DAVE MANYOU, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion issued September 18, 2006
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-05-00161-CR
............................
DAVE MANYOU, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 422nd Judicial District Court
Kaufman County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 22153-422
.............................................................
OPINION
Before Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Wright and Lagarde   See Footnote 1 
Opinion By Justice Lagarde
        Dave Manyou was convicted by a jury of possession of marijuana in an amount 2000 pounds or less but more than fifty pounds. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.121(b)(5) (Vernon 2003). The jury assessed appellant's punishment at eight years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.33 (Vernon 2003). In two issues, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
Motion to Suppress
 
        In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Appellant asserts that his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated because the record does not show he committed any traffic violation justifying the officer's initial stop of appellant's vehicle.
Suppression Hearing Testimony
 
        On May 3, 2004, appellant filed a motion to suppress.   See Footnote 2  On May 21, 2004, a hearing was held on the motion. Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) trooper Brad Brewer was the sole witness at the hearing.   See Footnote 3 
        Brewer testified that on October 15, 2002, at approximately 1:12 a.m., he was a Kaufman County Deputy Sheriff working traffic enforcement, alone, in a marked patrol unit on the eastbound side of Interstate 20 (I-20), between the Dallas County line and the City of Terrell. His attention was drawn to a minivan, with Georgia license plates, traveling east on I-20. Brewer had just cleared another vehicle, and he noticed the minivan because of a “problem with the driver's side headlight on the front of the vehicle.” Brewer followed the minivan and, when he passed it, he “observed the driver's side headlight, which was illuminated, but the bulb [was] rolling around inside the casing, and it also had white clear tape across the front.   See Footnote 4  The beam was pointing to the ground, then to the center median, then to the shoulder of the roadway. It was not secure inside the mounting bracket.” Brewer stopped the van based on the “defective headlamp with the beam of the headlight not shooting out a thousand feet like it says in the Traffic Code.”   See Footnote 5  Brewer's initial intent was to give the driver a warning about the defective headlamp.
        When Brewer activated his emergency lights, the minivan pulled to the shoulder of the roadway. Brewer got out and approached the driver, whom he identified as appellant. There was a front seat passenger, later identified as Errol Reid, in the van with appellant. Brewer identified himself as a Kaufman County sheriff's deputy and told appellant he had stopped him because of a defective headlamp. Appellant said he was aware of the damaged headlamp-that he had been involved in an accident in California.   See Footnote 6  Brewer asked appellant where he was coming from and where he was going. Appellant was nervous-his hands were very shaky. Brewer requested appellant's driver license or proof of identification, which appellant provided. Reid was “extremely nervous.” Notwithstanding the air-conditioning in the van, Reid was “sweating profusely” and was having problems making eye contact, which appeared strange to Brewer and aroused his suspicions. Responding to Brewer's question, appellant said he was a Christian rock music promoter and had been in California promoting Christian music. At that time, appellant reached down, picked up a Bible, and placed it on the dash. Brewer also found this action to be a little strange.   See Footnote 7 
        Brewer asked each occupant of the vehicle if he had ever been arrested, and each replied he had not. Brewer then returned to his patrol vehicle to run a routine computer check on both occupants. The computer check revealed that appellant did, in fact, have a criminal history, including a conviction for marijuana trafficking. The computer check on the passenger, Reid, was negative for arrests.
        In light of appellant's false statement about his criminal history and the demeanor of the two men, Brewer called for a back up unit. Brewer formed a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the nervousness of both occupants, as evidenced by the shaking of their hands and the throbbing of their carotid arteries, failing to make eye contact, agitation when asked to get out of the vehicle, the story about being Christian rock promoters, and appellant's picking up the Bible and placing it on the dash. Therefore, Brewer further detained the occupants. Appellant was “parked approximately six inches from the fog line.” For safety reasons, Brewer asked both men to get out of the car and away from the traffic. When Brewer asked appellant to get out of the vehicle, appellant became angry and belligerent and accused Brewer of picking on him and trying to put somebody in jail. Brewer believed he was dealing with a dangerous and agitated suspect; however, appellant did cooperate. Brewer detained appellant until DPS cover officers Peterson and Armstrong arrived. Brewer's reasonable suspicion was formed from the totality of the complete circumstances of the stop.
        After the cover officers arrived, the officers discussed calling for a drug dog. Before doing so, however, Brewer asked appellant for consent to search the minivan. A citation had not been issued at the time Brewer asked for consent. At the time Brewer asked for consent, appellant was standing by the front passenger side of the patrol vehicle, between it and appellant's vehicle. Appellant freely and voluntarily gave consent to search. Armstrong witnessed Brewer's request for consent to search. Brewer never asked the passenger for consent to search. Brewer testified he continued to investigate because appellant had lied to him about his criminal history.
        After hearing appellant consent to a search of the vehicle, Reid had a “meltdown” and started to cry. Brewer and Peterson searched the van. The search revealed two large black duffel bags. Each bag contained three large white bales, tightly wrapped with cellophane and dryer sheets, containing a green, leafy substance. One of the bags contained some baby clothing that appellant admitted belonged to him.   See Footnote 8  The officers punched a hole in one of the bundles and found marijuana. Together, the bundles contained ninety-eight pounds of marijuana. The officers also discovered $368 in a briefcase in the vehicle. Appellant explained the money was the remainder of the $5000 cash he had for the trip. The officers found $520 in cash on Reid's person. The officers arrested both appellant and Reid after discovering the marijuana.
        When Brewer was asked what specific section of the Traffic Code appellant violated, he answered, “I believe it's-okay, it's going to be 547.302 or 547.326 of the Traffic Code.”   See Footnote 9 
        After Brewer's testimony, the trial court recessed the hearing until May 27 so that the videotape of the stop could be retrieved and viewed. However, when the hearing reconvened, the trial court was informed the videotape was available, but it was defective and reflected nothing about the stop. No additional testimony was presented. After a briefing schedule was set, the hearing was adjourned.   See Footnote 10  The trial court ultimately denied appellant's motion to suppress.
Standard of Review
 
