People v Cruz
Annotate this CaseDecided on February 14, 2006
Supreme Court, New York County
The People of the State of New York,
against
Luis Cruz, Defendant.
0633/05
Robert M. Stolz, J.
Defendant Cruz is charged with one count of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the First Degree and two counts of Criminally Using Drug Paraphernalia in the Second Degree. He moves to suppress approximately 56 kilograms of cocaine seized at the time of his arrest. The cocaine was seized from a knapsack that he had been carrying, from a locked container and from a room. All of the items were within the confines of Cruz Ironworks, defendant's factory/warehouse at the time they were seized. Pursuant to defendant's motion, a suppression hearing was held before me at which the issues of probable cause for the defendant's arrest and the legality of the warrantless search of the warehouse were litigated.
The probable cause for defendant's arrest was based upon information provided by a confidential informant. Upon the application of the People, that issue was litigated ex parte and in camera, the court being satisfied that a public hearing would endanger the life of the informant and future investigations. At the hearing, the People called one witness, Detective Rodriguez. The informant did not testify at the hearing, nor was his testimony sought by the defense at that time. Defense counsel was afforded the opportunity to submit questions to the court to be posed at the hearing and was advised of the responses to them, to the extent that that could be done without endangering the informant or future investigations. See People v. Castillo, 80 NY2d 578 (1992); People v. Darden, 34 NY2d 177 (1974); People v. Merijildo, 305 AD2d 143 (1st Dept 2003). A record was kept of the in camera proceedings and has been sealed. Based upon the in camera testimony of Detective Rodriguez, the court determined that there was probable cause for the arrest of the defendant, which immediately preceded the search of the premises.
Thereafter, defense counsel contested the existence of the informant and requested that the court conduct a hearing pursuant to People v. Darden, supra. The court granted defendant's application for such a hearing and directed the People to produce the informant or show why he [*2]or she was unavailable and could not be produced by the People with due diligence. See People v. Edwards, 95 NY2d 486 (2000). As directed, the People presented the in camera testimony of Detective Clancy, which established to my satisfaction that, in fact, the informant was unavailable and could not be produced by the People with due diligence. Defense counsel again submitted questions that were posed at this supplemental hearing, which was transcribed under seal. Based upon all of the foregoing and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence at the in camera proceedings, the court has determined that the informant in this case existed, was reliable and in fact provided the information to Detective Rodriguez that gave rise to the probable cause in this case.
Probable cause having been found, the court then conducted a public suppression hearing at which the People called one witness, Detective Kevin Roy. Defense counsel fully cross-examined this witness. Detective Roy testified to the search of Cruz Ironworks and the seizure of the drugs herein. He is a fifteen-year veteran of the Police Department and a member of the Red Rum Unit of the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force, assigned to the investigation of major narcotics offenses and violent crimes associated with them. I find him to be a credible witness and, based upon his testimony, in addition to those findings made in camera , I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Findings of Fact
On January 27, 2005, at approximately 6:00 pm, defendant Cruz was arrested by agents of the Drug Enforcement Task Force outside of Cruz Ironworks, a warehouse/factory owned by the defendant at 150-29 107th Street in Queens, New York. As noted above, this arrest was based upon probable cause derived from a confidential informant. As the arresting officers approached the defendant on the street in front of the warehouse, he threw a knapsack which he was carrying, and which the officers knew contained a large quantity of narcotics, over an opaque fence. Approximately one hour earlier, a surveillance team had observed the defendant leave the warehouse with the knapsack.. The knapsack landed in an open-air yard within the confines of the Cruz Ironworks. The yard itself was bordered by two structures within the Ironworks, number 150-29 being an office facility on the left side of the yard, and number 150-29B another building on the right side of the yard.
