Matter of Laurel Hill Farms Inc. v Board of Assessors of Nassau County

[*1] Matter of Laurel Hill Farms Inc. v Board of Assessors of Nassau County 2006 NY Slip Op 52676(U) [21 Misc 3d 1143(A)] Decided on May 1, 2006 Supreme Court, Nassau County LaMarca, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 1, 2006
Supreme Court, Nassau County

In the Matter of the Application of Laurel Hill Farms, Inc., Petitioner, In a proceeding pursuant to Civil Practice Laws and Rules Article 78

against

The Board of Assessors of Nassau County and The County of Nassau, Respondents.



12126/05



Jaspan Schlesinger Hoffman LLP

Attorneys for Petitioner

300 Garden City Plaza

Garden City, NY 11530

Lorna B. Goodman, Esq.

County Attorney

Attorney for Respondent

One West Street

Mineola, NY 11501

William R. LaMarca, J.

In this Article 78 proceeding, petitioner, LAUREL HILL FARMS, INC. (hereinafter referred to as "LAUREL HILL"), petitions the Court for a judgment declaring that LAUREL HILL is entitled to an agricultural assessment of the entirety of a parcel of property consisting of approximately 122 acres in Cove Neck, New York, pursuant to Agricultural and Market Law (AML) §305, and for a review of LAUREL HILL's application for such an assessment and a direction to the BOARD OF ASSESSORS that it recalculate the agricultural assessment of said property for the 2005/2006 tax year. Respondents, THE BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF NASSAU COUNTY AND THE COUNTY OF NASSAU (hereinafter referred to as the "COUNTY"), oppose the petition, which is determined as follows:

Background

LAUREL HILL FARMS is identified on the Land and Tax Map of Nassau County as Section 26, Block A, Lots 280, 281, 811 and 46, with a total of 122.3 acres, but the controversy primarily concerns Lots 280 and 811 with a total of 116.88 acres (hereinafter referred to as the "subject property"). Counsel for petitioner, whose principal acquired the subject property in 1980, relates that, over the years, the land has been used for various agricultural purposes, including raising farm animals and growing vegetables, fruits and berries, and that LAUREL HILL had never previously applied for an agricultural [*2]assessment on the subject property as the tax burden had been relatively reasonable. However, it appears that after the County wide reassessment in 2003, when the local and real estate taxes increased to six figures, LAUREL HILL's principal, Barry Yampol, decided to increase the subject property's agricultural use in order to qualify for an agricultural assessment in an effort to hold the property as open space. He claims to have invested over $500,000.00 in installing and maintaining 7 to 8 acres of barns, stables, paddocks and housing, and improving the remaining 110 acres with 5 ½ miles of riding trails, containing jumps, barricades and obstacles, all for the purpose of training horses for the equestrian sport of Eventing.

Yampol describes Eventing as the Grand Prix of the equestrian world, which involves three (3) day competitions in which riders put their mounts through different equestrian disciplines such as dressage (precision drills), hunting (jumping) and cross-country. He claims that the subject property is ideal for Eventing as it contains 122 acres of rolling land with wandering cross-country trails upon which the race and training are conducted. He states that LAUREL HILL has engaged a professional Event Rider to advise them in the purchase and training of top quality horses, which are then sold, and that the entire subject property is used in this training, which produced approximately $40,000.00 in gross agricultural sales of trained horses in LAUREL HILL's first year of operation.

Counsel for LAUREL HILL states that the entire subject property, minus the land underlying improvements, is eligible for an agricultural assessment pursuant to AML §305. He claims that, on December 28, 2004, a timely application for an agricultural assessment was filed with the COUNTY and, on April 1, 2005, the COUNTY partially granted said application as to 57.05 acres (50 acres of farm woodland and 7.05 acres for training and selling horses) and not the 116.88 acres as requested. It is LAUREL HILLS's position that the COUNTY erroneously calculated the agricultural assessment to exclude approximately 59 acres of unimproved land and that the COUNTY's action in partially denying LAUREL HILL's application was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious.

In opposition to the petition, the COUNTY sets forth the pertinent sections of the Agricultural and Market Law which are applicable to the valuation and assessment of land used in agricultural production. AML §301(4) defines "Land used in agricultural production" as "not less than seven acres of land used as a single operation in the preceding two years for the production for sale of crops, livestock or livestock products of an average gross sales value of ten thousand dollars or more . . .". Land used in agricultural production also includes farm woodland which is part of land which is qualified for an agricultural assessment, not to exceed fifty acres. AML §301(4)(d). AML §305 details the annual application process, on a prescribed form, to demonstrate the eligibility for agricultural assessment of any land. The COUNTY states that, based upon surveys and worksheets, submitted by petitioner and reviewed by the COUNTY, it determined that 7.05 acres of the subject property was eligible as agricultural land, that 50 acres was eligible as farm woodland, and that 65.25 was ineligible as excess farm woodland. It is the COUNTY's position that LAUREL HILL received an agricultural assessment on that portion of its land that qualified for said assessment. More importantly, however, the COUNTY asserts that in order for LAUREL HILL to commence a timely challenge to the COUNTY's determination, it is limited to filing an Article 7 petition which must be submitted within 30 [*3]days after the final tax assessment roll was published. The COUNTY argues that the form of the instant petition is procedurally improper and untimely.

