In the Interest of C.L. and B.M.L., Children--Appeal from 408th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-03-00638-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF C.L. AND B.M.L., CHILDREN
From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2002-PA-01678
Honorable David Berchelmann, Jr., Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Catherine Stone, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 21, 2004

AFFIRMED

This is a parental termination case. The Department of Protective and Regulatory Services ("DPRS") brought suit against appellant Christina Martinez Monreal to terminate her parental rights to her children, C.L. and B.M.L. DPRS alleged Monreal has a mental illness or a mental deficiency that renders her unable to care for her children. The termination trial was held before the court, without a jury. At the close of trial, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Monreal's parental rights to C.L. and B.M.L. was in the children's best interest and that grounds existed for such termination pursuant to section 161.003 of the Texas Family Code. Monreal brings this appeal of the decree terminating her parental rights, urging: (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that her mental illness or deficiency, in all reasonable probability, will continue to render her unable to provide for her children's needs until their eighteenth birthdays; and (2) the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in her children's best interest. We overrule all of Monreal's issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Parental rights can be terminated only by a showing of clear and convincing evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.001 (Vernon 2002); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002). Clear and convincing evidence means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 101.007 (Vernon 2002); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264.

In a legal sufficiency review when the burden is clear and convincing evidence, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. Id. We must also disregard all evidence that a reasonable fact finder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. Id. We must, however, consider undisputed evidence even if it does not support the finding. Id.

In a factual sufficiency review, we must give due consideration to evidence the factfinder could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing. Id. We must determine "'whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations.'" Id. (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)). We also consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. Id. "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." Id.

Termination of the parent-child relationship is permitted under section 161.003(a) of the Family Code if the court finds: (1) the parent has a mental or emotional illness or a mental deficiency that renders the parent unable to provide for the physical, emotional, and mental needs of the child; (2) the illness or deficiency, in all reasonable probability, proved by clear and convincing evidence, will continue to render the parent unable to provide for the child's needs until the eighteenth birthday of the child; (3) the department has been the temporary or sole managing conservator of the child of the parent for at least six months preceding the date of the hearing on the termination; (4) the department has made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent; and (5) the termination is in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.003(a) (Vernon 2002). Monreal does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to establish subsections (1), (3), or (4) of the statute. Monreal merely contends that none of the witnesses at trial testified with certainty that her mental illness would continue to render her unable to provide for her children's needs until they reached the age of eighteen and that preserving the parent-child relationship is in her children's best interest.

Discussion

In her first two issues, Monreal complains that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that her mental illness or deficiency will continue to render her unable to provide for her children's needs until their eighteenth birthdays. We disagree.

At trial, Wallace Ross, a psychological associate for the Bexar County Mental Health Mental Retardation Facility, testified Monreal is mentally retarded and suffers from a major depressive disorder with psychotic features. According to Ross, Monreal acts as a pre-teenager in her daily activities and will continue to do so for the rest of her life. Ross testified he believes Monreal is not capable of independently meeting the needs of her children before their respective eighteenth birthdays. Although Ross testified that Monreal could meet the needs of her children if she were supervised and given assistance handling certain aspects of her life, he also stated that the degree of assistance that would be required was not available through the MH-MR facility.

Charles Sadler, Monreal's caseworker, also testified at the termination proceeding. Sadler testified regarding the various social and psychological services offered to Monreal. According to Sadler, Monreal did not utilize all of the services offered to help reunify her with C.L. and B.M.L. Sadler testified that Monreal failed to fully comply with the service plan provided to assist her and had "basically, g[iven] up on her plan."

In light of the aforementioned testimony, we hold that the record contains both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Monreal's mental illness or deficiency would render her unable to provide for her children's needs beyond their respective eighteenth birthdays. We therefore overrule Monreal's first two issues.

In her third issue, Monreal complains the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of her parental rights is in her children's best interest. In her brief four-sentence "argument" under this issue, Monreal sets forth the standard of review in the first two sentences and states in the final two sentences that "no evidence was introduced by the [S]tate to prove that termination was in [C.L.'s and B.M.L.'s] best interests [sic]" and "[t]here was no evidence introduced to rebut the strong presumption that preserving the parent-child relationship would be in the best interest of the child[ren]." Absent from Monreal's "argument," however, is any substantive analysis or discussion of the evidence to support her contentions. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h) (requiring an appellant's brief to "contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record."). Because Monreal has failed to properly brief this issue, we need not address this issue. See id.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Catherine Stone, Justice