Ian Drew Fields v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 12th District Court of Madison County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-94-178-CR

IAN DREW FIELDS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 12th District Court

Madison County, Texas

Trial Court # W-9326

O P I N I O N

On May 2, 1989, Appellant Ian Drew Fields was sentenced to forty years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections, now known as the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID), for several criminal convictions. On August 28, 1993, Fields had accumulated approximately 2,494 combined days of good time and work time to be applied towards his sentence and had been assigned a fixed mandatory supervised release date. Also on August 28, 1993, Fields and another inmate escaped from prison and stole a motor vehicle. They were apprehended in Houston on September 2.

On September 9 the TDCJ-ID decided in a disciplinary proceeding that Fields was guilty of the September 2 offenses. As punishment, all of Fields' good time and work time was rescinded; his mandatory supervised release date was postponed; and his inmate classification was changed from "S-2" to "Line 3," meaning that Fields could no longer earn any good time for each day of his sentence that he served.

Subsequent to this September 9 punishment order by the TDCJ-ID, Fields was indicted in Madison County for the offenses of escape and the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Fields argues on appeal from a denial of a habeas corpus petition that his State and Federal Constitutional protections against double jeopardy preclude him from being charged with these offenses because he has already been punished for them by the TDCJ-ID. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Tex. Const. art. I, 14. We disagree.

This court has previously addressed this issue, specifically under the federal constitution and citing to the Texas Constitution, and decided that the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy do not preclude the state from trying an inmate when he has already been punished for the same offense in administrative proceedings before prison officials. Prysock v. State, 817 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. App. Waco 1991, pet. ref'd). We conclude that Prysock controls this issue under the federal constitution.

Fields asserts that since a recent line of cases from the Court of Criminal Appeals, beginning with Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), has found the Texas Constitution provides greater protections to Texas citizens than its corresponding provisions in the United States Constitution, we should find that article I, 14, of the Texas Constitution prevents him from being charged with the September 2 offenses because he has already been punished for them. We will follow our sister courts of appeals who have ruled since Heitman that the State is not precluded by article I, 14, from trying an inmate when he has already been punished for the same offense in administrative proceedings before prison officials. See Mott v. State, 846 S.W.2d 398, 398-399 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Quevedo v. State, 832 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd).

Because we overrule Fields' points of error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects.

BOBBY L. CUMMINGS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Thomas,

Justice Cummings, and

Justice Vance

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed November 9, 1994

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