LaGraff v Hamilton Coll.

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[*1] LaGraff v Hamilton Coll. 2005 NY Slip Op 52238(U) [10 Misc 3d 1074(A)] Decided on November 1, 2005 Supreme Court, Tompkins County Relihan, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law ยง 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on November 1, 2005
Supreme Court, Tompkins County

Re: John LaGraff, Petitioner -v- Hamilton College, Joan Stewart, President, Hamilton College; and David Paris, Vice President for Academic Affairs and Dean of the Faculty, Hamilton College, Respondents.



2005-0506

Walter J. Relihan, J.

This is an Article 78 proceeding in which petitioner, a former assistant professor at Hamilton College, seeks a judgment annulling his termination which followed a hearing and recommendation of a faculty tribunal.

The evidence against the petitioner, considered by the tribunal, included a sexual harassment complaint by a female student in petitioner's class. The complaint had been resolved informally in June 2003 with a written apology by petitioner to the student and a warning by the College that any further problem would result in his dismissal. Petitioner, in addition, apologized to the College Vice President and Dean of the faculty and vowed "It will not happen again".

In May of 2004, however, the College was informed by Cornell University police that petitioner was the subject of an ongoing investigation based on complaints of female students [*2]that a man, on the terrace outside Helen Newman hall, had been observing and filming their dance class while masturbating.

Thereafter, while keeping the building under surveillance, the officers encountered and confronted petitioner on the terrace, at 9:30 p.m. on May 18, 2004. He was carrying a camcorder and back pack. He told the officers that he was there to film the sunset over Beebe Lake. The sun had set an hour earlier. It is agreed that any afterglow, on that date, would have lasted no more than 20 minutes. He refused to allow the officer to view several of his video films. In the course of the questioning, it was discovered that, in 2000, petitioner had been arrested on the Cornell campus and charged with exposing himself and endangering the welfare of a child. He had pled guilty to disorderly conduct on that occasion.

These cumulative circumstances led the Cornell officials to issue a "Persona Non Grata" notice which prohibited his presence anywhere on the campus. This exclusionary order effectively ended his previously granted access to the Cornell nanoscience facility in Duffield Hall. The use of this facility, apparently, was important to his research work as an assistant professor in the Chemistry Department at Hamilton. Nevertheless, he acknowledged receipt of the order of exclusion without demur and made no effort to challenge the order.

The petitioner had declined to resign his post, following the informal resolution of the 2003 student complaint, as the College administration desired. However, when the Cornell information reached Hamilton, the institution's Vice President and Dean of Faculty resolved to initiate termination proceedings in accordance with the College Handbook. Disciplinary measures, in this context, could include termination if the tribunal determined that the faculty member was unfit in his professional capacity or in his "behavior as a member of the Hamilton Community". Any such finding would be submitted, as a recommendation, to the President. The decision of the President is final (Handbook, at Appendix A at section E, subd. 6).

The faculty tribunal issued its unanimous findings and recommendations after a three-day hearing in which both the College and petitioner were represented by counsel. The tribunal took note of a series of emails sent by petitioner to a female student in his class during the fall of 2002 which were sexually suggestive and persistent in seeking a personal relationship which she did not desire. The informal resolution, described above, was effected in June of 2003. The petitioner's apology recognized that his conduct had been improper and unprofessional. The tribunal agreed. Under these circumstances, the testimony of the complaining student was not necessary to corroborate the petitioner's own acknowledgments.

Next, the tribunal considered the 2000 and 2004 Cornell incidents. Much of the documentation regarding these events, if made available, might have encountered a hearsay objection if this proceeding had been conducted in a judicial forum. The faculty tribunal, of course, was not a judicial body. The Handbook expressly states that the rules of evidence "shall not apply" but may be considered as a guide. In the event, the Cornell records were not made available.

The conclusions of the tribunal regarding the two Cornell incidents were based largely upon the respondent's own evasive and obstructive answers to direct questions regarding the Helen Newman encounter in 2004 and the 2000 charge which resulted in a plea of guilty to disorderly conduct. LaGraff had described the 2000 incident as merely sunbathing in the nude in a "secluded" area in one of the gorges which run through the campus. We note, in passing, that [*3]the gorges are open to the entire University community and to large numbers of visitors, including children, on a daily basis. Cornell authorities would not disclose the contents of its records regarding the 2000 or 2004 incidents without a waiver which LaGraff declined to sign. The tribunal, presumably, interpreted his refusal as evasive, obstructive and inculpatory. Moreover, LaGraff's explanation of his presence on the Helen Newman terrace with filming equipment, well after sunset, could not have been persuasive.

Defendants, in a criminal proceeding, are entitled to plead the 5th Amendment and to refuse to answer any question which might incriminate them. No adverse inference may be drawn from the invocation of the privilege. However, that privilege does not apply in a civil judicial proceeding and, certainly, would not apply in a college disciplinary hearing (New York Evidence Handbook, Martin, Capra & Rossi, at section 5.10.6). By 2005, the Cornell incidents had been closed and petitioner could not have been exposed to further criminal liability by signing the requested waivers or by answering questions on the subject. Since petitioner had no reasonable fear of prosecution, the privilege was not available. In consequence, the tribunal was free to draw any adverse inference from petitioner's refusals which common sense would suggest (Marine Midland Bank v John E. Russo Produce Co., 50 NY2d 31, 42-43).

Decisions of this kind, taken by faculties and the executive officers of educational institutions, regarding academic qualifications and continued good standing in the community of scholars, are entitled to a considerable degree of judicial deference. Maas v Cornell University, 94 NY2d 87, at p. 92, reiterates that "...the administrative decisions of educational institutions involve the exercise of highly specialized professional judgment and these institutions are...better suited to make relatively final decisions concerning wholly internal matters...". The Maas case did not involve the academic qualifications of the accused professor who enjoyed a high professional reputation in his field. That proceeding, as this one, turned on the propriety of the professor's conduct with certain female students. In short, the doctrine of judicial deference, explicated by the Court of Appeals in Mass, extends to issues of conduct and behavior as fully as decisions regarding appointment, renewal or termination based on academic quality and performance.

In sum, the tribunal made a rational judgment, supported by evidence in the record, that LaGraff was not credible and that inculpatory inferences were permissible and sufficient to conclude that his behavior made him unfit to continue as a member of the Hamilton College community. The president was well within the discretion permitted to academic authorities on issues of this kind.

The petition is dismissed with prejudice. This constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the court.

__________________________________

Walter J. Relihan, Jr.

Justice, Supreme Court

cc:Nancy Joch, Chief Clerk

[*4]



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