State of Utah, in the interest of W.B., R.B., and M.B.

State of Utah, in the interest of W.B., R.B., and M.B., persons under eighteen years of age IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah, in the interest of W.B., R.B., and M.B.,
persons under eighteen years of age.
______________________________

D.B. and A.B.,
Appellants,

v.

State of Utah,
Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 990584-CA

F I L E D
October 13, 2000 2000 UT App 282 -----

Seventh District Juvenile, Castle Dale Department
The Honorable Larry A. Steele

Attorneys:
Blaine T. Hofeling, Cedar City, for Appellants
Jan Graham and John Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian Ad Litem

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Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Davis.

JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge:

We first address D.B. and A.B.'s(1) challenge to the juvenile court's findings of fact. Although Parents marshaled most (but not all) the evidence supporting the trial court's findings of fact, they failed to show why those findings were insufficient as a matter of law to support the trial court's conclusions of law. See In re S.T., 928 P.2d 393, 400 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("Successful challenges to findings of fact must demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial court found the facts from the evidence, and second why such findings contradict the weight of the evidence."); In re E.D., 876 P.2d 397, 402 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (declining to address issue when parents failed to marshal evidence). Our painstaking review of the record has not "'induce[d] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" In re S.T., 928 P.2d at 400 (citation omitted). Essentially, Parents are asking us to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. See id. at 401 ("The mere fact that we could reach a different result than the juvenile court on the same evidence does not justify setting aside the juvenile court's findings."). Thus, we affirm the juvenile court's findings of fact.

Parents next assert that the findings of fact do not support the conclusions of law, and that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating their rights. Specifically, Parents challenge conclusions 3 (Parents are unfit), 5 (Father made only token efforts), and 6 (Mother made only token efforts). We conclude the challenged conclusions are supported by the trial court's findings of fact. Whether to terminate parental rights is left to the trial court's sound discretion. See In re M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Because the evidence supports the findings of fact, which in turn support the conclusions of law, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Parents' rights.

Parents next argue that, at the time the children entered DCFS custody, there was no causal nexus between Father's lewdness convictions and any harm, potential or actual, to the children. Whether a causal nexus exists or not is a question of fact. See In re M.S., 806 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The trial court found that "it was unsafe for the father to be allowed unsupervised contact . . . with other females under the age of 18 without the permission of his probation officer and approval from [his] primary therapist." Parents have not challenged this finding. "Since th[is] finding[ is] not clearly erroneous, the fact of causation was adequately established." Id. at 1219.

Parents also contend the initial juvenile judge was biased against them, and that without this bias, the case would never have proceeded to the termination hearing. We agree with the trial court that the facts cited in Mother's Affidavit of Bias were legally insufficient to mandate recusal. None of the assertions in the Affidavit of Bias show that the judge "'"had such a bias in favor of one party or prejudice against the other that he could not fairly and impartially determine the issues."'" In re M.L., 965 P.2d at 556 (citations omitted).

Finally, we address Parents' remaining issues. Because Parents failed to give adequate legal analysis and authority to support their arguments, we decline to address the following issues: whether the children should have been returned after Mother got out of jail and got an apartment; whether the trial court erred by allowing DCFS to make allegations other than dependency, which was the basis for the initial removal; and whether terminating Parents' rights to the three older children, while allowing them to keep the baby, violated Parents' right to equal protection. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370,¶8, 995 P.2d 14 (stating "[b]riefs must contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority").

We decline to address the following issues both because they were not adequately briefed and because they were not preserved below: whether Parents' fundamental constitutional right to raise their children was violated; whether the trial court should be equitably estopped from terminating Parents' rights because DCFS did not provide adequate services; and whether the trial court should be estopped from using Father's presence in the home as a factor justifying its finding of unfitness or token efforts. See id. (regarding inadequate briefing); see also In re E.D., 876 P.2d at 401 ("The appellate courts of this state have consistently refused to address issues, even those implicating constitutional rights, that are raised for the first time on appeal. This principle applies equally to proceedings originating before the juvenile courts.") (citations omitted).

Parents' last issue, whether the trial court should be estopped from making contradictory findings, was not raised below. Thus, we decline to address the merits of that issue. See In re E.D., 876 P.2d at 401.

Affirmed.
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings, Judge
 
 
 
 

______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge

1. We refer to D.B. as Father, A.B. as Mother, and to them collectively as Parents.