IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Heather Ann Bomba
v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Driver Licensing,
Appellant
BEFORE:
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No. 1539 C.D. 2010
Submitted: April 8, 2011
HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge
HONORABLE JAMES R. KELLEY, Senior Judge
OPINION
BY JUDGE LEAVITT
FILED: September 14, 2011
The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing (PennDOT), appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County (trial court) sustaining Heather Bomba’s (Licensee) statutory
appeal of the suspension of her driving privileges for refusing to submit to
chemical testing pursuant to Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code.1 PennDOT
contends that the trial court erred in finding that Licensee’s conduct did not
constitute a refusal to submit to chemical testing. Discerning no error, we affirm
the order of the trial court.
1
75 Pa. C.S. §1547(b)(1)(i). That section provides, in pertinent part, that if any person placed
under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol “is requested to submit to chemical testing
and refuses to do so, . . . the department shall suspend the operating privilege of the person . . .
for a period of 12 months.” Id.
On October 25, 2009, Licensee was arrested in Pittsburgh and charged
with driving under the influence of alcohol. On January 18, 2010, PennDOT
notified Licensee that her operating privilege was being suspended for a period of
12 months, effective February 22, 2010, as a result of her refusal to submit to
chemical testing at the time of her arrest. Licensee filed a statutory appeal, and a
hearing was held by the trial court on April 22, 2010.
At the hearing, PennDOT presented the testimony of Pittsburgh Police
Officer Siara Lawniczak, who administered the breath tests on the night of
Licensee’s arrest.
Officer Lawniczak testified that Officer Gregory Laepple
brought Licensee to the station and, after a standard 20-minute waiting period,
Officer Lawniczak read aloud the chemical testing warnings on Form DL-26.
Licensee responded that she would submit to the breath test and signed the Form
DL-26.
Officer Lawniczak then administered a breath test using a BAC
Datamaster breathalyzer machine, which had been properly calibrated and certified
for accuracy.
Officer Lawniczak testified that Licensee “attempted to give one
breath sample” that “was insufficient.” Notes of Testimony, 4/22/2010, at 15
(N.T.___). Officer Lawniczak explained that the breathalyzer machine allows a
two-minute window to provide an adequate breath sample; if an adequate breath
sample is not provided within the two-minute timeframe, the machine prompts the
operator to report whether a refusal has occurred. On the night in question, Officer
Lawniczak instructed Licensee to “blow with one steady breath until … told to
stop.” Id. Instead, Licensee gave “a series of short breaths, not one continuous
breath.” N.T. 16. After two minutes had elapsed, the breathalyzer instrument
2
prompted the officer to report whether there had been a refusal, and Officer
Lawniczak pressed the “yes” button.
On cross-examination, Officer Lawniczak admitted that Licensee may
have asked to retake the breath test; however, the officer stated that she is “only
required to give one test.” N.T. 25. Another test, according to the officer, would
have taken ten minutes. Licensee’s refusal took place approximately one hour
after her arrest. The Vehicle Code provides a two-hour window of time following
an arrest during which the breath test can be administered, as Officer Lawniczak
acknowledged. 75 Pa. C.S. §3802(a)(2).2
Licensee called the arresting officer, Officer Laepple, to testify. He
testified that Licensee was polite and cooperative at the time of her arrest and that
he was present during Licensee’s attempt to produce a breath sample. Officer
Laepple confirmed that Licensee’s breath sample was insufficient.
Licensee testified on her own behalf. She acknowledged that Officer
Lawniczak instructed her on how to provide a breath sample and explained that she
“tried the best [she] could.” N.T. 63. Licensee attributed her inability to do the test
the first time to being “very upset” by her arrest and placement in a holding cell.
N.T. 60. Licensee testified that when she learned she was being considered a
2
Section 3802(a)(2) establishes the “two-hour rule,” providing:
An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the
alcohol concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is at least 0.08% but less
than 0.10% within two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in
actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa. C.S. §3802(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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refusal, she immediately asked for another chance to do the breath test. According
to Licensee,
[Officer Lawniczak] told me she was marking me a refusal. At
that point I tried to ask her, please, give it to me again, please, I
want to try again. She did not let me do that.
