The State of Texas v. Edmund Norman Furley--Appeal from County Court at Law No 1 of Brazos County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-94-207-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellant

v.

EDMUND NORMAN FURLEY,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court # 2701-93

O P I N I O N

The State appeals from an order granting Norman Furley's motion to suppress evidence and brings two points of error. Point one asserts that Furley's statement that a gun was in his car was not the result of an illegal detention and was not obtained in violation of Miranda, // the United States Constitution or the Texas Constitution. The State, in point two, asserts that the arrest of Furley and seizure of other evidence did not violate the state or federal constitutions.

On September 27, 1994, an officer who was participating in a state-funded grant to enforce the safety belt law observed Furley's failure to buckle up and pulled him over. After the officer had informed Furley of the purpose of the detention i.e., violation of the seat belt law and obtained Furley's driver's license and insurance information, he asked him, "Is there anything in the car that I need to know about?" Furley truthfully responded, "Yes sir, I have a pistol under my seat." The officer, who then asked Furley to step out of the car, retrieved a nine-millimeter Berretta from under the driver's seat and arrested Furley.

Furley was charged with unlawfully carrying a handgun. He filed a motion to suppress his statement and the gun, arguing that both were obtained in violation of the United States and Texas constitutions. The arresting officer was the only witness at the suppression hearing. He did not testify that Furley's actions caused him to fear for his safety; rather, he testified that Furley's "unusual actions" created a reasonable suspicion that he had some type of contraband in the car.

Furley conceded that the initial stop was lawful. However, he argued that the officer further detained him and continued to investigate a different matter after the traffic-stop detention was completed. He claimed that such investigation was without probable cause or reasonable suspicion and that the evidence obtained from it is inadmissible. The court granted Furley's motion to suppress. //

On appeal of a suppression hearing, we consider only the question of whether the court improperly applied the law to the facts. See Banda v. State, 890 S.W.2d 42, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). We do not disturb the court's factual findings if they are supported by the evidence. Id. at 51-52.

The validity of a seizure pursuant to a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry v. State of Ohio. // Goodwin v. State, 799 S.W.2d 719, 727-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S. Ct. 2913, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1076 (1991). To comport with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, an officer's action must be justified at its inception and must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).

As already noted, Furley concedes that the officer was justified in the initial stop. He admitted that he had forgotten to fasten his seat belt. However, he argues that the officer's additional questioning was not reasonably related in scope to the purpose for the stop because the officer had already obtained all necessary information. "The scope of [a] search must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Id. One court has held that an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check of the information, and issue a citation, but when the driver has produced the information, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning. U.S. v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988).

To justify further detention for questioning, an officer must have a reasonable suspicion of illegal transactions in drugs or another serious crime. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498-99, 103 S. Ct. at 1324. The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the detention. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. Facts are judged against an objective standard; // hunches are insufficient.

Furley maintains that the officer's asking, "Is there anything I need to know about?," exceeded the scope which justified the initial interference i.e., the seat-belt violation. Additionally, he asserts that there were no articulated facts to create a reasonable suspicion under the objective test, and that the officer was not entitled to investigate beyond the seat-belt violation.

The officer testified at length, explaining the chronology of events and Furley's actions that he claims raised a reasonable suspicion to warrant further questioning. The officer testified that Furley's voice inflection and posture indicated that he was nervous. He described Furley's actions:

[H]is upright seated position with his upper body turned to the left with his hands on top of the door, bringing his hands forward in front of his face, rotating his hands, asking permission to go to certain areas of the car after I'd already asked him to retrieve that item.

The officer testified that Furley's actions caused him to have a reasonable suspicion that something was in the car. However, he admitted that he did not have any idea what that something might be. He also testified that Furley's actions, taken independently, would not raise a suspicion of criminal activity, but that he had "run into this type of situation with other persons that have been in my experience that I've later found out they've spent a large time in a state penitentiary."

Whether the continued questioning was "strictly tied to" the detention for the seat-belt violation, and whether Furley's actions would have objectively created a reasonable suspicion are both questions of fact for the trier of fact. The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses at a suppression hearing. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). This court will not disturb the trial court's findings so long as they are supported by the record. See id.

The evidence supports the court's implied finding that the further detention and questioning of Furley, after the officer had received all necessary information pertaining to the seat-belt stop, was not related to the initial traffic stop and was not based on a reasonable suspicion. Therefore, we find no error in the court's granting the motion to suppress. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); Banda, 890 S.W.2d at 51-52.

Points one and two are overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.

BOB L. THOMAS

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Thomas,

Justice Cummings, and

Justice Vance

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 23, 1995

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