Matter of Sheriff Officers Assoc., Inc. v Nassau County

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Matter of Sheriff Officers Assoc., Inc. v Nassau County 2012 NY Slip Op 31617(U) June 8, 2012 Sup Ct, Nassau County Docket Number: 4621/12 Judge: Karen V. Murphy Republished from New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service. Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for any additional information on this case. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [* 1] Short Form Order SUPREME COURT - ST ATE OF NEW YORK TRIAL TERM. PART 11 NASSAU COUNTY PRESENT: Honorable Karen V. Murphv Justice of the Supreme Court In the Matter of the Application of Index No. 4621/12 SHERIFF OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Motion Submitted: 4/30/12 EX REL MICHAEL STASKO and all other similarly affected members of the Sheriff Offcers Association, Inc., Motion Sequence: 001 Petitioner(s ), For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 75 of the NY Civil Practice Law and Rules -againstNASSAU COUNTY and the OFFICE OF THE NASSAU COUNTY COMPTROLLER, Respondent(s). The following papers read on this motion: Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause........................ Answering Papers......................................... .............. ... Reply............................................................................. . Briefs: Plaintiff slPetitioner ' s....................................... . Defendant' s/Respondent' s.................................. Upon the foregoing papers , it is ordered that the Petitioners ' application for preliminary injunctive relief pending disposition , through arbitration , of an interrelated contract grievance is determined as hereinafter articulated. [* 2] The instant proceeding emanates from a dispute between contracting parties , the Sheriff Officers Association , Inc. (hereinafter " ShOA" ) and the County of Nassau (hereinafter " County" ), respectively, and concerns the latter s obligation to pay health insurance premiums for certain former employees. Under an existing Memorandum of Agreement (hereinafter " MOA" ), which served to extend and modify an extant collective bargaining agreement , the County, with respect to the provision of health insurance coverage , is contractually obligated to " (p Jay the full cost of the premium for enrollment for its active , retired , and retiring employees , pursuant to the law and regulations now in force or as hereinaft r amended. " (Ex B , Petition , MOA 9 19 (a Michael Stasko , for whose immediate and direct benefit the instant proceeding was initiated , was a correction lieutenant employed by the County and a member of ShOA at the (see Petition time of his retirement on December 31, 2011. Mr. Stasko avers: " In total , I was employed as a uniformed officer for 23 years. " (Ex , Petition , Stasko Affidavit Mr. Stakso further avers: " (sic) In 2011 1 purchased two years of my prior miltary service to have those two years deemed ' creditable service ' so that I could retire with my full pension with 25 total years of ' creditable service. ' " (Ex D , Petition , Stasko Affidavit Mr. Stasko further avers: " I am presently receiving my full pension benefits with 25 years of ' creditable service ' (and amJ 51 years old. " (Ex D , Petition , Stasko Affidavit and directed to Mr. Stasko , the Office of the Nassau County Comptroller , a co-respondent herein , through its Assistant Director of Payroll and Benefits advised , in pertinent part , as follows: " We received your application for early retirement under the 25- Year Special Retirement Plan for Nassau County . We performed a review of your employment records , and concluded that you did not fulfill the service- years requirement to retire under this plan. We verified this with the State and received confirmation that you are not eligible to retire now because Nassau County requires you to have 25 years of service in a correctional officer title , and does not recognize service Please note that while some in other titles or miltary