B. Parsons v. Philadelphia Parking Authority (Majority Opinion)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Blondell Parsons, Appellant v. Philadelphia Parking Authority BEFORE: : : : : : : : No. 1899 C.D. 2010 Submitted: May 20, 2011 HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE JAMES R. KELLEY, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McGINLEY FILED: July 18, 2011 Blondell Parsons (Parsons), pro se, challenges the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) which denied Parsons s emergency motion to stay auto sale, lifted the stay and ordered that the sale of Parsons s vehicle proceed. On January 12, 2010, Parsons s vehicle was stopped by the Philadelphia Police Department (Department). The driver of the vehicle, who was not Parsons, was subsequently found to have been driving without an operator s license. Pursuant to Section 6309.2(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code (Code), 75 Pa.C.S. §6309.2(a)(1),1 the Department directed that the vehicle be towed and stored by the 1 Section 6309.2(a)(1) of the Code provides: (a) General rule. Subject to subsection (d), the following shall apply: (1) If a person operates a motor vehicle or combination on a highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth while the person s operating privilege is suspended, revoked, canceled, recalled or (Footnote continued on next page ¦) Philadelphia Parking Authority (Authority). On January 13, 2010, the Authority notified Parsons by letter that her vehicle was impounded. The letter informed Parsons of the location of the vehicle, notice of the daily storage fee, how to reclaim the vehicle and notice that if the vehicle were not reclaimed within fifteen days the Authority would petition the trial court for leave to sell the vehicle at public auction. Parsons appeared at the Authority to obtain her vehicle but she did not have a release order from the City of Philadelphia Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (Bureau) to establish that all fees associated with the impoundment were paid, as well as all fines and penalties associated with outstanding parking tickets owed by Parsons. The Authority directed Parsons to go to the Bureau to obtain the release order. On February 3, 2010, the trial court ordered that Parsons s vehicle be sold at a public auction of motor vehicles on April 1, 2010. On March 26, 2010, Parsons filed an emergency motion to stay the sale of her vehicle. Dennis G. Weldon, Jr. (Attorney Weldon), general counsel for the Authority, notified Parsons by letter dated March 26, 2010, that the Authority would delay the auction of her vehicle so that Parsons would have time to obtain a release order from both the Philadelphia Traffic Court and the Bureau. In a follow up letter dated April 5, (continued ¦) disqualified or where the person is unlicensed, as verified by an appropriate law enforcement officer in cooperation with the department, the law enforcement officer shall immobilize the vehicle or combination or, in the interest of public safety, direct that the vehicle be towed and stored by the appropriate towing and storage agent pursuant to subsection (c), and the appropriate judicial authority shall be so notified. 2 2010, Attorney Weldon informed Parsons I believe your only recourse at this point is to quickly schedule a hearing before the Philadelphia Bureau of Administrative Adjudication . . . and assert your claim there. Letter from Dennis G. Weldon, Jr., April 5, 2010, at 1; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 48. On May 5, 2010, the trial court temporarily granted the emergency motion to stay in order for Parsons to go to the Bureau so that the Bureau could provide her with the balance due on tickets/money owed by her . . . . Trial Court Order, May 5, 2010, at 1; R.R. at 63. The trial court scheduled the next hearing for May 19, 2010. On May 19, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing. Attorney Weldon stated that the Bureau informed him that morning that Parsons owed $3,263.20. Notes of Testimony, May 19, 2010, (N.T.) at 6; R.R. at 72-73. Attorney Weldon also stated that it was his understanding that the Bureau would accept $2,000 as a settlement. N.T. at 7-8; R.R. at 74. Parsons disputed the amount owed. She also stated, I felt that I have been treated unfairly. N.T. at 9; R.R. at 74. Parsons testified that she paid for tickets in 2008 and was unwilling to pay $3,263.20. N.T. at 11-12; R.R. at 77-78. She explained: I m merely asking for a printout from 2001 showing what tickets I paid for at that time because I did, and I m asking for a result of the cars they sold back I don t even know the date because they never gave us that paperwork. And then having the assessments removed because they are unfair. Then if I still owe I will pay. I will pay to keep my car if I still owe at the end, but they haven t given me anything. They [are] just holding my car and just expect me to pay them $3,000 dollars. For what? They never told me that they still had tickets on this car. I mean, do they have a 3 right to tell me something? I am an individual and I am a working citizen of the state. N.T. at 11-12; R.R. at 77-78. By order dated May 25, 2010, the trial court ordered that the stay remain in effect and remanded the case to the Bureau for a full hearing to determine the outstanding violations that were unpaid or alleged to be due/unpaid for the vehicle and any other violations for Parsons. The trial court further ordered the case to be relisted for a hearing if it did not settle by July 21, 2010. Parsons appeared before the Bureau on June 9, 2010. While Parsons included the transcript of the hearing in the Reproduced Record, it is not part of the Certified Record before this Court. Therefore, this Court may not consider the transcript. At any rate, the matter was not resolved before the Bureau. On August 4, 2010, pursuant to a petition filed on behalf of the Traffic Court, the trial court issued an order scheduling a sale of the vehicle for August 19, 2010. The trial court held another hearing on August 11, 2010. Parsons offered to pay $565 even though it appeared that she owed