STEPHEN LEN HEJNY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Annotate this Case

AFFIRMED; Opinion issued September 18, 2006
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-06-00159-CR
No. 05-06-00160-CR
............................
STEPHEN LEN HEJNY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F05-51848-HW and F05-51849-HW
.............................................................
OPINION
Before Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Wright and Lagarde   See Footnote 1 
Opinion By Justice Lagarde
        On his guilty pleas to the jury, appellant Stephen Len Hejny was convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (UUMV) and evading arrest-detention using a vehicle, and having a previous evading arrest conviction. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 31.07, 38.04(b) (Vernon 2003). The jury assessed punishment, enhanced by two prior felony convictions in each case,   See Footnote 2  at fifteen years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. In his sole point of error, appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's waiver of a jury in each case. Concluding no error has been shown, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
Background
 
        On December 13, 2005, appellant, before the trial court, entered pleas of guilty to the charged offenses and pleas of true to the enhancement paragraphs. The trial court admonished appellant and made a specific finding appellant was competent.   See Footnote 3  Although appellant waived his right to a jury trial and asked the trial court to assess punishment in each case, the trial court would not approve the jury waivers.
        Specifically, the record shows the following exchange between defense counsel and the trial judge, when the judge asked if counsel had anything else:
 
[Defense Counsel]:
 
Yes, your Honor. I-for the record, I would like to get on the record that prior to beginning trial today that Mr. Hejny had indicated that he wanted to enter a plea of guilty, that he wanted to waive his right to a jury trial and waive the right for a jury to enter that plea of guilty, and it's my understanding the Court, at this time, is not allowing him to waive his right to a jury trial and come to the Court for-for sentencing alone.
 
 
 
 
 
        And in that light, likewise, that in the effort to have a jury trial, but the Court is requiring him to have a trial before a jury at this time and, likewise, during that jury trial, that Mr. Hejny has entered an election of punishment for the Court to sentence him, and we would just like on the record that, initially, he, this morning, prior to voir diring [sic] a jury and prior to beginning trial that he had entered a request to waive his jury trial, to enter a plea of guilty before this Court and have this Court sentence him.
 
 
 
 
 
 
        And it's-it's my understanding the Court is not allowing that to happen, that the Court is forcing him to have a jury trial and, in that regard, likewise, he is requesting the Court to set his punishment in entering a plea of guilty before the jury, and the Court is refusing him that right and making him go to the jury for punishment.
 
 
 
 
[The Court]:
 
Okay.
 
 
 
 
[Defense counsel]:
 
Is that-is that-
 
 
 
[The Court]:
 
I'm not accepting his waiver of jury, so I'm not accepting his waiver of jury at this time. And if he wants-he has a right to plead guilty or not guilty; I'm not forcing him in terms of how he pleads.
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Now, if he pleads guilty and I'm not allowing him to waive a jury, so he's pleading guilty to the jury; but that's his option. He has a freedom to plead guilty or not guilty.
 
 
 
 
[Defense counsel]:
 
I understand but it's the Court's-the Court is making the decision at this time not to allow him to waive his right to a jury trial.
 
 
 
[The Court]:
 
Right. That's correct.
 
 
 
 
[Defense counsel]:
 
And is there a basis for that?
 
 
 
[The Court]:
 
I'm not allowing it.
 
 
 
 
[Defense counsel]:
 
Okay. Okay.
 