service for By correspondence dated March 15, 2012 health insurance purposes. services may qualifY as creditable service for pension retirement purposes. they do not always qualify for health benefit retirement. However , based on your length of employment (23 years) you are eligible to vest until you reach the age of 55 ... To keep this right you must enroll as a vestee and maintain [* 3] continuous enrollment until you are 55 years; otherwise you wil pennanently lose your to retire with health benefits. right Please submit payment of $4 688.40 for the period beginning February 1 , 2012 thru April 30 , 2012 ... Ifwe do not receive your payment by March 30 , 2012 your coverage wil be cancelled retroactively to February 1 2012. . . . " (Ex G , Petition (emphasis supplied)) It is asserted that the deadline for payment was extended to April 13 see also Ex I , Petition , Jaronczyk Affidavit , ~ 15) Petition , 2012. (see , ~ 24; By Order of this Court dated April 12 , 2012 , the Respondents , pending hearing and determination of the instant application , were " enjoined from stopping County paid medical health insurance contributions. . . on behalf of retired corrections officers , including Michael Stasko " and , through this proceeding, the Petitioners seek to extend such provisional relief through disposition of a corresponding contract grievance in an arbitral forum. A court evaluating a motion for a preliminary injunction must be mindful that' (t Jhe purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo , not to determine the ultimate rights of the parties (Matter ofWheaton/TMW Fourth Ave., LPv. New York City see Coinmach . 2d 41 (2d Dept. Dept. of Bldgs. 65 A. 3d 1051 , 1052 886 N. 2d 418 (2d Dept. Corp. v. Alley Pond Owners Corp. 25 A. D.3d 642 , 643 , 808 N. 2006)). " (Masjid Usman, Inc. v. Beech 140, LLC 68 A. D.3d 942 , 942 - 943 892 N. 430 (2d Dept. , 2009)). , 2009); Although the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo (see pending a trial , the remedy is considered a drastic one 2d 146 (2d Co. 114 A. 2d 165 , 172 498 N. McLaughlin , Piven, Vogel Dept. , 1986)). As a general rule , the decision to grant or deny a preliminar injunction lies (see Doe v. Axelrod 73 N. 2d 748 , 750 2d 44(1988)). In exercising that discretion , the Supreme Court 532 N. 2d 1272 , 536 N. must determine if the moving part has established: (I) a likelihood of success on the merits (2) irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction , and (3) a balance of the equities in favor (see Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso 75 N. 2d 860 , 862 , 552 N. E.2d 166 , 552 w.T. Grant Co. v. Srogi 52 N. Y.2d 496 517 , 420 N. 2d 953 , 438 2d 201 (2d Apa Sec, Inc. v. Apa 37 A. 3d 502 , 503 , 831 N. Matter ofMerscorp, Inc. v. Romaine 295 A. 2d 431 432 , 743 N. Dept. Albini v. SolorkAssoc. 37 A. 2d 835 , 326 N. S.2d 150 (2dDept. 562 (2d Dept. , which should be used sparingly v. Nolan within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court ofthe injunction S.2d 918 (1990); 2d 761 (1981); , 2007); , 2002); 2d 177 (2d 1971)). " (Trump on the Ocean , LLC v. Ash 81 A. 3d 713 715 916 N. 2d 425 (2011)). 17 N. 3d 875 , 956 N. 2d 1270 932 N. Iv dismissed Dept. , 2011), [* 4] (PJursuant to CPLR 9 7 502( c), the Supreme Court may grant a preliminary injunction in connection with an arbitration that is pending or that is to be commenced inside or outside this state ' but such relief may be granted' only upon the ground that the (arbitration J award to which the applicant may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual without such provisional relief (CPLR 7502 (c/). A part seeking relief under this provision must also make a showing ofthe traditional equitable criteria for the granting of temporary relief under CPLR article 63 (see Matter of K. W.F. Realty Corp. v. Kaufman 16 A. D.3d 688 , 689- 690, 793 S.2d 67 (2d Dept. , 2005)). (Winter v. Brown 49 A. D.3d 526 528 - 529 , 853 N. Alexander, Supplemental Practice 7502:6) Commentaries, Mc Kinney s Cons. Laws ofN.Y., Book 361 (2d Dept. , 2008) see also , (emphasis suppliedJ; 7B, view , application of the governing legal principles to presented in the Record supports the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief. In this Court' s the facts A grievance may be submitted to arbitration only where the parties agree to arbitrate that kind of dispute, and where it is lawful for them to do so. In determining whether a Matter of Acting grievance is arbitrable , we therefore follow the twoSupt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. (United Liverpool Faculty Ass ), 42 Matter of Board of Y.2d 509 , 369 N. 2d 746 399 N. part test enunciated in S.2d 189 (1997)(Liverpool) and Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. (Watertown Educ. Ass n), 93 N. 2d 132 143 710 We first ask whether there is any (Watertown)). 2d 1064 , 688 N. S.2d 463 (1999) statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance (see Liverpool 42 N. Y.2d at 513). This is the ' may- they-arbitrate ' prong. If there is no prohibition against arbitrating, we then examine the CBA to determine if the parties have Liverpool, 42 (see Watertown 93 N. Y.2d at 513- 514). This is the ' did- they-agree- to-arbitrate ' prong (Matter of City of 99 N. 2d 273 278 , 784 N. 2d 1158 Johnstown (Johnstown Police Benevolent Ass 2d at 140; agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue n), 755 N. 2d 49 (2002)). Lacking a statutory, constitutional or public policy argument against the grievance submission to arbitration , the Court' s focus narrows to the scope ofthe parties ' agreement. (see, Matter of Village of Horseheads (Horseheads Police Benevolent Assn., Inc. ), 94 2d 785 (3d Dept. , 2012)). 3d 1191 941 N. The controllng aspects of the parties ' agreements provide for binding arbitration of any unresolved grievance arising thereunder which implicates the meaning, interpretation or see also (see Ex A , Petition , CBA , 992, Petition , MOA 9 33) application of its substantive provisions. 4; 20; [* 5] Where , as here , there is a broad arbitration clause and a ' reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the parties collective bargaining agreement , the court ' should rule the matter arbitrable , and the arbitrator will then make a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the (collective bargaining agreement), and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them (Matter of Board ofEduc. (Watertown Educ. Assn. supra; see , Matter of Acting Supt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. (United 265 A. D.2d 806 , 807 Liverpool Faculty Ass ), supra). " (Matter of Van Scoy (Holder), 808 695 N. S.2d 834 (4 Dept. , 1999)). The dispute at bar turns on whether the Respondents may exclude a retiree s military service in calculating the minimum temporal service requirements necessary to catalyze its (see Ex B , Petition , MOA 9 19 (a)) notwithstanding the inclusion thereof in determining qualification for full pension benefits. contractual obligation to pay health insurance premiums Although Respondents ' counsel argues that the distinction drawn is authorized , the failure to cite the authority on which the position is predicated is conspicuous. That the Petitioners ' interpretation may be rejected , ultimately, is not an issue within the Court' s purview. On the contrary, " (iJt is for the arbitrator , and not the courts , to resolve (Matter of Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch Teachers Assn. , supra). " (Matter of Board of Educ. of Deer Park Union Free School District v. Deer Park Teachers Assn. , 50 any uncertainty concerning the substantive rights and obligations of these parties 2d 1011 1012 , 409 N. 2d 1356 431 N. 2d 682 (1980)). Importantly, it is not for this court to determine * * * the merits * * * upon a motion for preliminary injunction; rather quo status (Hoppman v. Riverview Equites Corp. , 16 , the purpose of the interlocutory relief is to preserve the until a decision is reached on the merits Moody v. Filpowski 146 A. 2d 675 537 2d 805 (1 st Dept. , 1962); 226 N. Fuel Oil Co. v. Martin 279 A. D. 669 670 S.2d 185 (2dDept. 