's line or right-of-way, only the land used for the rail
line or rail siding that will be physically altered as part of the
project shall be included in computing the amount of the land
involved.
1993, No. 200 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 (currently codified at 10 V.S.A. §
6001(3)(c)(iv)).
¶ 4. Notwithstanding this amendment and the Agency of
Transportation's support for MacIntyre's position, the district coordinator
in the present case concluded in her November 9, 2001 jurisdictional
opinion that MacIntyre was required to obtain an Act 250 permit. She found
Act 250 jurisdiction by including as involved land the entire
fourteen-mile-long railroad right of way running from Montpelier to
Graniteville. In her view, the 1994 amendment did not apply because the
project entailed more than just constructing a spur track. She further
concluded that, even if the railroad right of way was not considered as one
contiguous property for jurisdictional purposes, the entire Malone
property, approximately 100 acres, would have to be considered as involved
land because a small part of the project was located on that property.
¶ 5. MacIntyre appealed the district coordinator's decision to the
Environmental Board and submitted a statement of stipulated facts, which
was joined by the Agencies of Transportation and Natural Resources. The
Board held a hearing on April 17, 2002, but no oral argument took place
because MacIntyre's position was unopposed. Instead, Board members
directed questions to MacIntyre's attorney. On May 21, 2002, the Board
issued its decision upholding the district coordinator's ruling that the
proposed project required an Act 250 permit. The Board concluded that
because MacIntyre was not a railroad, and because components of the
proposed project were neither rail lines nor rail sidings, the land to be
considered in determining Act 250 jurisdiction was all contiguous parcels -
including the fourteen-mile railroad right of way and the entire Malone
parcel - and not merely the two acres or so that was to be physically
altered. On appeal to this Court, MacIntyre argues that (1) certain Board
findings are clearly erroneous; (2) the Board erred in concluding that the
1994 amendment to § 6001(3) exempted only that portion of the proposed
project involving the laying of track; and (3) with respect to both the
railroad right of way and the Malone property, the Board should have
considered only the land that was to be physically altered in determining
whether an Act 250 permit was required.
¶ 6. Because we need not address MacIntyre's challenge to certain
Board findings to resolve this appeal, we move directly to the central
question in this case: Did the Board err in concluding that the 1994
amendment to § 6001(3) exempts from Act 250 review only the component of a
proposed project involving the laying of track - and not the construction
of attendant facilities - when the project is undertaken by someone other
than a railroad? MacIntyre argues that the phrase "project undertaken by a
person to construct a rail line or rail siding to connect to a railroad's
line or right-of-way" should not and cannot be construed as exempting only
the track component of proposed rail siding projects. To do so, it argues,
would effectively negate the amendment because tracks are never built
without attendant facilities, and would undermine the purpose of the
legislation to put shippers transporting goods by rail on equal footing
with shippers transporting goods by highway. In response, the State argues
that the term "rail siding" has a narrow, technical meaning that refers
only to the track itself and cannot be expanded to cover attendant
facilities.
¶ 7. Although we generally defer to the Board's interpretation of
Act 250 and its "special expertise in determining whether it has
jurisdiction over a particular development," In re Stokes Communications
Corp., 164 Vt. 30, 35, 664 A.2d 712, 715 (1995), we do not abdicate our
responsibility to examine a disputed statute independently and ultimately
determine its meaning. When interpreting a statute, our fundamental
objective is to discern and implement the intent of the Legislature. See
Green Mountain Power Corp. v. Sprint Communications, 172 Vt. 416, 420, 779
A.2d 687, 691 (2001); Perry v. Med. Practice Bd., 169 Vt. 399, 406, 737
A.2d 900, 905 (1999). If the statutory language is absolutely clear and
unambiguous, we generally restrict ourselves to the plain meaning of that
language, but if any question remains as to the intent underlying the
statute, we also look at "the legislative history and circumstances
surrounding its enactment, and the legislative policy it was designed to
implement." Perry, 169 Vt. at 406, 737 A.2d at 905. Indeed, if "the plain
meaning of statutory language appears to undermine the purpose of the
statute, we are not confined to a literal interpretation, but rather must
look to the broad subject matter of the statute, its effects and
consequences, and the purpose and spirit of the law to determine
legislative intent." Town of Killington v. State, 172 Vt. 182, 189, 776
A.2d 395, 401 (2001); see Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd., 148 Vt. 47,
49-50, 527 A.2d 227, 228 (1986) ("the letter of a statute or its literal
sense must yield where it conflicts with legislative purpose"); State v.
Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 510-11, 438 A.2d 1135, 1140 (1981) (plain meaning
rule is merely legal truism that may be disregarded to carry out
legislative intent).
¶ 8. Here, the State has failed to demonstrate that the meaning of
the term "rail siding," particularly in the context of this statutory
provision, is so clear that we may not examine legislative history for
insight as to its intended meaning. As noted, the 1994 amendment was
enacted directly in response to the assumption of Act 250 jurisdiction over
a project that was nearly identical to the one proposed here. In asserting
Act 250 jurisdiction in this case, the Board relied upon the distinction in
the 1994 amendment between projects undertaken by "a railroad" and those
undertaken by "a person." 10 V.S.A. § 6001(3)(c)(iv). With respect to "a
person," the statute exempts from Act 250 only those projects that
"construct a rail line or rail siding to connect to a railroad's line or
right-of-way." Id. This language creates a legitimate ambiguity as to
whether the Legislature intended to exempt all aspects of rail siding
projects, with emphasis on the word "project," or only the track component
of such projects.
¶ 9. Our review of the committee hearings on the bill amending §
6001(3), H. 575, reveals that the second sentence of the amendment was
intended to exempt all components of rail siding projects, including both
the laying of track and the construction of attendant facilities. The bill
started in the House Transportation Committee and then was transferred to
the House Natural Resources and Energy Committee. At the initial
Transportation Committee hearing on February 23, 1994, a railroad
representative appeared and testified that the purpose of the proposed
amendment was to put the railroads on equal footing with the trucking
industry with respect to what type of projects required Act 250 permits.
The representative explained that the recent ruling of the district
coordinator including the railroad right of way as part of the involved
land in a proposed fuel transfer project meant that any time anybody wanted
to put a spur and facility adjacent to a rail line, that person would have
to obtain an Act 250 permit, notwithstanding the scope of the project. The
representative indicated that the proposed statutory language, which was
identical to the language eventually enacted into law, had been drafted by
an attorney representing the railroad industry.
¶ 10. At the initial hearing before the House Natural Resources and
Energy Committee on March 10, 1994, an attorney for the Railroad
Association of Vermont testified that the purpose of the second sentence of
the proposed amendment was that
if you've got somebody who proposes to ship or receive materials
by rail, and wants to construct a facility to make that possible -
a rail siding or a spur line, I guess, in common parlance - that
only requires an Act 250 permit if the actual project is going to
physically affect ten acres or more. . . . But what you don't do
in that case is aggregate that potential shipper's entire parcel.
The attorney explained that a shipper proposing a project adjacent to the
rail line should not have to obtain an Act 250 permit simply because
inclusion of the railroad right of way pushes the project over the ten-acre
limit. Doing so, according to the attorney, would have the effect of
discouraging connections to rail and favoring the highway industry. The
attorney emphasized that the second sentence concerned shippers who wanted
to construct a spur line or siding so that they could be serviced by the
railroad. In response to queries from committee members, Michael Zahner,
the Environmental Board administrator at the time, testified that it was
really a policy question as to whether the Legislature wanted to treat
railroads and highways the same. He noted that there would be "land-based
environmental impacts that are associated with the activity . . . occurring
at the siding, whether it's a fuel depot or whatever." He emphasized that
most of those concerns would be addressed through local zoning, but noted
that Act 250 review is generally more comprehensive. As he saw it, the
issue was whether the Legislature, as a matter of policy, was willing to
forego that more comprehensive review in these circumstances.
¶ 11. At a follow-up hearing the next day before the same
committee, the committee chair stated his understanding of the second
sentence of the proposed amendment as follows:
So if I need to buy some land to build a siding to connect to the
rail line, that land is involved land. And any land that I'm
developing for my warehouse or tank, farm, or furniture factory
also would be involved land. But not the railroad right of way.
