Matter of City of Utica v Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union 182

[*1] Matter of City of Utica v Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union 182 2006 NY Slip Op 52623(U) [21 Misc 3d 1109(A)] Decided on October 5, 2006 Supreme Court, Oneida County Hester, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected in part through October 21, 2008; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on October 5, 2006
Supreme Court, Oneida County

Application of the City of Utica, Petitioner, For an Order Pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR Staying Arbitration

against

Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union 182, Respondent.



CA2006-001145



Corporation Counsel

By: Charles N. Brown, Esq.

Attorney for Petitioner City of Utica

One Kennedy Plaza

Utica, NY 13502

Blitman & King, LLP

By: Nathaniel G. Lambright, Esq.

Attorney for Respondent Teamsters, Chauffeurs,

Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union 182

Franklin Center, Suite 300

443 N. Franklin Street

Syracuse, NY 13204

Samuel D. Hester, J.

Petitioner moves for a stay of arbitration and vacating of the demand for arbitration on the grounds that no agreement to arbitrate exists, and if it does, then respondent has failed to comply with a condition precedent within the terms of the agreement to arbitrate. Respondent argues that the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue presented in the grievance, that respondent did not fail to comply with a condition precedent to arbitration and that the petition should be dismissed and the matter proceed to arbitration.

The Court has considered the Notice of Petition to Stay Arbitration dated June 12, 2006; the Petition verified on the same date and the exhibits annexed thereto; the Affidavit of Charles N. Brown, Esq. sworn to on the 12th day of June, 2006 and the exhibits annexed thereto; the Affidavit of William Shrader, Commissioner of Public Works for the City of Utica, sworn to on the 12th day of June, 2006; the Verified Answer dated July 14, 2006; the Affidavit of Nathaniel G. Lambright, Esq. in opposition to the Petition sworn to on the 14th day of July, 2006 and the exhibits annexed thereto; the Affidavit of John Wilk in opposition to the Petition sworn to on the 5th day of July, 2006; and the Reply Affidavit of William Shrader sworn to on the 18th day of July, 2006.

The Petition involves a disciplinary matter concerning an employee of the City of Utica (petitioner) Department of Public Works. The employee is represented by the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union 182 (respondent) pursuant to a written Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for the term April 1, 2004 through March 31, 2007. The employee was hired on June 26, 2005, promoted to the position of truck driver on January 30, 2006 and subsequently promoted to the position of heavy equipment operator on March 27, 2006. The petitioner terminated his employment on March 28, 2006. On May 23, 2006, respondent presented a demand for arbitration of the matter alleging that the employee was terminated without just cause and in violation of agreed upon progressive discipline steps. Respondent argues that progressive discipline is authorized by Article XIV of the CBA. It is petitioner's position that the provisions of Article XIV do not apply to an employee unless he has completed the twelve month probationary period. It argues that until the employee has completed the twelve month probationary period measured either from his initial hire date or his promotion date that he is an "at will" employee and may be removed without cause and without being subject to the "just cause" provision or the arbitration provisions of the contract. The employee was terminated before the expiration of twelve months from his date of hire; thus, petitioner argues that the termination is not arbitrable. In the alternative, petitioner argues that even if there is an agreement to arbitrate, respondent has failed to timely comply with the arbitration requirements, since Article XIV specifies that respondent must file the demand for arbitration within fifteen work days after imposition of the discipline that is being reviewed.

The Court's analysis in this matter is governed by Article 75 of the CPLR. Specifically, § 7501 provides that "[i]n determining any matter arising under this article, the court shall not consider whether the claim with respect to which arbitration is sought is tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute." Thus, the Court's role in reviewing applications to stay [*2]arbitration is a limited one and it is not the Court's role to interpret substantive provisions of the contract or to pass on the merits of the dispute. See Matter of Enlarged City School Dist. of Troy (Troy Teachers Assn.), 69 NY2d 905, 906 [1987].

