Matter of B.R. v R.R.
Annotate this CaseDecided on August 31, 2009
Family Court, Westchester County
In the Matter of a Proceeding under Article 4 of the Family Court Act B.R., Petitioner,
against
R.R., Respondent.
1444-06/07C
Stephen J. Jones, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner
Jones Garneau, LLP
670 White Plains Road
Scarsdale, New York 10583
Donald Campbell, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
Danzig Fishman & Decea
One North Broadway
Suite 1202
White Plains, New York 10601
Colleen Duffy, J.
These parties, Petitioner B. R. ("Petitioner") and Respondent R. R.
("Respondent"), have had numerous matters before this Court - both custody and child support
over the [*2]last few years. Currently before this Court are
numerous inter-related objections filed by Respondent to several Decisions and Orders issued by
the Support Magistrate in connection with child support matters. Due to the inter-related nature
of the objections, this Decision and Order addresses all of the objections arising out of the
Decisions and Orders issued by the Support Magistrate in connection with these parties since
2007.
Chronology of Proceedings
On July 14, 2004, the parties had executed a separation/property settlement
agreement ("Agreement") which was incorporated, but not merged, into their Judgment of
Divorce, dated November 23, 2004. Pursuant to the Agreement, the parties agreed to deviate
from the Child Support Standards Act ("CSSA") guidelines and established child support
payable by Respondent in the amount of $4,400.00 per month for the benefit of the four minor
children: J. R. (D/O/B 10/21/88); D. R. (D/O/B 6/14/90); M. R. (D/O/B 9/28/90); C. R. (D/O/B
6/30/94) (hereinafter, the "Subject Children").
The Agreement also required Respondent to pay $1000.00 per month maintenance to
Petitioner until the earliest of one of three events occurred: (1) expiration of the payment period
of August 1, 2004 to July 31, 2008; or (2) the death of either party; or (3) the remarriage of
Petitioner or her continuous co-habitation with an unrelated member of the opposite sex for a
period in excess of 90 days.
On October 26, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition against Respondent to enforce the
child support and maintenance provisions of the parties' Agreement for the support of the Subject
Children. The matter was set for December 1, 2006.
On December 1, 2006, Respondent did not appear and no affidavit of service to
Respondent exists for that proceeding. The matter was adjourned to January 11, 2007 for service.
Respondent personally was served with notice of the January 11, 2007 date;
however, he failed to appear on that date. The Support Magistrate proceeded to Inquest on that
date, and, on February 9, 2007, entered an order of support, to be paid through Support
Collections Unit, continuing, effective February 1, 2007: (1) Respondent's child support
obligation in the amount of $4,400.00 per month; (2) Respondent's obligation to pay spousal
maintenance in the amount of $1,000.00 per month; and (3) Respondent's obligation to pay to
Petitioner a $75.00 per month contribution towards the cost of health insurance for the Subject
Children (hereinafter the "February 2007 Order").
In the February 2007 Order, the Support Magistrate granted Petitioner a judgment
totaling $67,200.00 against Respondent for support arrears representing unpaid spousal
maintenance, child support, unreimbursed medical expenses and health [*3]insurance premiums.[FN1] The February 2007 Order also requires
Respondent to provide life insurance in the amount of $250,000.00 for the benefit of the Subject
Children by February 28, 2007. The February 2007 Order also provides that Petitioner reserves
her rights and claims to her share of the parties' 2002 and 2003 tax refunds and an amount not
less than $3000.00 from the 2005 tax filing by the parties, or either of them, for a deduction or
exemption for the Subject Children.
On March 1, 2007, Respondent filed a petition seeking a downward modification of
his support obligations ("First Downward Modification Petition"). The matter was scheduled for
April 10, 2007 before the Support Magistrate.
While Respondent's First Downward Modification Petition was pending, Petitioner
filed a petition on March 16, 2007 ("2007 Violation Petition"), alleging that Respondent violated
the February 2007 Order based on Respondent's continued failure to pay support as directed in
the February 2007 Order. The hearing for the 2007 Violation Petition was scheduled for April
10, 2007 - the same date as the hearing on Respondent's First Downward Modification Petition.
At the April 10, 2007 proceeding, Petitioner appeared personally and with counsel.
Respondent appeared pro se. Respondent informed the Support Magistrate that he was
unprepared to proceed to hearing on his First Downward Modification Petition that day as he did
not have any financial information. The court granted an adjournment to Respondent to May 9,
2007. Respondent did, however, represent to the Support Magistrate on April 10 that he was
prepared to proceed to hearing on Petitioner's 2007 Violation Petition. However, since Petitioner
was requesting a finding of contempt, punishable by incarceration, for a willful violation of the
February 2007 Order, the Support Magistrate ruled that counsel would be assigned to represent
Respondent and also adjourned the hearing on the 2007 Violation Petition to May 9 for that
purpose.
At that April 10 proceeding, Respondent also gave Petitioner a certified bank check
in the amount of $4,400.00 which was recorded by Support Collections Unit and credited toward
Respondent's outstanding child support obligation.
On May 9, 2007, both parties appeared with counsel. Respondent's counsel
acknowledged readiness to proceed on the 2007 Violation Petition but Respondent requested that
the hearing be adjourned. Despite Respondent having been represented by counsel who indicated
that he was ready to proceed, the Support Magistrate agreed to Respondent's request to adjourn
the hearing on the 2007 Violation Petition to May 21, 2007.
