Stracar Med. Servs., P.C. v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp.

[*1] Stracar Med. Servs., P.C. v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. 2005 NY Slip Op 51987(U) [10 Misc 3d 1056(A)] Decided on December 7, 2005 Civil Court, Kings County Nadelson, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on December 7, 2005
Civil Court, Kings County

Stracar Medical Services, P.C., as assignee of Jesus Rivera, Plaintiff,

against

Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, Defendant.



103898/04

Eileen N. Nadelson, J.

This action arose out of a claim for recovery of No-Fault benefits in accordance with New York's No-Fault Insurance law. Insurance Law section 5100 et seq. The services were allegedly rendered by Plaintiff to its assignor from June 23, 1998 through January 20, 1999. The present action was commenced by service of a Summons and Complaint dated September 23, 2004. As a defense to this action, Defendant asserted, inter alia, that the action was filed after the expiration of the appropriate Statute of Limitations. This defense also forms the basis of its present cross-motion.

Defendant, the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) is a statutorily-created entity whose purpose is to provide innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents recompense for the injury and financial loss inflicted upon them, through no fault of their own, by unidentified motor vehicles which leave the scene of the accident. Insurance Law sec. 5201(b)(2). Salas v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 2004 NY Slip Op. 50806U, 4 Misc 3d 1010A (Kings County 2004). The procedures for commencing an action against MVAIC appear in section 5218(a) of the Insurance law, but the statute is silent on the [*2]applicable Statute of Limitations to be applied to the commencement of such actions.

Plaintiff contends that the appropriate statutory period for initiating suits against MVAIC should be the six-year period permitted under section 213 of the CPLR, for actions based upon a contractual obligation (213(2)) or for actions for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law (213(1)). As support for this contention, Plaintiff cites DeLuca v. MVAIC, 17 NY2d 76, 268 NYS2d 289 (1966), in which the Court of Appeals held that the six-year Statute of Limitations was applicable because the nature of the claim was based on an insurance policy and therefore was contractually founded. However, that decision is forty-years old and more recent courts have found that a different statutory period applies for filing suit against MVAIC. It should also be noted that in the instant case, unlike the situation in DeLuca, there is no operative insurance policy.

Section 214 of the CPLR states that the following actions must be commenced within three years:

...

2. an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created

or imposed by statute...

5. an action to recover damages for personal injury

In 1993 and 1994, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Second Department asserted that the correct Statute of Limitations period for suits against MVAIC was three years. In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 198 AD2d 358, 604 NYS2d 119 (2d Dept. 1993), the plaintiff denied benefits and so MVAIC was required to reimburse the injured party. MVAIC subsequently challenged Nationwide's denial. In the action to determine whether arbitration proceedings tolled the Statute of Limitations, the court concluded that "the three-year Statute of Limitations is applicable because MVAIC's claims fall under the principle of subrogation.

In Betances v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 210 AD2d 475, 620 NYS2d 835 (2d Dept. 1994), the court denied the petitioner's request for an order granting leave to being an action against MVAIC, and based its denial on the fact that the application was made almost six years after the date of the accident, and was "thus beyond the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations for personal injury actions."

The seminal case in determining the correct Statute of Limitations period for suits against MVAIC is Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation v. Aetna casualty & Surety Company, 89 NY2d 214, 652 NYS2d 584 (1996). In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the Court of Appeals stated that

MVAIC's obligation to pay no-fault benefits to an injured party where the

accident vehicle's insurer denies such coverage is purely statutory under the [*3]

no-fault scheme. MVAIC itself is a statutory creation ... and the rights

conferred upon it under articels 51 and 52 of the Insurance Law... arise only

by statutory enactment or departmental regulations.... Hence, the three-year

Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214[2]) applies.

In Vasquez v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 272 AD2d 275, 708 NYS2d 99 (1st Dept. 2000), the court alluded to the three-year Statute of Limitations for filing claims against MVAIC when it stated that the plaintiff sought leave to sue MVAIC, as required by the Insurance Law, six days before the expiration of the three-year Statute of Limitations [emphasis added].

Most recently, the court in In Line Chiropractic, P.C. aao Demond Webb v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 2005 NY Slip Op. 50275U, 800 NYS2d 345 (Bronx County 2005), stated that there is no dispute that the three-year Statute of Limitations is applicable to the situation in which MVAIC is sued for first-party benefits under the No-Fault law.

Based on the foregoing, this court holds that the appropriate Statute of Limitations for bringing actions against MVAIC is three years, pursuant to the provisions of CPLR 214. Therefore, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is hereby deemed moot.

This constitutes the decision and the order of the court.

Dated: December 7, 2005

__________________________

EILEEN N. NADELSON, J.C.C.