approximately $5,600. Notes of Testimony, August 11, 2010, at 7; R.R. at 107. On August 11, 2010, the trial court denied the emergency motion to stay the auto sale, lifted the stay, and ordered the sale of the vehicle to proceed. The trial court determined: Appellant s [Parsons] Emergency Motion to Stay Auto Sale was not a statutory appeal from the BAA [Bureau], nor was any direct Appeal from the BAA [Bureau] ever 4 filed by the Appellant [Parsons]. Appellant [Parsons] failed to offer proof of payment of the fines at any hearing, which resulted in her vehicle being impounded and ultimately allowed to be sold at public auction. .... In the present case, Appellant [Parsons] failed to file a direct appeal of the rulings before the BAA [Bureau]. At the hearing before the BAA ordered by the Court, Appellant [Parsons] stated on the record that she would not pay the amount due to have her vehicle released. The Appellant [Parsons] has repeatedly said that the amounts due are incorrect and that she has previously paid the outstanding ticket [sic] which are still due on her account with PPA [the Authority]. At no point has the Appellant [Parsons] shown this Court any receipts of payment or any other documentation that would prove she paid these previous violations. At the August 11, 2010 hearing before this Court, the Appellant [Parsons] again stated on the record that she was not willing to pay the assessment fees. In looking at the facts of the case, Appellant [Parsons] merely argues that she is being unfairly treated due to not having proper notice of fees and charges against her for violations concerning her vehicle and that she did not receive a fair hearing before the BAA [Bureau]. The Court ordered Appellant [Parsons] to go back to the BAA [Bureau] in order to get a fair hearing and figure out what she owes. The Appellant [Parsons] had the ability to appeal the decision of the BAA [Bureau] and dispute the amount they claim she owes, but Appellant [Parsons] choose [sic] not to do so. This issue before this Court was whether the sale of her auto should be stayed and Appellant [Parsons] provided no evidence or testimony for this Court to find that the sale should be stayed after the PPA [Authority] changed the date of the public auction three times already in this case. Under 75 Pa.C.S. §6309.2, the Appellant [Parsons] is required to furnish proof that she had paid the outstanding fines and costs, but instead she admitted they were still outstanding. Given these facts, this Court properly denied the Emergency Motion to Stay Auto Sale in favor of the PPA [Authority] allowing for Appellant s 5 [Parsons] vehicle to be sold at public auction to satisfy her fines and costs. Trial Court Opinion, November 12, 2010, at 3-5. Parsons contends that the actions of the City of Philadelphia and the Authority in seizing her vehicle and authorizing the sale of the vehicle at auction without ever affording Parsons any meaningful opportunity to challenge the alleged debt and not allowing the proceeds of the sale to be applied toward the reduction of the alleged debt deprived Parsons of property without due process of law in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Parsons also alleges violations of her rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.2 Initially, Parsons asserts that the trial court committed legal error and abused its discretion when it affirmed the Authority s violation of the federal and state constitutions. Specifically, she asserts that the trial court should have placed the burden of proof on the Authority to establish that the debt was legitimate and that the seizure of her property was justified. Simply, as noted by the trial court, Parsons did not appeal the Bureau s determination of the debt owed. She moved for an emergency stay in the trial court. The trial court granted the stay so that Parsons could have a hearing at 2 This Court s review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, whether it committed an error of law or whether its findings are supported by substantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Smothers, 920 A.2d 922, 924 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). 6 the Bureau to determine the amount she owed and possibly reach a settlement. Parsons did not agree with the Bureau s determination but did not appeal. Parsons also did not pay. The trial court did not commit an error of law or an abuse of discretion when it lifted the stay. Parsons next contends that she was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard. While Parsons cites to cases regarding due process, she does not argue how she was denied due process. This Court will not address this issue as this Court will not act as an advocate for a party. Parsons next contends that the Authority failed to provide justification for its actions and did not submit a proper record. Parsons was the party who sought the emergency stay. As the moving party, it was her burden to prove her entitlement to the stay. In her brief Parsons refers to the hearing at the Bureau to illustrate the utter futility of the grossly inadequate solutions offered to Appellant [Parsons]. Parsons s Brief at 15. Once again, Parsons raises arguments which do not address the order she appealed. Parsons next contends that the right to execute on a judgment should not be eternal. Parsons did not raise this argument in her Statement of Questions Involved. As a result this argument is waived. An appellate court will not ordinarily consider an issue if it is not set forth or suggested in an appellate brief s statement of questions involved. Cheng v. SEPTA, 981 A.2d 371, 374 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). 7 Accordingly, this Court affirms. ____________________________ BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge 8 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Blondell Parsons, Appellant v. Philadelphia Parking Authority : : : : : : : No. 1899 C.D. 2010 ORDER AND NOW, this 18th day of July, 2011, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned matter is affirmed. ____________________________ BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
