Santi v. Roxbury Town School District
Santi v. Roxbury Town School District (96-093); 165 Vt 476; 685 A.2d 301
[Opinion Filed 27-Sep-1996]
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
to press.
No. 96-093
Amedeo Santi, et al. Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. Washington Superior Court
Roxbury Town School District, et al. April Term, 1996
John P. Meaker, J.
Ann Danseyar Gelfon, Roxbury, for plaintiffs-appellants
Anthony B. Lamb and Mary L. Desautels, Law Offices of Anthony B. Lamb,
Burlington, for defendants-appellees
PRESENT: Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.
DOOLEY, J. Plaintiffs, voters of the Town of Roxbury, seek an
injunction to compel the Roxbury Town School District to hold a second
reconsideration vote on the 1995 school budget. The Washington Superior
Court held that a second reconsideration vote was not available to them.
We affirm.
The town's school budget was first voted by conventional ballot at
town meeting on March 7, 1995. The voters at the meeting approved the
following question: "Shall the Roxbury Town School District vote a sum of
money in the amount of $897,084.00 for current expenses of which
$482,074.00 is to be raised from property taxes?"
On March 21, 1995, more than five percent of the qualified voters of
the town filed a petition for reconsideration. On May 24, 1995, the town
convened a special school district meeting to vote upon the reconsideration
petition. By conventional ballot, a majority of the voters present voted
to reconsider the budget.
As a result of the reconsideration vote, the school board revised the
school budget and
resubmitted it to the voters for approval. On July 19, 1995, by Australian
ballot, the voters disapproved a revised budget in an amount of $871,799
for current expenses, of which $477,188 was to be raised from property
taxes. The school board again revised the budget and resubmitted it to the
voters. On September 12, 1995, by Australian ballot, the voters
disapproved a budget of $825,742, with $431,131 to be raised from property
taxes.
On October 26, 1995, again by Australian ballot, the voters approved
the following question: "Shall the Roxbury Town School District vote to
approve a revised budget in the amount of $815,758.00 for current expenses,
of which $421,147.00 is to be raised from property taxes?"
On November 16, 1995, more than five percent of the voters filed a
petition for a reconsideration vote on the question adopted on October
26th. The refusal of the school district to schedule the reconsideration
vote led to this litigation.
On January 16, 1996, plaintiffs sued the Roxbury Town School District,
three members of the school board and the tax collector for the Town of
Roxbury seeking an injunction preventing any tax collection while the suit
was pending, preventing expenditures in excess of the district borrowing
authority, and requiring the reconsideration vote demanded. The court
dismissed the tax collector as a defendant1 (F) and added the members of the
selectboard. After hearing, the court dismissed the action, concluding
that plaintiffs had no right to a second reconsideration vote.
The question of whether plaintiffs are entitled to a new
reconsideration vote turns on the proper construction of two statutes. 16
V.S.A. § 711e sets forth the procedure when a school district elects to
have its budget determined by Australian ballot, as has occurred here.
Under this section, the "budget shall be established if a majority of the
votes cast are in favor." Id. § 711e(d) & (e). If the budget is rejected,
the board must "prepare a revised budget" and
resubmit it to the voters, repeating the process, if necessary, until
a budget is adopted. Id. § 711e(f). Two general provisions are important:
(a) the vote occurs "under the provisions of section 2680 of Title 17," id.
§ 711e(a), and (b) "[u]nless clearly inconsistent, the provisions of
chapter 55 of Title 17 shall apply to actions taken under this section,"
id. § 711e(g).
17 V.S.A. § 2680, part of Vermont's general election law, provides for
Australian ballot in terms entirely consistent with 16 V.S.A. § 711e.
Within chapter 55 of Title 17, however, is the statute relied upon by
plaintiffs, 17 V.S.A. § 2661(b):
(b) Where a petition signed by not less than five percent of the
qualified voters of a municipality requesting reconsideration or
rescission of a question considered or voted on at a previous
annual or special meeting is filed with the clerk of the municipality
within thirty days following the date of that meeting, the legislative
body shall provide for a vote by the municipality in accordance
with the petition within sixty days of the submission at an annual
or special meeting duly warned for that purpose.