[*4]
Meanwhile, on May 9, after adjourning the
hearing on the 2007 Violation Petition, the Support Magistrate excused Respondent's counsel
from the remainder of the proceeding - as the Support Magistrate had not assigned counsel to
represent Respondent on any matter other than the 2007 Violation Petition - and asked
Respondent, who appeared pro se for his First Downward Modification Petition hearing,
if he was ready to proceed.
At that time, Respondent again represented to the Support Magistrate that he did not
bring any financial information with him and that he was not prepared to proceed to hearing. On
that date, the Support Magistrate dismissed the First Downward Modification Petition.[FN2]
On May 21, 2007, both parties appeared with counsel, for the hearing on the 2007
Violation Petition. On that date, however, Respondent made an oral application to the Support
Magistrate to relieve his assigned counsel, William Penny, Esq., as Respondent had retained his
own counsel, Donald Campbell, Esq., to represent him. The Support Magistrate granted the
request and Respondent's counsel then requested another adjournment of the hearing, which was
granted, over objection of Petitioner, by the Support Magistrate to June 1, 2007.
On May 31, 2007, Respondent filed before the Support Magistrate an Order to Show Cause
requesting that the Support Magistrate issue a Temporary Restraining Order staying the hearing
on the 2007 Violation Petition scheduled for the next day. In that Order to Show Cause,
Respondent sought to have the February 2007 Order (that had been issued after Inquest) vacated.
The Support Magistrate denied Respondent's application for an immediate stay of the proceeding
and scheduled a hearing on the Order to Show Cause for July 9, 2007.[FN3]
On June 1, 2007, parties and counsel appeared before the Support Magistrate, for the
hearing on the 2007 Violation Petition. The hearing was not completed and was continued to
July 9, 2007 - the same date as the hearing scheduled on the Order to [*5]Show Cause.
On June 8, 2007,Respondent filed another petition for a downward modification of
his support obligations ("Second Downward Modification Petition") which also was scheduled
for July 9, 2007.
On July 9, 2007, the hearing on the 2007 Violation Petition was completed and the
Support Magistrate reserved decision on the matter. In addition, on July 9, with respect to both
Respondent's Second Downward Modification Petition and the Order to Show Cause, after
hearing oral arguments from counsel for both parties on the Order to Show Cause, the Support
Magistrate adjourned the hearings on both of those matters to August 20 and 29, 2007 (in the
event the matters were not concluded on August 20, 2007).On July 9, the Support Magistrate
also informed Respondent's counsel that he could submit a modified Order, on notice of
settlement, which would reduce the arrears awarded in the February 2007 Order from $67,225.00
to $60,225.00. The $7,000.00 reduction in arrears apparently equals the total amount of
unreimbursed medical expenses that had been claimed by Petitioner.
After the July 9 proceeding, upon receiving a written request for an adjournment by
counsel for Respondent, the Support Magistrate again adjourned the hearings on the Second
Downward Modification Petition and the Order to Show Cause to September 19, 2007 to
accommodate the schedule of one of Respondent's witnesses.
On August 29, 2007, the Support Magistrate issued a modified Order and Judgment
("Modified 2007 Order")[FN4] reducing the amount of arrears in the February
2007 Order by $7,000.00. The Modified 2007 Order awarded Petitioner arrears of $60,225.00,
rather than the $67,225.00, without prejudice to Petitioner's right to seek to obtain the
unreimbursed medical expenses in the future. The other terms of the February 2007 Order
remained in effect.
On September 19, 2007, the Support Magistrate held the hearing on Respondent's
Order to Show Cause to vacate the February 2007 Order. He concluded the hearing on that date
and reserved decision. The Support Magistrate again adjourned the hearing on the Second
Downward Modification Petition pending the issuance of his decisions on the 2007 Violation
Petition and the Order to Show Cause.
On October 1, 2007, the Support Magistrate issued an Order of Disposition (1)
finding that Respondent violated the February 2007 Order, that such violation was willful, and
(2) granting Petitioner a money judgment of $21,600.00, plus interest, for the accrued support
arrears from February 1 through May 31, 2007. See Order of Disposition, dated October
1, 2007.[FN5] Specifically,
the Order of Disposition states that [*6]Respondent's failure to
provide life insurance by February 28, 2007 was willful.[FN6] Id.
Notably, although the October 1, 2007 Order of Disposition indicates that
Respondent's violation of the February 2007 Order was willful, the Support Magistrate's October
1, 2007 Findings of Fact expressly state that "[Respondent] non-willfully failed to obey the order
. . ." Moreover, in the October 1 Findings of Fact, the Support Magistrate articulates no findings
whatsoever about Respondent's failure to obtain life insurance.
On October 1, 2007, the Court sent notice to counsel and the parties that the hearing
on the Second Downward Modification Petition was scheduled for October 26, 2007.
By Order of Dismissal, entered October 9, 2007, the Support Magistrate
dismissed Respondent's Order to Show Cause for failure to state a cause of action (hereinafter
the "October 2007 Order of Dismissal of OTSC").
