Kenneth Watson v. Ricky Borem, Oscar Mendoza and Robert Parker--Appeal from 81st Judicial District Court of Karnes County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-02-00779-CV
Kenneth WATSON,
Appellant
v.
Ricky BOERM, Oscar Mendoza, and Robert Parker,
Appellees
From the 81st Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas
Trial Court No. 02-03-00045-CVK
Honorable Ron Carr, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 13, 2003

AFFIRMED

Kenneth Watson appeals the trial court's dismissal of his civil lawsuit. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background

Watson, an inmate, filed a lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Ricky Boerm, Oscar Mendoza, and Robert Parker violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, Watson alleged that in November of 2001, Boerm verbally assaulted him. And, although Mendoza and Parker were aware of Boerm's conduct, they did nothing to stop Boerm or protect Watson from Boerm. Appellees Boerm, Mendoza, and Parker filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Watson's claims against them should be dismissed for failure to comply with chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Watson's claims with prejudice.

Dismissal

In his sole issue, Watson argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. According to Watson, he was not required to exhaust administrative remedies, because there was "no remedy that the State Grievance Procedure offers which could have satisfied the relief in this present action." Watson explains that he seeks "monetary damages which the prison grievance procedure cannot provide."

In Allen v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice--Institutional Division, 80 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied), the First Court of Appeals addressed this same issue. The court relied on Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733 (2001), a Supreme Court case holding that as long as the grievance tribunal has authority to take some responsive action, administrative exhaustion is required even when the grievance process does not permit an award of money damages. Allen, 80 S.W.3d at 684. In Booth, the Supreme Court explained the policy reasons for its holding:

[R]equiring exhaustion in these circumstances would produce administrative results that would satisfy at least some inmates who start out asking for nothing but money, since the very fact of being heard and prompting administrative change can mollify passions even when nothing ends up in the pocket. And one may suppose that the administrative process itself would filter out some frivolous claims and foster better-prepared litigation once a dispute did move to the courtroom, even absent formal factfinding.

Booth, 532 U.S. at 737; see also Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that pursuant to Booth, inmate was required to exhaust all Texas Department of Criminal Justice grievance procedures even though money damages were unavailable in grievance system).

Relying on Booth, the First Court of Appeals noted that our grievance system in Texas provides procedures for an inmate to identify evidence to substantiate the inmate's claim, and for an inmate to receive all formal written responses to the inmate's grievance. Allen, 80 S.W.3d at 684 (citing Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 501.008(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003)). "By 'filter[ing] out some frivolous claims and foster[ing] better-prepared litigation," the TDCJ grievance tribunal 'has authority to take some responsive action.'" Id. (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 737) (alterations in original). The First Court of Appeals, thus, held that an inmate is required to exhaust all administrative remedies under the grievance system, regardless of whether he sought monetary damages. Id.

We adopt Allen's reasoning and also hold that even though Watson sought monetary damages, he was required to exhaust all administrative remedies under the grievance system. We overrule Watson's sole issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Watson's issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Karen Angelini, Justice