An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA10-682
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:
16 November 2010
IN THE MATTER OF:
Randolph County
Nos. 07 J 117, 118
J.G.L. & S.C.L.
Appeal by respondent-mother from orders entered 3 March 2010
by Judge Robert Wilkins in Randolph County District Court.
Heard
in the Court of Appeals 28 October 2010.
Robin K. Martinek, Staff Attorney, for petitioner-appellee
Randolph County Department of Social Services.
Lucas & Ellis, PLLC,
appellant mother.
by
Anna
S.
Lucas,
for
respondent-
Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, L.L.P.,
by Francisco J. Benzoni and J. Mitchell Armbruster, for
guardian ad litem.
JACKSON, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from the district court’s orders
terminating her parental rights to two of her sons, J.G.L. and
S.C.L.1
After careful review, we affirm.
On 20 July 2007, the Randolph County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) filed juvenile petitions alleging that S.C.L. was
a neglected juvenile and that J.G.L. was a neglected and dependent
1
The trial court also terminated the father’s parental rights
to J.G.L. and S.C.L. He does not appeal.
-2juvenile. The petitions alleged that the juveniles’ parents lacked
stable housing, were unemployed, had ongoing, untreated substance
abuse issues, and failed to provide proper supervision for the
juveniles.
In the petition regarding J.G.L., DSS further alleged
that J.G.L. did not take his prescribed psychotropic medications,
that he appeared to be obese, and that he did not attend school
consistently.
On the same day the petitions were filed, the trial court
entered nonsecure custody orders giving custody of J.G.L. and
S.C.L. to DSS, and DSS placed the boys together in a licensed
foster home.
J.G.L. and S.C.L. have a half-brother, D.W.A.2, who
was fifteen years old at the time and also was taken into nonsecure
custody.
D.W.A. originally was placed in a licensed foster home
with his brothers, but he was moved to a placement with his
maternal grandmother on 3 October 2007 after he had run away from
his foster placement.
On 23 August 2007, J.G.L. and S.C.L. were
moved to a therapeutic foster home, and on 27 August 2007, J.G.L.
was moved to a different licensed foster home.
The trial court conducted an adjudication and disposition
hearing on 9 April 2008 and entered a corresponding order on
23 April 2008.
Respondent-mother and the father3 of J.G.L. and
S.C.L. consented to an adjudication of dependency.
The putative
father of D.W.A. was not present at the time of the hearing.
2
D.W.A. has since reached the age of majority.
background is relevant to the instant case.
3
The
However, his
We refer to the father by the pseudonym “Ken L.”
-3trial court found that all three children were adjusting well to
their placements and made findings regarding each of the children.
J.G.L. was doing well in school and had lost weight.
However, he
exhibited some behavioral problems, such as cursing, lying, and
hitting.
His behavior had improved somewhat after his physician
switched
his
medication
Disorder (“ADHD”).
for
Attention
Deficit
Hyperactivity
Additionally, J.G.L. was receiving therapy for
his impulsive behavior.
S.C.L. also had behavioral problems, such
as biting, hitting, cursing, and having trouble staying on task.
S.C.L. was attending preschool to improve his academics and his
behavioral
problems.
S.C.L.
also
received
therapy
prescribed medication for his behavioral problems.
and
was
His behavior
had improved since he began taking the medication.
The trial court also made findings related to the parents.
Respondent-mother had been incarcerated on 22 August 2007 and was
released on 26 March 2008.
Prior to her incarceration, she
submitted
which
controlled
to
a
drug
screen,
substances.
While
in
was
positive
prison,
for
several
respondent-mother
completed a drug treatment program and attended weekly Alcoholics
Anonymous/Narcotic
Anonymous
(“AA/NA”)
meetings.
After
her
release, she moved to a halfway house in Asheboro for continued
drug treatment, had a negative drug test, and began vocational
rehabilitation.
By the time of the hearing, Ken L. had been
incarcerated several times and had several positive drug screens.
At the time of the hearing, he was serving a ninety-day sentence at
the Forsyth County Jail.
-4The
court
granted
respondent-mother
weekly
supervised
visitation, along with an additional monthly community-based visit.
The trial court ordered respondent-mother to obtain stable housing
and employment, to continue substance abuse treatment, and to
submit to random drug and alcohol testing.
At the time of the 28 September 2008 review hearing, the
children remained in the same placements.
continued
to
have
behavioral
problems
and
J.G.L. and S.C.L.
continued
therapy.
Respondent-mother was complying with DSS’s recommendations: she had
obtained a job, had completed an intensive outpatient treatment
program,
had
produced
negative
drug
screens,
had
completed
parenting classes, and had begun to transition into independent
housing.