It is followed by a proviso relied upon by defendants:
(c) A question voted on shall not be presented for reconsideration
or rescission at more than one subsequent meeting within the
succeeding twelve months except with the approval of the
legislative body.
Id. § 2661(c).
Plaintiffs argue that 17 V.S.A. § 2661(b)(FN2) governs and gives them a
right to the reconsideration vote because (a) the right to reconsideration
is not "clearly inconsistent" with the provisions of 16 V.S.A. § 711e and
therefore applies to the school district by virtue of § 711e(g), and (b)
the question of the budget amount of $815,758, as adopted on October 26th,
had never been presented for reconsideration before, and therefore, §
2661(c) does not apply.
Defendants respond that (a) the right to reconsideration under 17 V.S.A. §
2661(b) is "clearly inconsistent" with provisions of 16 V.S.A. § 711e
because that section provides that the "budget shall be established" if a
majority of voters approve it, and (b) the "question" being voted on is the
budget for the 1995-96 school year so that § 2661(c) prohibits a second
reconsideration of that question without approval of the legislative body.
We agree with defendants in part.
The first issue is whether the right of reconsideration is clearly
inconsistent with the provisions of 16 V.S.A. § 711e, particularly the
language that the "budget shall be established" if voted by a majority of
those voting. We considered a comparable question in Pominville v. Addison
Cent. Supervisory Union, 154 Vt. 299, 575 A.2d 196 (1990). There, voters
sought to require the school district to present to the voters an
alternative school budget, different from that being presented by the
school board. They claimed the right to do so under 17 V.S.A. § 2642(a),
authorizing five percent of the voters to place an article on the agenda of
the annual meeting. We rejected this provision, concluding that the
provisions of § 711e were sufficiently inconsistent with a general
referendum right that § 711e had to control. Specifically, we held that
provisions of § 711e gave the school board control over the questions to be
put to the voters and the referendum right was inconsistent with that
control. Pominville, 154 Vt. at 301, 575 A.2d at 197. We reasoned:
[T]he Legislature did not want to risk having a school budget
gutted by what our Court has called "`the uncertain disposal of the
"fierce democracie."'" Buttolph v. Osborn, 119 Vt. 116, 119, 119
A.2d 686, 688 (1956) (quoting Chittenden v. School District No.
1, 56 Vt. 551, 554 (1884)). If a budget proposed by the entity
charged with running the school is defeated by the voters, the
statute calls for budgetary revision by the same entity. This is a
commonsense balanced approach to resolving competing interests
by giving recognition both to the expertise of the board and the
taxing concerns of the community.
Id. at 302, 575 A.2d at 197-98.
Although many of the concerns expressed in Pominville are present
here, we cannot find that the right of reconsideration is clearly
inconsistent with the provisions of § 711e. The risks
from reconsideration are not as great as from referendum, and the statutory
inconsistency is less clear. The statute can be taken to mean that the
budget is established if a majority of the voters approve at the final
vote, whether that is on first consideration or reconsideration. We agree
with plaintiffs that the provisions of 17 V.S.A. § 2661(b) apply.
We must, therefore, consider whether the reconsideration vote sought
by plaintiffs is authorized by 17 V.S.A. § 2661(b) and not barred by §
2661(c). It is helpful, at the outset, to look at how we have treated
reconsideration votes in the past.
As early as 1850, in the absence of clear statutory direction, we
recognized the right of a town to reconsider a vote of its citizens.
Stoddard v. Gilman, 22 Vt. 568 (1850). In Stoddard, the citizens of the
Town of Westmore had voted to spend $500 for making roads, and thereafter,
on reconsideration rescinded the appropriation. This Court upheld the
reconsideration vote:
A vote to raise money for town purposes is a mere
declaration, or resolution, on the part of the town alone, and not
in the nature of a grant, or contract between the town and an
individual. . . . So long as this rests in mere resolution, and has
not been acted upon, we think the town must have the power to
rescind or reconsider it. Until something has been done under the
vote, the towns are alone interested in it, and may alter their
resolve at their own pleasure.
