Sie Joe Lann v. La Salle County; Cotulla Independent School District; and City of Cotulla; et al.--Appeal from 218th Judicial District Court of La Salle County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-02-00005-CV
Sie Joe LANN,
Appellant
v.
LA SALLE COUNTY, Cotulla Independent School District, and the City of Cotulla,
Appellees
From the 218th Judicial District Court of La Salle County, Texas
Trial Court No. 00-09-00014-TXL
Honorable Olin B. Strauss, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 22, 2003

REVERSED AND REMANDED

While Lann was incarcerated, he was sued by the taxing authorities for delinquent property taxes. Lann answered pro se and, on four separate occasions over the course of the ensuing eight months, asked the trial court to permit him to appear at trial either personally through a bench warrant or by telephone. In his last motion, Lann informed the court that he would prefer to appear by telephone and provided the phone number to schedule a telephone conference.

The trial court did not hear or rule on Lann's request until shortly before the trial was to begin. At that time, the court announced it had just received Lann's request "for a bench warrant ... so he could be here personally, or a telephone conference" and asked the taxing authorities what they had to "say about this motion." The taxing authorities' attorney objected to the motion "simply because this is a civil matter and is not really a family matter or some matter where he is facing additional criminal penalties." The trial court then summarily denied Lann's motion and rendered judgment against him for $3,782.36 to be satisfied by a foreclosure lien. Lann appealed. Under his twelfth point of error, Lann argues the trial court erred in proceeding to trial without affording him an opportunity to appear. We agree.

"[A]ll litigants who are forced to settle disputes through the judicial process have a fundamental right under the federal constitution to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner." Dodd v. Dodd, 17 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (quoting Nichols v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, no writ) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1971)). Thus, "[t]he right of a prisoner to have access to the courts entails not so much his personal presence as the opportunity to present evidence or contradict the evidence of the opposing party." Dodd, 17 S.W.3d at 717. "Should the court find that the pro se ... inmate in a civil action is not entitled to leave prison to appear personally in court, then the prisoner should be allowed to proceed by affidavit, deposition, telephone, or other effective means." Id. (quoting Byrd v. Attorney General, 877 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1994, no writ)).The trial court's ruling on a prisoner's bench warrant request is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Dodd, 17 S.W.3d at 716.

By denying Lann's motion in its entirety, the trial court implicitly found that Lann's personal presence at trial was not required. We have no quibble with that ruling. However, after determining that a bench warrant was unnecessary, the court should have permitted Lann to proceed by some other viable means, such as the telephone conference Lann had expressly requested. See Dodd, 17 S.W.3d at 718. Because the trial court did not do so, it effectively denied Lann's "fundamental right under the federal constitution to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner" and, in so doing, abused its discretion. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

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