Ken
L.,
however,
was
not
complying
with
DSS’s
recommendations, and the trial court ceased reunification efforts
with him.
By the time of the permanency planning hearing on 14 January
2009, however, respondent-mother’s progress had slowed.
She had
been laid off from her job temporarily, had been unable to find a
new job in the interim, had a positive drug test, and had several
new misdemeanor charges pending against her.
Respondent-mother
stated that the charges stemmed from her involvement with Ken L.,
and she admitted that she did not do well around him.
She further
admitted that staying away from him would be in her children’s best
interests. Notwithstanding respondent-mother’s setbacks, the trial
court
maintained
respondent-mother.
a
permanent
plan
of
reunification
with
-5By the next permanency planning hearing on 8 April 2009,
circumstances surrounding the case had changed, and in an order
entered 29 May 2009, the trial court ceased reunification efforts
with respondent-mother and changed the permanent plan for S.C.L.
and J.G.L. to adoption.
On 24 March 2009, DSS learned that D.W.A.
had run away from his grandmother’s home and had been gone for
approximately one month.
Although his whereabouts were unknown,
DSS also learned that D.W.A. was likely residing with his mother.
The grandmother admitted that she let D.W.A. spend a weekend with
his mother.
She also indicated that respondent-mother had visited
her residence and that D.W.A. left with respondent-mother.
DSS
unsuccessfully attempted to locate D.W.A. and filed a runaway
petition
on
2
April
2009.
DSS
attempted
to
contact
respondent-mother after D.W.A. ran away, but her whereabouts also
were unknown.
At the time of the hearing, DSS had recently learned
that respondent-mother and Ken L. both were incarcerated in the
Forsyth County Jail.
Respondent-mother subsequently was released
on 24 April 2009.
The
juveniles’
trial
court
mental
health
behavioral problems.
hospitalized
for
made
a
several
issues.
findings
J.G.L.
related
continued
to
to
the
have
After a troubling incident, J.G.L. was
week.
His
psychiatrist
prescribed
a
new
medication and he was diagnosed with ADHD, Oppositional Defiant
Disorder,
and
problems,
DSS
Adjustment
determined
Disorder.
that
Based
J.G.L.
on
needed
his
behavioral
a
therapeutic
placement, and he subsequently was moved to a therapeutic foster
-6home on 27 April 2009.
S.C.L. continued to reside in the same
therapeutic foster home.
therapist
recommended
He continued weekly therapy, but his
that
he
be
further
evaluated
by
a
psychologist.
On
17
June
2009,
DSS
filed
motions
to
terminate
respondent-mother’s parental rights to S.C.L. and J.G.L. based on
the following grounds: (1) neglect pursuant to North Carolina
General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(1); (2) willfully leaving the
juveniles in foster care for over twelve months without showing
reasonable progress in correcting the conditions which led to
removal
pursuant
to
North
Carolina
General
Statutes,
section
7B-1111(a)(2); (3) dependency pursuant to North Carolina General
Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(6); and (4) willfully failing to pay
a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juveniles pursuant
to North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(3).
also sought to terminate Ken L.’s parental rights.
DSS
D.W.A. turned
eighteen years old in September 2009 and is, therefore, no longer
subject to the trial court’s jurisdiction pursuant to the Juvenile
Code.
On 4 and 18 November 2009 and 22 January 2010, the trial court
conducted a termination of parental rights hearing as to S.C.L. and
J.G.L.
In orders entered 3 March 2010, the trial court found the
existence of all four grounds for termination alleged by DSS
against
respondent-mother.
At
disposition,
the
trial
court
concluded that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate
the parental rights of respondent-mother.
The trial court also
-7terminated Ken L.’s parental rights to S.C.L. and J.G.L. From this
order, respondent-mother appeals.
It is well-established that termination of parental rights
proceedings involve a two-stage process: (1) the adjudication
stage, where the petitioner is required to prove the existence of
grounds for termination by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,
and (2) the disposition stage, where the court’s decision whether
to terminate parental rights is discretionary.
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 7B-1110–1111 (2009); In re White, 81 N.C. App. 82, 85, 344
S.E.2d 36, 38, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 283, 347 S.E.2d 470
(1986).
On appeal, respondent-mother does not challenge the trial
court’s conclusions that grounds existed to terminate her parental
rights to S.C.L. and J.G.L.
to
the
adjudicatory
Nor does she make any other challenges
stage
of
proceedings.
Although
respondent-mother raised challenges to the grounds for termination
in her statement of proposed issues on appeal, she has not argued
any
of
them
in
her
brief.
