AL RANYAK, Appellant v. ADDISON AIRPORT OF TEXAS, INC., SAM STUART, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A H&S VENTURES, AND H&S VENTURES, LTD., Appellees

DISMISSED; Opinion issued July 2, 2002
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-01-01064-CV
............................
AL RANYAK, Appellant
V.
ADDISON AIRPORT OF TEXAS, INC., SAM STUART, INDIVIDUALLY
AND D/B/A H&S VENTURES, AND H&S VENTURES, LTD., Appellees
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 99-08749-E
.............................................................
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Whittington, Moseley, and Bridges
Opinion By Justice Bridges
        Both the petition for writ of mandamus of relators/appellees Addison Airport of Texas, Inc., Sam Stuart, individually and d/b/a H&S Ventures, and H&S Ventures, Ltd. (collectively “AATI”) and the appeal of Al Ranyak are before us. The facts of this original proceeding and appeal are known to the parties, and we do not recite them here. Further, because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(d).
        Relators contend the trial judge erred in vacating a summary judgment in relators' favor and granting a new trial, because the trial judge's plenary power had expired. Based on the record presented, we conclude the relators have not shown they are entitled to the mandamus relief requested. Further, because the trial court's summary judgment order was not a final judgment, we do not have jurisdiction over Ranyak's appeal.
        An appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). On November 30, 2000, the trial court entered two orders granting AATI's motions for summary judgment. The “Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment” ordered Ranyak to pay AATI $3,000 per month from the date of the order until August 31, 2005, “but only to the extent that AATI does not collect such amount from a current tenant of the hangar at issue in the above-referenced matter.”
        A judgment is final for purposes of appeal only if it actually disposes of all claims and parties before the court or states “with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192-93. A judgment must be sufficiently definite and certain to define and protect the parties' rights, or it should provide a definite means of ascertaining such rights so that ministerial officers can carry the judgment into execution without ascertaining facts not stated in the judgment. Stewart v. USA Custom Paint & Body Shop, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex.1994). Here, the trial court's order could not be carried into execution without determining facts not stated in the order itself as to Ranyak's liability; specifically, whether AATI has collected (or will collect before August 31, 2005) any amount from another tenant of the hangar, and if so, how much. Therefore, the “Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment” is not a final judgment from which an appeal could be taken.
        The Texas Supreme Court authority relied upon by relators/appellees is not to the contrary. In Hinde v. Hinde, 701 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1985), a suit on a divorce property settlement, the judgment provided the husband could obtain a $25,000 credit on the $49,547.11 judgment entered against him by reinstating a cancelled insurance policy. Id. at 638. Quoting Hargrove v. Insurance Investments Corporation, 142 Tex. 111, 176 S.W.2d 744, 747 (1944), the court noted a judgment could be final and appealable “though further proceedings may be necessary in the execution of it or some incidental or dependent matter may still remain to be settled.” Hinde, 701 S.W.2d at 639. Because the judgment “clearly establishes Marlene Hinde's right to receive $49,547.11 from Richard Hinde,” and “[t]he clerk can enter this as the amount upon which to execute,” the judgment was final and appealable. Id. The court emphasized:
 
The credit which concerns the court of appeals speaks not to the value of compensation owed to Marlene Hinde, but to the form of compensation owed by Richard Hinde. He may satisfy the $49,547.11 judgment by paying it all in cash or by paying $24,547.11 in cash and the balance by reinstating the $25,000 insurance policy. Under either method of payment, Marlene Hinde will receive the value of $49,547.11 or, in default, writ of execution will issue for that amount.”
 
Id. at 639 (emphasis in original). Here, in contrast, it is not the form of compensation owed by Ranyak that is uncertain, but the value of it. Unlike the Hinde judgment, the total amount owed by Ranyak to AATI is not determined, and cannot be determined without ascertaining facts not set forth in the judgment.
        Accordingly, relator's petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a); Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).
 
                                                          
                                                          DAVID L. BRIDGES
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47 011064F.U05