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The State ex rel. Reamer, Appellant, v. Industrial Commission of Ohio et
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al., Appellees.
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[Cite as State ex rel. Reamer v. Indus. Comm. (1997), ____ Ohio St.3d __.]
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Workers’ compensation -- Denial of wage loss compensation by Industrial Commission not an abuse of discretion when claimant voluntarily removes himself from the full-time labor market and limits himself to part-time work for reasons unrelated to his injury. (No. 94-2459 -- Submitted November 12, 1996 -- Decided February
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19, 1997.)
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APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No.
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93APD08-1177.
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Appellant-claimant, James F. Reamer, was injured in 1988 while in
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the course of and arising from his employment as a general laborer with
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appellee Sisters of St. Francis. His workers’ compensation claim was
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allowed for “lumbosacral strain/sprain, sacroiliac strain/sprain.” The injury
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resulted in a permanent restriction against claimant’s engaging in repetitive
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lifting of over seventy-five pounds. Although no other limitations were
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imposed, the lifting restriction prevented claimant from doing his former
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job, and claimant was released from his employment.
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Claimant worked sporadically for two employers between May 24,
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1990 and September 17, 1990. In mid-September of that year, claimant
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began full-time university studies and got a part-time job at the school
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library. In 1991, claimant moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio
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for wage-loss compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56(B). A district hearing
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officer denied compensation, writing:
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“The claimant is attending college and is not available for full time
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employment. [H]is employment consists of work study. The request for
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wage loss under [R.C.] 4123.56(B) is therefore denied. The Claimant’s
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wage loss is found not related to the injury.”
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The regional board of review affirmed, as did commission staff
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hearing officers, who clarified the period of compensation denial as May 24,
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1990 through March 30, 1993.
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Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for
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Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in
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denying wage-loss compensation. The appellate court denied the writ. 2
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This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
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Gallon & Takacs Co., L.P.A., and Theodore A. Bowman, for
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appellant.
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Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Melanie Cornelius,
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Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission.
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Brent T. Howard, for appellee Sisters of St. Francis.
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Per Curiam. R.C. 4123.56(B) provides:
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“Where an employee in a claim allowed under this chapter suffers a
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wage loss as a result of returning to employment other than his former
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position of employment or as a result of being unable to find employment
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consistent with the claimant’s physical capabilities, he shall receive
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compensation at sixty-six and two-thirds of his weekly wage loss not to
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exceed the statewide average weekly wage for a period not to exceed two
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hundred weeks.”
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Supplementing the statute, Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-32(D) provides:
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“In injury claims in which the date of injury * * * is on or after
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August 22, 1986, the payment of compensation [for] wage loss pursuant to
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division (B) of section 4123.56 of the Revised Code shall commence upon
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application with a finding of any of the following:
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“(1) The employee, as a direct result of the allowed conditions in the
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claim, returns to employment other than his former position of employment
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and suffers a wage loss.
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“(2) The employee returns to his former position but suffers a wage
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loss.
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“(3) The employee, as a direct result of the allowed conditions in the
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claim, is unable to find work consistent with the employee’s physical
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capabilities and suffers a wage loss.”
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Wage loss has two components -- actual wage loss and causal
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relationship to claimant’s injury. State ex rel. The Andersons v. Indus.
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Comm. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 539, 597 N.E.2d 143. Claimant concededly
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made less over the disputed period than he did at Sisters of St. Francis. At
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issue is whether the wage diminution was causally related to his injury. For
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the reasons to follow, we find that it was not.
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Claimant maintains that once an inability to return to the former
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position of employment has been causally related to his injury, wage loss 4
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eligibility is established. This is incorrect. Where compensation, as here, is
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sought pursuant to Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-32(D), it is necessary to
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explore why the particular alternative job was selected. As we stated in
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State ex rel. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Morse (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 210,
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216, 648 N.E.2d 827, 832-833:
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“Pepsi’s better argument is one that may ultimately prove inherent
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whenever lower-paying alternate employment underlies a request for wage-
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loss compensation - - the reason for taking the job. This is particularly
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relevant where the alternate employment is a part-time job, since the
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combined amount of wages and compensation could produce close to a full-
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time weekly income for part-time work. Wage-loss compensation was not
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intended to provide a disincentive to resumption of full-time employment or
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to subsidize - -at the State Insurance Fund’s or self-insured employer’s
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expense -- a part-time lifestyle. Conversely, if a part-time job is the only
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work available within a claimant’s post-injury capabilities, he or she should
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not be discouraged from accepting it.”
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The present claimant had a minimal physical-capability restriction --
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no repetitive lifting of over seventy-five pounds -- that would preclude few 5
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jobs. This left claimant with a wide array of lighter jobs that he could have
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performed on a full-time basis. Since claimant provided no evidence of a
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job search that might have shown that such full-time work was unavailable,
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the commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that claimant
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voluntarily removed himself from the full-time labor market and thus
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limited himself to part-time work for reasons unrelated to his injury. Such a
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voluntary limitation bars wage-loss compensation.
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Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
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Judgment affirmed.
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK
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and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
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