After securing the defendant, Detective Roy climbed atop a parked car, from which vantage point he was able to see a tumultuous scene unfolding within the yard. In the words of the detective, he saw "three individuals running all over the place...and two big dogs that were going crazy in there." Within five or ten minutes, the officers were admitted to the Ironworks through the door of 150-29. Unaware of the number of people or dogs who might be within the premises, and confronted immediately with "barking and snapping" dogs in the area of the knapsack, the officers sought to secure the premises for their own safety. To that end, the officers instructed one of the individuals to secure the dogs. The officers next arrested the three individuals before beginning a protective security sweep of the premises. The last of these three individuals was arrested in the yard near the knapsack, which was resting near a dumpster, within 10-15 feet of that individual. After hancuffing this individual, Detective Roy immediately retrieved the knapsack, opened it and recovered two kilograms of cocaine from inside. [*3]
Having secured the two kilograms of cocaine, the officers, who were unaware of whether there were other persons within the premises who might pose a danger to them, conducted a security sweep of the Ironworks. The officers began their sweep through the first floor of 150-29B and, discovering nothing, they continued the sweep through the second floor. Entering through a "wide-open" door, they encountered a cocaine laboratory of substantial proportions. On the floor were kilo presses, microwave ovens, strainers and plastic baggies. On a table were approximately 25 kilograms of cocaine; another kilogram was in the cocaine press; and several other kilograms were resting in an open tote bag. All of these items were in plain view. Securing these items, the officers returned to the first floor of that building and conducted a search.
In the course of that search the officers encountered a large "Husky" brand toolbox which was locked with a padlock. Although it was very heavy, the toolbox was on wheels. At the time defendant Cruz was arrested, the officers had seized his keys. Having determined that one of those keys fit the padlock, the officers opened the toolbox and seized an additional 24 kilograms of cocaine. Opposite the toolbox was a safe, which the officers seized and ultimately
searched pursuant to a search warrant the only warrant obtained in connection with these seizures.
Conclusions of Law
Defendant has moved to suppress all of the drugs that were seized as set forth above; to wit: (1) the two kilograms recovered from the knapsack; (2) the approximately thirty kilograms seized from the upstairs laboratory in 150-29B; and (3) the twenty-four kilograms seized from the toolbox on the first floor of 150-29B. He argues that the entry and sweep through the premises was unlawful without a warrant and that, even if the warrantless entry was lawful, the subsequent warantless opening of the knapsack and toolbox was unlawful. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
1.The Entry
Quite clearly, there was neither time nor opportunity for the officers to obtain a search warrant prior to entering the Ironworks. The defendant had just thrown a package which the officers knew to contain a substantial amount of narcotics into the premises. They were able to observe people and dogs inside the premises "running all over the place". Having previously observed the defendant emerge from the Ironworks with the knapsack one hour earlier, they reasonably and properly concluded that the persons inside the Ironworks were confederates of the defendant, who would be likely to remove or destroy the contraband that the defendant had just thrown over the wall. This gave rise to exigent circumstances justifying an immediate and warrantless entry to seize the drugs. People v. Smith, 302 AD2d 410 (2nd Dept. 2003) lv den 99 NY2d 632 (2003); People v. Kelly, 261 AD2d 133 (1st Dept. 1999) lv den 94 NY2d 824 (1999).
2.The Protective Sweep
Upon entering the Ironworks, the officers confronted a confused and menacing circumstance. Presumed co-conspirators of the defendant were "running all over the place", and menacing dogs were barking and snapping. All of this was occurring on the heels of a major drug arrest. The environment in which this occurred was decidedly uncertain: it was night, and the layout of the Ironworks was unknown to the officers. Likewise, there was no way of knowing how many others who might pose a danger to the officers or the evidence might be [*4]within the premises. Under these circumstances, the officers were entitled to conduct a protective sweep through the premises, including both structures and the yard in between, to insure their own safety. People v. Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173 (1976); People v. Lasso-Reina, 305 AD2d 121 (1st Dept 2003) lv den 100 NY2d 595 (2003); People v. Rivera, 257 AD2d 425 (1st Dept 1999) lv den 93 NY2d 901 (1999); see generally US v. Rudaj, 390 F Supp 2d 395 (SDNY 2005).
3.The Knapsack
As noted, immediately prior to his arrest, defendant hurled a knapsack, which the officers knew to contain a substantial amount of narcotics, over the wall and into the yard of the Ironworks. Upon entering the Ironworks, the officers confronted circumstances which can fairly be described as exigent. Thus, in addition to subduing at least three apparent confederates of the defendant and two large guard dogs, the officers needed to secure the premises, satisfy themselves that no one was there who could threaten them, and secure and safeguard the drugs that the defendant had just jettisoned. All of this had to be accomplished in an unknown environment at night.
