David Charles Crandall v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court at Law No 6 of Bexar County
David Charles CRANDALL,
The STATE of Texas,
From the County Court at Law No. 6, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 654866
Honorable Ray Adams, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice
Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice
Alma L. L pez, Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 1, 1999
David Charles Crandall ("Crandall") appeals his conviction for criminal mischief. Crandall asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's judgment. We overrule Crandall's contentions and affirm the trial court's judgment.Factual Background
Four witnesses were called during trial to testify regarding an incident involving Crandall and the complainant, Thomas Caddell. The four witnesses were Crandall, Crandall's wife Melissa, Caddell, and Caddell's fiancee Melinda.
Caddell testified that he drove his fiancee, Melinda, to the horse stables where she agreed to work for her sister, Melissa. Sometime later, Crandall and Melissa arrived, and Crandall accused Caddell of hunting on the property. Caddell denied the accusation, stating that he was dressed in camouflage because he was going hunting on his mother's property but had dropped Melinda at work first. After a heated discussion, Caddell testified that in the process of leaving, Crandall peeled his tires, flinging rocks against Caddell's truck. The rocks damaged the paint on the truck and broke the truck's side mirror.
Crandall testified that he might have spun his tires because he was upset that Caddell was trying to hunt on the property owned by his wife's employer, but he could never have damaged Caddell's truck in the manner Caddell claimed.
Melissa testified that Melinda told her that Caddell intended to go hunting. She and Crandall went to the property because this upset Crandall. Melissa testified that she heard the tires spin and felt the truck shifting sideways when she and Crandall were leaving. Melissa admitted that her husband has "road rage."
Melinda testified that when Crandall left after arguing with Caddell, he roared up to Caddell's truck and fishtailed, almost running into the back of Caddell's truck. Crandall then paused for a second and gunned his engine, sending gravel flying all over Caddell's truck really hard. Melinda stated that she heard glass breaking. The gravel was marble sized. Melinda observed that the side mirror was broken and there were pits and dents on the tailgate, left side, and roof of the truck. Melinda testified that given the distance between the two trucks, Crandall must have intended to cause damage to Caddell's truck. On re-direct examination, Caddell also stated that he believed Crandall intentionally intended the gravel to spray the truck and cause damage.Discussion
In his two issues, Crandall challenges whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show that he acted knowingly or intentionally. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In our factual sufficiency review, we must consider all of the evidence to determine whether the judgment is "so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence to be clearly wrong and unjust." Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
In this case, both Caddell and Melinda testified regarding the deliberate nature of Crandall's actions. Although Crandall attempted to impeach this testimony during cross-examination, the trial judge, as the trier of fact, was required to evaluate the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses and to determine the weight to be given the contradictory testimony. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 408-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We are not permitted to reweigh the evidence, rather we defer to the trier of fact's findings, particularly those based on credibility determinations. Id. at 407-09. We conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient, and the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
DO NOT PUBLISH