Santos Hernandez v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court at Law No 9 of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-04-00020-CR
Santos HERNANDEZ,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 9, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 866358
Honorable Oscar Kazen, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 2, 2004

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Santos Hernandez, was charged with the offense of indecent exposure. In accordance with the terms of a plea bargain agreement, Hernandez pleaded no contest to the alleged offense. The trial court sentenced Hernandez to 100 days imprisonment and fined Hernandez $1,000. Hernandez was also required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, Hernandez argues that the sex offender registration requirements of Chapter 62 constitute a cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. We affirm.

The State argues that Hernandez waived his complaint because he did not raise a specific objection at trial as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. At the plea bargain hearing, Hernandez simply objected to the registration requirement as "a violation of his constitutional rights." Such an objection is too general to constitute a proper objection under Rule 33.1. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1) ("As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion that stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context"). Hernandez did not specify the particular provisions of the state or federal constitutions which had been violated nor did he articulate an argument from which the trial court could have determined the exact basis of his objection. Because Hernandez's objection was too general to constitute a proper objection, we hold Hernandez failed to preserve his complaint for our review. See Steadman v. State, 31 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (holding defendant's failure to raise an objection in the trial court that the sentence was cruel and unusual waived the complaint for appeal).

Nevertheless, even if we were to assume Hernandez's general objection was sufficient to preserve his complaint for our review, his argument lacks merit. The court of criminal appeals has concluded that dissemination of the fact that a person is a convicted sex offender does not constitute a punishment. See Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding Texas Legislature's intent in passing the sex offender registration program was civil and remedial in nature, and the effect of the program is not so punitive as to transform the statute into a criminal sanction). Thus, because Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is essentially regulatory in nature, not punitive, Hernandez's complaint has no merit. We therefore overrule Hernandez's sole appellate issue.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Catherine Stone, Justice

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