N.T. 61. Instead, Officer Lawniczak asked Officer Laepple to remove her from the
testing room. Licensee testified that she did not refuse to take the breath test.
The trial court considered the evidence and made the following
findings:
The primary reason that the Courts look with disfavor upon the
practice of a motorist who delays and requests a second test or
changes her mind much later following a refusal, is due to the
effect of such a delay on the test itself. A long delay increases
the potential for inaccurate test results. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation v. Belle, 524 A.2d
1060 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
Here, Officer Lawniczak testified that [Licensee] gave her
consent to the breath test and her testimony was corroborated
by [Licensee]. This consent was nothing less than unqualified
and unequivocal. She was then unable to complete the breath
test in the two minutes permitted, but immediately requested
that Officer Lawniczak administer a second test. Officer
Lawniczak stated that the second test would take about ten (10)
minutes. There is absolutely no evidence that [Licensee] was
attempting to delay the administration of the test, which may
have resulted in an inaccurate reading.
[Licensee’s] initial, unequivocal and unqualified consent to the
breath test, her subsequent inability to perform it properly,
despite attempting to do so and her immediate request to re-take
the breath test, do not amount to a refusal under these
circumstances.
Trial Court Opinion at 3-4. The trial court sustained Licensee’s statutory appeal.
4
In its appeal to this Court,3 PennDOT contends that the trial court
erred. Specifically, PennDOT claims that Officer Lawniczak was not required to
give Licensee a second breath test. Licensee counters that she attempted to follow
the officer’s instructions and, when her effort proved unsuccessful, she pleaded
with the officer to administer a second test. Licensee emphasizes that at no time
did she refuse to consent to the breathalyzer test.
In order to sustain a 12-month suspension of a licensee’s operating
privileges, the Department must establish that the licensee: (1) was arrested by a
police officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee was
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; (2) was asked to
submit to a chemical test; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was specifically warned that
refusal would result in a license suspension.
Quick v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 915 A.2d 1268, 1271 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2007). Any response from a licensee that is less than an unqualified, unequivocal
assent to a chemical test constitutes a refusal.
Hudson v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 830 A.2d 594, 599 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2003). A licensee’s refusal need not be expressed in words; a licensee’s conduct
may constitute a refusal to submit to testing. Id. Questions of credibility are for
3
The issue of whether there was a refusal to submit to chemical testing is a question of law
subject to plenary review by this Court. Mueller v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Driver Licensing, 657 A.2d 90, 93 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Our scope of review is limited to
“determining whether the trial court’s findings are supported by competent evidence, whether
errors of law have been committed, or whether the trial court’s determinations demonstrate a
manifest abuse of discretion.” McCloskey v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 722 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
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the trial court.
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v.
O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 248, 555 A.2d 873, 875 (1989).
Here, PennDOT challenges the trial court’s finding that Licensee’s
conduct did not constitute a refusal to submit to chemical testing. PennDOT
argues that it satisfied its burden of proof: Licensee stipulated that Officer Laepple
had reasonable grounds to arrest her for DUI; Officer Lawniczak warned her that a
refusal to submit to chemical testing would result in a 12-month license
suspension; Licensee consented to take a breath test but failed to provide an
adequate breath sample within the two-minute timeframe allowed by the
breathalyzer machine.
PennDOT contends that Officer Lawniczak was not
required to provide Licensee with a second opportunity to do a breath test.
In advancing its argument that a licensee gets only one opportunity to
provide a valid breath sample, PennDOT relies on Sweeney v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 804 A.2d 685, 687 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2002). In that case, this Court held that
failure to complete a breathalyzer test constitutes a refusal. A
trial court’s finding that a licensee made a good faith attempt to
complete the breathalyzer test is irrelevant to the question of
whether the licensee refused the test. Anything less than a
completed breathalyzer test which registers a blood alcohol
reading on the breathalyzer constitutes a refusal.
