JAMES GANG, Appellant v. MOSHEN SADEGHI, Appellee

REVERSE and REMAND and Opinion Filed November 4, 2010
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-09-00898-CV
............................
JAMES GANG, Appellant
V.
MOSHEN SADEGHI, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 382nd Judicial District Court
Rockwall County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1-06-818
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O'Neill, Richter, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice O'Neill
        In a single issue, appellant James Gang challenges the trial court's entry of judgment against him for $1.4 million in damages based on appellee Moshen Sadeghi's cross motion for summary judgment. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Background
        Sadeghi sued Gang for breach of contract. Gang filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the contract was unenforceable as a matter of law because it was missing essential terms. Sadeghi filed a cross motion for summary judgment alleging the contract contained all of the essential terms; therefore, it was enforceable as a matter of law. The trial court granted Gang's motion and found there was no enforceable contract.
        On appeal, we reversed the trial court's judgment and concluded the parties entered into an enforceable contract. Sadeghi v. Gang, 270 S.W.3d 773, 774 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). We remanded the case “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” On remand, the trial court failed to conduct any further proceedings but instead simply signed a judgment against Gang and awarded Sadeghi $1.4 million.   See Footnote 1  This appeal followed.
Discussion
        Gang argues the trial court improperly signed a judgment and awarded $1.4 million in damages for breach of contract when the enforceability of the contract was the only issue raised during summary judgment proceedings. Therefore, the trial court erred by failing to conduct further proceedings as instructed by this Court in the underlying appeal regarding the remaining elements of the breach of contract claim. We agree.
        A court cannot grant summary judgment on grounds not presented in the motion. Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Tex. 2002); Garza v. CTX Mortg. Co., 285 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.). Further, the motion for summary judgment itself must expressly present the grounds upon which it is made. McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (“The motion for summary judgment shall state the specific grounds therefor.”). Further, when reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmovant. Caldwell v. Curioni, 125 S.W.3d 784, 789 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).         The underlying motion for summary judgment filed by Gang and the cross motion for summary judgment filed by Sadeghi concerned only whether the parties entered into an enforceable contract. The trial court's order specifically stated “the primary and dispositive issue before this Court was the enforceability of a contract. . . . There being no execution on the written agreement, there was no enforceable contract.” The only issue determined on appeal from this order was whether an enforceable contract existed. See Sadeghi, 270 S.W.3d at 774. When this Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for “further proceedings consistent with this opinion,” the trial court should have either conducted a trial on the merits to determine whether a breach of contract occurred and to determine the appropriate damages and attorneys' fees, if any, or allowed further summary judgment motions challenging the remaining elements of the breach of contract claim. See Petras v. Criswell, 248 S.W.3d 471, 477 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) (necessary elements for breach of contract are enforceable contract, performance, breach of contract, and damages).
        Instead, the trial court granted Sadeghi's motion based on elements that were never raised in a proper summary judgment motion. See McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 341 (motion must stand or fall on grounds expressly presented). Sadeghi argues the trial court, and this Court, has before it all the necessary information to enter a judgment because the breach is undisputed and the $1.4 million in damages is liquidated. He further contends he expressly stated in his cross motion for summary judgment that the contract had been repudiated and asked for damages in his prayer. Despite including these details in his cross motion for summary judgment, he still failed to specifically raise these elements as separate grounds for granting the summary judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (“The motion for summary judgment shall state the specific grounds therefor.”). Thus, we conclude the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Sadeghi based on grounds not presented in a motion. We sustain appellant's sole issue.
Conclusion
        We reverse and remand the trial court's judgment for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MICHAEL J. O'NEILL
                                                          JUSTICE
 
090898F.P05
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
Footnote 1 The trial court sent a letter to the parties stating, “I interpret the Court of Appeal's ruling to be that as a matter of law, Sadeghi's Motion for Summary Judgment should have been granted by the trial court. It follows that had Sadeghi's motion been granted, judgment would have been rendered in his favor on the contract. . . . it is the trial court's understanding . . . the case has been remanded to the trial court to enter judgment on Sadeghi's Motion for Summary Judgment.” He then signed plaintiff's proposed judgment.