        The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed one: both deferential and de novo. We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, especially when the findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Manzi v. State, 88 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). When the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. See Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We review de novo the trial court's application of search and seizure law to those historical facts. See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.
Analysis
 
        Appellant contends the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress because the evidence failed to show appellant committed any traffic offense justifying the traffic stop. The thrust of appellant's position is that Brewer was mistaken in his belief appellant's damaged headlight constituted a violation of the Texas Transportation Code, and that an officer's incorrect belief a motorist is in violation of state traffic laws is insufficient to justify a vehicle stop. Appellant complains only that the initial stop was not valid; he does not complain about the scope of the investigation following the stop.
        In support of his argument, appellant relies on three cases: United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998); and Trahan v. State, 16 S.W.3d 146, 147 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet.). Appellant also relies on sections 547.302(c), 547.321, and 547.326 of the transportation code to support his position that he was not violating any state traffic laws. Appellant interprets those sections to require only that his vehicle be equipped with at least two headlamps, one on each side of the front of the vehicle, and that at least one of those headlamps be illuminated and project its beam 1000 feet. Appellant contends that inasmuch as he had one headlamp that projected its beam 1000 feet, he was not violating the law, the traffic stop was illegal, his consent to search was the fruit of that illegal traffic stop, the resulting search was illegal, and the marijuana discovered as a result of that search should have been suppressed. Thus, appellant contends the trial court reversibly erred in denying the motion to suppress.
        The State first responds that appellant has waived any error for three reasons.   See Footnote 11  First, the State points to appellant's affirmative statement of “no objection” to the State's offer of the chain of custody affidavit that described the marijuana.   See Footnote 12  See Dean v. State, 749 S.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Traylor v. State, 855 S.W.2d 25, 26 (Tex. App.- El Paso 1993, no pet.). Next, the State contends error was waived because appellant did not obtain a ruling of record on the issue raised. Finally, the State contends error is waived because the record does not show the basis on which the court considered the motion to suppress. We conclude the State's waiver arguments are without merit. Defense counsel did object to the laboratory analysis reflecting the green leafy substance submitted to the laboratory was marijuana and the trial court overruled his objection and admitted the exhibit.
        The State further responds that the trial court did not err in holding there was a valid stop when several traffic offenses were shown. The State points to four traffic violations: (1) failure to “display” two headlamps at nighttime;   See Footnote 13  (2) failure to “display” two headlamps when there was not enough light to clearly discern a person or vehicle 1000 feet ahead;   See Footnote 14  (3) operating a vehicle in a condition that is unsafe so as to endanger “a person,” i.e., appellant, the passenger, or anyone on or beside the road;   See Footnote 15  and (4) “reckless driving,” defined as driving a vehicle “in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.”   See Footnote 16  The State argues that regardless of the deputy's understanding of the legal requirements for headlights, the stop was lawful and the trial court did not err when information was objectively available to justify arrest on four traffic offenses. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Blount v. State, 965 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd).
        The issue here is not whether appellant committed a traffic violation; rather, the issue is whether Brewer had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant for a traffic offense. If an officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting a person has committed a traffic offense, the officer may legally initiate a traffic stop. See Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Chang, 994 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.). The burden is on the State to demonstrate the reasonableness of the stop. See Aviles v. State, 23 S.W.3d 74, 79 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd); see also Chang, 994 S.W.2d at 877. The State is not required to show a traffic offense was actually committed, but only that the officer reasonably believed a violation was in progress. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d at 163 (citing Valencia v. State, 820 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd)).
        Here, Brewer's attention was drawn to appellant's vehicle because of a defective head lamp, the beam of which moved because the bulb was rolling around loose within the mounting. Appellant relies on section 547.326 as authority he was required to have only one head lamp illuminated and projecting its beam 1000 feet.   See Footnote 17 
        In relevant part, subsection (a) of section 547.326 of the transportation code provides “[a] vehicle that is not specifically required to be equipped with lamps or other lighting devices shall be equipped at the times specified in Section 547.302(a) with at least one lamp that emits a white light visible at a distance of at least 1,000 feet from the front.” Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 547.326(a) (Vernon 1999) (emphasis added). Section 547.321 provides that a motor vehicle shall be equipped with at least two headlamps, and that at least one headlamp shall be mounted on each side of the front of the vehicle. Id. § 547.321.
        Section 547.302 of the transportation code provides, in relevant part, that:
        (a)
 
