Christopher B. Stubblefield, Jr. v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 146th District Court of Bell County

Stubblefield v. State IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
AT AUSTIN

NO. 3-91-376-CR

 
CHRIS B. STUBBLEFIELD, JR.,

APPELLANT

 
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

 
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 146TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
NO. 40,327, HONORABLE RICK MORRIS, JUDGE

PER CURIAM

Appellant was convicted in a joint trial of five acts of forgery and was sentenced to imprisonment for seven years and a $5000.00 fine. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 32.21(b) (1989). In a single point of error, appellant contends that the district court erred in rendering judgment in cause number 40,327 because the evidence is legally insufficient to support the judgment. We will affirm.

Appellant allegedly stole checks belonging to Wayne Skinner, a legally blind, elderly man who lives in a nursing home. A friend of appellant's worked in this nursing home. Appellant attempted to pass one of Skinner's checks, number 572 (State's exhibit 4), at a King Saver grocery store allegedly using a Department of Veteran's Affairs identification card showing that appellant's name was Wayne Skinner. The check bore the purported signature of Wayne Skinner as the drawer. The cashier called the police after recalling that Skinner's checks had been reported as stolen. Appellant fled the grocery store after the cashier informed him the police were coming and was later arrested after the police found him hiding under a pickup truck in the parking lot. Appellant was indicted in cause number 40,327 for forgery by passing and transferring check number 572 (State's exhibit 4) with intent to defraud and harm another.

In his sole point of error, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment because the State has not proved that the purported drawer of the check, Skinner, did not authorize appellant to write the check. See Payne v. State, 567 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). In Payne, the defendant's mother stated that it was possible that she authorized the defendant to write her checks. The instant cause is distinguishable from Payne, however, because Skinner testified that the only Chris Stubblefield he knew was white (appellant is African-American) and because Skinner testified that he did not believe he asked anyone to sign a check for him that year. Skinner never stated that it was possible that he authorized appellant to write checks for him.

The critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court does not ask whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Skinner did not authorize appellant to write the check. Appellant's sole point of error is overruled.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

 

[Before Justices Powers, Jones and Kidd]

Affirmed

Filed: May 6, 1992

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