        A jury was selected. Outside the presence of the jury, appellant acknowledged to the trial court he had signed the stipulation of evidence freely and voluntarily. The trial court approved the stipulation. Appellant waived any complaint about amendment of the indictment and ten days to prepare for trial.   See Footnote 4  The jury was sworn and given certain instructions by the trial court. Before the jury, both sides announced ready; the indictments were read to the jury, and appellant pleaded guilty to the charged offenses and true to the enhancement paragraphs. The State offered, and the trial court admitted, into evidence appellant's signed pleas of true, stipulations of evidence, and certified copies of his prior convictions.         Kevin Le testified he is from Vietnam and has lived in Dallas for six years. He was living in Dallas on April 19, 2005, when his 2000 four-door Saab was stolen from in front of his home between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. Le discovered the car missing when his nineteen-year-old son came home and asked where the car was. Le called the police about 11:00 p.m. An officer came to his house and obtained the relevant information about his car. Le had no idea who took his car, and he had given no one permission to use it. About two days later, the police called and told Le the car had been found. Le went to the police station, talked to the detectives, and signed the necessary paperwork. There were no seats in his car, except a driver's seat that was a “dummy seat” and was not bolted down. There was a lot of trash in the car. Le replaced the car. Le had never met appellant and did not give him permission to drive his car.
        Dallas police officer Michael Paul Graesser testified that on April 21, 2005, he was working patrol in a marked squad car. At about 3:00 or 4:00 o'clock in the morning, he was specifically patrolling a residential area in far north Dallas looking for car burglars.   See Footnote 5  When Graesser arrived at the 6800 block of Saint Ann, he saw a vehicle driving slowly down the alley. Graesser saw the car stop in the alley next to a garage of a house where there was a Suburban parked with the rear door open and the dome light on. No one else was around. Graesser pulled around behind the vehicle, and the car started to pull off. A check of the license plate number revealed the car was stolen. Graesser turned on his emergency lights to make a traffic stop. The car accelerated and pulled away, turning onto a street. Graesser turned on the siren.   See Footnote 6  When the driver did not respond, Graesser radioed for assistance. A chase ensued.         Dallas police officers Byron Guynn and Tobin Childers caught up with Graesser, and took over the chase. During the chase, the fleeing car was going probably fifty miles per hour in a residential area. The driver was driving dangerously, nearly struck several vehicles, was speeding, did not stop at stop signs, and did not clear intersections. Graesser dropped out of the chase and returned to the area where he had seen the open car door. He contacted the owner of that vehicle, who said the vehicle had been broken into and there was property missing.   See Footnote 7 
        Dallas police officers Childers and Guynn testified to their part in the case.   See Footnote 8  Childers testified the driver of the stolen car reached speeds of 130 or 135 miles per hour before finally stopping. Childers identified appellant as the driver. When the officers removed appellant from the car, appellant said “well, did y'all have fun?”   See Footnote 9  Appellant was handcuffed and transported to jail in Childers's car. The inside of the car appellant had been driving had been stripped. The driver's seat was not bolted down and there was a “bunch of backpacks” and a “bunch of property” from complainants whose identities were later discovered by the officers. Appellant did not appear to be under the influence of anything at the time. He did, however, have an open folding-type pocketknife with about a four or five inch blade under his thigh. Appellant did not exhibit that weapon to the officers. Rather, they discovered it after appellant was removed from the car. Guynn testified he had no evidence appellant had stolen the cars from which the stolen property was taken, he only knew appellant had property from the other stolen cars. Guynn did not think appellant's behavior was irrational. Guynn just considered appellant as evading the officers, and when the officers caught up to him, appellant stopped.         Dallas police officer David Baker testified he became involved when other officers asked him to interview appellant. Baker briefly talked to appellant at the scene of the arrest and then interviewed him at the station. Baker gave appellant his Miranda warnings and asked if appellant wanted to make a statement. Appellant did make a statement. Baker testified there was nothing unusual about the interview. Appellant personally wrote down his voluntary statement around 8:22 a.m. In the statement, appellant admitted to driving the Saab. Baker testified appellant was cooperative and that Baker talked to appellant for about ten minutes.
        Appellant testified that he was twenty-nine years old. He pleaded guilty freely and voluntarily. He was born in Corsicana, Texas, his parents are alive and live near the border of Addison and Richardson, and he has a twenty-four-year-old brother named Dusty. Appellant went to Dallas public schools, but did not graduate. He did, however, get a GED and he has taken three classes at El Centro.
