NIEVES TAMEZ v. TEXAS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RISK POOL--Appeal from County Court at Law No 1 of Hidalgo County

NUMBER 13-05-555-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

NIEVES TAMEZ, Appellant,

v.

TEXAS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RISK POOL Appellee.

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

of Hidalgo County, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Ya ez, Rodriguez, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza

This appeal follows the entry of a take-nothing summary judgment against Nieves Tamez on his breach-of-contract claim for insurance benefits against the Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool ( TML-IRP ). We affirm.

Tamez was injured in an automobile accident while on duty as an officer in the Edinburg Police Department. Tamez received workers compensation benefits through TML-IRP, the administrator of a workers compensation plan for the City of Edinburg. In addition, TML-IRP permitted Tamez to sue the other driver involved in the accident. When the other driver admitted fault, TML-IRP authorized Tamez to settle his claim.

The parties finalized their settlement, and the at-fault driver s insurance company tendered to Tamez approximately $20,000, the full amount authorized under the policy. Subsequently, TML-IRP exercised a subrogation lien against the settlement proceeds, which allowed it to recover some of the benefits paid to Tamez under the City of Edinburg s workers compensation plan.

Tamez commenced the instant suit after unsuccessfully attempting to recover additional benefits from TML-IRP under the terms of an automobile-insurance policy administered by TML-IRP on behalf of the City of Edinburg. The policy specifically covers any vehicle owned by the City of Edinburg and provides uninsured/underinsured motorists protection for the City of Edinburg or an eligible person to a combined limit of $1 million for each accident.

Tamez s live petition alleges that TML-IRP has breached its contract with the City of Edinburg by refusing to pay him benefits under the policy covering accidents involving uninsured/underinsured motorists.

TML-IRP filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Tamez is not an eligible person under the contract and thus has no entitlement to benefits under the policy. Responding to this particular point, Tamez argued that the interpretation of the policy offered by TML-IRP would render the policy meaningless, because no one could utilize [it].

The trial court granted summary judgment to TML-IRP without specifying the grounds for its ruling. On appeal, Tamez raises four issues.

We review summary judgments de novo. See Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant s favor. See id.

In his first issue, Tamez contends that the trial court erred in granting TML-IRP s motion for summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding underinsured motorist exclusions in the insurance plan. We overrule this issue because the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is not a fact question but rather a legal issue for the court to decide. See Seagull Energy E&P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 49 Tex. Sup. J. 744, 2006 Tex. LEXIS 550, *6 (Tex. June 16, 2006) (citing Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1983)). Tamez s appellate brief concedes that the contract is not ambiguous. Accordingly, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in interpreting it as a matter of law.

In his second issue, Tamez contends that the trial court erred when it found that TML-IRP did not waive the plan exclusions after it consented to and approved Tamez s settlement with the at-fault driver s carrier. We overrule Tamez s second issue because Tamez has produced no authority to establish that estoppel or any other similar theory is applicable to this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). Specifically, we have no basis for holding that TML-IRP is legally precluded from denying Tamez s claim under the automobile policy because it gave consent, in its capacity as the administrator of a separate worker s compensation policy, to Tamez s settlement with the at-fault driver.

In his third issue, Tamez contends that the trial court erred when it found that he was not a third-party beneficiary of the insurance policy. We disagree. A third party may recover on a contract made between other parties only if the parties intended to secure some benefit to that third party, and only if the contracting parties entered into the contract directly for the third party s benefit. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Texas Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex. 1999); Knox v. Ball, 191 S.W.2d 17, 21 (Tex. 1945). There is a presumption against, not in favor of, third-party beneficiary agreements. MCI Telecomms., 995 S.W.2d at 651.

In this case, the contract defines the class of persons covered by the policy (i.e., eligible persons ) and specifically states that employees of the City of Edinburg are not eligible for coverage for bodily injury sustained in the course and scope of their employment. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Tamez was an intended beneficiary. Tamez s third issue is overruled.

In his fourth issue, Tamez contends that the trial court erred when it failed to consider Tamez s additional summary judgment evidence prior to granting TML-IRP s motion for summary judgment. We overrule this issue without reaching the merits because it is inadequately briefed and provides this Court with insufficient detail to discern the substance of the argument sought to be advanced by this issue. In particular, the issue is offered to the Court without citation or references to the record, case law, or other controlling authority that would assist the Court in evaluating the merits of the alleged error. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h).

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

________________________ DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,

JUSTICE

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this the 28th day of September, 2006.