People v Hines
Annotate this CaseDecided on August 21, 2012
District Court of Nassau County, First District
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
against
Louis C. Hines, Defendant.
2011NA018944
Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Nassau County, Attorney for People, 262 Old Country Road, Mineola, New York 11501 516-571-3800, Natasja V. Bellinger, Esq., Attorney for Defendant, 183 Anchorage Drive, West Islip, New York 11795
Helen Voutsinas, J.
The following papers have been considered by the Court
on this motion: submitted June 4, 2012
________________________________________________________________________
Papers Numbered
________________________________________________________________________
Notice of Motion, Affirmation & Exhibits Annexed...........................1 - 2
Affirmation in Opposition....................................................................3
Reply Affirmation................................................................................4
Defendant moves this Court by omnibus motion and the same is decided as provided herein.
The defendant is presently charged with one count of violating PL §220.03, Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree. This charge was reduced from the original charge of violating PL §220.06(5), Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree, by Short Form Reduction Order dated January 19, 2012.
Specifically, the People allege that on or about August 18, 2011, at approximately 1:30 am police conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle in which the captioned defendant was a backseat passenger. The arresting Officer observed a co-defendant, who was in the front passenger seat, move his right hand toward the floor of the vehicle. The Officer opened the door "for his safety" and recovered a clear, plastic bag "...containing a whitish rock like substance believed to be crack cocaine on the floor between the passenger seat and door". The Officer believed the substance to be crack cocaine based upon his training and experience. This conclusion was confirmed by an NMS Labs report dated November 21, 2011. [*2]
The defendant now moves for suppression of any evidence based upon a lack of probable cause, suppression of statement and evidence or in the alternative, granting a Mapp, Huntley and Dunaway hearing. The defendant also requests Sandoval relief.The People oppose the motion except as noted herein.
In order to obtain a suppression hearing based upon a claim that a statement or other evidence was obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest, the defense is required to make factual allegations demonstrating its entitlement to such a hearing (CPL §710.60[1]), except where evidence is sought to be suppressed pursuant to CPL §710.20(3) [voluntariness of statements] or CPL §710.20(6) [identification procedures].
Defense counsel moves for a probable cause/Dunaway hearing. Dunaway v. New York, 442 US 200 (1979). The People oppose the motion stating that the defendant has failed to comply with the requirements set forth in CPL §710.60(1), in that the defendant failed to submit allegations sufficient to warrant the granting of a pretrial hearing pursuant to People v. Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 (1993). The People assert that the defendant's papers are insufficient to prompt a pre-trial hearing.
This Court finds that the defendant's "sworn allegations of fact", supported by his attorneys affirmation, affirmed under the penalties of perjury, coupled with the People's own allegations, state sufficient grounds to warrant a probable cause hearing. The People state that the Officers approached the vehicle because "it was high crime area, late at night, where there had been recent burglaries". The defendant states that he was a passenger in the back seat of a parked motor vehicle, which was approached by police officers. The defendant further states, that he did not engage in any illegal conduct nor did he possess any drugs. The police directed him to exit the vehicle, when his person and the vehicle was subsequently searched without his consent.
Courts have held that approaching a vehicle in a high crime area, without any other articulate reason does not constitute a sufficient basis for an officer to approach a vehicle and request information. See People v. McIntosh, 96 NY2d 521 (2001); People v. Hollman, 79 NY2d 181(1992); People v. Miles, 82 AD3d 1010 (2nd Dept. 2011) Furthermore, in People v. Seda, 198 AD2d 98 (1st Dept. 1993), the Court held: "When one is simply standing lawfully in a place, engaging in no overt illegal activity it is difficult, and frequently impossible, to set forth, in detail, facts establishing the negative." This Court finds that questions of fact exist which can only be resolved at a hearing.
A passenger of a car has standing to challenge the admissibility of any evidence seized as a result of an illegal stop. Brendlin v. California, 551 US 249 (2007) If the stop is lawful, the passenger has no standing to challenge the search of the car unless he has [*3]established standing through some presumption or some expectation of privacy. People v. Millan, 69 NY2d 514 (1987) . A passenger has standing to object to police conduct if the stopping or the removal of the defendant from the car were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See, Millan, id. Accordingly, a Dunaway hearing is granted. However, the scope of this hearing is limited to whether the police were authorized to stop the vehicle and whether they were authorized to order the defendant out of the vehicle. This hearing will not address whether the police were authorized to search the vehicle for contraband unless the defense first establishes that the police were not authorized to stop the vehicle nor remove the defendant from said vehicle. People v. Millan, supra; People v. Hernandez, 177 Misc 2d 882, 679 N.Y.S.2d 790, 1998 NY Slip Op. 98454; People v. Chive, 189 Misc 2d 653, 734 N.Y.S.2d 830, 2001 NY Slip Op. 21499
Defense counsel also moves for a Mapp hearing, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961) to contest the search of the vehicle. The People oppose the motion stating that the defendant lacks standing that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle that was a subject of the search. It is unclear whether the People's case is based on a "drugs-in-a-car" presumption or some other theory. A "drugs- in-a-car" presumption confers standing on a defendant even when he fails to establish an expectation of privacy in his motions papers. PL § 220.25(1) Although the People have contested standing, defense counsel has failed to contend that the defendant had standing in its motion papers. The burden of establishing legal standing is on the defendant People v. Carter, 86 NY2d 950 (1986); People v. Wesley, 73 NY2d 351 (1988) Where the People do not intend to rely on a statutory presumption, defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence must include sworn allegations of fact establishing the defendant's standing to challenge a search and seizure of property. see, People v. Wesley, supra In the absence of sworn allegations of fact establishing the defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or in the items seized, the defendant's request for a Mapp hearing is denied. The defendant is granted leave to renew the motion upon proper factual assertions within 14 days of the date of this order or such further time as approved by the Court.
Accordingly, the motion is decided as follows:
1.That portion of the motion seeking a hearing on the issue of probable cause is granted to the extent and for the reasons set forth above. The defendant's motion for Mapp Hearing to contest the search of the vehicle is denied as set forth above.
2.On consent of the People a Sandoval/Molineux hearing is granted and shall be held immediately prior to trial. The appropriate disclosure shall be made pursuant to [*4]CPL 240.43.
3.Also upon the consent of the People, and in accordance with statute, a Huntley hearing regarding the voluntariness of the defendant's statements is granted and shall be conducted pursuant to CPL 710.20(3) and 60.45.
4.The People have expressed awareness of their continuing obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83.
5.The remainder of the motion is denied.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
So Ordered:
Hon. Helen Voutsinas
District Court Judge
Dated: August 21, 2012
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