1989);Peekskill Coal cf Walker Mem. Baptist Church v. Saunders 285 N. 108 N. S.2d 30 (2d Dept. , 1951); 462 474 35 N. 2d 42 (1941)). Viewed from this perspective , it is clear that the showing D.2d 631 of a likelihood of success on the merits required before a preliminary injunction may be (cf Rosemont properly issued must not be equated with the showing of a certainty of success 2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 585 , 380 N. Y. Co. 1975)). It is enough if the moving part makes a prima facie showing of his right 2d 475 (4 Dept. , 1976); (Tucker v. Toia 54 A. 2d 322 325 - 326, 388 N. to relief." Company, Inc. 114 A. 2d 165 , 172- 173 McLaughlin , Piven, Vogel v. Nolan in accord: 67 N. 2d 606 , (1986)). Iv den. 2d 146 (2d Dept. , 1986), 498 N. Enterprises v. McGraw-Hil Book Co. 85 Misc. 2d 583 , [* 6] Here , the Petitioners ' interpretation is reasonable on its face and consistent with the scope of " creditable service " utilized to determine other aspects of retirement eligibility. It finds support in the regulatory scheme promulgated under the Retirement and Social Security Law which , stranding alone , satisfies the first of the traditional criteria for injunctive relief. The second element of proof required for a preliminary injunction is proof that irreparable injury will occur if the relief is denied. Irreparable injury, for purposes of equity, has been held to mean any injury for which money damages are insufficient (citation. omitted). (McLaughlin, Piven , Vogel, Inc. v. W. J. Nolan at 174). Company, Inc., supra Here , monetary damages are an inadequate substitute for the anticipated disruption in the continuity of medical care that may result absent the perpetuation of injunctive relief. (see generally, International Union Niagara Falls 191 Misc.2d 375 380 - 381 , 743 N. of Operating Engineers, Local No. 463 v. City of 2d 236 (Sup. Ct. Niagara Co. , 2002)) To fulfill the remaining criterion , the applicants must demonstrate " that the irreparable injury to be sustained is more burdensome to (its retirees J than the hann that would be caused Morris (see Klein , Wagner to the (municipalityJ through the imposition of the injunction 2d 424 (2d Dept. , 1992); 186 A. 2d 631 , 588 N. v. Lawrence A. Klein , P. McLaughlin, Plven, Vogel v. Nolan Corp. 84 A. 2d 796 , 443 N. Inn Apartments Corp. 94 A. Co., supra; Poling Transp. Corp. v. A P Tanker 2d 895 (2d Dept. , 1981)). (Lombard v. Station Square 2d 116 (2d Dept. , 2012)). 3d 717 , 942 N. In this regard it merits mention that Respondents engage in no such analysis and fail to address the ramifications of an extension of the relief sought. In any event, unquantified economic consequences that may ensue would not tip the balance of equities in Respondents ' favor. In the event the Respondents ultimately prevail on the merits , premium payments expended may be recovered and any savings that might have been realized wil not be forfeited , merely delayed. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate to continue the provisional relief heretofore afforded in order to maintain the status quo pending disposition of the underlying grievance. Without its issuance , the award , were the Petitioners to prevail , may be rendered ineffectual. relief wil "' 118). " (see , CPLR 7502(c/) Stated alternately, the granting of injunctive . preserve the efficacy of (aJ potential arbitral award' (1985 (Cove v. Rosenblatt 148 A. 2d 411 538 N. N. Y. Legis Ann S.2d 826 (2d Dept. , 1989)). The temporal parameters of the reliefherein afforded are governed by CPLR 7502 (c), and the attention of counsel is most respectfully directed thereto. [* 7] Pursuant to the unequivocal mandate of CPLR 6312(b), the Petitioner shall post an undertaking in the sum of$5 000. (see , Putter v. Singer 73 A. 3d 1147 901 N. S.2d 382 (2d Dept. Masjid Usman , Inc. v. Beech 140, LLC, supra). 00 , 201OJ; The foregoing constitutes the Order of this Court. Dated: June 8 , 2012 Mineola , N. ENTERED JUN 12 2012 . NAS AU COUNTY COUNTY CLERK' S OFFICE

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