Id. (quoting Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Kilrain,
593 A.2d 932, 935 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991)) (emphasis omitted). PennDOT also relies
on Spera v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 817 A.2d
1236 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), where this Court held that a licensee’s conduct
constituted a refusal because he failed to follow the administering officer’s
6
instructions and did not blow properly into the machine.
We noted that the
licensee failed “to exert a total conscious effort to supply a sufficient breath
sample.” Id. at 1241.
The cases cited by PennDOT are factually distinguishable from the
case at hand. The licensees in Sweeney, Kilrain and Spera attempted multiple
times to provide an adequate breath sample but failed to do so. In Sweeney, the
licensee “attempted many times to blow into the mouthpiece, but her breaths were
not hard enough or long enough.” Sweeney, 804 A.2d at 686. In Kilrain, the
licensee “made five attempts to complete a second breathalyzer test and failed.”
Kilrain, 583 A.2d at 933 (emphasis added). Finally, the licensee in Spera made
“five to eight attempts” before the officer deemed his conduct a refusal for failure
to provide sufficient breath samples. Spera, 817 A.2d at 1239.
As noted by the trial court, the above-cited cases reflect the need to
avoid inaccurate test results caused by long delays in the testing process. That
concern was simply not present in Licensee’s case. Licensee made one attempt to
provide a breath sample. When it was not successful, she immediately asked to try
again. PennDOT offered no evidence that Licensee was attempting to delay the
testing process or was intentionally producing an inadequate sample.
PennDOT also cites Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic
Safety v. Ferrara, 493 A.2d 154 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985), to support its argument that
Officer Lawniczak had no obligation to offer Licensee a second opportunity to take
the breath test. Specifically, PennDOT cites this Court’s statement in Ferrara that
“[p]olice officers are not required to spend time either cajoling an arrestee or
waiting for [her] to change [her] mind.” Id. at 156-157.
7
The language PennDOT lifts from Ferrara is inapposite. There is no
evidence that Licensee employed stall tactics, such as deliberately not following
instructions, thereby requiring Officer Lawniczak to cajole her or wait for her to
comply.4 Licensee was permitted one, and only one, chance to perform the test.
She admitted that she “messed up” because of nerves, attributed to the stress of her
first arrest. N.T. 60. The arresting officer testified that Licensee was polite and
cooperative. Everyone present agreed that Licensee consented to the first breath
test and immediately requested another opportunity upon learning that her breath
sample had been inadequate. Significantly, only one hour had transpired since
Licensee was arrested; thus, Licensee’s request was made well within the two-hour
window of time following an arrest during which the breath test can be
administered. 75 Pa. C.S. §3802(a)(2). Stated otherwise, there was no danger that
a test conducted ten minutes later would have produced an inaccurate result.
It is well established that anything other than an unqualified,
unequivocal assent to a chemical test constitutes a refusal. What is less clear is
how many chances a licensee must be given to consent or refuse. Refusal cases are
highly fact-sensitive. The crucial, determinative factor we glean from the cases is
whether PennDOT’s evidence shows that the licensee deliberately tried to delay or
undermine the testing process. Such evidence was simply not present in this case.
Rather, the evidence showed, and the trial court found, that Licensee made a good
faith, but unsuccessful, attempt to provide a breath sample and immediately
requested to attempt the test a second time. This conduct does not constitute a
4
Notably, according to Licensee’s unrefuted testimony, she tried to cajole Officer Lawniczak
into letting her take a second breath test.
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refusal. Stated otherwise, PennDOT is incorrect that in every case where the
officer decides not to give the licensee a second chance at a breathalyzer, it has
proven a refusal to consent to chemical testing.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
______________________________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge
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IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Heather Ann Bomba
v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Driver Licensing,
Appellant
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No. 1539 C.D. 2010
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of September, 2011, the order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dated October 5, 2010, in the abovecaptioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.
______________________________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge
