People v Dunker

[*1] People v Dunker 2009 NY Slip Op 52629(U) [26 Misc 3d 1203(A)] Decided on November 30, 2009 Just Ct Of The Town Of Henrietta, Monroe County Piampiano, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on November 30, 2009
Just Ct of the Town of Henrietta, Monroe County

The People of the State of New York,

against

Jeffrey D. Dunker, Defendant.



09-56426



The State of New York appeared by the Monroe County District Attorney's Office, Martin Anderson, Esq., of Counsel, and the Defendant, Jeffrey Dunker, appeared by his legal counsel, Thomas A. Corletta, Esq.

James J. Piampiano, J.

A Probable Cause/Huntley Hearing was held in this matter on September 16, 2009. The Defendant moved, inter alia, for suppression of all evidence, including observations, statements, tangible evidence, and chemical test results derived from the alleged unlawful detention of the Defendant.

The Defendant asserts that Monroe County Sheriff Deputy JASON LaPLANT improperly detained the Defendant, after he had obtained sufficient information to prepare a Uniform Traffic Ticket for Insufficient Tail Lights, so that the Defendant could be further investigated for Driving While Intoxicated.

FACTS

The material facts are not in dispute. On April 24, 2009, at approximately 11:09 P.M., the Defendant, JEFFREY D. DUNKER, was driving a Pontiac Sunfire in a southbound direction on West Henrietta Road, in the Town of Henrietta, County of Monroe, State of New York. At said date, time and place, Deputy JASON LaPLANT, a seven (7) year member of the Monroe County Sheriff's Office, was on patrol in the Town of Henrietta. He first observed the Defendant's vehicle traveling southbound on West Henrietta Road, to the north of Calkins Road. The vehicle had come to the Deputy's attention because it had no tail lights on, at all. [*2]

Deputy LaPLANT initiated a traffic stop. After the Defendant stopped his vehicle at 135 Calkins Road, Deputy LaPLANT approached the vehicle. The Defendant produced his New York State driver's license in response to the Deputy's request. Deputy LaPLANT determined the identity of the Defendant by matching the photograph on the license to the Defendant.

When asked whether he had any initial conversation with the Defendant, Deputy LaPLANT testified, "Just the reason for the traffic stop, the reason I was stopping him." Deputy LaPLANT also was asked whether the Defendant said anything to him. Deputy LaPLANT stated, "No, just gave me his information."

Deputy LaPLANT took the Defendant's license to the patrol car and ran it through his computer. The Deputy thereby obtained, in conjunction with the registration on the vehicle, sufficient information regarding the Defendant so that he could prepare a ticket.

Deputy LaPLANT then wrote a ticket for the tail light violation. He did not write any other tickets. Significantly, when Deputy LaPLANT was asked whether he noticed anything else unusual about the operation of the vehicle, other than the tail lights, Deputy LaPLANT simply answered, "No."

While Deputy LaPLANT still had the Defendant's license in his possession, he called another officer, Deputy PETER CLARK, and notified Deputy CLARK of the traffic stop. Deputy CLARK arrived at the scene after an unspecified period of time, and he took over the investigation.

Conspicuously absent from the People's case was any testimony by Deputy LaPLANT regarding a possible basis for further detaining the Defendant beyond the traffic stop for insufficient tail lights. Deputy LaPLANT did not charge the Defendant with any offense other than the violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(2)(a)(3).

ANALYSIS

The Defendant contends that his prolonged detention at the traffic stop by the Sheriff's Deputy was unconstitutional, and that this Court should suppress the evidence obtained as a result thereof.

Although the Defendant does not challenge the initial stop of the vehicle that he was operating, the Defendant contends that he then was detained for a period of time and purpose that exceeded constitutionally permissible limits.

A traffic stop constitutes a limited seizure of the person. The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. PEOPLE v. BANKS, 85 NY2d 558 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 868 (1995).

For a traffic stop to pass constitutional muster, the Deputy's action in stopping the vehicle must be justified at its inception, and the seizure must be reasonably related in scope, including its length, to the circumstances which justified the detention in the first instance. [*3]PEOPLE v. BARRERAS, 253 AD2d 369 (1st Dept. 1998).

Deputy LaPLANT had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant for a vehicle and traffic infraction when he observed the Defendant operating his vehicle with insufficient tail lights. New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law §375(2)(A)(3). The length and circumstances of the detention following the initial stop, however, were improper.

Deputy LaPLANT verified the Defendant's identity by comparison with the Defendant's driver's license and vehicle registration. Once the Defendant's identity was verified by comparison with his driver's license, Deputy LaPLANT, without more, was obligated to issue the ticket for the tail light violation and allow the Defendant to proceed on his way, since the initial justification for seizing and detaining the Defendant was exhausted. PEOPLE v. BANKS, 85 NY2d 558 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 868 (1995).

The Deputy, however, retained possession of the Defendant's license and called for Deputy CLARK. Deputy LaPLANT, by retaining the Defendant's license, effectively forced the Defendant to remain at the scene while he awaited the appearance of the backup Deputy he had requested.

This continued, involuntary seizure of the Defendant constituted a seizure in violation of his constitutional rights. No testimony was elicited, nor was any other evidence offered, to provide a basis for reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was engaged in criminal activity.

The Court of Appeals has held that for such a reasonable suspicion, the requisite knowledge must be more than subjective; it should have at least some demonstrable roots. PEOPLE v. MAY, 52 AD3d 147 (1st Dept. 2008), appeal denied, 11 NY3d 738 (2008). PEOPLE v. SOBOTKER, 43 NY2d 559 (1978) (a search may not be justified by its avails alone).

In this case, there is no evidence of any circumstances coming to Deputy LaPLANT's attention, following the initial stop, that furnished him with reasonable suspicion of criminality. PEOPLE v. BANKS, 85 NY2d 558 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 868 (1995).

Deputy LaPLANT thus exceeded the bounds of a normal traffic stop by detaining the Defendant for an extended period of time, in an attempt to obtain information unrelated to the traffic infraction. PEOPLE v. MIKEL, 152 AD2d 603 (2nd Dept. 1989).

Accordingly, the People did not establish at the suppression hearing that Deputy LaPLANT had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop after its initial justification was exhausted. PEOPLE v. EDWARDS, 65 AD3d 829 (4th Dept. 2009). The use of hindsight to justify police actions has been "roundly criticized and flatly rejected." PEOPLE v. MAY, 52 AD3d 147, 152 (1st Dept. 2008), appeal denied, 11 NY3d 738 (2008).

CONCLUSION

The initial justification for seizing and detaining the Defendant was exhausted when Deputy LaPLANT had sufficient information to issue the traffic ticket for Insufficient Tail Lights. There is no evidence, by way of testimony, or otherwise, that any aspect of the Defendant's conduct or demeanor provided a further basis to detain him. PEOPLE v. BARRERAS, 253 AD2d 369 (1st Dept. 1998). The argument advanced by the People is unavailing, given that no justification for the prolonged detention was offered.

In light of the foregoing, this Court finds that the facts of this case warrant suppression of all evidence, including observations, statements, tangible evidence, and chemical test results derived from the alleged unlawful detention of the Defendant, based upon the "excessive detention" doctrine set forth by the Court of Appeals in PEOPLE v. BANKS, 85 NY2d 558 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 868 (1995).

Dated:November 30, 2009

Henrietta, New York

HON. JAMES J. PIAMPIANO

Henrietta Town Court Justice

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