        Appellant testified that when he was in junior high school, he was diagnosed with ADD.   See Footnote 10  In the eighth grade, he started taking Ritalin and seeing a psychiatrist. In high school, he was also diagnosed with schizophrenia, depression, and as being bipolar. Appellant takes medications.   See Footnote 11  When appellant does not take his medications, he “wants to go out and steal or something.” If appellant takes his medications, he can keep a job.
        Appellant also testified that he has a history of drug abuse. He started taking drugs in the eighth grade. He first used acid which he got from people at school. He took acid about three times-just experimenting. He also used ecstacy, cocaine, and speed. Appellant used to drink alcohol but does not anymore. He never smoked. Appellant was not on medication when these offenses were committed. He went off his medications when he left his parents' house. Appellant had been sentenced to attend drug/alcohol treatment by the court, known as SAFPF, a lockdown facility. Appellant stayed in SAFPF about seven months. When he completed the SAFPF program, he was released. Appellant returned to his parents' house and got a part-time job as a DJ at a club. He did not use drugs for about two months and was not taking medication.
        On June 28, 2004, appellant went to the Salvation Army for two weeks to go through drug rehabilitation. Appellant worked for about four months putting chimneys in new homes. Appellant was using cocaine, and would borrow money from his father to buy the drugs. Appellant's father did not know what appellant spent the money for. Appellant was taking ecstacy, speed and methamphetamine in “rock ice form.” He would put it in orange juice and drink it. Appellant has severe depression. Appellant was essentially self-medicating with drugs.
        Appellant explained that he was driving his father's car on the toll road and did not know one of the tires was “flat, kind of, with a plug in it.” Appellant was driving about eighty or ninety miles per hour and “popped his tire; it popped by itself.” And it “hit the rim.” Appellant explained he got the Saab he was driving from a person he knew as Kermit; the keys were inside the car. Appellant did not know the car was stolen. The seats were in the car when he got it, but appellant and one of Kermit's neighbors removed the seats the second day he drove it. Kermit is a drug dealer who was supplying appellant with drugs. Appellant was doing things for Kermit to get cocaine.
        At about 3:00 a.m. on April 21, 2004, appellant was getting ready to drop the car off in front of “their house.” “Their” meant “Kevin-the guy that came here yesterday, the Chinese guy.” Appellant was going to do that as a joke because he is a “little bit of a smart-ass sometimes.” Appellant took the police on a high speed chase. He stopped because he was running out of gas. Appellant ran from the police because he was high at the time. That day he had used “cocaine and ice mixed,” “[s]o they wouldn't get it.”
        Appellant testified he has a long history of property crimes, and he has been in the penitentiary three times. He has been previously convicted of seven felonies. He explained how his criminal history began. Appellant has never had any gang affiliation and has never committed an act of violence. He was nervous and on medication, Celexa and Wellbutrin. Appellant knew he was going to the penitentiary and planned to take some classes “up there,” and open his own business when he gets out, either a club or a power washer.
        Appellant testified he was glad to get out of prison, but did nothing to change his life after he got out either time, except to get a job. He testified this time will be different because he will not be living with his parents. The reason he “did it” was because he got kicked out of the house. He has a pretty good relationship with his parents. His parents kicked him out because he took their car without their permission and it “pissed them off.” It cost $200 for a new tire. And he wasn't finding a job fast enough.
        Appellant also testified that he committed burglaries in the general neighborhood around his parents' house. His parents were not at trial. Appellant was doing at least 150 miles per hour on the freeway; he is always racing. Appellant was wearing a seatbelt even though the seat was not bolted in. He did not think it was dangerous because he is a competent driver. People have stolen things from him before and it made him mad. Appellant has the desire to steal even though he has a pocketful of money. He did it because he could not get a job. The medication he was on at trial slows him down and puts him to sleep. When appellant is not on his medication, he thinks all kinds of crazy stuff; people get on his nerves, that kind of thing. When he is on his medications, he is happier. He was “pretty much” having a good time when he was going down the freeway that night. That is why he asked them if they were having fun.         At the conclusion of the evidence, the charges were read to the jury, arguments were presented, and the trial court instructed the jury to find appellant guilty of the charged offenses and the enhancement paragraphs true. The jury assessed punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine in each case.   See Footnote 12 
Denial of Jury Waiver
 
