People v Smith
Annotate this CaseDecided on July 25, 2005
Supreme Court, Bronx County
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
against
TINA SMITH, Defendant.
2729/03
Joseph Fisch, J.
The defendant, indicted for Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree and related charges, moves to suppress physical evidence, statement testimony and challenges the validity of her arrest. Based upon the evidence adduced at the Mapp-Huntley-Dunaway hearing, the motion to suppress is GRANTED.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The People called one witness, Detective Robert C. Rodriguez, whom the Court finds credible. The defense called no witnesses.
Detective Rodriguez, assigned to the Regional Fugitive Task Force, a unit responsible for locating fugitives wanted on federal and state warrrants, was assigned on May 23, 2003 to execute a bench warrant issued for an individual by the name of Keith Pringle. The warrant was issued in 1999 when Pringle failed to appear in court on a case stemming from a 1998 arrest. Rodriguez testified that the address on the warrant, 4212 Monticello Avenue, Apartment 2, Bronx, New York, had been provided by Pringle at the time of his arrest in 1998. The warrant was not produced at the hearing.
Prior to arrival at the address on the warrant, Rodriguez checked several databases from the New York City Police Department in an effort to obtain updated information about Pringle. In addition, he ran a check with the various Criminal Justice systems to ascertain if Pringle had a recent arrest, was incarcerated or was a recidivist. No information was obtained from any of these databases. Rodriguez also checked the automated warrant system and the CRIMS Court System to verify that the warrant was still active and that it had not been assigned to another investigator. No investigation was conducted with the New York [*2]City Housing Authority to determine if Pringle was living in a housing authority location, and no effort was made to obtain current information on Pringle from other agencies, such as the Department of Motor Vehicles, Department of Welfare or Social Services. Rodriguez never spoke with neighbors, nor checked the name on the mailbox, doorbell, Postal authorities, or the delivered mail, to determine if Pringle resided at the location. In summary, the only information Rodriguez had was a 5-year old address provided by the fugitive which address had never been verified.
On May 23, 2003, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Rodriguez and his partners, Sergeant Thomas Barrett, Detectives Kevin Spellman , Luis Pena and another detective proceeded to the address provided in 1998 by Keith Pringle, 4212 Monticello Avenue, Apartment 2, which appeared from the outside to be a single family detached home. Pena and another detective covered the rear and side of the building while Rodriguez, Barrett and Spellman walked up the stoop, opening an unlocked screen door which led to an inner entry door to the home. Beyond this inner door was a common hallway with a set of stairs leading to a second floor, and a door toward the rear of the vestibule area. Rodriguez and his partners opened the inner door which was unlocked and entered the vestibule. As Rodriguez ascended the steps he saw light underneath the apartment door on the second floor, heard a television set playing and further heard people running in the apartment from one side to the other. As Rodriguez observed movement underneath the door, he received a radio transmission from Pena reporting that he observed a window shade move from side to side and saw the shadow of a person looking out the window. Rodriguez and his partners waited on the stairs and listened but the noise ceased. As they continued to the top step, Rodriguez again heard movements and then quiet. Rodriguez knocked on the door and stated "Police, come to the door, police." After hearing no response, Rodriguez banged on the door and in a louder voice stated "Police, police, open the door, open the door." Once again there was no response. This led Rodriguez to conclude that the subject of the bench warrant, Pringle was hiding in the house.
Rodriguez and his partners decided to enter the apartment. Rodriguez turned the knob on the inner door, which was unlocked, pushing the door all the way open. He began to yell in a loud voice for whomever was in the house to come forward. Rodriguez continued to identify himself as "the police," but nobody responded.
Once inside, Rodriguez and his partners conducted a "protective sweep," systematically searching the apartment to determine who was present. They began in the kitchen, then entered the living room where a young girl, approximately 10 to 11 years of age was discovered hiding behind the couch. After informing the officers that the only other person in the apartment was a young boy, the girl was removed from the apartment and the detectives continued their search of two adjoining bedrooms. There was a closet whose door was closed in the first bedroom, and when Rodriguez turned the knob, the door would not open, it appearing that someone inside was holding the door knob. Pursuant to Rodriguez's order to come out, a little boy exited the closet and when asked, told the detectives that no [*3]one else was present in the apartment. Rodriguez then proceeded to the second bedroom where he observed a television containing a surveillance camera displaying the entry way of the house, further leading him to believe that Pringle was in the apartment. After checking under the bed, Rodriguez proceeded to the closet in this second bedroom where he observed a shopping bag in front of the closet door. As Rodriguez moved the bag aside to open the closet, he saw that it contained two large zip loc bags of marijuana. There was no one inside the closet.
Upon completion of the "protective sweep" of the apartment, Rodriguez and his partners brought the young girl and boy back upstairs, and Rodriguez returned to the second bedroom where the shopping bag containing the marijuana was retrieved. A search of the shopping bag revealed a large zip loc bag of cocaine in addition to the two zip loc bags of marijuana. While the detectives were speaking to the two children, one of them requested to call their mother, Tina Smith, whom they said also lived in the apartment. The call was made and Rodriguez and the child spoke to her. Rodriguez told Smith they were there to execute a warrant for Keith Pringle, discovered the children home alone, and advised Smith that she should come home.
