State v. Ploof
STATE_V_PLOOF.92-276; 162 Vt. 560; 649 A.2d 774
[Filed 16-Sep-1994]
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers
are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109
State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609- 0801 of any errors in order that
corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
No. 92-276
State of Vermont Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. District Court of Vermont,
Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit
Richard Ploof June Term, 1994
Edward J. Cashman, J.
Howard E. VanBenthuysen, Franklin County State's Attorney, St. Albans, for
plaintiff-appellee
Dori Jones, Burlington, for defendant-appellant
PRESENT: Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.
ALLEN, C.J. Defendant appeals from an order of the Franklin District
Court denying his motion to strike his sentence, following his conviction of
second degree murder. We affirm.
Defendant was accused of stabbing and killing Timothy Papineau, following
a failed marijuana transaction, and was charged with second-degree murder in
September 1990. He immediately moved for a competency evaluation, which was
completed about a month later by psychiatrist William Woodruff, who reported
to the court and the parties that he believed defendant was competent to stand
trial. Dr. Woodruff examined defendant again prior to a status conference in
March 1991, and a third time in June 1991.
Defendant represented himself from the middle of April to the middle of
June, 1991, at which time the court ruled that he was not competent to
represent himself. The court stated:
After much consideration of the facts and issues, the Court
concludes that the Defendant should be represented by a public
defender. This action will protect the Defendant and utilize the
legal safeguards available to him. Moreover, there is enough in
the Court's eyes to question his competency to conduct a
reasonable defense. Therefore, the Court reappoints the Public
Defender until the Court is satisfied that he is sufficiently
competent to represent himself.
In November 1991, defendant changed his plea to guilty, pursuant to a
plea agreement, but no claim of incompetency was then raised by defendant or
his attorney, or by the State or the court.
Still represented, defendant was sentenced in December 1991. At the
sentencing hearing, the State revealed two incident reports it had received a
short time earlier concerning defendant. The following colloquy ensued:
[State's Attorney]: Just to indicate to The Court at least so the
record is clear that upon information and belief, the State had
received information that Mr. Ploof might be contemplating some
kind of outburst or demonstration or something even more sinister
for his appearance, either for the visitation or for the court
appearance. Our concern is the safety of everyone here, that we
wanted to alert The Court and Mr. Dunham to that possibility, in
light of the fact that the sheriff may have to adjust to some more
stringent controls.
THE COURT: Well, you are not required to make any
comments, but certainly we will give you that opportunity.
[Defendant's Counsel]: Well, Your Honor, my client is
expecting that he would of course have his leg shackles on during
his visit this morning, but not to be restrained as he is currently,
at least during the visit. We have no concerns that he has anything
in mind other than having the best possible visit with the family .
. . .
The sentencing proceeding occurred without incident, and defendant was
given a sentence consistent with the plea agreement of twenty years to life,
split to serve twenty-five years.
Defendant moved twelve days thereafter to strike the sentence, on
grounds that he had been incompetent at the time of sentencing. His motion
stated, in relevant part, with respect to defendant's state on the date of
sentencing:
1. At the time of sentencing, Richard Ploof's sole goal was to
be sentenced so that his life was in order so that he could promptly
commit suicide. He planned to end his life in open court as soon
as sentence was pronounced. However, in order to secure his last
visits, he had to promise to abandon the plan. This left Richard
Ploof in a total state of mental confusion.
2. During the two weeks prior to sentencing, Richard Ploof was
suicidal and injured himself on several occasions, including
Thanksgiving.
3. Richard Ploof was not competent at sentencing.
The trial court rejected defendant's assertion that he had been suicidal
on the date of sentencing, finding instead that the defendant intended to
obtain further concessions from the state in the plea bargaining that
continued right up to sentencing. The court also found that just prior to the
sentencing hearing, the court specifically asked defendant and the State
whether either had any concern about defendant's competency, and neither side
indicated any such concern.
The court concluded that defendant had waived his rights to assert
incompetency at the sentencing hearing by not raising the issue and that
during sentencing, the trial court did not have reason to believe that
defendant may not be competent to stand trial within the meaning 13 V.S.A.
4817. The present appeal followed.
Defendant contends first that the court violated V.R.Cr.P. 11(c) and his
due process rights by accepting his guilty plea without determining that he
understood the nature of the charges and the minimum and maximum penalties, in
violation of V.R.Cr.P. 11(c)(1) and (2). Defendant did not raise this issue at
sentencing, nor did he raise it in his post-sentencing motion, supplemental
motion, or proposed findings. It is therefore understandable that the trial
court did not rule on the issue in the decision from which the present appeal
has been taken. We held in State v. Thompson, No. 92-036 (Vt. June 3, 1994)
that "an issue under Rule 11(c), alleging violations in taking a plea, absent
plain error, demands a factual record and opportunity for the trial court to
grant relief before this Court may properly review it." See also State v.
Doleszney, 139 Vt. 80, 81, 422 A.2d 931, 932 (1980) (an appeal challenging the
voluntariness of a plea is appropriate only upon the trial court's denial of a
timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea).