Certainly there was probable cause to seize the knapsack the officers knew it contained a significant quantity of narcotics. Further, under these circumstances, I find that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by the opening of the knapsack without a warrant. This determination is made after weighing "the degree of intrusion that the search entailed against the precipitating and attending circumstances" set forth above, focusing "on whether the police conduct was reasonable in view of the totality of the circumstances." People v. Anderson, 17 AD3d 166, 167 (1st Dept 2005). The legality of this warrantless seizure is supported by what the Court of Appeals has denominated as the "coexistence of two factors", both of which are present here. First, the seizure took place under exigent circumstances. Secondly, it was "specifically focused on a predetermined target [the knapsack], the predetermination of which was based on explicit information furnished" to the officers herein and confirmed by officers at the scene. People v. Clements, 37 NY2d 675, 679 (1975).
Moreover, the opening of the knapsack under these circumstances was also proper as a search incident to the arrest of the various individuals at the Ironworks, particularly the last of the three individuals who was placed in custody immediately before the officers opened the knapsack, which was approximately ten to fifteen feet away from him in the open yard area. People v. Thomas, 291 AD2d 462, 464 (2nd Dept. 2002). The fact that the defendant and the others were arrested shortly before the knapsack was opened does not argue to the contrary, particularly in light of the fact that, as far as the police were aware, there might well have been others hidden on the premises who could threaten them or the integrity of the evidence. Rather, for compelling reasons I find present here, that is, the safety of the officers and the preservation of easily-destroyed evidence, a search " not significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest' may be conducted even though the arrested person has been subdued and his closed container is within the exclusive control of the police [citation omitted]." People v. Smith, 59 NY2d 454, 458 (1983).
Finally, in this regard, the People argue that the defendant abandoned the knapsack by throwing it over the wall into the Ironworks, which was subsequently determined by the police to be his property. In light of the court's determination that the seizure and warrantless opening of [*5]the knapsack were legal for the reasons set forth above, I do not reach this issue.
4.The Second Floor
As held above, the officers were entitled to conduct a protective sweep of the premises, including the second floor of 150-29B. In the course of that sweep, they seized some 30 kilograms of cocaine and a quantity of narcotics paraphernalia. The incriminating nature of these objects was readily apparent. All of these items were in plain view in an area where the officers were entitled to be. Accordingly, their seizure was entirely lawful. See Horton v. California, 496 US 128, 136-7 (1990); People v. Lasso-Reina, supra.; People v. White, 259 AD2d 400 (1st Dept 1999) lv den 93 NY2d 1029 (1999).
5.The Toolbox
The search of the toolbox and the seizure of cocaine from within it, rests on a considerably less secure footing than the other seizures in this case. As Detective Roy testified, the officers returned to the toolbox as part of a "search" after the protective sweep was concluded and after any exigencies associated with these events had run their course. Physically, the box was a large, heavy metal chest, which could not possibly have contained any items subject to imminent destruction, or anything or anyone that might have posed a danger to the officers. It was padlocked and therefore completely secure, and it could only be opened with the key that the officers had seized from the defendant at the time he was arrested.
Tellingly, the toolbox was in the same room as a safe that the officers secured but did not open until they had in fact obtained a search warrant to do so. Thus, there was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant for the toolbox without compromising any legitimate law enforcement interest. I find that in all material legal respects, the toolbox was identical to that safe under the Fourth Amendment. Absent an exception to the warrant requirement, the officers were required to obtain a search warrant to open this locked container, just as they did for the safe. People v. Smith, 59 NY2d at 458; People v. Ernest E., 38 AD2d 394 (2nd Dept 1972) aff'd 30 NY2d 884 (1972)(closed safe). No such exception appearing on this record, I am constrained to suppress the drugs seized from within the toolbox.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion to suppress is denied, except to the extent that the drugs seized from the toolbox are suppressed. With respect to the drugs seized from the toolbox only, defendant's motion to suppress is granted. This case is adjourned to February 27, 2006 in Part 60 to set a trial date.
Dated: February 14, 2006 _____________________________
J.S.C.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