Accordingly,
the
trial
court’s
adjudication of grounds for termination is binding on appeal.
See
N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2009).
Instead, respondent-mother only presents challenges to the
dispositional stage of the proceedings.
After an adjudication
determining that grounds exist for terminating parental rights, the
trial court is required to consider the following factors in
determining whether termination is in the juvenile’s best interest:
(1)
The age of the juvenile.
(2)
The likelihood
juvenile.
of
adoption
of
the
-8(3)
Whether the termination of parental
rights will aid in the accomplishment of
the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4)
The bond between the juvenile and the
parent.
(5)
The quality of the relationship between
the juvenile and the proposed adoptive
parent, guardian, custodian, or other
permanent placement.
(6)
Any relevant consideration.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2009); see, e.g., In re S.C.H., ___
N.C. App. ___, ___, 682 S.E.2d 469, 474 (2009), aff'd, 363 N.C.
828, 689 S.E.2d 858 (2010) (per curiam).
We review the trial
court’s determination that a termination of parental rights is in
the best interest of the juvenile for an abuse of discretion.
In
re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002).
“Abuse of discretion exists when ‘the challenged actions are
manifestly unsupported by reason.’” Barnes v. Wells, 165 N.C. App.
575, 580, 599 S.E.2d 585, 589 (2004) (quoting Blankenship v. Town
and Country Ford, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 161, 165, 574 S.E.2d 132, 134
(2002)).
In its order as to S.C.L., the trial court made the following
relevant findings of fact:
12.
That an entry of an order terminating
parental rights of the Father and the
Mother would not result in an unnecessary
severance of the relationship between the
biological parents to the minor child.
. . . .
23.
The permanent plan for the minor child is
adoption. [DSS] believes that the minor
child will thrive in a structured and
stable home environment as he has thrived
-9in his current foster home and that the
minor child is an adoptable child.
A
child profile regarding the minor child
was completed to send out to various
adoption agencies.
[DSS] has already
recently received responses from five
different families interested in adoption
of the minor child and the minor child’s
sibling.
[DSS] is in the process [of]
reviewing the profiles of the five
families to determine which family will
be the best match for the minor child.
Once a family is matched with the minor
child [DSS] will move forward with the
process of introducing the minor child to
the matched family to include meeting
with the family, arranging visits with
the minor child, and placement of the
minor child in the identified home.
24.
The minor child has been visiting with a
family who has expressed an interest in
adopting him.
The minor child has had
overnight visits with this family on
several occasions as recent as the
weekend of January 8, 2010.
In its order as to J.G.L., the trial court made the following
findings:
12.
That an entry of an order terminating
parental rights of the Father and the
Mother would not result in an unnecessary
severance of the relationship between the
biological parents to the minor child.
. . . .
25.
The permanent plan for the minor child is
adoption. [DSS] believes that the minor
child will thrive in a structured and
stable home environment as he has thrived
in his current foster home and that the
minor child is an adoptable child.
A
child profile regarding the minor child
was completed to send out to various
adoption agencies.
[DSS] has already
recently received responses from five
different families interested in adoption
of the minor child and the minor child’s
sibling.
[DSS] is in the process [of]
-10reviewing the profiles of the five
families to determine which family will
be the best match for the minor child.
Once a family is matched with the minor
child [DSS] will move forward with the
process of introducing the minor child to
the matched family to include meeting
with the family, arranging visits with
the minor child, and placement of the
minor child in the identified home.
In each of the orders, the trial court made findings regarding
the birth dates of S.C.L. and J.G.L., from which one can infer that
S.C.L. was six years old and J.G.L. was nine years old at the time
of
termination.
Thus,
the
trial
court
made
findings
which
demonstrate that it considered the age of the juveniles, the
likelihood of adoption, the bond between parent and child, and
whether termination would aid in the accomplishment of a permanent
plan for the juveniles.
The trial court did not make any findings
regarding the relationship between the children and the current
foster parents, but such a finding was not necessary because the
children’s
foster
home
was
not
a
pre-adoptive
placement.
Additionally, in each order, the trial court made several findings
regarding each child’s educational progress, mental and physical
health, behavioral issues and any related progress, and ongoing
mental health treatment.
Although not mandated by North Carolina
General Statutes, section 7B-1110(a), these findings are relevant
to
the
children’s
best
interest
determination
because
the
children’s mental health and behavioral issues have a bearing on
any permanent plan for the children.
However, respondent-mother does not argue that the trial court
neglected to consider the factors listed in North Carolina General
-11Statutes, section 7B-1110.
