EX PARTE JAWANZ COCHRAN

AFFIRM; Opinion issued April 30, 2010
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-10-00055-CR
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EX PARTE JAWANZ COCHRAN
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On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 401-80558-09
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OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Moseley, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Morris
        In this case, Jawanz Cochran appeals the trial court's order denying him a reduction of pretrial bail. We submit the appeal without briefs because neither appellant nor the State filed briefs within the time period set by the Court. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court's order.
 
Background
 
        The State charged appellant with aggravated robbery. The trial court set appellant's pretrial bail at $750,000. On April 6, 2009, appellant filed a motion to have the bail reduced to $10,000. A docket sheet notation reflects that on June 22, 2009 the trial court reduced the bail to $200,000. On August 4, 2009, appellant filed an “application for writ of mandamus,” again seeking a reduction of his pretrial bail. On August 11, 2009, appellant filed a motion for further reconsideration. The trial court conducted a hearing on appellant's motion to reduce bond on December 10, 2009.         At the hearing, two letters written in support of appellant were admitted into evidence. The first letter, from appellant's mother, stated appellant had taken a “night job”to help support his infant daughter. She also stated she is a long-time resident of DeSoto, the family does not have the funds to post the bond for appellant, and, if released, appellant would reside with her. The second letter described appellant's good character.
        Additionally, the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that a co-defendant of appellant's “just got 17 years and a $7,000 fine from a jury” for engaging in organized criminal activity and “[t]en years, eight months on the aggravated robbery, and a $5,000 fine.” It also took judicial notice that another co-defendant was released from jail on bond, which the State had not opposed. The trial court further took judicial notice that the bonds of two other co-defendants were reduced to $25,000 but indicated it did not know the facts behind the bond reductions of the co-defendants.
        The judge presiding at the hearing recited into the record that there was evidence presented in the trial of one co-defendant that a group of young men met at an apartment complex. The men changed license plates, some changed clothing, and they traveled to a shopping mall. The group consisted of “distraction teams,” “surveillance teams,” the “gunman,” and the “transportation guys.” At the mall, part of the group started an altercation to create a distraction while another was watching a jewelry store. A young woman pretended to be a customer to distract the clerk and to get the jewelry case open. There were allegations the woman pretending to be the customer did so under duress because of threats to herself or her family members. After the jewelry case was opened, another of the men robbed the clerks at gunpoint, taking thousands of dollars worth of property. Several rings were recovered at a jewelry store in southern Dallas county. The judge also noted there was testimony of other robberies at jewelry stores in Arlington, Irving, and Valley View Mall involving the same general group of men. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion for a bond reduction and signed its order on March 9, 2010.
 
Discussion
 
        In reviewing the trial court's decision to grant or deny habeas corpus relief, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We uphold the ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Id. We afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of the historical facts that are supported by the record, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We afford the same amount of deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts if the resolution of the ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. If the resolution of the ultimate questions turns on an application of legal standards, we review the determination de novo. Id.
        It is within the trial court's discretion to determine the proper amount of bail. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15 (Vernon 2005). In determining the amount of bail to set, the court is guided by the following rules: (1) the bail should be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with; (2) the power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an instrument of oppression; (3) the nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed are to be considered; (4) the ability to make bail is to be considered, and proof may be taken upon this point; and (5) the future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community may be considered. See Ex parte Welch, 729 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.). Relevant facts to be considered in determining the amount of bond include the accused's work record, family and community ties, length of residency, previous criminal record, and conformity with the conditions of any previous bond, any outstanding bonds, aggravating circumstances involved in the charged offense, and the range of punishment for the charged offense. See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849-50 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981).
        The person seeking the reduction has the burden of demonstrating the bail is excessive. See Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Although the ability or inability of the accused to make bail is a factor to be considered, that factor alone does not control the amount of bail. See Ex parte Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
        In this case, appellant is charged with aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, a first- degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2), (b) (Vernon 2003) The punishment range for the offense is five to ninety-nine years, or life imprisonment, and a fine of up to $10,000. See id. § 12.32 (Vernon Supp. 2009). There is evidence the crime was intricately planned and orchestrated and involved a number of men and a woman.
        Appellant presented little evidence of his work record, other than he had taken a night job. There was no evidence about how long he had the job before his arrest and whether the job would still be available to him if he was released on bond. His mother's letter stated appellant would live with her. There was no evidence about appellant's criminal record or conformity with the conditions of any previous bonds. Moreover, other than asserting appellant and his family could not afford the $200,000 bond, there was no evidence about the amount of bond appellant could post. Rather, counsel's argument centered on the fact that because the bonds of some co-defendants had been reduced, appellant's bond should likewise be reduced.
        After reviewing the record, we conclude appellant did not satisfy his burden to show the bond was excessive. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion to reduce his bail.         We affirm the trial court's order denying appellant's motion for a bond reduction.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          JOSEPH B. MORRIS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
100055F.U05