A vehicle shall display each lighted lamp and illuminating device required by this chapter to be on the vehicle:
 
        
 
(1)
 
at nighttime; and
 
        
 
(2)
 
when light is insufficient or atmospheric conditions are unfavorable so that a person or vehicle on the highway is not clearly discernible at a distance of 1,000 feet ahead.
 
        
* * * *
 
 
 
 
(c)
 
At least one lighted lamp shall be displayed on each side of the front of a motor vehicle.
 
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 547.302 (a), (c) (emphasis added).
        The van appellant was driving was a motor vehicle. Because appellant's motor vehicle was required by section 547.321 to be equipped with at least two headlamps, by its own terms, section 547.326 does not apply. Appellant's reliance thereon is misplaced.
        When Brewer saw the light from one of the head lamps pointing straight down and not casting forth its beam forward 1000 feet, he had specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was violating the requirements of the transportation code. Thus, the stop was valid. Upon stopping the vehicle, Brewer was able to see from the front of the vehicle that the bulb, although connected to the electrical wiring and illuminating, was not affixed and the bulb was rolling around within the casing, sending various light patterns as it rolled. At that time Brewer observed a violation of the traffic laws in his presence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 14.01(b), 14.03 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2006).
        After an officer has validly stopped a vehicle for a traffic offense, the officer may conduct a brief investigative detention of the occupants of the vehicle, based upon his observations of suspicious activity by the occupants of the vehicle before and after the stop, combined with his knowledge of the area and the frequency of crime in the area, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the behavior of the occupants of the vehicle. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-77 (2002). Thus, Brewer was justified in conducting a brief detention of appellant. During that detention, appellant consented to a search of the vehicle and the ninety-eight pounds of marijuana were discovered and seized. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress.
        We resolve appellant's first issue against him.
 
Sufficiency of the Evidence
 
        In his second issue, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support the conviction.   See Footnote 18  Appellant asserts the evidence is insufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to affirmatively link him to the marijuana found in the back of the vehicle he was driving.
Facts
 
        The State presented three witnesses at trial: Brad Brewer, Michael Villareal, and Joe Don Law. Brewer testified to essentially the same facts he had earlier testified to at the suppression hearing. Additionally, he testified to post-arrest events, specifically preservation of the chain of custody of the evidence. In response to a question from defense counsel, Brewer testified it was not a violation of the transportation code for a headlight to be taped, and that both lights were illuminated.
        Villareal testified that on the date of the offense he was a criminalist with the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Lab in Garland where the analysis was conducted on the substance submitted. That analysis revealed there were ninety-eight pounds of marijuana seized.
        Law testified at the time of trial he was a Kaufman County Constable, but on the date of the offense he was employed as a Kaufman County Deputy Sheriff, and was assigned to the crime scene unit. He was also the evidence custodian. Law testified concerning the chain of custody of the evidence and sponsored admission of a chain of custody affidavit, which was admitted without objection.   See Footnote 19  Over defense counsel's objection, the marijuana was also admitted into evidence.
        After the State rested, appellant testified in his own behalf. Appellant explained that he and Reid left Florida some five weeks before in Reid's truck and drove to Atlanta, Georgia. Reid's truck broke down and was put in a repair shop in Atlanta. Because Reid did not have a credit card, appellant rented the van in his name. Appellant did not know the rental agreement restricted its use to the state of Georgia. Appellant told of having been stopped several times over the five weeks they were traveling. He explained he had just sold his home in Florida and wanted to make some more money, so he agreed to join Reid in a promotional venture in California. Appellant owned a restaurant in Florida; his wife owned two beauty shops: one in Florida and the other in Atlanta.   See Footnote 20  Appellant denied he knew the marijuana was in the van. He also denied the baby clothing was his or that he had stated at the scene it was his. Essentially, the defense's theory was that it was Reid's marijuana, and Reid had put it in the van without appellant's knowledge.
Standards of Review and Applicable Law
 