On October 26, 2007, the Support Magistrate held a hearing on the Second
Downward Modification Petition. Both parties appeared and were represented by counsel. The
Support Magistrate concluded the hearing that day and reserved decision.
While the Support Magistrate's decision on Respondent's Second Downward
Modification Petition was sub judice, on December 20, 2007, Petitioner filed a notice of
motion for counsel fees, which was scheduled to be heard by the Support Magistrate on January
24, 2008. Respondent submitted an opposing affidavit by counseland memorandum of law on
January 22, 2008, just two days prior to the scheduled return date on the motion. No leave of
court was sought by Respondent to extend his time to oppose the motion and the Support
Magistrate did not consider the opposition papers submitted by Respondent.[FN7]
By Order of Dismissal, entered January 23, 2008 (hereinafter the "January 2008
Order of Dismissal"), the Support Magistrate dismissed the Second Downward Modification
Petition on the grounds that Respondent failed to state a cause of action.[FN8]
[*7]
On January 24, 2008, the return date for
Petitioner's motion for counsel fees, Petitioner appeared with counsel. Neither Respondent nor
his counsel appeared. The Support Magistrate heard oral argument on the motion by Petitioner's
counsel and reserved decision.
By Order on Motion, entered November 19, 2008, the Support Magistrate granted
Petitioner's motion for counsel fees and awarded Petitioner counsel fees and costs in the amount
of $39,274.09 payable by Respondent ("Attorney's Fees Order").
Respondent's Objections
On November 9, 2007, Respondent filed with this Court an objection to the
Support Magistrate's October 2007 Order of Dismissal of the Order to Show Cause
("Respondent's Objection to OTSC Dismissal").
On February 27, 2008, Respondent filed with this Court an objection to the Support
Magistrate's Order of Dismissal of the Second Downward Modification Petition ("Respondent's
Second Downward Modification Objection").
On January 16, 2009, Respondent filed with this Court an objection to the Counsel
Fees Order ("Respondent's Counsel Fees Objection"). [FN9]
For the reasons set forth in this Decision and Order, the Court grants
Respondent's Objection to the OTSC Dismissal, denies Respondent's Second Downward
Modification Objection except to the extent set forth herein and grants Respondent's Counsel
Fees Objection and remands the matters to the Support Magistrate for further proceedings
consistent with this Decision and Order.
Statement of Law
Family Court Act section 439(a) empowers Support Magistrates "to hear,
determine and grant any relief within the powers of the Court" in proceedings properly before
them. FCA section 439(e) provides that the Support Magistrate's determination "shall include
Findings of Fact and a final order." The parties are permitted by the [*8]statute to submit "specific written objections" to the order for
"review" by a Family Court judge. This review of the Support Magistrate's order is essentially
equivalent to an appellate review of such an order. Matter of Green v. Wron, 151 Misc
2d 9, 571 NYS2d 193 (Fam. Ct. NY Cnty. 1991). The scope of that review, however, is narrow,
confined to whether the Support Magistrate, as the trier of fact, has made the necessary findings
of fact and an order and whether, upon review of the record, the findings of fact present a
reasonable basis for that order. The Support Magistrate is granted broad discretion in weighing
the relative financial positions of the parties and evaluating testimony and, therefore, his or her
findings are entitled to great deference. Creem v. Creem, 121 AD2d 676, 504 NYS2d
444 (2d Dep't 1986). The determination of the Support Magistrate should not be disturbed on
appeal unless no fair interpretation of the evidence can support the findings. Stone v.
Stone, 236 AD2d 615, 652 NYS2d 824 (2d Dep't 1997); Reed v. Reed, 240 AD2d
951, 659 NYS2d 334 (3rd Dep't 1997).
Respondent's Objection to the OTSC Dismissal
As an initial matter, this Court notes that Respondent improperly filed his
motion before the Support Magistrate as an order to show cause seeking to stay the 2007
Violation Petition hearing and to vacate the February 2007 Order. See Dep't of Social
Services on Behalf of Gary Z. v. Burton H., 151 Misc 2d 400, 572 NYS2d 839 (Support
Magistrate . . . may not sign an order to show cause and may only exercise jurisdiction
specifically granted by statute); Family Court Act § 439 ("support magistrate shall have the
authority to hear and decide motions [emphasis added] . . ."). Respondent's appropriate
remedy would have been to file a motion to vacate the default pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1).
See TO v. JS, 19 Misc 3d 1108A, 859 NYS2d 907 (party seeking to challenge order
entered on default must file motion [emphasis added] before the Support Magistrate).
Nonetheless, the Court notes that, in effect, the order to show cause was heard by the Support
Magistrate as a motion to vacate and he held a hearing on the record on September 19, 2007 and
dismissed the OTSC on October 9, 2007.
With respect to Respondent's Objection to the OTSC Dismissal, the Court finds that
the Support Magistrate erred in denying Respondent's application to have the February 2007
Order, entered on default, vacated. A party seeking to vacate a default judgment must establish
both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense or claim. Rolston v.
Rolston, 261 AD2d 377, 689 NYS2d 226 (2d Dep't 1999).Although the determination as to
whether the party has established a reasonable excuse for the default typically lies within the
discretion of the trial court - here, the Support Magistrate, as the finder of fact, see Lutz v. Goldstone, 31 AD3d
449, 809 NYS2d 341 (4th Dep't 2006), the Court notes that the Second Department has
adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in proceedings involving custody and
child support. Louis v. Louis, 231 AD2d 612, 647 NYS2d 819 (2d Dep't 1996).
