Paul Joseph Garcia v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 187th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-03-00075-CR
Paul Joseph GARCIA,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2002-CR-3161
Honorable Raymond Angelini, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Sitting: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 7, 2004

AFFIRMED

Paul Joseph Garcia ("Garcia") was charged in a three-count indictment for the separate offenses of murder, manslaughter, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In a bench trial, Garcia pled guilty to manslaughter and aggravated assault and not guilty to the charge of murder. The trial court convicted Garcia of murder and sentenced him to twenty-four years confinement and a $1000 fine. On appeal, Martin challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the trial court's findings that he did not act in self-defense or in defense of property. We affirm.

Background

As Garcia and his four friends were traveling together on Military Drive in San Antonio, they noticed a crowd on the sidewalk taunting drivers as they drove by. When traffic came to a standstill, one of the men walked up to Dan Banda's ("Banda") open window and ripped his gold chain off of his neck and fled. Garcia and his friends drove away, but pulled into a nearby parking lot to discuss how to recover Banda's stolen necklace. There, Garcia armed himself with a shotgun and returned with the others to Military Drive.

With the shotgun aimed out the window, Garcia fired several shots into the crowd. As they drove away, Garcia told his friends that he shot the individual who stole the necklace from Banda. It was later determined that Garcia had shot both Manuel Sanchez ("Sanchez") and Crystal Salazar ("Salazar"). Salazar later died as a result of her injuries.

Analysis

Garcia argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's implied finding that he did not act in self-defense and was not justified in using deadly force in defense of Banda's property. When reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether the trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Furthermore, the trier of fact is permitted to make reasonable inferences from the evidence. See Cobb v. State, 93 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In a factual sufficiency challenge, we review all of the evidence in a neutral light and reverse only if the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence or is so clearly wrong as to be manifestly unjust. See Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App 2000).

A person is justified in using deadly force in self-defense when they reasonably believe it is immediately necessary to counter the use or attempted use of deadly force against them. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 9.32 (Vernon Supp. 2003). After a robbery or theft, a person can also be justified in using deadly force in defense of their property if they reasonably believe it is necessary to prevent another from escaping with the property and that it cannot be recovered by any other means. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 9.42 (Vernon Supp. 2003). The State has the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt in disproving the defendant's claim of self-defense and defense of property. See Saxton v. State, 804, S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Garcia contends that his actions were justified because the evidence shows he reasonably feared for his life. He relies on the stipulated evidence that the crowd appeared to be comprised of gang members and that they were throwing bottles at Garcia's vehicle. Moreover, Garcia asserts that when they returned to Military Drive to retrieve Banda's necklace, he was under the impression that the gang members had guns. And while he accepted responsibility for the recklessness of his actions, Garcia argues there was no evidence that he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Salazar to support a murder conviction. Rather, he asserts that the evidence supports the contention that he could not reasonably retreat and that he was merely trying to recover Banda's property.

Despite Garcia's contention, the evidence supports the trial court's implied findings. Garcia confessed to the shooting on the night in question. Furthermore, the trial court reasonably concluded that Garcia possessed the requisite intent for a murder conviction. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 19.02(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003). The evidence at trial reflected Garcia aimed and fired the gun in the general direction of the crowd. Therefore, Garcia possessed the required intent to kill. See Forest v. State, 989 S.W.2d 365, 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)(holding that firing a gun is an act clearly dangerous to human life); Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)(holding the specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon, unless the use is reasonably apparent that death or serious bodily injury could not result).

Deadly force is justified only when retreat is unreasonable. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 9.32 (Vernon Supp. 2003); Hughes v. State, 719 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Here, there is no evidence of Garcia's inability to retreat. In fact, the evidence clearly shows Garcia and his friends were able to safely drive away immediately after Banda's necklace was stolen. Furthermore, the evidence is uncontroverted that neither Garcia's or Banda's lives were at risk. Instead, Garcia knowingly returned to the scene only after he and his friends devised a plan on how to recover the necklace. The police were never called to assist. Accordingly, nothing in the record supports a conclusion that Garcia's actions were the only alternative to prevent the thief from escaping.

After considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined Garcia's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Vasquez v. State, 2 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd). Additionally, in viewing the evidence in a neutral light, the State's evidence, taken alone, is not too weak or manifestly unjust to support the implied findings against Garcia. In rendering a guilty verdict, the trial court implicitly rejected Garcia's claims and held him accountable for the murder of nineteen-year-old Crystal Salazar. Accordingly, we affirm the judgement of the trial court.

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

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