People v Harrington

[*1] People v Harrington 2009 NY Slip Op 51455(U) [24 Misc 3d 1214(A)] Decided on July 9, 2009 Supreme Court, Kings County D'Emic, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on July 9, 2009
Supreme Court, Kings County

The People of the State of New York

against

Jeanine Harrington, Defendant.



5143/07



Attorney for the People:

ADA Cynthia Lynch

Office of District Attorney, Kings County

350 Jay Street

Brooklyn, NY 11201

(718)-250-2000

Attorney for the Defendant:

Jesse Young, Esq.

790 Washington Avenue, Suite 216

Brooklyn, NY 11238

(718)-772-4903

Matthew J. D'Emic, J.

Defendant is charged with the murder of her boyfriend by running him over with her husband's car early in the morning of May 29, 2007. She challenges the voluntariness of statements made by her to the police on the grounds that drug use and sleep deprivation shut down her will and capacity for self-determination (see: People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35).

FINDINGS OF FACT

At about 6:30 in the morning of May 29, 2007, Police Officer Arnold Nickey, assigned to drive his sergeant at the 73rd Precinct, received a call to respond to an accident on the corner of Rockaway Avenue and Chauncey Street. At the scene information about the driver of the car involved in the accident along with a description of the driver was imparted. Shortly after arriving he was called to 27 Marconi Place, about seven blocks away, where the suspect was spotted by Police Officer John Iles and his partner. Meanwhile back at the 73rd Precinct, Police Officer Edwin Perez received a call from a hysterical, crying woman stating "I just ran over somebody" with nothing more. Within seconds the desk sergeant received a 911 dispatch of the [*2]accident at Rockaway Avenue and Chauncey Street.

Back at 27 Marconi Place, Officer Nickey knocked on the door and attempted to gain access. The defendant appeared in an upstairs window and told him she was getting dressed and would be right down. She came out a bit later and told the officer "I was driving the vehicle." Police Officer Iles drove her to the precinct. Detective John Ulmer took pedigree information and Detective Timothy O'Gorman proceeded to interview Ms. Harrington.

Detective O'Gorman introduced himself and read the defendant her Miranda rights. Ms. Harrington answered yes, wrote yes next to each question and signed the sheet. When asked to write her statement she told the detectives she was too upset and asked the police to write what she said. It was memorialized in this fashion. Ms. Harrington read and signed the statement at about 9:00 in the morning. At 2:15 PM she made a videotaped statement to an assistant district attorney after again being advised of her rights. This statement was consistent with her morning statement. In substance, defendant said she had a fight with her boyfriend over drugs. He then threatened her, got on his bike and left. She followed him in her husband's car intending to scare him, but mistaking the gas pedal for the brake, ran him over. During the interview she admitted to smoking a crack pipe and being up all night. This apparently caused Ms. Harrington to fall asleep during the questioning, forcing the questions to arouse her in order to get an answer. Detective Ulmer testified that she nodded out during his pedigree questioning as well.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Since the defendant was not in custody at the time of her spontaneous and unsolicited statements to Police Officer Perez and Police Officer Nickey, they will not be suppressed. Although the caller to the precinct did not identify herself to Officer Perez; since the defendant in her subsequent statements admitted to calling the 73rd Precinct and then 911, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to admit the call.

The defense argues that drug use and lack of sleep renders the statements to the police and district attorney involuntary. The mere fact that a confession is made under such circumstances however, does not necessarily render the admission inadmissible. It is a factor to be considered in determining whether the confession was, in fact, the product of a rational intellect and a free will.

The testimony of the police officers and detectives who saw Ms. Harrington as well as her appearance on camera, all suggest that she was aware of her surroundings and able cogently to answer questions posed to her. She did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or strung-out at the time of her interview. She sat up straight, adjusted herself appropriately and responded properly to open-ended questions. Detective Ulmer received the right answers about her pedigree and Detective O'Gorman testified that the defendant's statement was a narrative - so complete that it was, in part, exculpatory. Even after falling asleep in the video, the defendant, when aroused, gave answers without needing the questions repeated.

Under the totality of these circumstances, it is clear that Ms. Harrington knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived her rights. Moreover, she called the precinct and 911 and, throughout the day, her statements were totally consistent. (See: People v Coad, 60 AD3d 963; People v Arevalo, 54 AD3d 380; People v Williams, 40 AD3d 1364; People v Millington, 37 AD3d 350; People v Iddings, 23 AD3d 1132; People v Dlugos, 237 AD2d 754; State v Batiste, 956 So. 2d 626; McDougal v State, 748 SW2d 340; State v Madera, 554 AD2d 263; Campbell v [*3]State, 444 So.2d 913).

The police had received a description of the driver of the car as a black female with prominent freckles, as well as the location in which she lived. Police Officer Iles, witnessing the defendant, who matched that description, upon observing her enter 27 Marconi Place acted properly in calling for additional officers. These facts, together with Ms. Harrington's statement to Officer Nickey that she was the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident certainly gave the police sufficient cause to arrest the defendant.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.

____________________________

Matthew J. D'Emic

J.S.C.