In 1977 the Court of Appeals decided Matter of Acting Superintendent of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. (United Liverpool Faculty Association) (42 NY2d 509 [1977]) which established a methodology for determining whether a public sector grievance is subject to arbitration. This analysis requires the Court to engage in a two step inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether the arbitration claims concerning this particular subject matter are authorized by the Taylor Law, New York Civil Service Law Article 14. The next step concerns "whether such authority was in fact exercised and whether the parties did agree by the terms of their particular arbitration clause to refer their differences in this specific area to arbitration." See Matter of Board of Educ. (Watertown Educ. Assn.) and Matter of Indian Riv. Cent. School Dist. (Passino), 93 NY2d 132, 137-138 [1999].

The parties to this grievance do not argue that public policy restricts the arbitration of this matter; therefore, the Court considers the first prong of the "Liverpool Two-Step Format" to be resolved. Next, the Court must determine whether the present complaint falls within the contract definition of grievance and whether the parties agreed to arbitrate this particular grievance. Article XVI of the CBA addresses the grievance procedure. Section 1 defines grievance as "a claimed violation of a specific term of this Collective Bargaining Agreement in its application or interpretation by the employer." The remainder of the article goes on to set forth the procedures to be utilized to bring a matter to arbitration. Using the "Liverpool" analysis, the Court must determine whether the agreement to arbitrate contained within the CBA is broad or narrow. The parties to this agreement have executed an unambiguous agreement to arbitrate. It is broad in its scope by its very terms in that it applies to the employer's application or interpretation of the agreement. See generally Matter of Board of Educ. (Watertown Educ. Assn.), 93 NY2d 132 [1999]; Board of Educ. v Barni, 49 NY2d 311 [1980]. The employee's claim in this matter falls squarely within the class of claims to be arbitrated because it implies a violation of the agreement. Further, if the matter in dispute bears a "reasonable relationship" to some general subject matter of the CBA, it is for the arbitrator not the courts to decide whether the specific disputed matter falls within the CBA. See Matter of Uniform Firefighters v City of Cohoes, 94 NY2d 686, 694 [2000].

Petitioner argues that the Court should determine the parties' intent with regard to the specific terms contained within Article XIV of the CBA. Thus, if the Court were to decide that the twelve month probationary period runs anew from the date of each promotion, this particular grievance would not be arbitrable. However, it is not the Court's duty to examine the scope of the substantive provisions of the contract to determine whether this particular grievance falls within the scope of Article XIV. This is a matter of contract interpretation and because the CBA contains a broad arbitration clause, the question must be resolved by the arbitrator. See Board of Educ. v Barni, 49 NY2d at 314-315.

Petitioner argues that even if the Court finds that the parties agreed to arbitrate this dispute, then it should go on to determine that respondent failed to comply with a condition precedent in that it failed to comply with the specific time limits set forth in Article XIV. Since the Court has determined that the arbitration clause of Article XVI is broad enough to encompass [*3]the general subject of this dispute, the question of the scope of the substantive provision is a matter for resolution by the arbitrator. Therefore, if it is petitioner's argument that a condition precedent to the grievance being submitted to arbitration is the probationary or non-probationary status of the employee, that is for the arbitrator to decide (id.). If petitioner is arguing that respondent failed to comply with the time limits contained within Article XIV, as compared to the time limits contained within Article XVI, that too is a matter for the arbitrator to resolve. Compliance with contractual step-by-step grievance procedures have been determined to be matters of procedural arbitrability and are to be resolved by the arbitrator, especially when the parties have agreed to a broad arbitration clause. See Matter of Enlarged City School Dist. (Troy Teachers Assn.), 69 NY2d at 905, 907; see also Matter of Kachris v Sterling, 239 AD2d 887, 888 [4th Dept 1997].

Thus, based on the foregoing, the petition seeking a stay of the arbitration in the instant matter is denied and the petition is hereby dismissed.

Now, therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the petition is denied and dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent's counsel is directed to file this Decision, Order and Judgment, and the underlying papers, with the Oneida County Clerk's Office within ten days of the date of this Decision, Order and Judgment and to serve a filed copy, with notice of entry thereon, upon petitioner's counsel within ten days of the date of filing.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision, Order and Judgment of the Court.

E N T E R.

Dated:October 5, 2006__________________________________________

at Rome, New York.Hon. Samuel D. Hester

Justice of the Supreme Court