In the Intererst of M.J.R., III and C.A.R., Minor Children--Appeal from 166th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-03-00616-CV
In The Interest of M.J.R., III and C.A.R., Minor Children
From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 91-CI-16405
Honorable Henry Schuble, III, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Paul W. Green, Justice

Sitting: Paul W. Green, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 8, 2004

REVERSED AND RENDERED

The Office of the Attorney General of Texas (the OAG) contends the amount of the child support arrearage judgment against the father, Mario A. Ruiz, is incorrect in that it is legally insufficient. The OAG raises three issues: 1) whether res judicata bars Ruiz's collateral attack on a previous arrearage judgment rendered against him, 2) whether Ruiz's arrearage amount is established as a matter of law, and 3) whether the evidence is legally insufficient to support the advisory jury's verdict and the trial court's judgment. Ruiz did not file a brief on appeal.

Because the issues in this appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment for the OAG in this memorandum opinion under Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 for the following reasons:

1. The OAG says the 1995 agreed arrearage judgment against Ruiz was res judicata of Ruiz's present claim that he was not given proper credit for direct payments made to his ex-wife for child support before the judgment was signed. We agree. "Although a final judgment may be erroneous or voidable, it is not void and thus subject to collateral attack if the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter." Jones v. Jones, 900 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied). Because Ruiz did not show that the 1995 arrearage judgment against him was void, he was barred by res judicata from challenging the correctness of that judgment. The issue is sustained.

2. The OAG next claims that its payment record for Ruiz established his arrearage as a matter of law. Ruiz challenged the accuracy of this record by arguing he made direct payments to his ex-wife before the 1995 arrearage judgment that were not credited in the judgment. Ruiz did not dispute the accuracy of the OAG's record of payments thereafter. Because the 1995 arrearage judgment is res judicata of Ruiz's claim that the judgment was inaccurate, and because the payment record after the 1995 judgment has not been disputed, we agree that the OAG's payment record establishes Ruiz's child support arrearage as a matter of law. See In the Interest of W.G.S., 107 S.W.3d 634, 629 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). The issue is sustained.

3. Finally, the OAG says the evidence is legally insufficient to support the advisory jury's verdict and the trial court's judgment. We agree. Ruiz's child support arrearage was established as a matter of law and the trial court erred by entering a judgment based on the jury verdict. The issue is sustained.

4. The trial court's judgment is reversed and judgment is rendered against Mario A. Ruiz for child support arrears in the amount of $10,600.11 as of February 17, 2003.

Paul W. Green, Justice