The first mention of this issue is in defendant's brief before this
Court, which does not discuss the question of plain error. Upon our own
examination of the record, the case against
plain error is strong. As his own brief states, defendant conceded on the
record that he knew that he was charged with second-degree murder and that the
potential penalty was not less than ten (10) years and not more than Life.
Defendant conducted the early stages of his plea bargain negotiations pro se,
and was made aware of both the nature of the offense charged and the potential
penalties. The State placed clear and adequate information about the nature
of the offense on the record, in the presence of defendant. See In re Kivela,
145 Vt. 454, 457-58, 494 A.2d 126, 128-29 (1985).
Moreover, we have always required a practical and functional application
of V.R.Cr.P. 11 -- not as a technical formula, but rather as a guideline to
insure fairness to a defendant in the taking of a plea. See In re Hall, 143
Vt. 590, 594-95, 469 A.2d 756, 758 (1983) ("It is enough that the court
engages in an open dialogue with the defendant involving . . . the Rule
11(c) elements to the end that the court is satisfied, and the record
substantiates, that the defendant knows and understands the full array of
legal consequences that attach to a guilty plea.").
Defendant next argues that defendant was incompetent at the time he pled
guilty and that the plea should therefore be stricken. Defendant emphasizes
the absence of a competency hearing at any stage of the proceedings, though
conceding that he was examined and found to be competent on at least three
occasions. Defendant, however, never requested a competency hearing, and
given the number and consistency of the competency examinations, it is clear
that the issue of competency was not raised until after the sentencing
hearing. We held in In re Hanson, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 623 A.2d 466, 476-68
(1993):
The manifest purpose of 4817(b) is to prevent the trial of a
defendant who is not competent to stand trial, and in carrying out
that purpose, to resolve any disputes about competency through an
adversarial hearing. The keystone is the court's responsiveness to
the competency question, whenever and however it is raised.
When a party raises competency and then fails to pursue the issue,
the court must conduct a hearing only if it is not satisfied that the
issue about defendant's competency to stand trial was adequately
resolved. There is no question on the present record that neither
petitioner nor the State wanted to pursue the competency question
after [the examining physician] had performed his examination.
In like manner, there is no question that neither defendant nor the State
sought to pursue the
issue of competency after the series of examinations by Dr. Woodruff.
Defendant next contends that in ruling that defendant was not competent
to represent himself, the court effectively concluded that he was incompetent
to stand trial. On June 20, 1991, the court conducted a hearing with respect
to defendant's pro se status. The court thereafter found that "[t]he
defendant was angry and uncooperative during the hearing. He has a
well-documented history of anger." The court also noted that "Defendant is
charged with a serious crime with a range of allowable punishment from 20
years to life depending upon the aggravating and mitigating circumstances."
The court concluded that defendant should be represented by the public
defender:
This action will protect the Defendant and utilize the legal
safeguards available to him. Moreover, there is enough in the
Court's eyes to question his competency to conduct a reasonable
defense. Therefore, the Court reappoints the Public Defender to
represent the Defendant until the Court is satisfied that he is
sufficiently competent to represent himself.
It is clear that the court's ruling was limited to defendant's capacity
to represent himself in a murder trial, not his competency to stand trial.
Defendant never argued at trial that the determination with respect to pro se
representation amounted to a finding of incompetency to stand trial. The plea
bargaining, change of plea, and sentencing all followed the ruling on the need
for counsel, without any suggestion that the matter of competency had been
effectively determined by the court. Indeed, the plea bargain and change of
plea would have made no sense in the context of a positive ruling on
competency. Nor does defendant cite any precedent for the proposition that
competence to stand trial necessarily implies competence to defend oneself
against serious felony charges.
Finally, defendant contends that the existence of the two incident
reports suggesting that defendant might attempt disruptive actions at
sentencing gave the court reason to believe that defendant may not be
competent to stand trial within the meaning of 13 V.S.A. 4817(b). The
trial court, however, specifically found that none of his actions or his
statements to the court during the proceedings suggests he would take his life
or act out inappropriately.
Defendant argues that he presented evidence at the motion to strike that
he had been suicidal and injured himself during the two weeks before
sentencing, was not taking his medications, and was unable to think or act
rationally in his own best interests. Defendant treats these assertions as
revelations, but the record clearly indicates they were not matters unknown to
defendant's examining physician or the court. The court sua sponte ordered a
competency evaluation after receiving an unsubstantiated report of the
defendant's attempted suicide. Dr. Woodruff's assessments were directed at
defendant's mental status generally, and not the impression generated by any
specific event. Bizarre behavior, even including suicide attempts, are
factors suggesting a state of mind and not ipso facto indicators of any
particular mental state. See Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1085 (1985) (prior suicide attempts, head
injuries, bizarre behavior, and alcoholism did not raise new doubts about
competency and did not require competency hearing); People v. Holman, 450
N.E.2d 432, 435 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (even evidence of established history of
neurological problems does not by itself require competency hearing).
In sum, even without reference to the trial court's suggestion that
defendant's claims of incompetency and the conduct on which they rested were
an exercise in gamesmanship, defendant's allegedly suicidal conduct was fairly
and thoroughly considered by the court, which found it unconvincing. There is
no basis to question the court's acceptance of Dr. Woodruff's evaluations
finding defendant competent to stand trial.
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
_____________________________
Chief Justice