        In his sole issue on appeal, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant his right to waive a jury trial. Appellant contends “the liberty to waive a jury trial is part and parcel of the right to trial by jury guaranteed in both the Texas constitutional and statutory law.” Appellant argues a trial judge should not be allowed to simply refuse to accept a defendant's plea of guilty without just cause and force a defendant to enter a guilty plea before a jury. Appellant contends the record affirmatively shows the State did not object to appellant's jury waiver, and that his guilty pleas to the trial court would not have delayed the trial, impeded justice, prejudiced the State, caused an inconvenience to witnesses or jurors, or interfered with the orderly administration of the business of the court.
        The State responds that absent a showing of prejudice, the trial court's decision to not approve appellant's requested jury waiver is not subject to review for abuse of discretion.
Applicable Law
 
        The right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate. See U. S. Const. amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 15; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.12 (Vernon 2005). A defendant's only constitutional right concerning the method of trial is the right to an impartial trial by jury. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). The ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist on the opposite of that right. Id. at 34-35.
        Conversely, the right to a trial before the court is not absolute; the statutory right is subject to procedural conditions. See State ex rel. Turner v. McDonald, 676 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Article 1.13(a) of the code of criminal procedure provides:
 
The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense other than a capital felony case in which the State notifies the court and the defendant that it will seek the death penalty shall have the right, upon entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by jury, conditioned, however, that such waiver must be made in person by the defendant in writing in open court with the consent and approval of the court, and the attorney representing the State. The consent and approval by the court shall be entered of record on the minutes of the court, and the consent and approval of the attorney representing the State shall be in writing, signed by him, and filed in the papers of the cause before the defendant enters his plea.
 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.13 (a) (Vernon 2005) (emphasis added). The waiver of a jury pursuant to article 1.13 is a trilateral process to which both parties and the trial court must agree. See In re State ex rel. O'Connell, 976 S.W.2d 902, 904 n.3 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, orig. proceeding) (op. on reh'g). By its plain language, article 1.13 requires the court's consent and approval of the jury waiver. The term “consent” inherently implies the idea consent may be withheld. See Garner v. State, 864 S.W.2d 92, 102 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd).
 
Analysis
 
        Appellant gave no reason for wanting to waive a jury and offered no evidence of why he could not, or did not, receive a fair trial by the jury in his cases. Nor does appellant argue on appeal he was prejudiced by having had a jury trial. In fact, citing Marquez v. State, 921 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), and Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), appellant recognizes that “[i]t has been long since established that a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court 'absent a clear showing that it abused its discretion.'” Nevertheless, appellant asks us to find the trial judge abused her discretion by not consenting to his jury waivers. Appellant cites no authority in support of his position.
        Because article 1.13 requires that the trial court consent to and approve the jury waiver and nothing in the record shows the trial court abused its discretion in not so doing, we conclude appellant's complaint is without merit. We overrule appellant's sole point of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgments.
 
                                                          
                                                          SUE LAGARDE
                                                          JUSTICE, ASSIGNED
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
060159F.U05
 
Footnote 1 The Honorable Sue Lagarde, Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Retired, sitting by assignment.
Footnote 2 The same two offenses were alleged in the enhancement paragraphs in each case.
Footnote 3 Appellant had previously been seen by a psychiatrist who had filed a report with the trial court concluding appellant was competent. Defense counsel indicated to the court he thought his client was competent. Appellant indicated, in response to a question from the trial court, he did not think he was competent because he was on medication.
Footnote 4 Appellant orally waived the time; however, the trial court urged the parties to get a written ten-day waiver signed and filed.
Footnote 5 The area had an influx of burglaries; there had been thirty vehicle burglaries within two weeks in a quarter-mile radius; another officer had received a call about two blocks away where a burglar had been scared off.
Footnote 6 Graesser described standard operating procedure was first to use the lights, then if no response, the siren, and then if no response, to make radio contact for cover officers to assist.
Footnote 7 Appellant was not charged with any of the car burglaries and no damage was done.
Footnote 8 They were in separate squad cars with their emergency equipment on.
Footnote 9 Appellant just put his hands up inside the car and would not get out.
Footnote 10 Attention Deficit Disorder.
Footnote 11 Trizadone, Celexa, and Wellbutrin.
Footnote 12 In sentencing appellant, the trial judge stated that appellant had requested a jury trial. Defense counsel corrected that statement stating that, instead, appellant had asked to enter a plea of guilty before the court and be sentenced by the court.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.