Frenando Ray Taylor v. Raul J. Mata, Et Al.--Appeal from 52nd District Court of Coryell County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-94-288-CV

FRENANDO RAY TAYLOR,

Appellant

v.

RAUL J. MATA, ET AL.,

Appellees

From the 52nd District Court

Coryell County, Texas

Trial Court # 28,256

O P I N I O N

Taylor, a prison inmate, appeals pro se and in forma pauperis the dismissal by the District Court of his appeal from a disciplinary hearing in which he was found by Mata, a TDCJ-JD Disciplinary Captain, to have damaged state property. As a result of the disciplinary hearing, $22.64 was deducted from Taylor's inmate trust fund account pursuant to Tex. Govt. Code Ann. 500.002 (Vernon 1989).

Taylor appeals from the dismissal, alleging violations of the United States Constitution, Texas Government Code 500.002, and a Texas Prison System Directive.

We find the court was correct in dismissing Taylor's claim under 500.002 because he failed to appeal within sixty days of the adverse decision. The decision from the disciplinary hearing was on October 12, 1993, and no appeal was taken until December 27, 1993, well past the 60 days prescribed by 500.002(e).

Concerning his Federal constitutional claim, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974), states the minimum standards for disciplinary proceedings concerning alleged violation of prison rules, as follows: (1) 24 hours notice of the alleged violation of rules; (2) a written statement of the evidence relied on; (3) an opportunity for the inmate to present his side of the story, including the qualified right to call witnesses; and (4) a neutral and detached hearing body. Id at 2977. Taylor does not allege facts showing that any of the required procedural aspects of the disciplinary hearing were violated, but only complains that Mata decided the case wrongly. An inmate's disciplinary conviction will be upheld if there is any evidence to uphold the decision. Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1986) (a finding of guilt requires only the support of "some facts" or "any evidence at all"). Here, there was testimony from the charging officer and a photograph of the damaged handcuffs at the hearing, representing some evidence of Taylor's guilt. We find that Taylor was accorded due process procedurally according to Wolff and that factually the evidence was sufficient.

It is not clear what violations of TDCJ-ID administrative polices Taylor is complaining of, however, there is no cause of action for the violation of administrative policies. Even if Taylor's allegations regarding policy violations are true, such allegations are not recognized as causes of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1251-52 (5th Cir. 1989). Taylor also complains about the failure of the court to file findings of facts and conclusions of law; however, a trial court, in dismissing indigent prisoner's in forma pauperis complaint before any hearing or trial, is not required to make findings of fact or conclusions of law. Timmons v. Luce, 840 S.W.2d 582, (Tex. App. Tyler 1992, n.w.h.).

Accordingly, we affirm the court's dismissal of this cause.

BOBBY L. CUMMINGS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Thomas,

Justice Cummings, and

Justice Vance

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 2, 1995

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