Matter of J.G. Wentworth Originations LLC v Ruiz

Annotate this Case
[*1] Matter of J.G. Wentworth Originations LLC v Ruiz 2014 NY Slip Op 51087(U) Decided on July 17, 2014 Supreme Court, Kings County Rivera, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on July 17, 2014
Supreme Court, Kings County

In the Matter of the Petition of J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC, Petitioner,

against

Victoria Ruiz, Allstate Life Insurance Company and Allstate Settlement Corporation, Respondents.



1575/14



Atty for Plaintiff

Michael Nestor, Esq.

Lum, Drasco & Positan LLC

460 Park Avenue, 21st floor

New York, NY 10022
Francois A. Rivera, J.

By order to show cause and petition filed on April 17, 2014, petitioner J. G. Wentworth Originations, LLC., (hereinafter petitioner or Wentworth) seeks an order permitting the Court of Common Pleas of Northern County, Pennsylvania to determine the requested transfer of future structured settlement payments from respondent Victoria Ruiz (hereinafter Ruiz) to Wentworth under Pennsylvania's Structured Settlement Protection Act, PA ST 40 P.S § 4001, et seq.



BACKGROUND

On March 25, 2014, Wentworth commenced the instant matter by filing an order to show cause and petition with annexed exhibits with the Kings County Clerk's office. No respondent has appeared or submitted a response or written opposition to the petition.



MOTION PAPERS

Wentworth's papers consist of an order to show cause, a petition, an affirmation of its counsel and five annexed exhibits labeled A through G. Exhibit A is a copy of the Infant [*2]Compromise Order between Toni Ann Cruz, as Mother and Natural Guardian of plaintiff, Victoria Ruiz and Toni Ann Cruz, Individual v Vincenzo Rappa and Maria Rappa entered in Kings County Supreme Court under index number 4756/93. Exhibit B is described as a copy of the Structured Settlement Agreement and Release of Victoria Ruiz. Exhibit C is a copy of an affidavit of Victoria Ruiz dated January 14, 2014. Exhibit D is described as an application Wentworth made to the Court of Common Pleas of Northern County, Pennsylvania. Exhibit E is described as Purden's Pennsylvania Statute 40 P.S. §4003. Exhibit F is a copy of an order dated March 14, 2013, in Kings County Supreme Court in which the court granted a similar request for the same reliefs. Exhibit G is a proposed order granting the instant application.LAW AND APPLICATION

CPLR 2214 (a) provides that a notice of motion shall specify the relief demanded and the grounds therefore. Wentworth seeks judicial permission from the New York State Supreme Court to make an application for judicial approval by the Court of Common Pleas of Northern County, Pennsylvania for a transfer of certain structured settlement payments being received by Victoria Ruiz. Wentworth is not seeking that this court approve the proposed transfer, rather it soley seeks that this court give permission for the Pennsylvania court to determine the application. In fact, Wentworth did not annex a copy of the proposed transfer agreement that it reached with Victor Ruiz and that it wants the Pennsylvania court to approve.Wentworth has claimed, as evidenced by exhibit D, that it has commenced the proceeding in the Pennsylvania court. That exhibit, however, consists of a cover letter dated January 21, 2014, addressed to the Pennsylvania court. The cover letter advises of the inclusion of an original and a copy of a Joint Petition for Partial Transfer of Structured Settlement and a check for the filing fee. The exhibit, however, did not include the referenced original or copy of the petition.There is no other evidence reflecting that either the Pennsylvania court received the correspondence or commenced any proceedings.Assuming that the Pennsylvania court did commence a proceeding, Wentworth has not claimed or shown that the Pennsylvania court has issued any orders. Wentworth has not cited any law from either New York or Pennsylvania which requires a petitioner having a matter pending in the Courts of Pennsylvania to seek permission of a New York State Court to commence or maintain the proceeding in Pennsylvania.

General Obligations Law Title 17, § 5-1701 et seq., known as the Structured Settlement Protection Act (SSPA) sets for the procedure for seeking and obtaining judicial approval of the appropriate Court of the State of New York for the transfer of certain structured settlement payment. SSPA was adopted by the State Legislature to give greater protection to individuals either entering into a structured settlement agreement or negotiating to sell or transfer a periodic payment thereunder to a third party. The issue before the court on such a petition is whether approval of the proposed transfer would be consistent with the letter and spirit of SSPA (Matter of Settlement Capital Corp. (Ballos), 1 Misc 3d 446 [Sup Ct Queens Co. 2003]).The plain language of General Obligations Law § 5-1706 sets forth several procedural mandates that must be adhered to for judicial approval of an application for transfer of a [*3]structured settlement to a third party (Id.). Equally significant, the statute mandates that the court, in determining such an application, make a two-prong inquiry based upon considerations of prudence, equity and reason, and vests in the court the authority to make an independent discretionary determination as to whether "the transfer is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependants; and whether the transaction, including the discount rate used to determine the gross advance amount and the fees and expenses used to determine the net advance amount, are fair and reasonable" (Id.).

The primary purpose of the SSPA is to protect the recipients of long-term structured settlements from being victimized by companies aggressively seeking the acquisition of their rights to guaranteed structured settlement payments (see 321 Henderson v Martinez, 11 Misc 3d 892 [Sup Ct NY Cty 2006]).

Purden's Pennsylvania Statute 40 P.S. §4003 et seq., is Pennsylvania's statute pertaining to petitions to purchase structured settlement payments. It is similar to SSPA. Wentworth stated that Purden's Pennsylvania Statute 40 P.S. § 4003 (a) 5 (i) B provides authority for the instant petition. That statutory provision, however, is only applicable to a pending transfer petition that the presiding Pennsylvania court finds is in contravention to the terms of the structured settlement. Under those circumstances the petitioner must obtain the written approval by the payee and any court or responsible administrative authority that previously approved the structured settlement, among other requirements. That provision requires that the petitioner obtain the written approval of the court that approved the structured settlement agreement. By it express terms, the court that approved the structured settlement agreement must approve in writing the proposed transfer.Wentworth has not claimed or shown that the Pennsylvania court have ordered it to obtain this court's approval pursuant to Purden's Pennsylvania Statute 40 P.S. §4003 (a) 5 (i) B. Assuming, for the sake of argument that it made such a showing, Wentworth's application has expressly stated that it does not seek this Court's approval of the proposed transfer but solely permission to have the Pennsylvania court decide the application. Therefore, the only law Wentworth has cited is not applicable to the relief it seeks. Consequently, Wentworth has not complied with the requirements of CPLR 2214 (a) because it has not set forth and established the facts or law which support the relief requested. Accordingly, the application is denied and the petition is dismissed without prejudice.

Should Wentworth file another petition seeking the same relief, it is directed to attach the instant decision and order to its commencement papers, include the law and facts that it relies upon to supports the petition, annex a copy of the proposed transfer agreement and advise the court by affirmation or affidavit of a person with personal knowledge of the outcome of any prior petition for the same or similar relief.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this Court.



Enter: J.S.C.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.