Id. at 573. More recently, we reiterated this holding in Denicore v. City
of Burlington, 116 Vt. 138, 140, 70 A.2d 582, 584 (1950), summarizing that
"voters have the unlimited right of rescission in the absence of
legislation and where the rights of third parties have not vested or
intervened." Id. at 145, 70 A.2d at 586. Other courts have applied this
limited rule even where legislation specifically recognized the right of
reconsideration. See, e.g., Ogden v. Allen, 200 N.E.2d 559, 561 (N.Y.
1964).
The general principles reflected in Stoddard v. Gilman have meaning
today although the complexities of modern life present the conflicting
considerations in a different context. There is necessarily a tension
between the democratic principles supported by allowing reconsideration
and the need for finality if the district is to deliver the educational
services upon which its families depend. In the absence of an approved
budget on or before the start of the fiscal year on July 1st, the school
district is authorized to borrow funds to operate, but only "up to 87
percent of the most recently approved school budget." 16 V.S.A. § 566.
See also 16 V.S.A. § 711a(b).
An endless cycle of votes and reconsiderations, as the result is
determined by which of a divided electorate shows up at the polls on any
day, gives no weight to the need for finality. A school district is a
living organism that must open and run its schools irrespective of the
fiscal indecision of its electorate. Inevitably, as the process drags on
and the school year passes, the budget is determined by the limited
borrowing authority and not the will of the electorate. The rights of
innocent third parties, led by the children to be educated by the district,
are inextricably involved.
Plaintiffs argue that despite these considerations, we have already
construed the statute in Baird v. Town of Berlin, 126 Vt. 348, 231 A.2d 110
(1967), and that that decision requires that they prevail. Baird involved
an earlier version of the reconsideration statute and a vote on an
authorization for a town school board to purchase land for a school. The
plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the vote, and the defendants argued
that because of earlier votes the plaintiffs were in effect seeking a
second reconsideration, which was barred by the statute. We rejected the
argument, noting that earlier votes related to the purchase of a
differently described site, purchase under option, authorization of a bond
issue to purchase the site and build a school on it, and a higher price.
Id. at 353, 231 A.2d at 114.
We do not believe Baird governs this case. Baird, like Stoddard v.
Gilman, involves a single discrete expense, and not the operating budget of
the school district. Thus, the intervening effects on other persons are
not involved, as they are here. Moreover, nothing in Baird states that a
difference of price alone would have been sufficient to allow another
reconsideration vote. It was the combined effect of numerous differences
in the proposal that
caused us to hold that the reconsideration request was "not substantively
the same question considered at the other meetings referred to." Id.
We construe a statute consistent with its purpose, subject matter,
effects and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law. See In re
Spring Brook Farm Found., ___ Vt. ___, ___, 671 A.2d 315, 318 (1995). We
avoid construing statutory language in a way that produces an irrational
result. State v. Quinn, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 675 A.2d 1336, 1338 (1996).
Consistent with these principles, we hold that the term "question voted
on," as used in 17 V.S.A. § 2661(c), means the budget of the school
district and is not changed as different budget amounts are submitted to
the voters. Since there has been one reconsideration vote of the 1995-96
Roxbury school budget, § 2661(c) prevents further revotes without the
approval of the legislative body of the district. The legislative body has
not approved the reconsideration vote sought by plaintiffs, and therefore,
it is barred by § 2661(c).
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
_______________________________________
Associate Justice
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Footnotes
FN1. In view of our disposition, we do not reach plaintiffs' claim
that the dismissal of the tax collector was error.
FN2. Section 2661(b) applies to questions voted on "at a previous
annual or special meeting." According to plaintiffs' theory, however, the
"question" was voted on October 26, 1995 by Australian ballot without a
meeting. Defendants have not contested the application of § 2661(b) on
this basis. We also note that in 1992, the Legislature added a form of
ballot for reconsideration by Australian ballot, thus indicating that this
method of reconsideration was expected. See 17 V.S.A. § 2661(d).
