COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
ROMIE LEE EDWARDS
THE STATE OF TEXAS
FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
In one point, Appellant Romie Lee Edwards appeals the revocation of his
community supervision. We affirm.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
Edwards pleaded guilty to injury to a child (his daughter) in exchange for
six years of confinement, suspended for six years’ community supervision. His
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
community supervision included the following conditions: (1) complete a sex
offender evaluation and then sex offender treatment if recommended; (2) have
no unchaperoned contact with the complainant; (3) work at suitable employment;
and (4) pay court costs and supervision fees. The State subsequently filed a
petition to revoke based on the four conditions set out above, and Edwards
pleaded true to violating all four.
At the revocation hearing, Edwards testified that he was disabled and that
he had failed to complete the sex offender evaluation because he could not pay
the fee. He said that he had failed to pay his court and supervision fees because
he was unemployed and his Supplemental Security Income benefits had not
been reinstated since his release from jail. Additionally, he testified that his first
post-conviction contact with his daughter occurred when he went to see her at
her mother’s house, that he had thought it was chaperoned because her mother
was present, and that he had misunderstood that chaperone meant someone
ordered by the court. His second contact with his daughter was at his sister’s
house when his sister brought his daughter home with her unannounced. He
also admitted that he had spoken with his daughter on the phone.
The trial court found that Edwards violated all four conditions and
sentenced him to six years’ confinement. This appeal followed.
We review an order revoking community supervision for an abuse of
Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);
Cherry v. State, 215 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d).
A single plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation of
community supervision, as is proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any
one of the alleged violations. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim.
App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1979).
In his single point, Edwards complains that ―[t]he trial judge abused her
discretion when she revoked appellant’s probation for failure to attend and
complete sex offender treatment as a condition of his probation for a non-sex
offense.‖ The bottom line of Edwards’s argument is that Ex parte Evans, 338
S.W.3d 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), should be expanded in its application from
parolees to probationers.2
We first note that Edwards was not required under the terms of his
community supervision to receive sex offender treatment but rather to complete a
sex offender evaluation. Second, we need not reach Edwards’s point because
the State sought revocation for the violation of four conditions of Edwards’s
community supervision. Edwards pleaded true to all four violations and does not
challenge the trial court’s findings on the other three violations. Hence, we hold
In Evans, the court held that a parolee previously released on
discretionary mandatory supervision was entitled to due process protections
before being required by the parole board to meet certain additional sex offender
conditions when he had not been convicted of a sex offense. 338 S.W.3d at
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Edwards’s community
supervision based on his ―true‖ plea to the three unchallenged allegations, and
we overrule his sole point. See Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926; Cole, 578 S.W.2d at
Having overruled Edwards’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: March 8, 2012