The Law

As a general rule, a taxpayer who challenges a property assessment is relegated to a tax certiorari proceeding brought under the provisions of Article 7 of the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) for the review of assessments. Krugman v Board of Assessors of Atlantic Beach, 141 AD2d 175, 533 NYS2d 495 (2nd Dept. 1988), citing Hewlett Associates v City of New York, 57 NY2d 356, 456 NYS2d 704, 442 NE2d 1215 (C.A. 1982) and Matter of 22 Park Place Coop. v Board of Assessors, 102 AD2d 893, 476 NYS2d 935 (2nd Dept. 1984). RPTL 702(2) contains a very short Statute of Limitations of 30 days designed to facilitate the expeditious resolution of taxpayers' challenges to their own property assessments . . . Thus, where a proceeding to review an assessment is improperly brought as a CPLR article 78 proceeding or a declaratory judgment action and RPTL article 7 is found to provide the exclusive means for judicial review, the proceeding risks dismissal as being time barred. In those instances, the 30-day Statute of Limitations (RPTL 702) would govern, rather than the four-month period of CPLR 217 applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedings or the six-year residual period of limitations contained in CPLR 213(1) generally applicable to declaratory judgment actions . . . ( Citations omitted).

Krugman v Board of Assessors of Atlantic Beach, supra .

RPTL §704 sets forth the grounds for review of an assessment which may be founded upon an assertion that the assessment is "excessive, unequal or unlawful, or that property is misclassified". Said grounds are the exclusive jurisdiction of RPTL Article 7 proceedings, however, two (2) exceptions to the general rule exist: 1) when the petitioner is challenging the jurisdiction of the taxing authority, or 2) when the tax itself is claimed to be unconstitutional. Krugman v Board of Assessors of Atlantic Beach, supra ; Hewlett Associates v City of New York, supra ; Matter of 22 Park Place Coop. v Board of Assessors, supra . "Furthermore, a taxpayer may properly forego the statutory certiorari procedure and mount a collateral attack on the taxing authority's action if the challenge is to the method employed in the assessment involving several properties rather than the overvaluation or undervaluation of specific properties". Krugman v Board of Assessors of Atlantic Beach, supra .

Discussion

After a careful reading of the submissions herein, it is the judgment of the Court that LAUREL HILL's challenge to the partial assessment granted by the COUNTY is limited to a RPTL Article 7 proceeding which is governed by a thirty-day Statute of Limitations and that the instant petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 is untimely. Although counsel for LAUREL HILL asserts that a CPLR Article 78 proceeding is proper in that he seeks "to attack this fundamental illegality of assessment" and "the municipality's methodology or [*4]interpretation of statute", he has not demonstrated that LAUREL HILL falls within any of the exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction of RPTL Article 7. The petitioner is not challenging the jurisdiction of the taxing authority nor claiming that the tax itself is unconstitutional. He simply seeks to have the COUNTY recalculate the agricultural assessment on the specific property of LAUREL HILL FARMS which, in essence he contends has been "misclassified" and "overvalued". A CPLR Article 78 proceeding is not available to review a complaint of overvaluation and the instant proceeding is not capable of conversion to a RPTL Article 7 proceeding pursuant to CPLR § 103 (c) because it was not commenced within the time specified for such a proceeding. Cathedral Fourth Development Corp. v Board of Assessors, 25 AD3d 693, 811 NYS2d 728 (2nd Dept. 2006). Although AML §305 does not provide specific directions for challenging an agricultural assessment, it is the Court's view that in directing notice to applicants "[n]ot less than ten days prior to the date for hearing complaints in relation to assessments", the legislature contemplated a tax certiorari proceeding under RPTL Article 7. Cf., Sidman v Town of Lewisboro, 29 Misc 2d 622, 493 NYS2d 725 (Sup. Westchester Co. 1985). Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED, that LAUREL HILL's petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 is dismissed.

All further requested relief not specifically granted is denied.

This constitutes the decision and judgment of the Court.

Dated: May 1, 2006

__________________________

WILLIAM R. LaMARCA, J.S.C.

TO:

laurelhillfarms-nassau,#

01/taxassessment