Shortly after this phone conversation a woman, identifying herself as Donna Barnes, arrived and spoke with detectives outside and requested to come upstairs. Although she identified herself as a friend of Tina Smith, she was denied access because she was not the mother, nor an occupant of the apartment. After the detectives explained to Barnes that they found the children alone while executing the warrant for Pringle, she made a call to an individual believed to be Smith, stating "It's okay. Everything is okay. They just here about the kids." Within a few minutes, another car arrived and a woman exited the vehicle, identified herself to Rodriguez as Tina Smith and acknowledged that she lived in the apartment. Smith was escorted upstairs to the apartment, where after a request for identification, she provided the detectives with a copy of her license, bearing her name and address, 4212 Monticello Avenue, Apartment 2, Bronx, New York. Smith was then placed under arrest and the drugs were vouchered as arrest evidence. At the precinct the defendant once again provided her name and address in response to pedigree questions asked during the arrest processing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The primary issue to be determined is whether or not the police entry into the apartment of the defendant was legal. It has consistently been held that entry into a home to conduct a search or make an arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, (1948). Exigent circumstances and consent constitute exceptions to the warrant requirement and thereby permit entry without a warrant. A bench warrant, which is the equivalent of an arrest warrant, permits entry into what the police reasonably believe to be the suspect's residence provided that at the time of entry the police reasonably believe that the suspect is present. U.S. v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, (2000), U. S. v Risse, 83 F.3d 212, [*4](1996 ). A law enforcement officer cannot legally search, without a search warrant, for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party. When an arrest warrant is executed without a search warrant, any evidence of other crimes recovered within the residence may not be used against a person with a privacy interest in the home. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, (1981).
In the instant case, Rodriguez was executing a bench warrant for Keith Pringle at the time he entered defendant's apartment and discovered evidence of a criminal nature. The defendant, who maintained a privacy interest in the apartment was placed under arrest and charged with possession of the illegal drugs recovered.
The Court must determine if the arrest warrant for Pringle justifies the entry and search in the home of the defendant. The facts in the instant case are somewhat analogous to the facts in Steagald. In Steagald, the officers knowingly relied on a warrant issued for an individual by the name of Lyons to enter the home of a third party, while in the instant case the apartment, first believed to belong to the suspect, was discovered to be that of a third party. The United States Supreme Court held in Steagald,that "absent exigent circumstances or consent, law enforcement officer could not legally search for subject of arrest warrant in home of third party, without first obtaining search warrant." Id at 214. Although the Court held that an arrest warrant did not authorize the search of a third party's home, the Court did recognize the principles enunciated in Payton. The Court held in Payton that an arrest warrant permits an officer to enter a residence provided that they reasonably believe it belongs to the suspect and they reasonably believe the suspect is present at the time they enter. These two prongs must be satisfied in order for the entry to be legal.
It is undisputed that the detectives did not have a search warrant for the home of the defendant which would justify their entry and search of the apartment, and that they entered said apartment solely on the basis of the bench warrant for Keith Pringle. The issue therefore, is whether the actions and beliefs of the detectives were reasonable and thereby justify their entry into the apartment.
Determinations of reasonable belief are based upon "the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents." U.S. v Magluta, 44 F 3d 1530, 1535 (11th cir. 1995). In order for a belief to be reasonable one must consider all of the information possessed by the law enforcement officer at the time the warrant is executed as well as the age of the information. "No mechanical test exists for determining when information becomes fatally stale." Rather " ' staleness is an issue which must be decided on the peculiar facts of each case.'" U.S. v. Bascaro, 742 F 2d 1335, 1345 (11th cir. 1984) quoting U.S. v. Hyde, 574 F 2d 856, 865 (5th cir. 1978) A court should consider the length of time between when the information was obtained and the time the warrant was executed, the nature of the crime for which the warrant was ordered, habits of the accused, character of items sought, and nature and function of the premises to be searched. U.S. v Harris, 20 F3d 445, 450 (1994)
The evidence established that Rodriguez and his partners were executing a bench [*5]warrant that was issued in 1999 on a 1998 arrest for an individual named Keith Pringle. The address on the warrant was provided by Pringle when he was arrested five years earlier, but never verified. Although Rodriguez conducted numerous checks through various law enforcement data bases, he was unable to obtain any updated or current information for Pringle. Rodriguez did not conduct any independent investigation of Pringle with other agencies such as the Department of Motor Vehicles, Department of Welfare or Social Services, but rather chose to rely entirely on law enforcement databases which failed to provide current information. Rodriguez testified that the only thing he discovered from these law enforcement data bases was that Pringle had not been rearrested and was not currently incarcerated. Rodriguez did not undertake any investigative effort to verify that Pringle still lived at the location. He did not visit the location prior to the execution of the warrant, did not speak to neighbors, check names on the mailbox or doorbell nor surveil the location to see if Pringle ever appeared there.
Based upon the limited and five-year old information in his possession, Rodriguez concluded that Pringle still resided at 4212 Monticello Avenue, Apartment 2. Rodriguez testified that when he went to execute the warrant he heard noise as he climbed the stairs which then stopped. He then received a transmission from his partner that someone was looking out of the window. Additionally, Rodriguez discovered a surveillance monitor inside of the bedroom which displayed the entry way of the apartment. According to his testimony, all of these factors led him to conclude it was Pringle in the apartment. However, these same factors could reasonably lead to the belief that some other individual may have feared the unexpected arrival of the police to their home at 1:30 in the morning, and was hiding inside. Rodriguez conceded he did not conclude Pringle was in the apartment until he ascended the steps and actually entered the apartment to execute the warrant.
The Court holds that it was not reasonable for Rodriguez to believe that the apartment belonged to Pringle, nor that he was in the location at the time the warrant was executed. Having failed to satisfy both prongs, possessing a reasonable belief it was the dwelling of the subject and a reasonable belief the subject would be there at the time the warrant was executed, entry into the dwelling of the defendant was not valid in the absence of a search warrant for the location. Accordingly, all evidence stemming from the illegal entry, i.e. marijuana, cocaine and statements by the defendant must be suppressed.
The defendant's motion to suppress is GRANTED.
The foregoing shall constitute the decision and order of the Court.
Dated:
Honorable Joseph Fisch
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