As the chair explained, under the second sentence of the proposed
amendment, persons would not be encumbered by counting all of the land
involved in the railroad right of way. Rather, "just the rail siting
acreage and whatever acreage that's associated with their project" would be
counted - the same as if the person was locating a business near a highway.
At a later hearing held before the committee, the chair stated that the
"crux" of the proposed amendment was that we would "not be calculating the
main rail lines every time you have an adjacent project by the railroads or
any of their customers."
¶ 12. The proposed statutory language presented to the committees
remained exactly the same through enactment of the amendment into law.
Apparently, however, the statements of the committee members and those that
testified before the committee were not made part of a written report
distributed to all of the members of the Legislature. Thus, they are
certainly not conclusive as to what the disputed statutory language means.
Nonetheless, the common understanding of those concerned at the committee
hearings, including the Environmental Board administrator, suggests that
the Legislature intended the second sentence of the amendment to exempt
rail siding projects - including those components of the projects that go
beyond the mere laying of track. Cf. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Clark County
v. White, 729 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Nev. 1986) ("When a statute is of doubtful
import and subject to opposite meanings, limited resort may be had to
testimony and committee discussions concerning the legislation in
question."). Accordingly, we hold that the Board erred in including the
fourteen-mile railroad right of way as part of the involved land in
MacIntyre's proposed rail siding project.
¶ 13. One remaining problem, however, is that a small part of
MacIntyre's project is on a private parcel leased by the railroad from
Malone and subject to an Act 250 permit. MacIntyre invites this Court to
adopt a rule whereby Act 250 jurisdiction would be triggered only if the
proposed use in cases such as this violated any of the permit conditions on
the private land, and then to review the conditions of the Malone Act 250
permit to determine whether the proposed project would violate any of those
conditions. The State responds that MacIntyre has waived this argument by
stating in its initial stipulation of facts that it intended to join the
owner of the Malone property in applying for an amendment to the Malone
permit.
¶ 14. We agree with the State, and therefore decline to address
MacIntyre's arguments concerning the Malone property. The Board issued a
prehearing conference report and order on February 28, 2002 establishing a
schedule for the proceeding before it. Pursuant to that order, within the
next month MacIntyre and the state agencies submitted a stipulation of
facts in which they waived an evidentiary hearing. In so doing, they
stated that the stipulation covered all relevant facts, and that no
relevant fact was in dispute. Regarding the Malone property, the
stipulation indicated that MacIntyre intended to join the owner of the
property in applying for an amendment to the existing Act 250 permit that
would allow the activities contemplated for the property under MacIntyre's
proposed project. Later, beyond the deadline set forth in the Board's
prehearing order, MacIntyre and the state agencies submitted a supplemental
statement of stipulated facts and exhibits concerning the Malone property
and its Act 250 permit. MacIntyre also proposed conclusions suggesting
that no Act 250 permit was needed because none of the proposed activities
on the Malone property violated any of the conditions of the Malone permit,
but, at the same time, reiterated its intent to seek an amendment of the
Malone permit.
¶ 15. In its May 21, 2002 decision, the Board declined to consider
the supplemental stipulation of facts and exhibits because they were not
authorized under the prehearing order, and because the parties waived the
right to an evidentiary hearing based on the original stipulation of facts.
Here, on appeal, MacIntyre has failed to demonstrate, or even argue, that
the Board abused its discretion in refusing to consider the supplemental
stipulation of facts and exhibits. Therefore, we agree with the State and
the Board that MacIntyre has waived its right to challenge the Board's
ruling with respect to the Malone property. For MacIntyre to proceed with
its proposed project, it will first have to obtain an amendment to the
Malone permit.
The Environmental Board's May 21, 2002 order is reversed in part and
affirmed in part, and the matter is remanded for further consideration
consistent with this opinion.
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________________
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice
_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.)
Specially Assigned
_______________________________________
Ernest W. Gibson, III, Associate Justice
(Ret.) Specially Assigned
