Terrance E. Anderson v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 82nd District Court of Robertson County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-99-192-CR

TERRANCE E. ANDERSON,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 82nd District Court

Robertson County, Texas

Trial Court # 97-12-16,295-CR

O P I N I O N

Once again, we are presented with the question whether a criminal defendant who pled guilty may bring an appeal without complying with the rule of appellate procedure which gives this Court jurisdiction. We hold that by failing to comply with the rule, the defendant has not invoked our jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and the appeal must be dismissed.

Terrance Anderson pled guilty to the offense of Indecency with a Child and accepted a plea bargain offer for four years of deferred adjudication probation. Pursuant to the State's plea recommendation, the court deferred the adjudication of Anderson's guilt and placed him on community supervision for four years. Less than two years later, the State filed a motion to proceed with the adjudication. Anderson pled not true to the alleged violations of his community supervision. After a hearing, the trial court determined Anderson had violated his terms of community supervision and adjudicated Anderson guilty of indecency with a child. The trial court then sentenced him to twenty years in prison and a $500 fine.

A defendant who has pled guilty or nolo contendere in exchange for deferred adjudication must comply with Rule 25.2(b)(3) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure when he seeks to appeal a subsequent sentencing. See Watson v. State, 924 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (applying former appellate rule 40(b)(1) now Rule 25.2(b)(3)). Rule 25.2(b)(3) provides in pertinent part that if a defendant seeks to appeal:

from a judgment rendered on the defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere under Code of Criminal Procedure article 1.15, and the punishment assessed did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant, the notice must:

(A) specify that the appeal is for a jurisdictional defect;

(B) specify that the substance of the appeal was raised by written motion and ruled on before trial; or

(C) state that the trial court granted permission to appeal.

Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3).

Anderson pled guilty to the original charges against him. After his adjudication of guilt, Anderson filed a general notice of appeal which does not recite that the appeal is for a jurisdictional defect; that the substance of the appeal was raised and ruled on by pretrial motion; or that the trial court granted him permission to appeal. Thus, Anderson s notice of appeal does not comply with the requirements of Rule 25.2(b)(3).

Because Anderson's notice of appeal does not comply with these requirements, we have no jurisdiction over this appeal. Watson, at 715. See Tressler v. State, 986 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tex. App. Waco 1999, no pet.). This holding has been uniformly accepted by the courts that have addressed this issue. See Okigbo v. State, 960 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd); Walker v. State, 970 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex. App. Dallas 1997, no pet.); Carothers v. State, 928 S.W.2d 315, 317 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1996, pet. ref'd). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

TOM GRAY

Justice

Before Chief Justice Davis,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Gray

Dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed August 2, 2000

Do not publish