Before reaching the merits of Respondent's application to vacate the default, the
Court expresses its serious concerns about the sequence in which the Support Magistrate
proceeded to hearing on the matters pending before him, to wit, a Violation [*9]Petition filed by Petitioner alleging that Respondent violated the
February 2007 Order and an OTSC by Respondent seeking to vacate that very same order. After
the Support Magistrate already had adjourned the scheduled hearing on Petitioner's violation
petition alleging a violation by Respondent of the February 2007 Order no less than three times -
and one of those adjournments was initiated by the Support Magistrate himself, the Support
Magistrate denied Respondent's request to defer the hearing one more time, to wit, until after
having a hearing on whether to vacate that very same order. Instead, the Support Magistrate
commenced and concluded the hearing on a Petitioner's violation petition while leaving pending
Respondent's application seeking to have that same February 2007 Order vacated.
Only after the violation hearing was completed and sub judice did the
Support Magistrate hold a hearing on whether Respondent met the requisite criteria — to
wit, reasonable excuse and a meritorious defense to vacate the February 2007 Order
entered on default. Thus, the Support Magistrate heard testimony and received evidence about
Respondent's failure to comply — indeed, Petitioner sought a finding of a willful failure
to comply — with an order entered on inquest that Respondent was seeking to have
vacated. If, for no reason other than to conserve judicial resources and for judicial efficiency and
economy, as well as to reduce the number of court appearances and attorney costs incurred by
the parties, the hearing on whether to vacate the February 2007 Order should have occurred
before or together with the hearing on whether the February 2007 Order was violated. See
TO v. JS, 19 Misc 3d 1108A, 859 NYS2d 907 (Fam. Ct., Oswego Cnty. 2008) (bifurcation
of proceedings is burdensome to parties, adds to the relative costs associated with prosecuting
and defending case by adding to number of appearances).
Indeed, if the application to vacate the February 2007 Order had occurred first, and,
if the Support Magistrate had concluded, as did this Court, that said order should be vacated,
such a determination may very well have been a factor in determining whether any violation of
such order was or was not willful.
Nonetheless, the Support Magistrate's failure to exercise judicial efficiency in this
matter is not a basis for granting the Respondent's objection of the dismissal of the application to
vacate the February 2007 Order.[FN10] Rather, the errors of law dictate that the
February 2007 Order be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings in this
action.[FN11]
In this case, in his findings, the Support Magistrate indicated that he accepted as
credible Respondent's testimony that Respondent's father had died the weekend before [*10]the February 2007 court proceeding. See October 9 Order of
Dismissal and Findings of Fact. However, the Support Magistrate found as incredible
Respondent's proffered reason of depression — or his mental illness — as the basis
for Respondent's failure to ask the court for an adjournment or to appear in court when
Respondent was able to get himself to work for two days immediately after his father's death.
The Court finds that the Support Magistrate erred as a matter of law and abused his
discretion in denying the application to vacate the default. See Frances v. Lanigan, 16
Misc 3d 968, 842 NYS2d 326 (Family Ct., Oswego Cnty. 2007) (court reverses denial of motion
to vacate default due to Support Magistrate error). Specifically, the Support Magistrate erred in
finding that Respondent's excuse for the default was not reasonable. See Id. at 942;
see also Bridget v. Bacon, 169 Misc 2d 858, 645 NYS2d 1016 (Surr. Ct. West. Cnty.
1996) (death of brother and diagnosis of acute clinical depression constitutes excusable default).
Here, the Support Magistrate erroneously excluded evidence — to wit, expert
testimony of Respondent's witness, that could have shored up Respondent's reason for not
contacting the court after his father's death to request an adjournment. Specifically, the Support
Magistrate failed to require opposing counsel to state the basis for his objections to Dr. Kaitz's
opinion testimony — which, if such basis had been stated, could have cured counsel's
failure to qualify Dr. Kaitz as an expert in mental illness. See §538 Richardson
on Evidence, 10th Ed., Prince, J. (1973) (requiring grounds of an objection to be stated is to
prevent delay in the administration of justice; substantial justice requires that the objection be
specified so that the party offering the evidence can cure it, if possible); see also Peo v.
Keough, 51 AD2d 808, 380 NYS2d 267 (2d Dept' 1976).
Had Dr. Kaitz been able to testify as to his opinion of Respondent's mental health on
or around the day of court (which testimony apparently would reflect the position articulated by
Dr. Kaitz in a letter that was accepted into evidence by the Support Magistrate), that, combined
with the parent's death which occurred in such proximity to the proceeding, would constitute
reasonable excuse.[FN12]
Indeed, the Court finds that such expert testimony in this matter was crucial to the
Support Magistrate in his making a determination as to whether the excuse was reasonable in
that the Support Magistrate apparently imposed his own view that Respondent's ability to
function in his typical routine of attending work belied Respondent's credibility about his
contention that he could not get himself to court or contact the court for an adjournment. The
extraordinary act of a lay person or persons attending or dealing with a court proceeding does not
seem comparable to that same person being able to maintain a daily function or routine. See
e.g., Bridget at 860 (depression resulted in incapacity to deal with legal affairs).
Perhaps the stress of a court proceeding or even thinking about a court proceeding was untenable
to [*11]Respondent who had just experienced the death of his
father. Of course, since Dr. Kaitz was not qualified as an expert, due, it appears, to the Support
Magistrate's failure to require the basis of the objections to the "opinion" testimony to be stated
which would have given counsel the opportunity to cure his failure to qualify Dr. Kaitz as such
an expert, the Support Magistrate simply imposed his own surmise of Respondent's abilities.
Accordingly, this Court finds that Respondent proffered a reasonable basis - the
death of his father just days before court - as to why he missed the February 2007 court
proceeding. Moreover, the Support Magistrate erroneously precluded expert evidence by failing
to require to be stated the basis of the objections to the testimony (which would have allowed
counsel to cure such objections) and allow into evidence the expert testimony that could have
shored up Respondent's reason for not appearing or contacting the court.
The Court also finds that the Support Magistrate erred in determining that
Respondent did not offer a meritorious defense. The Respondent was not required to prove that
he could succeed against all the claims of the Petitioner; rather, he needed only to establish that
he had a meritorious defense to such claims. See Lanigan at 970. Here, the Support
Magistrate erred as a matter of law and fact when he found that his issuance of the Modified
2007 Order in August 2007 reducing the February 2007 Order by $7,000.00 somehow does not
evidence that Respondent has a meritorious defense to those claims upon which the February
2007 Order is, in part, based.
According to the Support Magistrate, "[w]ith regard to Petitioner's claims that
Respondent did not prove, even on inquest, $7,000.00 in unreimbursed medial expenses,
Respondent and Petitioner had previously agreed in Court during these proceedings to delete so
much of those findings and portion of the money judgment . . ." See Findings of Fact,
dated 9/28/07.
This Court could find no record that the parties agreed in court to reduce the
February 2007 Order. Indeed, the transcript of the July 9, 2007 proceeding indicates exactly the
opposite:
[SUPPORT MAGISTRATE]: I'm just talking generally whether or not you want to
pull the unreimbursed medicals out of the judgment and take care of the issue that way.
[Mr. JONES Petitioner B. R.'s Counsel] : Your Honor, we would like to have the
hearing in all respects."
[SUPPORT MAGISTRATE]: "so what he's saying is, I don't want to agree. I want to
take, so called, the chance with going forward with litigation."July 9, 2007 Tr. at pp. 90-91.
[*12]
Moreover, even if the parties had agreed, after
the fact, to reduce the amount of the February 2007 Order, such event would not negate
Respondent's meritorious defense to those claims upon which the February 2007 Order was
issued. Indeed, if Petitioner had been willing to reduce the amount of an already-entered order,
such willingness would suggest that Respondent's defense to the claims upon which that part of
the order was based, in fact have merit. Thus, the Support Magistrate's issuance of a Modified
2007 Order demonstrates tacit recognition that Respondent had a meritorious defense to at least
some of Petitioner's claims that previously were awarded in the February 2007 Order.
As the Support Magistrate should have found that Respondent presented a
reasonable excuse as to his default and should have found that Respondent presented a
meritorious defense, the Court need not reach Respondent's other arguments on this issue.
Accordingly, Respondent's Objection to the OTSC Dismissal is granted, the February 2007
Order is vacated[FN13]
and the matter is remanded to the Support Magistrate for proceedings consistent with this
Decision and Order.
Respondent's Second Downward Modification Objection
With respect to Respondent's Second Downward Modification Objection, the
Court dismisses the objection for the reasons set forth below, but remits the matter to the Support
Magistrate for issuance of an amended corrected order as noted previously, herein.
A party seeking to modify an order of child support that has been incorporated into a
divorce judgment, as in this case, must show an "unanticipated and unreasonable change in
circumstances." Boden v. Boden, 42 NYS2d 210, 397 NYS2d 701 (1977).Here, the
Support Magistrate dismissed Respondent's petition finding that Respondent failed to meet his
burden of proof.
The scope of this Court's review of the Support Magistrate's finding is narrow,
confined to whether the Support Magistrate, as the trier of fact, has made the necessary findings
of fact and an order and whether, upon review of the record, the findings of fact present a
reasonable basis for that order. Creem v. Creem, 121 AD2d 676, 504 NYS2d 444 (2d
Dep't 1986). The Support Magistrate is granted broad discretion in weighing the relative
financial positions of the parties and evaluating testimony and, therefore, his or her findings are
entitled to great deference. Creem at 676. Moreover, the moving party should not merely
repeat arguments made before the Support Magistrate, but must show, or offer to show, error by
the Support Magistrate. See Green v. Wron, 151 Misc 2d 9, 571 NYS2d 193.
Upon this Court's review of the file, the Court finds that Respondent has failed to
articulate any error of law or fact by the Support Magistrate upon which this Court should
disturb the Support Magistrate's determination. Rather, Respondent simply has reiterated the
arguments and facts that already were made to the Support Magistrate.
Moreover, the Court finds that the Support Magistrate has presented a reasonable
basis for his determination, and, accordingly, the Court dismisses Respondent's objections to the
dismissal of Respondent's Second Petition for a [*13]Downward
Modification in their entirety.
Respondent's Counsel Fees Objection
With respect to Respondent's Counsel Fees Objection, the Court grants the
objection and remands the matter to the Support Magistrate for the reasons set forth below.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Respondent filed his objection on January
16, 2009, fifty-eight days after the Order on Motion Granting Counsel Fees was entered on
November 19, 2008. Section 439(e) requires that "[s]pecific written objections to a final order of
a support magistrate may be filed by either party with the court within thirty days after receipt of
the order in court or by personal service, or, if the objecting party or parties did not receive the
order in court or by personal service, thirty-five days after mailing of the order to such party or
parties. FCA § 439. Nonetheless, the Court notes that Respondent's filing delay is de
minimis and the merits of the objection still may be considered by the Court. See
Fernandez v. Mark Andy, 7 AD3d, 776 NYS2d 305 (2004).
Section 438 of the Family Court Act sets forth the provisions pursuant to which an
award of counsel fees may be made in proceedings of this nature. Specifically, section 438
provides, in relevant parts, that: "(a) [i]n any proceeding under this Article . . . the court may
allow counsel fees at any stage of the proceeding . . . (b) [i]n any proceeding for failure to obey
any lawful order compelling payment of support . . . the court shall [empahsis added],
upon a finding that such failure was willful, order respondent to pay counsel fees to the attorney
representing petitioner . . . ." FCA § 438.
Here, the Court finds that the Support Magistrate made several errors of fact in his
Findings upon which he granted counsel fees. Specifically, the Support Magistrate found that
"[the Respondent] had been duly served initially, and failed to appear on several occasions
despite adjournments in his favor to allow him to avoid default." Findings issued with Order
on Motion Granting Counsel Fees, dated 10/28/09 and 11/13/08 (hereinafter "2008
Findings").[FN14] The
Support Magistrate also found that "these proceedings would have been less than half as long
and less than half as complex were it not for Respondent's exacerbation of the situation by failure
to appear and later offering spurious and ultimately unproved claims and defenses." See
2008 Findings.The record of the proceedings and the Court file show that these findings are
incorrect on several bases.
First, the court record and file reflect that Respondent missed only two court dates
that he was required to attend — January 11, 2007 (which is the date the Support
Magistrate proceeded to inquest in Respondent's absence) and January 24, 2008 (the return date
on Petitioner's motion for counsel fees), — and appeared on all other court [*14]dates which have been numerous.[FN15] Thus, the Support Magistrate's finding that
Respondent "failed to appear on several occasions (see 2008 Findings)" is error.
Moreover, there was never even one adjournment, let alone many "adjournments in
his favor" for the purpose of " allow[ing] [the Respondent] to avoid default." See 2008
Findings. Indeed, the court record and file show that, at the initial proceeding on Petitioner's
enforcement petition on December 1, 2006, Petitioner had not effected service on Respondent
and the Support Magistrate adjourned the proceeding in favor of Petitioner to allow Petitioner
the opportunity to have service effected on Respondent.
Thereafter, when service of process was accomplished and Respondent did not
appear on January 11, 2007, the Support Magistrate immediately proceeded to Inquest on that
date, he did not adjourn to allow Respondent an opportunity to avoid default. Thus, the Support
Magistrate's determination that he had provided "adjournments" to Respondent to avoid default
also is an error of fact.
The Court is cognizant that there have been several adjournments of the court
proceedings before the Support Magistrate that underlie these objections. However, those
adjournments were for hearings on Respondent's petitions for downward modification of his
child support obligations, the violation petition and the hearing on the OTSC, not for the purpose
of affording Respondent the opportunity to avoid a default.
The Court also notes that the Support Magistrate adjourned the hearing on the
Violation Petition no less than three times - one on his own motion although Respondent
indicated on that date he was ready to go forward on the hearing, and another even though
Respondent's counsel informed the Support Magistrate he was ready to proceed (but Respondent
himself interjected saying he wasn't). Despite counsel's representation, the Support Magistrate
again adjourned that hearing. The Support Magistrate thereafter ignored judicial efficiency and
economy in rejecting Respondent's application to have the OTSC hearing before the Violation
hearing.
Moreover, the Support Magistrate's finding that [u]pon default, extra proceedings
were required on [Respondent's] application(s) to vacate his default" also is an error of fact. As
noted previously herein, it was not Respondent's acts, but rather the Support Magistrate's failure
to consolidate or properly sequence the matters, to wit, the Violation Petition hearing and the
OTSC hearing, that contributed to the increase in court appearances and caused the proceedings
to be onerous, duplicative and extra-lengthy.
Moreover, as noted herein, this Court's determination that Respondent's application
to have the default judgment vacated should have been granted vitiates, in large measure, the
Support Magistrate's findings that "Respondent exaceraba[ted] the situation." See 2008
Findings.
The Court also notes that the notice of motion for counsel fees by Petitioner sought
fees due to the Support Magistrate's finding of "willfulness" by Respondent in connection with
Respondent's failure to comply with the February 2007 Order. Notably, the Violation Order and
findings attendant thereto confusingly reflect that Respondent both willfully and non-willfully
violated the February 2007 Order. To date, that [*15]information
remains uncorrected. [FN16] The Court has no way to determine whether
the Support Magistrate made any such willfulness finding or whether it was simply a
typographical error in the order.
As noted previously herein, although the October 1, 2007 Order of Disposition
indicates that Respondent's violation of the February 2007 Order was willful, the Support
Magistrate's October 1, 2007 Findings of Fact expressly state that "[Respondent] non-willfully
failed to obey the order . . ." Moreover, in the October 1 Findings of Fact, the Support Magistrate
articulates no findings whatsoever about Respondent's failure to obtain life insurance. Moreover,
no referral of this purported willful violation determination ever was made to this Court by the
Support Magistrate for a confirmation hearing on any purported finding of willfulness as to
Respondent's failure to provide the requisite life insurance.
The Court also notes that the Support Magistrate did not indicate in his 2008
Findings that the award of counsel fees, or any part of it, was issued pursuant to a finding of
willfulness. Nonetheless, as § 438(b) of the Family Court Act mandates an award of
counsel fees upon such a finding, it is vital for the Support Magistrate to correct the error in that
Violation Order and findings attendant thereto - one way or the other - so that the Court may
properly determine the appropriateness of all or part of the Support Magistrate's award of
counsel fees.
Thus, the errors of fact of the Support Magistrate in the 2008 Findings upon which
the award of counsel fees was based, combined with the errors rife in the previous orders issued
in this matter by the Support Magistrate and this Court's vacatur of the February 2007 Order
entered on default for further proceedings, mandate reversal of the award of counsel fees and
remittal of the matter to the Support Magistrate for further proceedings consistent with this
Decision and Order.
Acccordingly, the Court hereby grants Respondent's objection, vacates the award of
counsel fees, and remands the matter to the Support Magistrate for further proceedings consistent
with this Decision and Order.
Decision and Order
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that Respondent's Objection to the OTSC Dismissal is granted, the
February 2007 Order and Modified 2007 Order are vacated, and the matter is remanded to the
Support Magistrate for proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order; and it is further
ORDERED that Respondent's Second Downward Modification Objection is
denied in its entirety, but the matter is remitted to the Support Magistrate for issuance of an
amended corrected order as noted previously herein; and it is further
ORDERED that Respondent's Objection to Counsel Fees is hereby granted, the
award of counsel fees is hereby vacated, as is any judgment entered thereon, and the matter is
remitted to the Support Magistrate for further proceedings consistent with this Decision and
Order; and it is further
[*16]
ORDERED that the Support Magistrate issue
amended and/or corrected orders in the proceedings underlying these matters consistent with this
Decision and Order; and it is further
ORDERED that counsel and the parties shall appear before Support Magistrate
Allen Hochberg for further proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order on
________________, 2009 at ___ p.m.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THIS COURT.
NOTE: (1) THE ORDER OF CHILD SUPPORT SHALL BE ADJUSTED
BY THE APPLICATION OF A COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENT AT THE DIRECTION OF
THE SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT NO EARLIER THAN TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS
AFTER THIS ORDER IS ISSUED, LAST MODIFIED OR LAST ADJUSTED, UPON THE
REQUEST OF ANY PARTY TO THE ORDER OR PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH (2)
BELOW. UPON APPLICATION OF A COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENT AT THE
DIRECTION OF THE SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT, AN ADJUSTED ORDER SHALL BE
SENT TO THE PARTIES WHO, IF THEY OBJECT TO THE COST OF LIVING
ADJUSTMENT, SHALL HAVE THIRTY-FIVE (35) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILING
TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN OBJECTION TO THE COURT INDICATED ON SUCH
ADJUSTED ORDER. UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH WRITTEN OBJECTION, THE COURT
SHALL SCHEDULE A HEARING AT WHICH THE PARTIES MAY BE PRESENT TO
OFFER EVIDENCE WHICH THE COURT WILL CONSIDER IN ADJUSTING THE CHILD
SUPPORT ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT.
(2) A RECIPIENT OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE SHALL HAVE THE CHILD
SUPPORT ORDER REVIEWED AND ADJUSTED AT THE DIRECTION OF THE SUPPORT
COLLECTION UNIT NO EARLIER THAN TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS AFTER SUCH
ORDER IS ISSUED, LAST MODIFIED OR LAST ADJUSTED WITHOUT FURTHER
APPLICATION OF ANY PARTY. ALL PARTIES WILL RECEIVE NOTICE OF
ADJUSTMENT FINDINGS.
(3) WHERE ANY PARTY FAILS TO PROVIDE AND UPDATE UPON ANY
CHANGE THE SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT WITH A CURRENT ADDRESS, AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-THREE OF THE FAMILY COURT
ACT TO WHICH AN ADJUSTED ORDER CAN BE SENT, THE SUPPORT OBLIGATION
AMOUNT CONTAINED THEREIN SHALL BECOME DUE AND OWING ON THE DATE
THE FIRST PAYMENT IS DUE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE ORDER OF SUPPORT
WHICH WAS REVIEWED AND ADJUSTED OCCURRING ON OR AFTER [*17]THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ORDER, REGARDLESS OF
WHETHER OR NOT THE PARTY HAS RECEIVED A COPY OF THE ADJUSTED ORDER.
PURSUANT TO SECTION 1113 OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, AN APPEAL
FROM THIS ORDER MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THE ORDER
BY APPELLANT IN COURT, 35 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILING OF THE ORDER
TO APPELLANT BY THE CLERK OF COURT, OR 30 DAYS AFTER SERVICE BY A
PARTY OR THE LAW GUARDIAN UPON THE APPELLANT, WHICHEVER IS
EARLIEST.
