People v Martinez
Annotate this CaseDecided on June 15, 2017
City Court of Poughkeepsie, Dutchess County
The People of the State of New York,
against
Luis A. Martinez, Defendant.
CR-3862-16
Hassel Nunez, Esq., Senior Assistant Public Defender
Dutchess County Public Defender
Attorney for the defendant
22 Market Street, 4th Floor
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
Andrea Long, Esq., Senior Assistant District Attorney
Dutchess County District Attorney
236 Main Street
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
Frank M. Mora, J.
Defendant has moved by way of a Notice of Motion, dated April 20, 2017, seeking various forms of relief, including dismissal of the accusatory instruments for facial insufficiency. Defendant's motion is supported by the affirmation of Hassel Nunez, Esq., Sr. Assistant Public Defender, dated April 20, 2017. The People have filed the "Affirmation in Answer to Defendant's Omnibus Motion" of Andrea Long, Esq., Senior Assistant District Attorney, dated May 3, 2017, in opposition to the motion. Defendant is charged by simplified traffic information with two (2) counts of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511(2)(a)(ii) and § 511(2)(a)(iv), both unclassified misdemeanors. Now having duly deliberated on the motion and the People's opposition, the Court hereby finds and determines the matter as follows:
1. That branch of defendant's motion seeking dismissal of the accusatory instruments charging him with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511(2)(a)(ii) and § 511(2)(a)(iv) on grounds that the accusatory instruments are facially insufficient, is denied.
An accusatory instrument is defined as "an indictment, an indictment ordered reduced pursuant to subdivision one-a of section 210.20 of this chapter, an information, a simplified information, a prosecutor's information, a superior court information, a misdemeanor complaint or [*2]a felony complaint . . . . " C.P.L. § 1.20(1). A simplified information is defined to include a simplified traffic information [C.P.L. § 1.20(5)(a)] - means by which is the People filed the instant charges against this defendant here.
In order to assess whether the People have filed a legally sufficient accusatory instrument, the Court is governed by Article 100 and 170 of the C.P.L in its determination. At the pleading stage of a criminal prosecution, the People must allege facts that would establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged. See, C.P.L. §100.40 (1)(b). This does not require that the accusatory instrument state facts that would prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather that it contains allegations of fact that "give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense."People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 (2000). The general rule of law is that an accusatory instrument will be dismissed as facially insufficient only if it fails to allege non-hearsay facts of an evidentiary nature that support or tend to support each and every element of the offenses charged and the defendant's commission thereof. C.P.L. §§100.15 (3); 100.40 (1)(c); People v. Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 (1987). However, critical here is that the charges defendant seeks to have dismissed do not have to contain any factual allegations of an evidentiary nature because the charges were filed by simplified traffic informations. More specifically, a "simplified traffic information" is defined as:
"A written accusation by a police officer, or other public servant authorized by law to issue same, filed with a local criminal court, which charges a person with the commission of one or more traffic infractions and/or misdemeanors relating to traffic, and which, being in a brief or simplified form prescribed by the commissioner of motor vehicles, designates the offense or offenses charged but contains no factual allegations of an evidentiary nature supporting such charge or charges. It serves as a basis for commencement of a criminal action for such traffic offenses, alternative to the charging thereof by a regular information, and, under the circumstances prescribed in section 100.25, it may serve, either in whole or in part, as a basis for prosecution of such charges." C.P.L. § 100.10(2)(a) (emphasis added).
As such, irrespective of C.P.L. §§100.15 (3), 100.40 (1)(c), and People v. Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 (1987) referenced above, a simplified traffic information does not have to set out sufficient factual allegations of an evidentiary nature to establish reasonable cause for a warrant of arrest or as a basis for a securing order. NY CRIM PROC. LAW § 100.10 (McKinney 2004). On the other hand, Criminal Procedure Law §100.25(2) [as referenced in C.P.L. § 100.10(2) above] gives the defendant who is charged by a simplified traffic information the right, upon a timely request, to demand to have filed with the court and served upon him or his attorney, a supporting deposition of the complainant officer based upon personal knowledge or upon information and belief, which must set forth reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense or offenses charged.C.P.L. § 100.25(2). While failure to serve a timely supporting deposition shall be sufficient grounds to dismiss a simplified traffic information [People v. Tyler, 1 NY3d 493 (2004)], here the defendant never requested a supporting deposition. The officer filed a supporting deposition at the same time as the simplified traffic information. In reviewing that supporting deposition, the officer established by both personal knowledge and upon information and belief sufficient facts establishing reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the aforesaid offenses. C.P.L. §100.25(2). As such, defendant's motion to dismiss must be denied.
This Court now turns to the remaining forms of relief as set forth in the defendant's motion:
2. That branch of defendant's motion that seeks discovery and inspection is granted to the extent that there exists unanswered discovery demands. The People are reminded of their continuing obligation to comply with Criminal Procedure Law § 240.60.
3. That branch of the defendant's motion that seeks compliance by the People pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) is granted, and the People are reminded of their duty to provide the defense with all material required pursuant to Brady and its progeny, including material impeachment evidence. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4. That branch of defendant's motion which seeks to preclude the People from cross-examining the defendant at trial relative to any prior criminal history or bad acts is denied. However, a hearing shall be held immediately prior to trial to determine the admissibility of such evidence in advance of trial [People v. Sandoval, 34 NY2d 271, 378 (1974)] with the consent of the People. Long affirmation, dated May 3, 2017, ¶13. As well, the People are directed to notify the defendant prior to said hearing of all specific instances of prior uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct which the prosecutor intends to offer at trial, and to comply with the statutory notice requirements pursuant to C.P.L. § 240.43; People v. Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981).
5. The defendant's request for relief relative to People v. Molineux is granted to the extent that the People are directed to comply with the strictures of People v. Molineux, and the cases descending therefrom and seek a ruling from this Court prior to and in the event they intend to present any evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant as evidence in their case in chief. People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901).
6. That branch of defendant's motion that seeks leave to file additional motions is granted, to the extent that they are filed in accordance with C.P.L. § 255.20.
WHEREFORE, based upon all of the foregoing, it is now
ORDERED, that branch of defendant's motion which seeks to dismiss the accusatory instruments charging him with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree is denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that the remaining relief requested by defendant is granted to the extent set forth herein and above.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:June 15, 2017
Poughkeepsie, New York
FRANK M. MORA
CITY COURT JUDGE
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