        The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are well established. When deciding whether evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, we assess all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 729-30 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 481 (2005). When deciding whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we must examine all the evidence without the prism of the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether the fact finder was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
        Under either standard, the fact finder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (legal sufficiency review); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (factual sufficiency review). We must give deference to the fact finder's decisions about the weight and credibility of evidence. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9.
        To prove appellant unlawfully possessed marijuana, the State was required to prove by direct or circumstantial evidence appellant exercised “actual care, custody, control, or management” over the substance and knew the substance he possessed was marijuana. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Deshong v. State, 625 S.W2d 327, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). When possession is not exclusive, additional independent facts and circumstances must affirmatively link the accused to the contraband. Deshong, 625 S.W.2d at 329. The affirmative links, however, need not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except the appellant's guilt. Harris v. State, 173 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). Whether sufficient affirmative links exist is determined by the totality of the circumstances. Sosa v. State, 845 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd). The “logical force” or degree to which the independent facts and circumstances, either alone or in combination, tend to affirmatively link the defendant to the contraband is more important than the number of links. See Smith v. State, 176 S.W.3d 907, 916 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. ref'd).
Analysis
 
        It is undisputed appellant was not in exclusive possession of the minivan. Appellant points to the following facts in arguing the State failed in its burden to affirmatively link him to the marijuana: the marijuana was in enclosed baggage in the back of the minivan; appellant was not under the influence of a controlled substance; appellant was cooperative when questioned; appellant willingly consented to the search of the vehicle; nothing suspicious was found on the driver's side of the vehicle or within appellant's immediate reach; no other contraband or paraphernalia was found in the vehicle or on appellant's person; appellant did not make any furtive gestures indicating an attempt to hide contraband, nor did he attempt to flee. Appellant testified he did not know the marijuana was in the van and he also denied the baby clothing was his, or telling the officer it was.
        The State, on the other hand, points to the following facts and circumstances to show it met its burden of proof to affirmatively link appellant to the marijuana: appellant was driving the minivan; appellant rented the minivan in his name and was the primary driver; appellant was traveling late at night when police presence is low; appellant had the keys to the minivan and, thus, access to the marijuana; the amount of marijuana, in terms of bulk, weight and value, indicates appellant would have known about it; appellant invoked religion in an attempt to avoid detection; appellant admitted at the scene the baby clothes in one of the bags were his; appellant falsely stated he did not have a criminal history; appellant's criminal history involved marijuana trafficking; appellant's demeanor and “standoffishness” indicated a consciousness of guilt; appellant's testimony about going to California for five weeks was implausible; the $5000 he spent during the trip was in cash; and appellant had $368 in cash when he was stopped.
        It was the jury's role, as fact finder, to determine the credibility of the witnesses and resolve the conflicts in the evidence. After reviewing the facts presented under the respective standards of review, we conclude the evidence was legally and factually sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to support the jury's finding that appellant knowingly possessed marijuana in an amount of fifty pounds or more but less than 2000 pounds. We resolve appellant's second issue against him.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          
                                                          SUE LAGARDE
                                                          JUSTICE, ASSIGNED
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
050161F.U05
 
