Gloria Sanchez Chavez v. United Medical Centers--Appeal from 293rd Judicial District Court of Maverick County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-02-00675-CV
Gloria SANCHEZ CHAVEZ,
Appellant
v.
UNITED MEDICAL CENTERS,
Appellee
From the 293rd Judicial District Court, Maverick County, Texas
Trial Court No. 00-07-16706-CV
Honorable Cynthia L. Muniz, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 29, 2003

AFFIRMED

Gloria Sanchez Chavez appeals the trial court's summary judgment in her premises liability suit against United Medical Centers. We affirm.

Chavez was injured when she lost her balance on a speed bump in United Medical Centers' parking lot. In her deposition, Chavez testified that she had gone to UMC approximately once a month for approximately one year before her accident. On her previous visits, and on the day of her accident, Chavez testified, she was aware - and wary - of the speed bump:

Q: Did you ever notice a problem with the - with that area?

A: I - I kept that in mind all the time. I said "Why do they have this bump here?" You know, especially when I was dragging my feet, you know, that I always was careful because I had been injured before. You know, I was always careful not to fell [sic] down or not to - on that and - but that time I just, you know, like when you have something on the way, you might not hit it the first time, but the next time that comes around, you might.

Q: So you - you were aware of that speed bump being there. You just didn't see it that day; is that correct?

A: I saw it that day. I did see it, you know, it's - but as I was walking, you know, I just didn't raise my feet well enough to go over that speed bump, that on the first place they shouldn't have it there.

On the basis of this testimony, UMC moved for summary judgment, contending the evidence conclusively established Chavez's knowledge of the premises condition. UMC also moved for summary judgment on a second ground: "UMC had no duty to warn [Chavez] of risks that are matters 'within the ordinary knowledge common to the community"; and "speed bumps are within the ordinary knowledge common to the community."

In her response to UMC's motion for summary judgment, Chavez contended "she did not see the unmarked, unidentified obstruction, speed bump or asphalt barrier prior to her tripping and falling over it nor did she have prior actual notice of it." In support of her response, Chavez filed her affidavit, in which she explains that, on the day of her accident, she approached UMC's front entrance, while on previous visits she had entered from a side entrance. Chavez did not respond to UMC's second ground for summary judgment. Without stating a ground, the trial court granted UMC's motion and rendered a summary judgment against Chavez. We affirm the trial court's judgment. "[T]here is 'no duty' to warn a person of things ... which are so open and obvious that as a matter of law he will be charged with knowledge and appreciation thereof." Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tex. 1978). We hold as a matter of law that United Medical Centers had no duty to warn Chavez of the speed bump in the front parking lot, particularly in light of Chavez's undisputed knowledge of the speed bump in the side parking lot. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice