Caribbean Cowboys v. Worthen

----ooOoo----

Caribbean Cowboys Co., Ltd.,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

John Worthen, et al.,
Defendants and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 981696-CA

F I L E D
April 13, 2000
  2000 UT App 107 -----

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable William B. Bohling

Attorneys:
John Worthen, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se
Kevin M. McDonough and Robert J. Moore, Salt Lake City, for Appellee -----

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis.

JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge:

Although Worthen concedes the trial court had proper in personam jurisdiction over him in this case, he argues that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. To the contrary, the trial court did have authority to decide this civil contract dispute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp. 1999). It is true that incidental to deciding the dispute in favor of Carribean Cowboys Co., Ltd. (CCCL), the trial court ordered Worthen to sign real property conveyance documents, effecting the specific performance remedy CCCL requested. However, the efficacy of the conveyance documents under Belize law is not at issue here and instead is for Belize officials to decide. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 5, 30 S. Ct. 3, 5 (1909). Further, [a] decision in personam can be rendered by the court of a state with regard to a res which is not situated within the state if the decision merely obliges a person subject to its jurisdiction in personam to dispose of the res . . . in the manner prescribed by the decision. Thus, jurisdiction in personam is a sufficient basis for a decision of a court ordering the defendant to convey an interest in land located outside the territorial ambit of the court's jurisdiction. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 80 (1995). We therefore conclude the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

Worthen next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in appointing a proxy to sign the conveyance documents in Worthen's stead, considering Worthen's argument that he had no authority to sign on his company's behalf. However, the order stemming from the August 27, 1998 hearing, from which Worthen appeals, specifically states that the trial court was enforcing its December 11, 1997 order, which "clearly required the individual John E. Worthen to perform a specific act; i.e., execute conveyance documents." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, it states that "this Court requires Defendant John E. Worthen, in his individual capacity, to execute any and all conveyance documents regarding the property at issue in this case." (Emphasis added.) Thus, Worthen need not have had authority to sign documents on behalf of a business entity; he was to sign only on his own behalf. The record does not contain a copy of the actual conveyance documents signed by the proxy. We therefore have no way of knowing how the documents designated Worthen and can not say the trial court abused its discretion in this matter.(1)

Worthen also asserts the trial court erred in its findings in a minute order and in granting CCCL's motion to strike Worthen's answer and for entry of default judgment. We decline to address these arguments because they were improperly briefed, containing no citation to legal authority. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Further, the two orders under attack were not listed in Worthen's notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 3(d) (requiring notice of appeal to "designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from"). Finally, once a default judgment has been entered, it can be set aside only in accord with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Therefore, Worthen may not attack the default judgment directly, but should instead have attacked the denial of his two Rule 60(b) motions.

Worthen additionally raises two issues regarding whether CCCL breached the underlying contract. However, because this case was decided in a default judgment, the trial court did not reach the merits of these issues. Consequently, we will not address the merits either.

We have carefully considered other of Worthen's arguments (regarding venue, counsel withdrawal, and due process) and conclude they are wholly without merit; we thus decline to address them. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (holding we "need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal"); cf. Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75,¶8, 984 P.2d 987 (holding, to allow supreme court certiorari review, this court must "at the very least identif[y] the basis for refusing to treat an issue"). We also decline to consider several points that Worthen cursorily raises for the first time in his reply brief (e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel). See Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980) (stating that appellate courts generally decline to consider arguments presented initially in reply brief).

Affirmed.
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge
 
 
 

______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge

1. A copy of certain unexecuted conveyance documents contained in Worthen's addenda are included in the record as an attachment to a letter from CCCL's attorney to Worthen more than a year before the August 27, 1998 hearing.  They show Worthen designated as follows:  "John E. Worthen (also known as John Worthen Company)."  This may be whence Worthen draws his argument that to sign the conveyance documents he needed authority to act on his company's behalf.  However, we have no way of knowing whether these are similar to the documents that were actually signed by the proxy.  Further, what authority Worthen had vis-a-vis the designations "John Worthen Co." and "John Worthen et al." was
decided as part of the original default judgment in which the trial court awarded CCCL "the relief it seeks in its Amended Complaint."  In the amended complaint, CCCL had alleged that the above designations were alter egos of Worthen as an individual. The default judgment resulted in this becoming a fact in this
case.  Thus, the above designations were to be read as synonymous with Worthen, the individual, and he always had authority to sign as Worthen, the individual.