Footnote 1 The Honorable Sue Lagarde, Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Retired, sitting by assignment.
Footnote 2 In his motion, appellant sought suppression of any and all tangible evidence, as well as any testimonial evidence by law enforcement officers or others, including all written and oral statements made by appellant to any law enforcement officers or others. Appellant alleged he was “arrested without lawful warrant, probable cause or other lawful authority” in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. Appellant sought suppression pursuant to article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
Footnote 3 Brewer testified to his official training and experience as a peace officer. He testified he had been a certified peace officer since September 1998, and on the date of this offense he was a Kaufman County Deputy Sheriff.
Footnote 4 Brewer knew the bulb was rolling around because he could see it.
Footnote 5 Two pictures of the defective headlamp were admitted into evidence, without objection.
Footnote 6 Appellant provided Brewer with a copy of the accident report showing the damage occurred in a California accident a few days before the stop. He also provided the rental agreement for the minivan, although appellant referred to it as the “registration.” The rental agreement reflected the minivan was rented in appellant's name over a month before the stop. It also reflected the passenger's age as twenty-five and showed the passenger to be an authorized driver, and that the minivan was not authorized to leave Georgia.
Footnote 7 Based on Brewer's training and experience in narcotics, the invocation of religion was a strong indicator of narcotics activity.
Footnote 8 At trial, however, appellant testified the baby clothing was not his. Appellant told the jury the only clothing he had was in his bag behind the seat-that the passenger must have loaded the duffel bags into the minivan. Appellant also gave a detailed explanation of his trip to show why he was unaware of the marijuana.
Footnote 9 Brewer was then asked to read those particular sections. There was a difference of interpretation of the statute between defense counsel and Brewer. Brewer read the section to say a passenger vehicle is required to have both beams of the two headlights reaching 1000 feet. Defense counsel read it to say a vehicle was required to have two head lamps with at least one of them emitting a light a distance of a thousand feet. Brewer read that portion to refer to a vehicle, such as a motorcycle, that had only one headlamp.
Footnote 10 On June 18, appellant filed a brief, and the State responded on June 29, 2004. The briefs were admitted into evidence and are before us in the appellate record. After the trial court admitted the respective briefs, without objection, defense counsel noted there was a “ruling or an order within the file denying defendant's motion to suppress.” The trial court stated that defendant's motion to suppress was denied “as previously ruled.” The record contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law, nor does it otherwise reflect the basis of the trial court's ruling.
Footnote 11 As a basis for its waiver argument, the State relies on evidence that was admitted at trial after the trial court had denied appellant's motion to suppress.
Footnote 12 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.42 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (providing the chain of custody of physical evidence may be established by affidavit without the necessity of any person in the chain of custody personally appearing in court).
 
        State's Exhibit 1 consists of three pages. The first page is titled “Notice of Filing Chain of Custody Affidavit of Joe Don Law, Kaufman County Sherif's Department” signed by Rosalind Jeffers; the second page is a “Certificate of Service” signed by Rosalind Jeffers; the third page is a “Chain of Custody Affidavit (CCP Art. 38.42)” signed by Joe Don Law. That affidavit twice describes the physical evidence as “#1 - six white bundles containing large amount of green leafy substance.” State's Exhibit 1 was admitted without objection; however, nowhere in that document is the evidence described as marijuana.
 
        State's Exhibit 2 consists of four pages. The first page is titled “Amended Notice of Filing” and is signed by Rosalind Jeffers; the second page is a “Certificate of Service” signed by Rosalind Jeffers; the third page is titled “Certificate of Analysis and Chain of Custody Affidavit” signed by Michael Villareal and references “the attached Laboratory Report;” the fourth page is that referenced laboratory report reflecting the results of analysis of exhibit 1 to be “98.00 pounds of marihuana.” When State's Exhibit 2 was offered into evidence by the State, defense counsel made the following objection, “Obviously, your Honor, we would object, as we have before, to the admissibility of these documents in that we believe it's a violation of the constitutional and statutory rights of the defendant under 4th, 5th, 6th, 14th Amendments of the Constitution a well as under Article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” Counsel made a second objection based on the seal; however, upon comparing the copy with the original, counsel indicated to the trial court that satisfied his objection “as to the seal.” The trial court then stated, “All right. The other objections are overruled” and admitted State's Exhibit Number 2.
Footnote 13 See Tex. Trans. Code Ann. §§ 547.004(a)(2), 547.302(a)(1), 547.321 (Vernon 1999); see also id. §§ 547.002, 547.301(a), 547.304, 547.326, 547.371, 547.801 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2006) (providing exceptions and alternative requirements for other types of vehicles).
Footnote 14 See id. §§ 547.004(a)(2), 547.302(a)(2), 547.321.
Footnote 15 See id. § 547.004(a)(1).
Footnote 16 See id. § 545.401.
Footnote 17 Appellant does not challenge the distance the beam must project as being 1000 feet; he only challenges the number of headlamps he was required to have.
Footnote 18 Appellant's stated issue is factual insufficiency. However, his argument addresses only legal insufficiency. No standard of review for factual sufficiency is cited. Notwithstanding the ambiguity of appellant's issue, we address both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence.
Footnote 19 It is the lack of an objection to this document the State claims waived error on appeal. We disagree. When the physical evidence of the marijuana was offered into evidence, defense counsel re-urged the same objections he had earlier raised in his motion to suppress.
Footnote 20 Appellant's wife had joined him in California for several days shortly before appellant and Reid left to return to Florida.