Instead, respondent-mother argues that
the trial court abused its discretion by terminating her parental
rights,
notwithstanding
the
existence
respondent-mother and the children.
acknowledge
that
there
may
of
a
We disagree.
have
been
a
bond
between
Although we
bond
between
respondent-mother and her children, the existence of a bond does
not necessarily preclude the termination of parental rights.
Respondent-mother also argues that the children were bonded to
each other and their older brother, and therefore, it would not be
in their best interests to allow for separate placements for the
children.
Again, although this evidence may be relevant to the
trial court’s determination, it does not necessarily preclude the
termination of parental rights.
Here, the trial court determined that, notwithstanding any
bond,
it
was
in
the
children’s
best
interests
to
terminate
respondent-mother’s parental rights in light of their significant
mental and emotional problems and their need for a structured and
stable home.
See In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438, 448, 615 S.E.2d
704, 709 (2005) (holding that the trial court was entitled to
determine whether “other facts” outweighed the presence of a bond
between mother and child), aff’d and disc. review improvidently
allowed,
360
N.C.
475,
628
S.E.2d
760
(2006)
(per
curiam).
Therefore, the trial court’s determination in this regard was not
an abuse of discretion.
Next,
respondent-mother
contends
that
the
trial
court
incorrectly determined that termination was in the children’s best
-12interests based upon the lack of prospective adoptive parents at
the time of the termination.
trial
court
should
have
Respondent-mother suggests that the
given
more
weight
to
the
children’s
likelihood of adoption in determining whether termination was in
their best interests.
We disagree.
Contrary to respondent-mother’s suggestion, the trial court is
not required to find that a child is adoptable before terminating
a parent’s parental rights.
See In re Norris, 65 N.C. App. 269,
275, 310 S.E.2d 25, 29 (1983) (“It suffices to say that such a
finding [of adoptability] is not required in order to terminate
parental rights.”), cert. denied, 310 N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 703
(1984). Here, the trial court found that DSS was in the process of
finding adoptive placements and was even reviewing family profiles
at
the
time
of
the
hearing,
and
the
trial
court’s
findings
regarding the children’s likelihood of adoption were supported by
the
testimony
of
the
social
worker
assigned
to
their
case.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in this regard.
Finally, respondent-mother contends that the trial court did
not adequately consider her mother as a placement for S.C.L. and
J.G.L.
As an initial matter, we note the following regarding
potential kinship placements raised at a termination proceeding:
During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court
does not consider whether there is a relative
who can take custody of the minor child, but
focuses on whether there is evidence to
support termination on the grounds alleged in
the petition. If a fit relative were to come
forward and declare their desire to have
custody of the child, the court could consider
-13this during the dispositional phase as grounds
for why it would not be in the child’s best
interests
to
terminate
the
respondent’s
parental rights.
In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 75, 623 S.E.2d 45, 51 (2005).
Furthermore, even if the trial court considers a potential relative
placement, “the trial court is not required to make findings of
fact on all the evidence presented, nor state every option it
considered.”
After
Id.
reviewing
the
record,
we
disagree
with
respondent-mother’s contention and hold no abuse of discretion in
the trial court’s decision not to place the children with the
grandmother.
First, it is evident that the trial court considered
the grandmother as a placement because she testified during the
dispositional portion of the hearing regarding her willingness and
ability to take respondent-mother and the children into her home.
Next, we note that the evidence indicates that the grandmother
would not have been an appropriate placement for J.G.L. and S.C.L.
in light of the failed placement with D.W.A.
Although D.W.A.’s
placement started out satisfactorily, D.W.A. ultimately ran away
from the grandmother’s home.
DSS did not find out that D.W.A. had
run away until a month after he left home, and the grandmother
refused to inform DSS of her knowledge regarding his whereabouts.
At the hearing, the grandmother admitted that D.W.A. continued to
visit her after he ran away, but she did not share this information
with DSS. Additionally, prior to his leaving home, the grandmother
allowed D.W.A. to spend a weekend with his mother in violation of
the trial court’s orders.
Given the events that occurred during
-14D.W.A.’s placement with the grandmother, the trial court was within
its discretion to rule her out as a placement for J.G.L. and S.C.L.
Although the trial court did not make specific findings of fact
regarding the grandmother as a placement, it is apparent that the
court considered her as an option.
See id. (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by failing to make findings
rejecting a relative placement). Therefore, we cannot say that the
trial
court
abused
its
discretion
by
terminating
respondent-mother’s parental rights to J.G.L. and S.C.L. instead of
placing them with the grandmother.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order terminating
respondent-mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges ELMORE and THIGPEN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