DATED: August 31, 2009
Yonkers, New York
ENTER
Hon. Colleen D. Duffy
Judge of the Family Court
Footnotes
Footnote 1: On February 9, 2007, the
Support Magistrate issued a money judgment against Respondent totalling $67,225.00 —
$67,200.00 for arrears and $25.00 for costs and disbursements. The Court's file does not have a
certified copy of the February 9, 2007 money judgment nor is there a notice of entry from the
clerk of Westchester County.
Footnote 2: The Order of Dismissal,
entered May 14, 2007, by the Support Magistrate contains two "ORDERED" paragraphs. The
first ORDERED paragraphs states that the "petition is dismissed with prejudice." The second
ORDERED paragraph states that the "within petition be and hereby is dismissed without
prejudice for failure to proceed as not ready." The Support Magistrate's Findings of Fact, dated
May 9, 2007, states, in pertinent part, "the within petition be and hereby is dismissed without
prejudice for failure to proceed." See Order of Dismissal, entered May 14, 2007 and
Findings, dated May 9, 2007. In light of the subsequent proceedings that occurred before the
Support Magistrate, this Court deems Respondent's First Downward Modification Petition to
have been dismissed without prejudice. The Court also remits the matter to the Support
Magistrate to issue an amended corrected Order for that proceeding.
Footnote 3:
On June 4, 2007, Respondent filed a motion for leave to appeal the Support
Magistrate's denial of his Order to Show Cause and to stay the hearing. The Appellate Division
denied the leave to appeal.
Footnote 4: The Modified 2007 Order,
signed on August 29, 2007, that is in the Court's file does not have a notice of entry.
Footnote 5: The Court file reveals that
the Support Magistrate's October 1, 2007 Order of Disposition has no notice of entry.
Footnote 6: No referral of the willful
violation determination was ever made to this Court by the Support Magistrate for a
confirmation hearing on the Support Magistrate's finding of willfulness by Respondent's with
respect to Respondent's failure to provide the requisite life insurance.
Footnote 7: Specifically, the Support
Magistrate noted in his Findings issued with the Order on Motion Granting Counsel Fees,
entered November 17, 2008, that "[h]ad anyone been present for Respondent, it is more likely
than not that the Court would have at least entertained the claims of opposition, but no one
appeared . . ." Findings, dated 10/28/09 and 11/13/08.
Footnote 8: The January 2008 Order of
Dismissal contains two "ORDERED" paragraphs; the first states that "the petition is dismissed
without prejudice"; the second indicates that "the relief sought in the within Petition for
Downward Modification be and hereby is denied and the application is dismissed with prejudice
after a hearing on October 26, 2007." The January 2008 Order of Dismissal is dated and signed
as of December 16, 2007. The text of the Support Magistrate's Findings of Fact, which are dated
and signed by the Support Magistrate as of November 28, 2007, are preceded by a statement that
provides that "Order to enter herein that the relief sought in the within Petition for Downward
Modification be and hereby is denied and the application is dismissed with prejudice after a
hearing on October 26, 2007." There is no further mention in the actual findings of whether or
not the Second Downward Modification Petition is dismissed with or without
prejudice.Accordingly, the Court remits the matter to the Support Magistrate to issue an
amended corrected order consistent with his determination.
Footnote 9: The Court notes that these
objections have been pending for an inordinate length of time and expresses regret for that to
litigants and counsel. However, the Court spent hundreds of hours reviewing the voluminous
submissions by counsel, listened to hours of court audio transcripts of the proceedings before the
Support Magistrate, read written transcripts of the June 1 and July 9, 2007 proceedings, and
scoured volumes of court files, counsel's correspondence to the court and Support Magistrate's
notes in preparing this decision and order.
Footnote 10: It is, however, as noted
further herein, one of the bases upon which the Court is granting Respondent's motion to vacate
the award of counsel fees.
Footnote 11: The numerous
irregularities in the various Orders issued by the Support Magistrate, as noted herein in the
procedural history, also are reasons why those matters are being remanded to the Support
Magistrate for correction and/or issuance of amended orders.
Footnote 12: Indeed, this Court finds
that the father's death just days before the hearing, in and of itself, constitutes a reasonable
excuse for the default.
Footnote 13: The Modified 2007
Order also is vacated.
Footnote 14: The Findings that are
attached to the entered Order on Motion Granting Counsel Fees contain two dates near the
Support Magistrate's signature; the first is typed as "10/28/08"; the second is a handwritten
notation beneath the Support Magistrate's signature "11/13/08". There is no indication in the
document as to who placed the handwritten date on the document or why.
Footnote 15: As noted previously,
although Respondent did not appear on December 1, 2006, he was not required to do so as no
service had been effected conferring jurisdiction over him. He cannot be penalized for not
appearing when jurisdiction yet had not been conferred. See Sutton v. Mundy, 24 AD3d
464, 810 NYS2d 185 (3d Dep't 2005).
Footnote 16: The Court notes that the
Support Magistrate failed to recognize that the orders underlying the proceedings are rife with
errors — typographical or otherwise — that appear to have caused additional
attorney time and attention.
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